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Abstract 
The main aim of this thesis is to introduce a new way of thinking about security 
within International Relations by developing a model that can be used to explain the 
relationship between terrorism and organised crime. Referred to as the crime-terror 
continuum (CTC), the model identifies six major points of convergence between the 
terrorist and criminal worlds. The crime-terror continuum seeks to move away from 
the traditional confines of International Relations as encapsulated within realist 
thought. After providing an overview of the limitations of traditional theories, and a 
working definition of terrorism and organised crime, this thesis applies an alternative 
conceptual framework - based on a combination of applicable assumptions about 
security presented by the Copenhagen School, Ken Booth and Mohammed Ayoob - to 
an understanding of the threats posed by terrorism and organised crime. It also 
incorporates the understanding of the contemporary security environment provided by 
the globalisation and netwar proto-paradigms as a way to go beyond debates about 
concepts by seeking to understand the operational and organisational dynamics of 
contemporary security threats. Paying special attention to the argument that non-state 
actors can be equal to state actors in the security domain, this thesis highlights that 
competition over state functions and territory continues to play an integral role. The 
alternative view of security and the CTC are subsequently applied to two case studies: 
Russian Organised Crime and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Despite 
illustrating different aspects of the CTC, these case studies highlight the ability of the 
conceptual framework and the CTC to explain and understand the post-Cold War 
security environment. 
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Introduction 
Within popular Western culture, the saying: 'money makes the world go around' is 
often used to reflect the perception that an innate relationship exists between money, 
power and influence. Related to the study of International Relations, and more 
specifically International Security, these concepts and the relationship between them 
are widely debated. Therefore, unlike the general public's acceptance that these ideas 
are interdependent, universal conclusions have not been reached within academic 
discourse. In fact, it is often the case that money and power, and subsequently 
political influence, are treated as distinctly independent phenomena. Applied to the 
context of 'security' this perception is reflected in the fact that politically-motivated 
activities are commonly isolated from activities driven by profit-maximisation. The 
academic norm has therefore been to treat studies of conflict (including terrorism) 
separately from that of organised crime. In fact, organised crime has rarely been the 
focus of discourse within International Relations because it has been historically 
classified as a law enforcement problem, and not a problem of national or 
international security. 
It is the absence of detailed studies combining economic and political motivations for 
conflict that form the overarching impetus for this thesis. This, however, is coloured 
by debates about the role of the state in the post-Cold War environment. With 
evidence pointing to the expanding role and influence of non-state actors, limiting 
investigations about economic and political motivations for conflict to state actors 
fails to provide an accurate picture of security as it exists at the start of the twenty- 
first century. The main research questions I therefore pose are: is there a nexus 
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between organised crime and terrorism, and if there is, what are the implications for 
our understanding of security? In other words, can the inclusion of organised crime 
and terrorism within debates about security contribute to the development of a more 
accurate and flexible understanding than that which is offered by traditional 
approaches? 
As with any political or military activity, it is self-evident that terrorist groups require 
funding in order to coordinate and perpetrate acts of terrorism. Although there are 
numerous sources of revenue from which terrorist groups can accrue support (i. e. 
donations and state sponsorship), the post Cold-War environment has facilitated 
access to criminal activities. At the same time, instability in politically weak states 
throughout the world has produced an environment in which organised crime has 
found it beneficial to enter the political realm. As a result, it may be preliminarily 
concluded that the international environment has created a predicament in which the 
use of terror tactics and organised crime by non-state actors has become so prevalent 
that pinpointing a group's motivations or aims is an increasingly complex task. In 
other words the interaction between political dynamics (i. e. control over state 
functions) and personal dynamics (i. e. profit maximisation) has resulted in blurred 
distinctions about the nature of 21" century security threats primarily because the 
threats that emerge from both have proven to undermine the stability of sovereign 
states. 
My own personal interest in the relationship between organised crime and terrorism, 
and the impact violent non-state actors had on international security emerged in 1992 
at the start of my undergraduate studies. Although I argued then that a distinct 
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relationship existed between terrorism and criminal activities, the degree of the extent 
of these relations remained a mystery as they were not addressed in any academic 
studies at the time (apart for Ehrenfeld, 1990). This question has therefore 
preoccupied my mind for 13 years, turning into a personal quest for evidence that 
either confirmed or refuted my early beliefs. It was this quest to understand how and 
why threats converge that inspired me to contribute my arguments to the existing 
literature on security, terrorism and organised crime. My goal was not solely to 
question the relevance of traditional approaches to these concepts, but to provide an 
alternative conceptual framework that gives an additional understanding of how they 
can be related to the post-Cold War environment. In addition to compiling theoretical 
components that are applicable to an explanation of the threats posed by non-state 
actors, I have sought to take a step further by building a model that illustrates the 
evolving nature of security by tracing the various types of relationships that exist 
between organised crime and terrorism. By doing this, my intention coincides with 
Robert Nisbet who wrote: 
Beyond a certain point, it is but a waste of time to seek tidy semantic 
justifications for concepts used by creative minds. The important and 
all-too-neglected task in philosophy and social theory is that of 
observing the ways in which abstract concepts are converted by their 
creators into methodologies and perspectives which provide new 
illuminations of the world. ' 
Methodology 
The inherent difficulties associated with researching security issues such as organised 
crime and terrorism reveals a need to reflect on the assumptions that underpin this 
individual research project. This is a valuable exercise precisely because it establishes 
research parameters that will be used to navigate through the complexities of this 
1 Robert Nisbet, Makers of Modem Social Science: Emile Durkheim (Englewood, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 39. 
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specific social world, while outlining potential weaknesses and strengths associated 
with studying this subject area. Based on this requirement, what follows is a summary 
of my position on questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology as they 
relate to my work. 
Beginning from a positivist perspective, reality exists independent of theory and 
therefore is merely awaiting observation. 2 Following this line of thinking it may be 
concluded that organised. crime and terrorism unquestionably exist within the social 
world, as with any other concept labelled by researchers. However, this is a very 
simplistic way of asserting the existence of these phenomena, and it does not provide 
answers to questions related to the nature of existence claims in this thesis. Given the 
nature and political use of the terms 'organised crime' and 'terrorism', the task of this 
thesis is not only to reveal their existence as threats in the security realm, but to be 
able to ascertain the difference between facts and illusions. For this reason, positivism 
does not necessarily provide a solid ontological framework. 
Adopting the approach of critical realists, there are three levels of reality in the 
context of my research: the empirical, actual, and real/deep. 3 As outlined by Smith, 
the empirical consists of perceptions, impressions and sensations; the actual consists 
of events and states of affairs; and the real/deep level encompasses structures, 
mechanisms and powers/liabilities. 4 This highlights the importance of various aspects 
in determining the nature of their existence. Making a distinction between these levels 
2 Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: an introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 64. 
3 Mark J. Smith, Social Science in Question (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 299. 
4 As outlined in Smith, 'states of affairs' refers to the normal conditions within which events take place, 
such as within the institutions of a liberal democracy. For a description of structures, mechanisms and 
powers/liabilities, see Ibid. 
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is thus necessary in order to build a complete understanding of the phenomenon in 
question. 
Based on this ontological understanding of reality, it could be argued that 'terrorism' 
exists as a 'real' social phenomenon. On the empirical level terrorism is defined by 
the perceptions, impressions and sensations experienced by society. Thus terrorism is 
partially defined by the fear and terror felt within a specific segment of society, or it 
may also be understood as a tool used by groups who have the impression that the use 
of terTor tactics are an effective means of attaining specific goals. Furthermore, after 
assessing numerous events that produce fear/terror within a society, another 
characteristic of terrorism may be uncovered. From this a definition of terrorism 
should include a reference to actions that are intended to produce fear/terror. On this 
level, without action terrorism cannot materialise. Finally on a real/deep ontological 
level of reality, terrorism does not disappear just because a specific group within 
society does not experience it on the first two levels. Generally speaking, this is 
because structures can exist independently of our knowledge of them, "structures are 
a property of being and not just a property of our discourse about being. "5 
Within this example, it is evident that a careful examination of each level of reality is 
capable of revealing how specific phenomena work and are understood. Furthermore, 
this ontological view of the nature of existence claims made within research is based 
on the assumption that perceptions and events are distinguishable. As Outhwaite 
wrote, "Realism is, then, a common-sense ontology, in the sense that it takes seriously 
5 Raymond A. Morrow and David D. Brown, Critical Theory and Methodolog (London: Sage 
Publications, 1994), p. 155. Although this is an oversimplified example, it does show the importance of 
the three levels of reality outlined by critical realism, for answering questions that relate to the nature 
of the existence of phenomena discussed in this thesis. 
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the existence of the things, structures and mechanisms revealed by the sciences at 
different levels of reality. "6 This ontological view is revealed throughout my research 
as I build an alternative understanding to security based on the threats posed by 
organised crime and terrorism. 
Aside from providing an answer to questions relating to 'what there is' in the social 
world, it is equally important to outline how this knowledge can be realised. For the 
most part, empiricism forms the basis of the epistemological claims made throughout 
this thesis. According to empiricists, knowledge is derived from experience; therefore 
what we know of the world ultimately comes from our senses. Knowledge is 
"regarded as representation - doubtless sometimes erroneous or incomplete - but a 
representation none the less, corresponding to the external world. 197 This position, 
however, does not completely represent the assumptions about knowledge present in 
this thesis. In order to overcome weaknesses of empiricist epistemology, elements of 
post-realism (i. e. critical realism) have been incorporated. For critical realists 
epistemology is not solely about a scientific method based on logic and empirical 
data, but reality can exist independently of our consciousness. Thus according to 
Morrow and Brown, "The continuously changing and diverse nature of scientific 
concepts and practices does not, therefore, call into question confidence in scientific 
knowledge because there is no need for concepts to correspond to reality in order to 
be justifiable. "8 
6 William Outhwaite, New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical The2a 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), p. 19. 
7 Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural 
Real ism (New York, Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 18 1. 
'Morrow and Brown (1994), p. 78. 
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Despite arguing that knowledge does not only come from experiences, the 
epistemology of empiricism takes precedence in this thesis. The study of organised 
crime and terrorism is, in a sense, dependent on the belief that there are 'facts' that 
can be gathered in the social world. More specifically, this thesis uses the definition of 
empiricism as a "conception of social research involving the production of accurate 
data - meticulous, precise, generalisable - in which the data themselves constitute an 
end for research. It is summed up by the catchphrase 'the facts speak for 
themselves'. "9 Research does not end here, but incorporates an understanding that 
knowledge also arrives from the interpretation of these 'facts'. This interpretation is 
based on an analysis of the historical context, paying attention to the importance time 
and space has for producing such knowledge claims. 
Following this thinking, knowledge about terrorism and organised crime emerges 
from a combination of human action, language, human practice, and the models of the 
world and society produced by societal actors. 10 Therefore "actions cannot be 
explained by statistics alone, "" however statistics provide the basis of any knowledge 
claim. Regardless of the epistemology used within specific research projects, although 
'facts' can be ascertained, Martyn Hammersley correctly pointed out that "we must 
recognise that absolute certainty is not available about anything. " 12 Although this 
truth is important to remember throughout the research process as a way of testing 
knowledge claims made, it does not present an obstacle to asserting the probabilities 
9 M. Bulmer, The Use of Social Research: Social Investigation in Public Policy-Making (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 31 as quoted in Tim May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and 
Process, 2 nd Edition (Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press, 1997), p. 11. 
10 Hollis (1994), p 144. 
11 Ibid., p. 183. 
12 Martyn Hammersley, The Politics of Social Research (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 17. 
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of knowledge being true. Bhaskar summarised the epistemology that underlies the 
research undertaken in this thesis when he wrote: 
Things exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can 
only know them under particular descriptions... Science ... is the 
systemic attempt to express in thought the structures and ways of 
acting of things that exist and act independently of thought. 13 
Finally, the methodology used to compile the arguments made in this thesis is based 
primarily on positivist accounts of methodology as tools used to identify regularities 
in the behaviours of research objects. Although this positivist foundation is made 
explicit in the following chapters, unlike positivist methodology, the underlying 
structures, forces and causal necessities are also taken into consideration. 14 ThiS is 
done by combining scientific methods with an understanding that the natural and 
social world operate differently. 
At a basic level, the research in this thesis follows five steps: the study of relevant 
information sources, formulating a hypothesis, developing a research design, 
collecting data, and analysing the data. 's More accurately the methodology used 
closely follows that which emerged from the work of Roy Bhaskar. Thus in line with 
Bhaskar's conception of scientific discovery, my research follows three steps. First, I 
identify and describe the convergence between organised crime and terrorism. 
Second, I construct various hypothetical mechanisms (i. e. the way in which the 
structure of an object can generate an observable event) which, if proven to exist, will 
explain why the crime-terror nexus poses a security threat. Third, I attempt to 
13 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 2 nd edition (Brighton: Harvester, 1978), p. 250. 
14 Positivism does not believe that underlying structures exist. 
15 Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research: the Unity and Diversity of Method (London: Pine 
Forge Press, 1994), p. 15. 
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demonstrate the existence and operation of the mechanisms through a combination of 
experimental activity and by eliminating alternative explanations. 16 
The specific research methods used in this thesis combine the analysis of information 
sources with case studies. Information sources (i. e. primary and secondary sources 
and statistics) are critical to advancing the epistemological claim that there is a 
convergence between organised crime and terrorism on various levels. Based on 
reading and analysing literature, press releases, news releases, and statistics from a 
variety of sources, the data required to support my hypothesis was collected and 
collated. I have not incorporated personal experiences of the events as they happen, 
but have instead focused on reading a combination of divergent sources about a single 
event. Subsequent analysis and observing linkages over time thus leads to efficient 
assessments of 'truth'. Unlike the empiricists' claim that facts speak for themselves, I 
also acknowledge the need to analyse written 'facts' based on their origin; thus 
accounting for propaganda and disinformation given the sensitive nature of both 
organised crime and terrorism in the post-Cold War world. 
With reference to the case studies chosen to illustrate the conceptual frameworks 
developed in this thesis, by presenting two distinct countries in very different regions 
of the world (i. e. the Former Soviet Union and South America), I illustrate that the 
relationship between organised crime and terrorism has become a characteristic of the 
post-Cold War security environment. Although the detailed logic for choosing each 
case study will be provided in Chapter Four and Five respectively, the comparative 
process that takes place within this thesis reveals that, despite regional differences, the 
16 Outhwaite (1987), p. 33. 
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object of this study can be tested on other cases throughout the world (i. e. in Africa, 
South Asia, and Southeast Asia). 
The philosophical underpinnings of this thesis are highly influenced by empiricism; 
however, it also relies on post-realist thought in order to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of the social phenomena that are being investigated. 
Although the arguments herein are based on assumptions that there are real, 
observable facts in the social world, they also acknowledge that these facts do not 
necessarily 'speak for themselves' as empiricists would have us believe. Instead, once 
certain facts are uncovered, they should be placed under scrutiny and judged 
according to the three ontological levels of reality discussed earlier. Given the nature 
of social science enquiry, weaknesses and criticisms can be pitted against the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological framework used in this thesis. 
However, confronting the assumptions that inevitably affect my research an 
understanding of how the evidence is treated in the following chapters is necessary 
because it allows the reader to 'see where I am coming from' and assess subsequent 
arguments from more common ground. Truth and knowledge are philosophical 
concepts that will never share widespread agreement; the social world presents a 
different experience for everyone in it. As such, as long as I know what I know, my 
research will add to the understanding of my world. 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One: The Limitations of Traditional Security Concepts and Mindsets is a 
literature review of traditional theories of International Relations, terrorism literature 
and literature on organised crime. The first part of the chapter begins by discussing 
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the changing context of the international security environment in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, focusing on the impact of globalisation. It continues by examining realism 
and neorealist assumptions about security, followed by providing a critique of these 
traditional approaches based on the new security environment. The chapter moves 
into assessing theories that have attempted to overcome realism's limitations, 
concentrating especially on the work of Barry Buzan. Finally, the chapter provides an 
overview of the literature on terrorism and organised crime, providing a working 
definition of each concept that will be applied within the parameters of the thesis. It 
concludes by noting the need for an alternative view of security that is capable of 
accounting for non-state security threats. 
Chapter Two: Reconceptualising Security., the Promise of Critical Security Studies 
explores contemporary theories and paradigms of International Relations that can 
contribute to an alternative security framework. The chapter begins with a discussion 
on critical security and post-realism, focusing on the work of the Copenhagen School, 
and Ken Booth and Mohammed Ayoob respectively. It continues by arguing that the 
globalisation and netwar proto-paradigms contribute to an understanding of post-Cold 
War security. This section primarily uses the work of James Mittelman, and John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. The second half of the chapter uses assumptions 
highlighted in the previous discussions to formulate an alternative theory of security 
that is subsequent applied to an explanation of how terrorism and organised crime 
pose security threats. 
Chapter Three: Explaining and Understanding the Crime-Terror Continuum builds 
on the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two by developing a new model 
that can be used to explain the relationship between terrorism and organised crime. 
Referred to as the crime-terror continuum in this thesis, the model identifies six major 
points of convergence between the terrorist and criminal worlds. After presenting an 
overview of literature that has sought to introduce an understanding of the 
convergence between these two phenomena, the model is introduced and each point is 
explained with the aid of contemporary illustrative examples. The crime-teffor 
continuum seeks to move away from the traditional confines of International Security 
Studies, and thus reveals how the key limitations of traditional theory can be 
overcome. 
Chapter Four., (Re)Establishing Power Yhrough Terror- The Hybrid Nature of 
Russian Organised Crime is the first of two case studies used to test the conceptual 
framework and utility of the crime-terror continuum in explaining and understanding 
threat as they have come to exist in the post-Cold War security environment. This 
chapter begins with a historical account of the nature of organised crime in the Soviet 
Union, followed by a discussion of how the end of the Cold War impacted organised 
crime in the context of the Russian Federation. The chapter proceeds by providing 
evidence from the activities of Russian organise crime that illustrate various points of 
the crime-terror continuum, beginning with alliances, but focusing on Russian 
organised crime's adoption of terror tactics for operational purposes. It concludes by 
arguing why Russian organised crime should be considered a hybrid (i. e. 
simultaneously criminal and terrorist) entity. Throughout the chapter, the relevance of 
the alternative security framework in explaining the threat posed by Russian 
organised crime is highlighted. 
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Chapter Five: Travelling the Length of the CTC: the Evolving Nature of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia from Terror Group to Criminal 
Organisation is the second case study that is also used to test the utility of the 
conceptual framework and crime-terror continuum developed in Chapter's Two and 
Three, respectively. This chapter, however, illustrates the full potential of the crime- 
terror continuum because the example of FARC reveals how an entity situation on 
one of the continuum (i. e. a traditionally defined terrorist group) can evolve into an 
entity situated at the opposite end of the continuum (i. e. organised crime group). The 
chapter predominantly charts the evolution of FARC, highlighting how the group 
illustrates each point of the continuum, from entertaining alliances, using organised 
crime for operational purposes, to focusing on organised crime as their a priori 
motivation. As with Chapter Four, the alternative view of security developed in 
Chapter Two is also incorporated into this case study to show how the relationship 
between organised crime and terrorism in Colombia pose a formidable security threat. 
The concluding chapter The Crime-Terror Continuum as a Model of 21" Century 
Security provides a broader analysis of the conceptual frameworks developed in the 
thesis, while highlighting how the case studies provided contextual illustrations. It 
argues that a new approach to security that regards non-state and state actors equally, 
while affirming the continued importance of the state primarily because it remains the 
focus of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The chapter concludes by highlighting the 
importance of the crime-terror continuum outside of an academic/theoretical context, 




The Limitations of Traditional Security Concepts and Mindsets 
Changes taking place within international society and the international system since 
1989 have challenged the dominant understanding of security which has tenaciously 
focused on 'traditional' theories of International Relations that gained authority during 
the Cold War period. Unfortunately, it took academics some time before they 
recognised that the meaning of security had evolved significantly. In fact, it may be 
concluded that state officials were among the first who publicly commented about 
emerging non-military security threats such as environmental degradation, 
uncontrolled migration, terrorism and organised crime. An indication of this 
recognition of the evolution in security threats in the post-Cold War world is 
illustrated in a quote released by an official of the U. S. State Department in 1997: 
Foreign policy as we have known it is dead ... because it is no longer foreign. The world has invaded us and we have invaded it ... The distinctions between domestic and foreign are gone. Look at the 
issues: The principal preoccupation of Americans is on drugs and 
crime. And the fight against drugs and crime has major international 
components. Our stolen cars end up in El Salvador or Guatemala, or 
Poland. Our drugs come from Peru or Pakistan or Burma or elsewhere 
and transit almost anywhere. Crime cartels spread tentacles from 
Nigeria or Russia or Colombia. Today it is inconceivable to consider a 
coordinated attack on crime without working a part of the strategy in 
the international arena. -International terrorism has reached our 
shores .... We cannot deal with the threats to our environment, to 
assaults on biodiversity with domestic policy. Ozone layer depletion 
and global warming cannot be addressed by domestic environmental 
regulations alone. Over and over again we find issues that are domestic 
in consequence but international 
I 
in scope. These are the consuming 
issues of the twenty-first century. 
1 Craig Johnstone, Director of the Off ice or Resources, Plans, and Policy at the U. S. State Department, 
"Strategic Planning and International Affairs in the 21' Century"Y address to the Conference Series on 
International Affairs in the 21' Century, U. S. Department of State, Washington D. C., 18 November 
1997, as quoted in Maryann K. Cusimano, "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign 
Problems, " in Maryann Cusimano, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, (Belmont, 
CA: WadsworthGroup/Thompson Learning, 2000), p. 7. 
14 
This disjuncture between academia and the policy world not only reveals changing 
threat perceptions, but changing attitudes about the nature of security threats and 
security itself 
The impetus to rethink the concept of security has primarily emerged as a result of 
two factors. First is the growing importance of globalisation and the pressures it 
produces on states, communities, and individuals. The general result of globalisation 
is that world politics has increasingly become interdependent through a series of 
events, ideas, institutions and decisions. 3 Second, the end of the Cold War and the 
subsequent demise of the Soviet Union uncovered a plethora of issues previously 
overshadowed by balance of power politics. This emerging environment has had 
unforeseen implications that have raised questions about the way academics and 
policy-makers understand security. For example, the centrality of the state is regularly 
challenged; non-state actors have, in many countries, acquired a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence -a privilege once held solely by the state; and, 
international politics are increasingly dictated by intra-state and regional conflicts. 
Having significantly affected most sovereign states, it may be concluded that these 
phenomena have simultaneously altered the international security environment. Not 
only is the international community faced with an overabundance of domestic security 
threats, but the changing international environment has also given rise to an explosive 
'Molotov cocktail', 4 turning the new global security agenda into a subject of particular 
concern. Among the most challenging and worrying threats to emerge from the post- 
2 Paul Stares (ed), The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey. (Tokyo, New York: Japan Center for 
International Exchange, 1998), p. 11. 
3 Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Tnterest. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 8. 
4 Sergei Medvedev, "Former Soviet Union, " in Paul B. Stares, The New Security Agenda: A Global 
Survey. (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p. 75. 
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Cold War security environment has been a combination of terrorist and criminal 
activity, which has evolved with the growing prevalence of weak and failing states. 
In light of this predicament, the aim of this chapter is to highlight the inadequacy of 
'old' ways of thinking about security in a 'new' international environment. To begin 
with, the inter-related processes of globalisation and the end of the Cold War will be 
introduced as the dominant factors responsible for transforming national and 
international structures and processes. Against this background it will be argued that 
little has been done within the academic discipline of International Relations - 
specifically International Security Studies - to adapt the understanding of security to 
meet these new challenges. Furthermore, overshadowed by Cold War dynamics and 
largely ignored within contemporary security literature, terrorism and organised crime 
will be introduced as two security threats that merit special attention within the 
evolving international environment. As is the case with the study of international 
security, however, the dominant literatures which focus on terrorism and organised 
crime have so far failed to Produce an adequate response to the changes that have 
emerged from the process of globalisation and the end of the Cold War. Despite their 
shortcomings, recent attempts made within academia to address security, terrorism 
and organised crime in the changing international security context will be introduced. 
This chapter argues that traditional mindsets are no longer capable of explaining or 
understanding the security threats which individuals, states, regions and the 
international system currently face. In order to understand twenty-first century 
security, the concept of security itself must be reconceptualised. Unlike the Cold War 
era when security threats were easily identifiable, in the post-Cold War environment it 
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is increasingly difficult to differentiate the origin and motivation driving various 
security threats. In fact, most regions of the world experience hybrid threats 
emanating from a combination of para-military groups, terrorists, criminal 
5 
organisations, regular military forces, mercenaries and private military companies. 
The Changing International Security Environment 
Although the concept of 'globalisation' emerged in the 1980s, it was not until the 
1990s that it became a term widely-utilised by policy-makers, academics and the 
popular media to describe the spread of ideas, culture, and commercial products 
throughout the world. Regardless of whether the process of globalisation began at "the 
dawn of history" 6 or more recently as a phenomenon "unprecedented in history", 7 its 
significance for the purposes of this thesis is in its contemporary impact. A general 
overview of both globalisation and more specifically, globalisation in the context of 
the post-Cold War period will reveal that the environment in which people and states 
operate has fundamentally changed. For example, these historical processes have 
directly challenged the primacy of the state, and they have given rise to a host of new 
justifications for the emergence of inter-state and intra-state conflict. In addition to 
assessing the evolving post-Cold War security environment, the following section will 
highlight the trends which are responsible for calling traditional ways of thinking 
about security, terrorism and organised crime into question. 
5 Mary Kaldor, "Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control, " 
http: //www. ssrc. org/septl I/essays/kaldor - 
text 
- 
only. htm (downloaded 26 July 2002), p. 3. 
6 Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 4. Roland Robertson, 
Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, (London: Sage, 1992) and Jan Aart Scholte, 
Globalization: a critical introduction, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000) also treat globalisation 
as a historical process. The idea that globalisation is a timeless concept, however, is not accepted by 
everyone writing about the subject, for example Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence 




The term 'globalisation' has been used in numerous contexts, and has been defined in 
several ways. Although a universally-accepted definition of the term does not exist, 
Jan Aart Scholte has perceptively argued that most existing definitions of 
globalisation can be divided into five broad categories. 
8 The first category includes 
the most straightforward definitions that describe globalisation simply as cross-border 
relations that emerge from the growth in international exchange and interdependence. 
9 
Second, globalisation has been used synonymously with liberalisation, or the "process 
of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in 
order to create an 'open', 'borderless' world economy. "10 Extending this idea that 
globalisation is solely about economic integration, the third category equates 
globalisation with universalisation, or the process by which the same objects (i. e. 
automobiles, fashion) and experiences (i. e. decolonisation) are spread throughout the 
world. Fourth, globalisation has often been defined as westernisation or 
modernisation. 11 This definition of globalisation focuses on the universal spread of 
predominantly Western ideas such as capitalism, democratisation, rationalism, and 
industrialism. 12 Finally, globalisation is often regarded as deterritorialisation, or the 
"reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in 
, 03 terms of territorial places, territorial distances, and territorial borders. Initially 
attributed to advances in communications and transportation technology, this 
8 Scholte (2000). 
9 This understanding of globalisation has been advanced by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 
Globalization in Question: the International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996). 
10 Scholte (2000), pp. 15-16. 
11 Globalisation as westernization is argued by authors including: H. I. Schiller, "Not Yet the Post- 
Imperialist Era, " Critical Studies in Mass Communications vol. 8, no. I (March 1991), pp. 13-28; T. 
Spybey, Globalization and World Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); and P. J. Taylor, "Izations 
of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization, " in C. Hay and D. Marsh, eds., 
Demystifying Globalization, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 49-70. 
12 Ibid., p. 16. 
13 Ibid. This aspect of globalisation has been advanced by David Held and Antony McGrew, 
"Globalisation and the Liberal Democratic State, " Government and Opposition, vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 
1993), pp. 261-85; and Leander (2001,2002). 
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interpretation of globalisation as the process of breaking down territorial boundaries 
through integration also presumes that the shrinking of social and political space has 
subsequently threatened the primacy of the Westphalian 14 nation-state. 
Regardless of the focus taken in defining globalisation, it may be concluded that, 
although globalisation has often resulted in "presenting opportunities and benefits to 
many, it has also brought new risks and costs. " 15 Among the most serious 
consequences of globalisation for international security is the resulting diminution of 
state legitimacy and the state's capacity to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence where a sovereign state is granted the sole authority over the use of 
force within its borders, and externally to protect the territorial integrity of the state. ' 6 
In an international system which continues to place priority on states and the 
maintenance of state control by state actors, globalisation has introduced an 
environment characterised by competition for control over the state by non-state 
actors. Historically state control was challenged by external states and groups of 
legitimate internal actors (i. e. the military), as exemplified in coup d'6tats and the 
creation of empires. Increasingly, however, states are being challenged by non-state 
actors, including terrorist and criminal groups, which have taken advantage of the 
benefits and opportunities presented to them through globalisation. 
14 The Westphalian state refers to the modem state system that emerged from the signing of the Treaty 
of Westphalia in 1648. Integral to the Westphalian state system is the notion that the international 
community is composed of sovereign state actors. For arguments focusing on the decline of the 
Westphalian state, see, Caporaso, ed., International Studies Review vol. 2, no. 2 (2000), special issue: 
Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order; and, Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: the 
Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
15 Stares (1998), p. 12. 
16 Anna Leander, "Globalisation and the Eroding State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence, " 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper, No. 24, (2001). 
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As a point of clarification, and because the term &non-state' actors is frequently 
referred to throughout this thesis, a working definition is necessary. Non-state actors 
generally refer to a group of actors that are independent from the state and from state 
authority. More specifically, non-state actors are organisations: 
largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and 
control; emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or 
from political impulses beyond state control and direction; operating 
as or participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of 
two or more states - thus engaging in 'transnational' relations, linking 
political system, economies, societies; acting in ways which affect 
political outcomes, either within one or more states or within 
international institutions - either purposefully or semi-purposefully, 
either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities. 17 
On a primarily political level, phenomena such as terrorism and organised crime have 
developed to such an extent that they are beyond the capacity of states to deal with 
through traditional diplomacy. These phenomena are transnational in nature, and thus 
necessitate a coordinated, multinational and multifaceted response. Furthermore 
international society is witnessing the spill-over of problems across state borders (i. e. 
the cross-border movement of refugees and illicit smuggling networks); the 
interrelationship of political-economic phenomena (i. e. the linkage between hunger, 
overpopulation, deforestation, the greenhouse effect, and regional conflict); and, the 
growing number and importance of transnational movements and institutions that 
have emerged in response to globalisation. 18 Some of these non-state actors have 
played an important role in bringing non-traditional security threats, such as 
environmental degradation, onto the political agenda of state actors. ' 9 However, there 
17 Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, "Non-State Actors in World Politics: a Framework, " in 
Josselin and Wallace, eds. Non-State Actors in World Politics, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
and New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 3-4. 
" Gurtov (199 1), pp. 9-11. 
'9 In terms of bringing environmental issues on political agendas, the work of Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace has met with sporadic success. For an overview of how environmental pressure groups and 
non-governmental organizations have introduced environmental issues into the political realm, see: 
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are also non-state actors which, by embracing the various dynamics of globalisation 
specifically referred to below, now pose one of the most serious challenges to 
international security. 
Since the 1960s technological breakthroughs have accelerated the growth of 
international transfers of money, labour and information. As a result of this 'shrinking 
financial world', regional actors (such as the Association of South East Asian Nations, 
the North American Free Trade Association, and the European Union) emerged to 
consolidate the integration of economic activities, thus building entities with varied 
sources of political strength and economic vitality. 20 Despite growing trends towards 
international economic integration, it was not until the 1980s that structural changes 
emerged to produce what is commonly referred to as the period of economic 
globalisation. In essence, the free movement of capital deepened what Mittleman 
labels "commodified forms of political and social integrations". 21 Thus not only could 
production be transferred globally in order to reduce costs and thereby to drive out 
competitors, but the frequent relocation of production simultaneously globalised the 
distribution of commodities and raised consumption patterns in many parts of the 
world. 
The globalisation of trade and investment was initially welcomed as a phenomenon 
that could redistribute wealth globally, however it was not long before the effects of 
globalisation revealed an inherent contradiction. Many academics have argued that 
Neil Carter, The Politics of the Environment_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 1) and Paul 
Wapner, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1996). 
20James Mittelman, "How Does Globalization Really Work? ", in James H. Mittelman (ed), 
Globalization: Critical Reflections. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 229. 
21 Ibid., p. 23 1. 
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globalisation has produced a social polarisation both among and within countries. 
According to Robert Cox, the world has a three-part hierarchy: the upper echelon 
consists of people integrated in the world economy (i. e. those involved in the 
production process and those who buy commodities); the middle consists of people 
who serve the economy in more 'precarious employment' (i. e. prostitutes, criminals); 
and at the bottom are those who are excluded from the global economy because of a 
lack of opportunities (i. e. most of Affica and many parts of the former Soviet 
Union). 22 For the most part, the last two groups are potentially destabilising forces 
because, as 'losers' in the globalisation process, they have been forced to locate ways 
to redefine their roles in an emerging order. This is already evident in the realm of 
organised crime which has taken advantage of global financial services (i. e. electronic 
transfer of credit and info-technology 23 ) to such an extent that crime is being 
transforined to something "beyond people, places and even identifiable victims. " 24 
Criminal organisations have recognised opportunities presented by open borders and 
modem communications and transportation technologies to increase their operations 
and to enter new areas of activity, such as the illegal traffic in human beings. 
Furthermore, globalisation has opened access to a largely unregulated international 
financial system to such an extent that actors previously excluded for political reasons 
have been able to obtain unimpeded access. For example, Abdullah Ocalan - leader of 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) - noted that the market economy was "very 
,, 25 useful for us. If you have money you can find anything on the market. In the 
current international financial environment, ease of money laundering coupled with 
rising numbers of tax havens and the abuse of more traditional bank secrecy, has 
22Robert W. Cox, "A Perspective on Globalization", in Mittelman (ed), Globalization: 
-Critical Reflectionsl p. 26. 
23 Mark Findlay, The Globalisation of Crime. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Quoted in Leander (2002), p. 21. 
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made it "very difficult for public authorities to trace illegal activities and it makes it 
relatively easy for movements to organise their financing far from public 
,, 26 authorities. 
In addition to ushering in new opportunities in the legal market economy for criminal 
and terrorist groups, globalisation has also expanded the operations of parallel 
economies in regions where "new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living 
have sprung up among the excluded parts of society9'27 , and have thus legitimised new 
forms of criminal activity. Kaldor argues that these parallel economies are produced 
from the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by international organisations, forcing 
states within the fon-ner Soviet Union (FSU), Africa and Latin America to undertake 
macro-economic stabilisation, deregulation and privatisation. These forced economic 
programmes have also increased unemployment, depleted natural resources, and 
generated greater income disparities - creating conditions conducive to terrorism and 
criminality. In this context it may not be concluded that the victory for capitalism and 
free markets in the 1990s implies peace as "free enterprise can easily dovetail into 
economic violence, and self-help into helping oneself. "28 
Although the expanding market economy has given non-state actors, such as terrorist 
and criminal groups, many new opportunities, it has also been used as a focus of and 
incentive for political backlash. For example, extremist organisations have gained 
support in some regions because of globalisation and the perceived spread of a 'global 
community' based on western liberal democratic values that threaten their cultural 
and/or religious existence. In this context the inherent dichotomies of globalisation 
26 Susan Strange, Mad Money (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
27 Kaldor (1999), pp. 78-79. 
2' Keen (1998), p. 44. 
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(creating integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification, 
globalisation and localisation) have mobilised non-state actors to react to what is 
commonly perceived as the "growing incompetence and declining legitimacy of 
,, 29 established political classes. In many cases this mobilisation is executed in various 
forms of public demonstrations, usually led by extremist organisations; however weak 
states run the risk that this mobilisation will take on a violent form - such as 
terrorism. Partly because extremist organisations do not have the membership base or 
resources required to launch a full-scale military attack on their enemies, some of 
these groups have utilised terror tactics to defend their beliefs. As one Islamic scholar 
asserted, "The world as it is today is how others shaped it ... We have two choices: 
either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so 
that we can construct the world as Islam requires". 
30 This political aspect, combined 
with technological developments, has enabled terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda to 
conduct mass-casualty terrorist acts globally. 31 
In addition to using globalisation as a mobilising force to recruit a membership base, 
terrorists have utilised another by-product of globalisation: the spread of media. Since 
the mid-twentieth century, the media has increasingly become a tool utilised by state 
and non-state actors to help establish their political authority within the general 
public. This is primarily because the media plays "a crucial role in opinion formation 
29 KaIdor (1999), p. 78. 
30Amir Taheri, Holy Terror The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Sphere, 1987), pp. 7-8. 
31 Under the leadership of Osamah bin Laden, Al-Qaeda has been responsible for four major terrorist 
attacks: the 1998 U. S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the bombing of USS Cole off the 
coast of Aden in 2000, and the simultaneous September I I" attacks on New York and Washington in 
200 1. For an excellent assessment of how Al-Qaeda was able to establish an international network by 
manipulating the post-Cold War environment, see: Rohan Gunaratna, Inside A]-()aeda : Global 
NeLwLork of Terror, (London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., 2002). 
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and information spread among the parties to confliCtS.,, 32 Since the 1980s terrorist 
groups have relied on the media to report their actions in order to spread their political 
message to a wider audience. 33 As will be discussed later in this chapter, this reliance 
on media outlets (i. e. newspaper, television) has declined since the early 1990s and 
has been replaced by more overt attempts by terrorist and criminal organisations to 
develop their own media and information technology capabilities. For example, 
groups such as Hezbollah have successfully used the internet as their primary 
propaganda tool. Hezbollah manages three websites: "one for the central press office 
(www. hizbollah. org), another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets 
(www. moqawama. org), and the last for news and information 
(www. almanar. com. 1b) ., 
04 Prior to and following the al-Qaeda led terrorist attacks in 
the U. S. on II September 2001, the group's leader Osamah bin Laden released 
several home-taped videos to spread his messages both to the followers of his radical 
form of Salafist Islam and to the wider international community. This reduced 
35 the 
reliance of terrorist groups on journalists, enabling them to avoid potentially 
vulnerable interview situations and to maintain control over the way in which a 
message is recorded. Furthermore, following the September attacks and the 
subsequent U. S. led counter-terrorist campaign against Afghanistan, a "virtual al- 
32 Leander (200 1). 
33 For more on the relationship between terrorism and the media, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism 
and the Media: Problems, Solutions and Counter-Problems, " Political Communication and Persuasion 
vol. 6 (1989), pp. 311-89; David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmidt, eds., Perspectives on Terrorism and 
the Media (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992); and Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter nine. 
34 For an overview of the various ways in which terrorist groups utilize the internet, see, Michele 
Zanini and Sean Edwards, "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age, " in John Arquilla, David 
Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror. Crime and Militancv 
(Santa Monica: RAND Publication MR-1382-OSD, 2001), pp. 29-60. 
35 Complete reliance on the media has not been eliminated because in order for messages to reach the 
widest possible audience, these groups remain dependent on the media to broadcast. The groups can 
maintain complete control over the taping and transmission of messages using the internet (i. e. web- 
based), although the audience for such messages may be limited to like-minded individuals. 
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Qaeda" continued to post radical messages to its followers via websites such as 
www. alneda. com 36 and www. jehad. net. 37 
The success of non-state actors in taking advantage of the various dynamics of 
globalisation, as briefly described above, has also directly challenged the state's 
monopoly over the use of violence in the Westphalian state system. In the post-Cold 
War era, non-state actors compete for state control by establishing their own 
monopoly on violence - an action facilitated by the expansion of the international 
market in arms since 1990.38 Although establishing a monopoly is difficult to attain 
throughout a country, there are examples of non-state actors having success in this 
respect in isolated regions or provinces, as has been the case in Colombia with the 
FARC, and in Turkey with the PKK. In both cases, a central component of the 
groups' activities - in addition to directing violence against the state - is symbolically 
to attack the state. As a result, they regularly seek to: 
impose their own taxes, issue their own passports/identification 
documents and often require foreigners to obtain visas with them. 
They provide alternative social structures (schools, hospitals, credit 
systems). They also impose alternative controls over organised 
36 Paul Eedle, "Al-Qaeda Takes Fight for 'Hearts and Minds' to the Web, " Jane's Intelligence Review 
Vol. 14, no. 8 (August 2002). 
37 Edmund Blair, "Islam Takes to the Web in the Aftermath of 9/11, " Rcuters. com, 10 September 2002. 
Despite U. S. and Western European attempts to revoke the rights of websites operated by terrorist 
groups, terrorist groups such as a]-Qaeda use hackers to break into websites and create secret pages that 
send messages to their followers. A]-Qaeda, for example, posted messages on a science fiction website 
of an unsuspecting owner. "Al Qaeda hackers break into websites to post messages: experts, " ABC 
News Online , 
Sunday 27 October, 2002. 
38 For accounts of the expansion of the international weapons market after the Cold War, see, for 
example: James Adams, Engines of War. Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race, (New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990); Graham T. Allison, et. al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the 
Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1996); Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim 
Assessment, " Transnational Organized Crime, Vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995). For excellent background 
information on arms smuggling and the prevalence of illicit arms on the international market, refer to 
the following websites: The Small Arms Survey at http: //www. smallarmssurvey. org; The Norwegian 
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers at http: //www. nisat. org; the Bonn International Centre for 
Conversion at http: //www. bicc. de; The Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at http: //cns. miis. edu; and 
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research at http: //www. unidir. ch. 
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violence. They have alternative "police" forces and alternative "drafts" 
for their own armies. 39 
In situations where the state is successfully challenged, the "efficiency, attractiveness 
and legitimacy" of the state is subsequently undermined. 40 In extreme cases, such as 
Afghanistan, an environment emerges in which it is difficult to hold any one actor 
accountable in the political process - thus subsequently producing a state of anarchy, 
ruled by tyranny. This directly complicates security because if tyranny is identified as 
"government that is not held to give account of itself, " the absence of a ruler in an 
anarchic state "is clearly the most tyrannical of all since there is no one left who could 
even be asked to answer for what is being done. "41 The environment that this breeds 
is one wherein violence necessarily begets more violence. 
The cycle of violence that ensues in states threatened in their authority and legitimacy 
occurs for two reasons, according to Leander (2001). First, in order to defend their 
position within the state, governments attempt to hold onto their authority - referring 
to a "person or institution which legitimizes acts or commands; as such it must be 
differentiated from power which indicates capacity rather than right, A2 - by reverting 
to violence and repression. This situation has been the most obvious reason for the 
escalation of intra-state violence, and has thus been well documented throughout most 
of modem history. Second, violence is prevalent in an environment characterised by 
competition for state control for economic gain. For example, economic processes 
that emerged from globalisation have transformed violence into an "important means 
39 Leander (2001). 
40 Ibid., p. 19. 
41 Hannah Arendt,! Qn Violence, (New York: A Harvest Book Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), p. 
39. 
42 'Legitimacy', on the other hand, refers to acquiring recognition based on popular support. Graham 
Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics: A reference guide to concepts. ideas 
and institutions (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
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of social control and an economic resource in and by itself. ', 43 Furthermore, through 
the expansion of information, technology, finance and manufacturing, globalisation 
has given rise to "warlords, mafias and mercenary groups, many of which have an 
interest in the perpetuation of confliCtS., 44 Especially in the context of weak states 
(described in further detail below), the dynamics caused by the spread of information 
technology and market liberalisation have helped create a "situation where the 
structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart", thus 
creating conditions where the hold on power is increasingly divided between "What is 
left of the formal institutions of the state (which are invariably corrupt), local 
warlords and gang or mafia leaders. "45 
Paradoxically, the very fact that there are numerous examples of non-state actors 
challenging the state - expanded further in the case studies of this thesis - 
demonstrates that control over state functions remains an important feature in the 
current security environment. The state, for example, is the only organised institution 
that can symbolically assert legitimacy and authority. Most importantly, however, 
within the current international system, states have the right to make a claim of 
'sovereignty'. State sovereignty is generally understood as a concept that 
encompasses two components: first, it incorporates the ability of a state to enforce 
rules within its borders and to monitor and control what happens within its territory. 
This concept is often incorporated in definitions of state sovereignty that focus on 
control over violence, such as that employed by Charles Tilly when he defined 
sovereignty as "controlling the principal means of coercion within a given 
43 Leander (200 1), p. 29. 
44 Barbara Harris-White, "Globalisation, Insecurities and Responses: an Introductory Essay, " in 
Barbara Harris-White, ed., Globalisation and Insecurity: Political. Economic and Physical Challenges 
(Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Publishers, Ltd., 2002), pp. 1-3. 
45 Harris-White summarizing an argument initially presented by Susan Willett, ibid., p. 11. 
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territory. 1946 Morgenthau defined the concept a decade earlier in reference to "the 
appearance of a centralised power that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing 
authority within a certain territory. 'A7 Second, state sovereignty commonly refers to 
48 state relations with external actors. The governments of sovereign states can 
subsequently claim ultimate control over how their territory interacts with the world 
and how it should be internally regulated. This claim allows states to decide what 
activities they should focus their resources on: be it economic development, or 
illegally selling arms. Instead of making the state a defunct actor, globalisation has 
thus merely intensified the competition for control over state functions by creating a 
host of non-state actors seeking to assert territorial authority and monopoly over the 
use of violence. 
Globalisation, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union contributed to the emergence of a transitional security environment that was 
initially characterised by the virtual disappearance of the bipolar world and an 
identifiable enemy for the West. These historical events subsequently ushered in an 
international environment in which the threat of inter-state conflict diminished 
significantly. As a result, academics began to herald the emergence of an era of 
democratic peace, the 'end of history', 49 and the rise of a single superpower (the 
46 Charles Tilly, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), p. 638. 
47 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1965), pp. 312-313. 
48 These points are expanded in: Stephen Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and 
Political Possibilitiesl (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), Robert Jackson, Ouasi-States: 
Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), and Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence ' (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985). 
Although 
this general view of sovereignty is used in this thesis, it is important to note that the concept is 
contested within International Relations literature. 
49 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: The Free Press, 1992); 
Michael Doyle, "Kant, liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, " Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, 
nos. 2/3 (1983), pp. 205-35; Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds. Debating the Democratic Peace, 
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United States) that would ensure international stability to maintain its own political 
and military supremacy. This had a profound impact on Soviet client states that were 
previously used by Moscow to train and channel funding to terrorist groups that 
impeded Western interests. Countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya lost 
the indirect protection afforded to them by the Soviet Union - thus complicating the 
rationale for these states to protect or support terroriSM. 50 The fall of the Soviet Union 
thus indirectly changed the operational dynamics of terrorist groups operating in the 
Cold War period, forcing them to seek alternative sources of protection and 
financing. 51 
Although inter-state conflict diminished, intra-state tensions increased substantially in 
the post-Soviet period, especially within the states of the FSU. Within these newly 
independent states, historically suppressed ethnic and nationalist tensions were 
unleashed, often resulting in the use of violence as the only available tool that could 
be effectively used in the process of state building. 52 As intra-state conflict flourished, 
it highlighted several factors of the post-Cold War security environment. First, 
although most intra-state conflicts during the Cold War were proxy wars manipulated 
by the U. S. and the Soviet Union, neither the U. S. or the newly independent Russian 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles fo 
a Post Cold War World, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
50 For example, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was, since the early 1980s, based in Lebanon and 
Syria. Because Syria had a treaty of friendship with the Soviets, it was not in Ankara's interest to push 
Syria on the PKK question. However, immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey 
placed troops on the Syrian border and demanded action be taken against the PKK. This directly led to 
the ousting of the PKK from both Syria and Lebanon. 
51 This topic will be covered as a central component of Chapter Three. 
52 The following provide a good introduction to post-Cold War ethnic and nationalist conflict: Adun 
Appadurai, "Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalisation, " Public Culture vol. 10, no. 
2 (1998), pp. 225-47; Michael Brown, Steven Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, eds., Nationalism and 
Ethnic Conflic , 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001); Ted Robert Gurr, People Versus States: Minorities 
at Risk in the New Century (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2000); Donald L. Horowitz, 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (University of California Press, 2000); David Lake and Donal Rothchild, 
eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Hakan 
Wiberg and Klaus Schlichte, eds. Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
30 
Federation had a reason to continue supporting warring factions in places like South 
America (i. e. Peru's Sendero Luminoso) and East Asia (i. e. the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia). The removal of financial support thus forced warring factions to secure 
alternative sources of finance, a task that was facilitated by replacing a "top-bottom 
economy with a bottom-up one" which entailed a greater degree of predatory 
behaviour against citizens, and growing criminalisation of society. 53 In this context 
predatory behaviour involves looting and diverting resources from the civilian 
population - often resulting in a humanitarian crisis. Although the emergence of a 
humanitarian crisis is often a by-product of predatory behaviour, it may also be 
purposefully created in order to attract external humanitarian aid which is 
subsequently used to "secure economic and political power and survival" under 
unstable conditions. 54 The criminalisation of society, on the other hand, refers to the 
convergence between political action and organised crime. In other words, at some 
point "a symbiosis between the two occurs where illegal activities become both 
,, 55 political and economic capital. In many scenarios, it could be concluded that 
criminality and the search for power through the acquisition of profit provided a new 
ideological impetus and justification for criminal and terrorist actions. 
Second, although intra-state conflicts during the Cold War were contained within 
states by Moscow and Washington, in the post-Cold War period, such conflicts have 
often posed a security threat beyond their borders. Whereas domestic, regional and 
53 Jean-Christophe Rufm, "Les Economies de Gueffe dans les Conflits; Internes, " in Fracoise Jean and 
Jean-Christophe Rufm, eds., Economie des Gueffes Civiles, (Paris: Hachette, 1993), pp. 19-59, as 
quoted in Leander, (2001), p. 30. 
" Mark Duffield, Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, "Conclusion, " in Joanna Macrae, Anthony Zwi, 
Mark Duffield and Hugo Slim, eds. War and Hunger. Rethinking International Responses to Coml2lex 
Emergencies, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 222-232. 
55 Ibid. This encompasses a central component of the argument presented in the case study on FARC in 
Chapter Five. 
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international problems could be fairly easily differentiated during the Cold War, today 
it is difficult to distinguish between these levels of analysis with a high degree of 
confidence. In newly independent states and states which previously enjoyed 
superpower support, this mounting environment of military instability has created 
conditions conducive to the rise of criminal and terrorist groups, thus complicating the 
security predicament at both a national and international level by placing non-state 
actors at the centre of protracted conflicts. 56 It can be further argued that the 
relationship between collapsed states and globalisation inevitably contributed to this 
prevailing security environment. 57 Security-related agencies with no effective central 
authority or dependable state-funding are able to take advantage of alternative 
markets and opportunities to secure funding for their organisational structures. In the 
absence of legitimate sources of financing, security agencies often become complicit 
to organised crime. This predicament further contributes to the already eroding 
capacity of the state to respond to security threats enhanced by globalisation such as 
those emanating from non-state actors (i. e. organised crime and terrorism). 
Ethnic tensions, the resurgence of nationalism, and rising political and religious 
extremism have not only led to an increase in civil wars and criminality, they have 
also facilitated the spread of terror tactics. Groups which have used terror tactics in 
such circumstances include the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Chechen militants, 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Sierra Leone's Revolutionary Unity 
Front (RUF), and Sendero Luminoso of Peru. With specific reference to the FSU, by 
56 There are numerous examples of this scenario, including Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Russian 
Federation (Chechnya), and Tajikistan. For an excellent overview of Macedonia's experience, see John 
Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkansl (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). 
57 These points are discussed in Alexander Cooley, "Globalisation and National Security in the Post- 
Soviet Space, " International Studies Association Annual Conference, 17-20 March 2004, Montreal, 
Canada. 
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1995 Russia's security services expressed concern that the region was "on the way to 
becoming one of the world leaders in the number of violent acts involving the use of 
arms, explosives, and incendiaries; kidnapping and hostage taking; as well as attempts 
of nuclear blackmail and the threat of nuclear blackmail and the threat of chemical 
and biological weapons use. " 58 The potential dangers posed by these phenomena at 
the end of the Cold War rose exponentially in the FSU due to widespread border 
porosity, lack of coordination and resources within law enforcement, and the 
declining ability of the state to respond to global pressures. Furthermore, combined 
with global trends, what has classically been "defined as 'terrorism' has clearly 
interwoven with what has been classically identified as 'organised crime"'. 59 
A third trend that emerged as a result of the end of the Cold War is that Communism 
as an ideology has lost much of its appeal. This was a significant development for 
both the FSU and other countries that were either allied to the Soviet Union, or 
confronted terrorist groups which espoused Communist ideals. During the Cold War, 
many terrorist groups were ideologically connected to the "communist-anticommunist 
9 60 competition'. More specifically, terrorist organisations used their commitment to 
communism to justify their own campaigns against non-communist governments. The 
collapse of Communist Party rule in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union 
dealt a blow to the image of Communism as an ideology of power and undermined 
the claim to legitimacy of such movements. For example, the virtual disappearance of 
Communism as an organising ideology was an important factor in the post-Cold War 
evolution of Marxist-Leninist groups in Latin America. On a practical level, leftist 
58Medvedev (1998), p. 94. 
59Myles Robertson, "Internal Security: Terrorism, Government, Business and European Trends, " Low 
Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcemen vol. 4, no. I (Summer 1995), p. 91. 
60 Donald M. Snow, UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 55. 
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terrorist groups in the region lost their rear bases in Nicaragua and Cuba, and suffered 
from their newly "discredited ideological underpinnings.,, 61 These factors thus drove 
groups such as El Salvador's Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional 
(FMLN), Guatemala's Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guaternalteca (URNG), 
Uruguay's Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros to overcome their propensity 
for violence and become political parties. 62 Although many Marxist-Leninist groups 
did renounce their ideology and the use of violence, others continue to operate in 
Colombia, Peru and Mexico. This, however, does not suggest that they remain 
entirely committed to Communist ideals. On the contrary, groups such as the Fuerzas 
Annedas Revolutionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Peru's Sendero Luminoso have 
adapted to the fact that their ideological foundations have been globally discredited. 
Although these entities continue to espouse political motivations, for the sake of 
group survival the FARC and Sendero Luminoso have focused most of their post- 
Cold War attention on criminal activities, such as producing and trafficking drugs, 
and kidnapping for ransom. 63 
Offering a somewhat different, yet related example is the experience of the states 
within the FSU. In this environment disillusioned members of the former Communist 
Party sought to replace their failed political ideology with the ideology of capitalism. 
As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, individuals' attempts to secure 
their positions in the emerging - and largely unregulated - market economy of Russia 
led many former Communist officials to organised crime. This is especially true of 
members of state security services who have used their positions to further penetrate 
61 Michael Radu, "Latin American Challenges: The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas, " Orbis vol. 
44, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 363. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Rohan Gunaratna and Magnus Ranstorp, "Taking on the Kidnappers, " Jane's Intelligence Review 
vol. 13, no. 5 (May 2001). 
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government institutions. It has thus been argued that the corrupting influence of 
organised crime in Russia has undermined the government to such an extent that 
"government structures fail to protect their citizens because they are collusive and 
complicit in the organised crime actiVity.,, 64 
The Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union obscured a set of 
threats and dangers that were exacerbated by globalisation and enhanced in an 
environment that has done little to control their existence. For example, issues 
associated with human rights violations, migration, and environmental degradation 
gained widespread attention from academia, policy-makers and society at a time when 
these issues were already out of control in many parts of the world. The growing 
importance finally accorded to non-state threats was eventually exemplified in the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the 1997 and 
1999 International Conventions For the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, and for the 
Suppression of the Financing of TerroriSM65 (respectively), and the 2000 United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. 
In the context of globalisation and the post-Cold War era, it is not difficult to see how 
states have lost some of their autonomy, at least with reference to territorial 
sovereignty and their ability to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
violence. As Richard Falk notes, "Territorial sovereignty is being diminished on a 
spectrum of issues in such a serious manner as to subvert the capacity of states to 
govern the internal life of society, and non-state actors hold an increasing proportion 
64 Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organised Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism, " Transnational 
Organised Crime vol. 2, no. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 123. 
65 It should be noted that prior to 1997, ten conventions dealing with some facets of terrorism were 
adopted by the United Nations, however, none of these were exclusively written to solely deal with 
terrorism. All of these conventions are accessible at: http: //www. odccp. org/odccp/terrorism. html. 
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of power and influence on the shaping of world order. " 66 This loss of territorial 
power has also resulted in a widespread tendency toward the decomposition of civil 
society that is revealed in the fragmentation of social forces and the growing gap 
between citizens and the political leadership. 67 In a growing number of states - 
including Russia and Colombia - politicians are seen as serving their own interests. 68 
Although this is not unique to the post-Cold War period, the decline of citizens' 
confidence in politics reflects not only a disgust with corruption but also a concern 
that the state alone is no longer capable of resolving the major problems confronting 
their society. 
Although the power of the state has been called into question, 69 globalisation has not 
significantly under-mined the Westphalian interstate system. Globalisation, however, 
has succeeded in detaching security from territoriality and instead, it has enmeshed 
security in global networks. It has also created a new security agenda in its own right, 
and it has diminished the capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens. 70 As 
a result of state borders that are increasingly open to external penetration, the 
autonomy of governments is declining over a range of issues including economic 
planning, social ideas and cultural choice. In essence, the prosperity and fate of 
nations, communities, and individuals are bound together through the world economy, 
66 Richard A. Falk , 
Predatory Globalization ( Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 35. 
67COX (1996), p. 27. 
68 This point will be covered in detail in the respective case studies of Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
69 This argument is made in numerous sources, including: Joseph Camiller and Jim Falk, End of 
Sovereignty?: the Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 
1992); Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2000); and, Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: the Rise of Reizional 
Economicsl (London: HarperCollins, 1996). 
70 Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. I 11. The idea that security has been detached from territoriality refers to the growing belief 
that many security threats do not simply affect individual states. For example, environmental issues 
threaten regions and global society. This aspect will be dealt with in more detail in the next section of 
this chapter. 
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the global communications network, and regional and supranational organisations. 71 
The post-Cold War environment thus can be summarised as one that highlights the 
inability of some governments to adequately provide for their citizens, to secure their 
own territorial borders, and respond to the rise of non-state actors. This predicament 
has subsequently intensified the spread of weak, failing and failed states throughout 
the international system. Although there is little consensus as to what constitutes a 
weak or failing state, 72 states generally fail because they are no longer capable of 
delivering "positive political goodS"73 to their people, and therefore the government, 
and ultimately the state itself, is regarded as illegitimate by a growing percentage of 
74 citizens. Complete state failure, on the other hand, is often declared when internal 
violence is paramount, "when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the 
infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their 
t, 75 responsibilities. As will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, the growing number 
of failed or failing states provide - both directly and indirectly -a hospitable 
environment for criminal and terrorist groups. Examples of failed states providing de 
facto safe havens include Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone; however, Chechnya, 
Colombia, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province 
7 'For example, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation and the United Nations. 
72 There is a vast and growing literature on the failure of states, including Barry Buzan, People, States 
and Fear: An ARenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1991); Kai Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World, " in The Insecurity 
Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, edited by Brian Job, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1996); Robert Jackson, Ouasi-States: Sovereig ty. International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 
73 Robert 1. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, " The Washington Quarter] , vol. 25, 
no. 3 (Summer 2002) notes that political goods primarily consist of security, education, health care, 
economic opportunity, a legal framework and judiciary, and infrastructure requirements such as a 
system of transportation and communications. 
74 Ibid., p. 85. 
75 Rotberg (2002), p. 86. 
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are also examples of the connection between state failure and the rise of criminality 
and/or terrorism. 
Despite the changes that have developed in the international environment, security, 
terrorism and organised crime largely remain understood in their traditional contexts. 
The next three sections of this chapter will therefore survey the dominant literature 
associated with these issues with the view of revealing weaknesses, in addition to 
highlighting the inadequacy of their responses to the changes international society and 
the international system have been experiencing since the 1990s. At the same time 
key tenets that could contribute to building an understanding of the contemporary and 
ever-evolving security environment will also be highlighted. However, these factors 
are relevant only when incorporated into a reconceptualised security framework. As a 
result, this will form the background for introducing an alternative conceptual 
framework that can be used to explain and understand terrorism and organised crime 
as security threats in Chapter Two. 
International Security and the 'Traditionalists' 
In the security vacuum created by the virtual disappearance of the Soviet threat, 
traditional ways of thinking about international security have faced considerable 
criticism. By the late 20th century security was synonymous with the definition of that 
term provided by realism, the principal paradigm within the field of International 
Relations. Realist thought can generally be divided into two strands: traditional 
realism, 76 and neorealism. 77 The common thread between them is that they are 
76 For an in-depth overview of traditional realist thought, see: Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought 
from Weber to Kissinge (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). 
77 For an overview of neorealism, see: Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986). 
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predominantly based on three tenets: "namely the assumptions of anarchy, of statism, 
,, 78 and of politics as the struggle for power and peace. 
For traditional realists, the meaning of security is fundamentally subsumed under the 
rubric of power and self-preservation. Thus as Arnold Wolfers writes, 
Self-preservation calls forth ... a variety of attitudes toward power because countries which are satisfied to let things stand as they are 
have no immediate incentive for valuing power or for wishing to 
enhance it. Whether they become interested in power at all, and the 
extent to which they do, depend on the actions they expect from 
others. It is a responsive interest which takes its cue from the threats, 
real or imagined, directed at things possessed and valued. If policy is 
rationally decided, the quest for power here increases or decreases in 
proportion to these external threats. 79 
Threats here refer to forces that place in danger the territorial integrity of a state, its 
right to self-determination and its economic well-being. This state-centric definition 
of security is based on the assumption that one can distinguish between domestic 
'order' and international 'anarchy, and the belief that the potential for war is ever- 
present because states are in the first instance concerned about maintaining their 
power, thus creating a self-help system characterized by the security dilemma. 80 
One of the most detailed accounts of traditional realism was fashioned by Hans 
Morgenthau in his famous Politics Among Nations, " oziginally published in 1948. 
Morgenthau was primarily responsible for packaging the "practical realist maxims of 
78 John Vasquez, The Power of Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism Cambridge 
Series in International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3 7. 
79 Arnold Wolfers, "The Role of Power and the Power of Indifference, " in Wolfers, Discord and 
Collaboration: Essays in International Politics. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 
97, as quoted in Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma? " in 
Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, (London: Frank Cass Publishers Ltd., 
1996), p. 99. 
8OAnn J. Tickner, "Re-visioning Security, " in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations 
Theory Today. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 176. 
81 Morgenthau (1948). 
39 
scepticism and policy prescriptions into a rational 'scientific' approach. ý982 
Furthermore his work introduced the argument that power was not necessarily an 
innate human drive, but instead the necessity for power emerged from pressures of 
socialisation within the international system. According to traditional realism: 
security has involved assuring the physical survival of a political unit 
and of the individuals or groups populating it. Security has also 
included maintaining (and often expanding) the territorial domain of 
the unit, protecting its basic institutional structure against change 
imposed from outside, and assuring that domestic systems of 
command, control, production, and distribution are not disrupted by 
external forces. 83 
Based on this straightforward summary it is clear why realism, with its focus on the 
power-political situation of a state, is also commonly referred to as the 'power- 
9 84 politics model . As Guzzini notes, the core subject matter of realism is "the study of 
war and the conditions of peace. , 85 
In an attempt to address the changes taking place within the international system, and 
thus re-work traditional realism to respond to the post-Cold War security 
environment, neorealism. has asserted itself to take the place of realism as the 
dominant paradigm within the study of security. 86 One of the most influential writings 
on the neorealist understanding of contemporary security is Walt's "Renaissance of 
Security Studies" published in International Studies Quarterl in 1991. In this article 
Walt notes that the purpose of security studies is for scholars who follow the rules of 
82 Stefano Guzzini, "The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations, " Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute Working Paper, (2002). 
83 James Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov, eds., The Oceans and Environmental Securitv: Shared U. S. 
and Russian Perspectives. (Washington: Island Press, 1994), p. 6. 
84 Steve Smith and Martin Hollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 27. 
8' Stefano Guzzini, "'Realisms at War': Robert Gilpin's Political Economy of Hegemonic War as a 
Critique of Waltz's Neorealism, " COPRI Working Paper, 11/2002, p. 4. 
86 This is not to say that neorealism is a post-Cold War phenomenon. Neorealism emerged in 1979 after 
Kenneth Waltz published Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
Nevertheless, it was not until neorealists began to address the post-Cold War environment that the 
theory itself began to gain prominence in relation to traditional realist views of the world. 
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scientific research to investigate the role of military force. He therefore defines 
security as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. " 87 According to 
Wait, any attempt to bring non-military issues onto the security agenda will render the 
subject of security indistinct and meaningless. 88 It is only when other issues (i. e. 
environmental) intrudes the military realm that they could conceivably be considered 
a security threat. 
Prior to the writings of Walt, Kenneth Waltz laid out the foundational principles of 
neorealism in his book Theory of International Politics. According to Waltz, the key 
concern of neorealism is how capabilities between states are organised. Strictly 
differentiating between the structures of domestic politics and international politics, 
Waltz notes that whereas domestic politics is centralised and hierarchical, the 
international system is anarchiC. 89 Neorealism shares with traditional realist thought 
the assumption that the international system is anarchic and therefore based on self- 
help because state survival is entirely dependent on a state's own efforts. In other 
words, "fear of unwanted consequences therefore stimulates states to behave in ways 
that tend towards the creation of balances of power. "90 It is the anarchic structure of 
the system that subsequently determines which states survive and which states fail. 
Those that fail do so primarily because they are not successfully socialised into the 
87Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies, " International Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, no. I 
(199 1), p. 212. 
"This view is not held by all neorcalists. Levy, for example, argues that adding non-military thýeats to 
the security agenda is a cynical ploy to attract more public attention and resources to their cause [Mark 
Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue? ", International Securit , vol. 
20, no. 2 (1995), pp. 
35-62. ], while Deudney [ Daniel Deudney, "Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking, " The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol. 47, no. 3 (1991), pp. 22-28.1 and Soroos [Marvin Soroos, 
"Global Change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoners' Dilemma, " Journal of Peace Researchl vol. 
31, no. 3 (1994), pp. 317-332. ] believe that there is a danger in adding non-military issues to the 
security agenda because, keeping with the realist tradition, they will ultimately illicit a military 
response. 
89 Waltz (1979), p. 8 8. 
90 Ibid., p. 118. 
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international system, and thus are eliminated as actors through competition. 91 
Furthermore, neorealism posits that states are largely rational actors, and thus can be 
expected to respond to external constraints and incentives in certain ways. According 
to Waltz, empirical justification is not possible in the study of international politics, 
and as such neorealism is theoretically the most sound. 
As with realism, neorealism includes similar foundational claims about how the world 
is, where threats originate and how they are to be dealt with. Neorealism, in this 
context, has not considerably changed how security is understood in the post-Cold 
War era, and as a result it faces critiques similar to those aimed at its traditional realist 
predecessor. Critiques of both forms of realism can be generally divided into five 
areas: assumptions, methods, ethics, ethnocentrism, and narrowness. 92 In the context 
of this thesis, however, it is primarily the narrow assumptions of realist thought that 
present an obstacle to explaining and understanding the specific threats of terrorism 
and organised crime. 
Realist assumptions about security are weak on several fronts. On the one hand, by 
focusing on international threats to the state, realists exclude threats posed by states to 
groups and individuals. T'hus, they inherently disregard the insecurity caused by state 
terrorism or by situations of internal ethnic cleansing by military forces. The ability of 
realist thought to explain the conflicts that have raged in Somalia, Afghanistan, or 
Bosnia throughout the 1990s can thus be questioned. In addition, because realism 
focuses on the state as the central political actor, it ignores the growing relevance of 
91 In most scenarios competition takes the form of war; war, according to Waltz, emerges from one of 
three levels: human nature, type of political regime, or from conditions of the international system 
(anarchy). Guzzini, (2002) "Realisms at War... ", p. 5. 
92 Neta C. Crawford, "Once and Future Security Studies, " Security Studiesl vol. 1, no. 2 (1991), pp. 
294-6. 
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armed actions and claims of non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations. 93 Based 
on this tenet, a strict understanding of realism cannot provide an explanatory 
framework for the success of non-state actors such as FARC and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelarn (L'17E) in wresting control of Colombian and Sri Lankan territory 
from the sovereign Colombian and Sri Lankan states. 
The state centrism of realism has also been criticized because it is reductionist and 
presents a view of the state as a concrete entity with interests. 94 According to critical 
security theorists, 95 the state does not exist in any concrete sense; it emerges and 
changes as a result of various internal and external pressures and entities. This is 
precisely the case for states that have been formed as a result of external military 
action and direct and prolonged political interference, such as post-2001 Afghanistan. 
Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 the country 
96 entered a condition of almost constant civil war. There was no effective government 
authority until the emergence of the Taliban and its consolidation of power throughout 
much of Afghan territory in 1996. Instead Afghan territory was divided amongst 
groups of warlords who engaged in a variety of illicit activities including drug 
trafficking, extortion and mass rape. 97 Within this environment the country soon 
became a haven for organised criminals and terrorist groups seeking territory to 
conduct training and establish international contacts. Among the most notorious 
93 Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector! ", International Studies 
Ouarterl vol. 36 (1992), p. 422. 
94 Stares (1998), p. 108. 
"Refer to chapter 2 for a summary of critical security studies and its dominant theorists. 
96 For an excellent overview of the Soviet-Afghan war, see, Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin. 
Afghanistan - the Bear Tram the Defeat of a Superpowe (Barnsley UK: Leo Cooper, 2001,2"d 
edition). 
97 For good sources that describe the post-1989 environment in Afghanistan, including the rise of the 
Taliban, see, Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-199.7 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002,2 nd edition); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam. Oil and the New Great Game in 
Central Asia, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); and Patrick Karam, Asie Centrale: le nouveau grand jeu, 
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002). 
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groups operating from Afghanistan was Al-Qaeda. In response to Al-Qaeda's 
orchestrated attacks on American territory in September 2001, Washington embarked 
on a 'war on terrorism' that was initially directed at destroying Al-Qaeda training 
camps in Afghanistan, and rooting out the Taliban for granting Al-Qaeda a safe 
haven. Following a concentrated bombing campaign that successfully dispersed both 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, the U. S. led counter-terrorism coalition sought to 
establish a fiiendly and democratic Afghan government. Thus the current government 
operating in Afghanistan could be viewed as little more than a creation of the 
international community following an external intervention, as opposed to an entity 
that naturally emerged from within Afghanistan. As a result, it would be difficult to 
argue that Afghanistan is a sovereign state as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia. 
A further critique of realism's state centrism, focuses on its presumption that only state 
actors can attain political authority and legitimacy. These two principles generally 
encompass the idea that the state is given power and legitimate social purpose because 
the "body politic recognizes its right to rule and voluntarily submits to its power. 1198 
Conversely, where the state has no authority, citizens do not accept the state's right to 
rule, and thus the only reason citizens comply with state institutions is because they 
fear the state's power to punish. Although this observation appears valid in many 
contemporary cases, the state is not the only political actor capable of obtaining 
widespread consent from a specific polity. For example, although Hezbollah does not 
enjoy legitimacy as a political actor throughout Lebanon, the group was able to attain 
a degree of authority in the Bekaa Valley, essentially by providing basic social 
welfare and services to the people of that area which the state was unable to do. In this 
98 Ann C. Mason, "Colombian State Failure: The Global Context of Eroding State Authority, " paper 
presented at the conference on 'Failed States, ' Florence, Italy (10-14 April, 2001), pp. 4-5. 
44 
context authority was passed on to (or taken over by) a non-state actor. This example 
therefore reveals that while the state's effectiveness in confronting challenges 
deteriorates, non-state actors are becoming increasingly capable of addressing acute 
internal crises. 99 As discussed in subsequent chapters, the state remains an important 
actor - however, this context stresses the desire for non-state actors to attain control 
over state functions as a way towards attaining authority and legitimacy. 
Finally, realism fails to provide an adequate account of the relationship between units 
and the international system, thus undermining the capacity of states to promote 
international change. Realism therefore describes a self-perpetuating cycle: an 
anarchic international system in which the actors (states) are engaged in a never 
ending security dilernma that they have no ability to change, but can only reduce the 
insecurity they feel through the acquisition of military power. 100 In an era where 
military power is no longer the sole guarantor of security, this tenet loses much of its 
explanatory appeal. As a result of globalisation and the various dynamics of the post- 
Cold War era, states are no longer dependent on building military power for internal 
security - instead, they can ensure internal security by participating in other aspects of 
the international system, such as the international market economy. Thus for example, 
the more external states depend on a single domestic economy, the greater the chance 
that these states will ensure that the economy in question is secured. The U. S. 
decision to fight Iraq on behalf of Kuwait during the Gulf War can thus be explained 
by Washington's need to secure oil prices for the American economy. Using the 
99 Ibid., p. 10. 
10OSome neorealists, including Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), argue that economics has taken the place of 
military power - thus in the post-Cold War era it is economic power that determines the balance of 
power. 
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motivation of securing Kuwaiti sovereignty America was able to justify its military 
intervention. As Ayoob argues: 
It was unfortunate for Saddam Hussein that Iraq and Kuwait happened to 
be located within a region defined by U. S. strategists as having intrinsic 
importance for U. S. security regardless of the state of great power 
relations at a particular point in time. Had such an invasion taken place 
in another, less strategically important region of the Third World, and 
had it involved countries that lacked the massive oil reserves controlled 
by Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the U. S. outcry would have been 
much diminished, and the outcome would almost certainly have been 
very different. 101 
A similar argument can also be made in the context of non-state actors. For example, 
terrorist and criminal organisations can secure their operations and survival by 
gaining control over the domestic economy of the country of their primary operations. 
This has been the case in Colombia with FARC gaining control over a large 
proportion of the illicit narcotics trade (a staple of the Colombian economy); and in 
Russia with Russian organised crime attaining a considerable degree of control over 
the Russian banking sector and natural resources. This highlights that security is no 
longer solely about territorial control, but incorporates the ability of the state to secure 
all legitimate sectors considered detrimental to political stability (i. e. political, 
judicial, and economic institutions). 
A second critique of realist thought centres around the fact that it has a shallow 
normative foundation. This is evident, for example, in the common practice of realists 
in isolating the issue of the use of force from the central question of whether or not 
the use of force is legitimate in each specific situation. 102 For realists the end justifies 
the means, therefore force may be used as long as it produces security for the state. A 
101 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making. Regional Conflict. and 
the International System (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 122. 
102 Kolodziej (1992), p. 429. 
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comparable argument could be used by terrorists and criminal organisations, who like 
states in the realist context, are equally interested in statism, survival and self-help. 
However, because realism prioritises the state as a referent object, it is not surprising 
that realism does not take into consideration security at the individual, regional, 
international or global level. Ethics are therefore discarded in the name of policy 
interests, and national security. This further acts as an antecedent to the level of 
analysis problem that is inherent in all realist theory - not only with respect to agents 
that can be threatened, but also with respect to which actors are capable of threatening 
the state. Although domestic threats are relatively straightforward to identify, without 
accepting that external nonstate actors are capable of posing a security threat, realism 
is incapable of explaining how, for example, the United States could have secured its 
territory from terrorists based in Afghanistan. This significantly undermines Waltz's 
opinion that the Westphalian system has not been challenged in the post-Cold War 
era, and that there is thus no need to shift away from a focus on the state system to a 
transnational system where non-state actors are playing an increasingly important 
role. 103 
A final key criticism made of realism concerns its quest for scientific objectivity. 
Realists themselves admit that their research does not necessarily meet the scientific 
standards they have set, and that their "use of interpretation to validate theoretical 
propositions raises questions about the quest for transhistorical, acontextual, 
generalizable theory. " 
104 Largely since the end of World War 11, realist thought 
required little justification, it claimed that it understood reality 'as it is', and given the 
103 Leander, (2001), p. 3. 
104 Keith Krause and Michael Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and 
Methods, " Mershon International Studies Review vol. 40 (1996), p. 237. 
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dynamics of the international system at the time, few questioned its explanatory 
powers. However, in light of the changing international system ushered in by the end 
of the Cold War, realism has been faced with the task ofjustifying its approach - this 
task has proven difficult, and realism has subsequently lost "its persuasiveness in 
times of a rational debate it decides not to address. "105 The perpetual defence that 
realist world-views are natural and should thus be taken for granted, according to 
Guzzini, is precisely what is responsible for its demise. 
Although the realist paradigm has given priority to security, it has devoted little effort 
to producing an accurate definition of the concept itself. Instead of providing a 
comprehensive account of what security is, realists have provided oversimplifications. 
For example, Waltz merely describes security as survival -a definition that would 
render policy goals indistinguishable from each other. 106 This narrowness in 
definition is also evident in the fact that realism ignores factors that play a role in 
understanding security, such as psychological and organisational issues. 107 Thus as 
Leander notes: 
if we try to understand international politics in general and violence, 
war and peace in particular (the classical IR topics), we had better not 
define away the non state actors and no-state realm from the outset. 
This is likely to blind us to the many important questions deriving 
from the changing boundaries of the political, but also to make it hard 
to adequately analyse traditional questions of international politics 
since it is not the case that the state system somehow continues 
unaffected by what is happening in other spheres of international 
politiCS. 108 
105 Stefano Guzzini, "The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations, " 
http: //www. copri. dk/publications. htmi (2003). 
106David Baldwin, "The Concept of Security, " Review of International Security, vol. 23 (1997), p. 2 1. 
107Crawford (199 1), p. 295. 
108 Leander (2001), p. 13. 
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Traditional realism and neorealism have unquestionably dominated the International 
Relations and the International Security agenda throughout the Cold War. For much 
of Western academia and governments, the realist paradigm provided answers that 
explained the Cold War period. This however is not true in the post-Cold War world 
where a new set of imminent dangers presented themselves; dangers that were not 
confined to the politico-military realm. Thus to remain focused on a definition of 
security that privatised military terms, attention is drawn away from non-military 
threats that promise to undermine the stability of nations. 
109 Traditional realist- 
neorealist perceptions of security therefore cause paralysis in understanding and 
responding to security threats as they continue to evolve. 
Considering the dynamics of the international drugs trade for example, the realist 
paradigm is unable to account for the fact that something considered 'low politics"' 
0 
could detennine the fate of a nation, an entire region, and potentially the course of 
international politics. Andreas and Sharpe argue that the issues that will determine the 
fate of Latin America, "foreign debt, economic crisis, civilian-military relations, 
human rights, democratization, and guerrilla insurgencies" will be determined by 
cocaine politics. "' This quote also highlights the fact that the drug trade challenges 
the realist notion of state sovereignty. Given the presence of intricate international 
trafficking routes that extend through the region, coupled with the rising demand for 
illicit narcotics, the drug phenomenon cannot be successfully curtailed independently 
by any one country. States in Latin America have therefore lost a degree of control 
109Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International 
Security. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 19. 
"ODefined by Mandy Bentham, The Politics of Druiz Control, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 
1998), p. 14 as "issues that do not affect security and diplomatic prestige, do not involve the highest 
decision-makers in government, do not lead to crises and are not dominated by states". 
111 P. F_ Andreas and K. E. Sharpe, "Cocaine Politics in the Andes, " Current History, vol. 91 (February 
1992), p. 74. 
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over what or who crosses into their territory. For this simple reason, realist theories do 
not directly apply to an explanation of drug trafficking on any other criminal activity 
that crosses national borders. 
The limitations of realist thought as outlined in this section provide a glimpse into 
why realism's inability to explain post-Cold War security has led to significant 
theoretical debate within International Relations. Although it has been increasingly 
argued that realism would be unable to provide a direct understanding of the security 
threat posed by non-state actors, there are a few key realist tenets that would be 
applicable if they existed in an adapted framework. If realist theorists accepted the 
argument that non-state actors are equally important to the state in the international 
system, then there are several positions that would continue to have resonance in the 
current international environment. For example, the assumption that states that cannot 
be socialised within the international system is eliminated as actors via competition 
could also be applied to non-state actors, including organised crime and terrorist 
groups. The failure of non-state groups to socialise themselves as a legitimate 
authority would also consequently lead to the group's ultimate demise as it would fail 
to have attracted a support base necessary to conduct operations and attain its goals. 
Developing social programmes and seeking to advance other functions otherwise 
associated with the state have therefore become a priority for many non-state actors as 
illustrated throughout this thesis. However, as with the state, should non-state actors 
attain recognition to rule by people within specified terTitorial boundaries, either via 
cooperation or fear, they too would be seen as having acquired political authority and 
legitimacy. This is connected to the notion that only a state actor can attain political 
so 
authority and legitimacy because people recognise its right to rule and therefore 
voluntarily submit to its power. 
Furthermore, as is the case with state actors, non-state actors are caught in a self-help 
environment characterised by the security dilemma. The survival of non-state actors is 
associated with their own ability to secure group survival. As with a state, a non-state 
group seeks its physical survival as a political unit and it seeks the survival of the 
individuals populating it. Connected to this is the search for territorial control and the 
protection of the group's basic institutional structures against external pressures. 
Although non-state actors are unlikely to engage in outright war, traditionally defined 
as violence conducted between two identifiable armed forces, their survival can be 
threatened by the state security agencies. Thus in order to attain a sense of security, 
the actions of non-state actors often reflects the belief that the end justifies the means. 
As a- result, the use of force can be justified as a tool that is adopted to provide 
security. On a very basic level, security in relation to non-state actors can be seen 
using similar lenses as those that explain security of states. Security in this context is 
thus about actor survival. These realist tenets will be discussed in the context of a 
reformulated conceptual understanding of security that is provided in Chapter Two. 
Applying 'Plasters': overcoming realism's inefficiencies 
Beginning in the 1980s, some writers 112 attempted to address the inherent weaknesses 
of the realist paradigm in addressing non-military threats by calling for a broader and 
more comprehensive approach to security. Their attempts, however, were largely 
ignored and overshadowed by the dimensions of the Cold War. It was not until the 
112included in this group are Richard Ullman and Arthur Westing. 
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end of the Cold War when the threat of Soviet attack on the West disappeared, that 
such arguments resurfaced and gained an audience. 113 Approaches that revisited the 
usefulness of realism were broadly divided into two approaches: the 'widener' debate, 
and the debate seeking to 'deepen' the meaning of security. The first merely 
ýroadened the neorealist conception of security to include a wider range of threats; 114 
whereas the second not only broadened the range of threats, but attempted to deepen 
the security agenda by including the individual or human security level, and/or the 
international or global level, with the regional or societal levels used as intermediate 
points. ' 15 
The 'widening' approach to security largely grew out of the literature on 
environmental security which fundamentally argued that, because of environmental 
imperatives, the focus of security needed to be shifted away from military threats. For 
example, security was as much threatened by migration caused by resource scarcity as 
it was threatened by external military force. Furthermore, by adding an environmental 
dimension to security this approach placed "societal values in a more appropriate 
hierarchy". 116 The state was therefore no longer considered the only political actor or 
agent that needed to be 'secured', and security was redefined as "an action or 
sequence of events that (1) threatened drastically and over a relatively brief span of 
time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatened 
significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a 
state or to private, non governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within 
113 Stares, (1998), p. 13. 
114 Included in this group are Ullman (1983), Mathews (1989), Deudney (1991), Crawford (1991), 
Haftendorn (199 1), Homer-Dixon (1993), and Soroos (1994). 
"sKrause and Williams (1996), "Broadening the Agenda... ", p. 229. Also included in this group are 
Tickner(1992), Gurtov (1991), Buzan (1991), Griffith (1994), and Waeveret al (1998). 
116 Soroos (1994), p. 319. 
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the state. " 117 This definition of security expanded the traditional range of threats to 
include military, economic, resource, food, and environmental issues. 118 
Theoretical arguments of the early 'wideners' also commonly focused on the potential 
of major environmental change to generate and intensify conflict between and within 
states. 119 Gleick argued that security was threatened when resource and 
environmental problems reduced the quality of life and resulted in a range of 
conflictual situations among subnational or national groups, whereas Homer-Dixon 
concentrated on the connection between environmental scarcity and acute conflict (i. e. 
conflict involving a substantial probability of violence). 120 
This approach to (environmental) security only sought to add the environment into the 
traditional security framework and thus incorporate it into already existing issue-areas 
of 'high politics'. 121 The problem with these approaches is that, in continuing to use 
realist rhetoric, none of them attempted to deconstruct of the term 'security' so that it 
may then be reconstructed to specifically deal with the nature of environmental - or 
any other emerging - security issues. Although definitions of security, such as that 
provided by Ullman, include a range of actors, they still remain too general to provide 
any sufficient understanding of security, who should be secured, and by what means. 
117 Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security vol. 8, no. 1 (1983), p. 133. 
118Mathews, (1989) defines security in very similar terms as Ullman, she argues that the traditional 
definition of security should be expanded to include environmental, resource and demographic issues. 
119Soroos (1994), p. 318. 
120See Peter Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International Security, " 
International Security vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 1993). Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt; 
Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment. Population. and Security, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 1998). Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes 
as Causes of Acute Conflict; " International Securi , vol. 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991). 12'Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security" 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies. vol. 19, no. 3 (1990) argues that placing the environment 
into 'high politics' is not a negative thing, but it "has a sound goal - to get people to react as urgently 
and effectively to the environmental problem. If people took the environmental problem as seriously as, 
say, an attack by a foreign power, think of all that could be done to solve the problems! "p. 465. 
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Broadening the security agenda without seriously reconceptualising how security is 
and should be understood in the post-Cold War is an incomplete exercise. The 
problem with the dominance of the realist paradigm is that it has failed to account for 
the pressures of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, thereby making the 
swidence approach vulnerable to similar criticisms. In an effort to overcome this 
weakness of simply adding issues to the traditional security agenda, some academics 
in the ficid of International Relations made an attempt to deepen the meaning of 
security while broadening the range of threats included on the security agenda. 
Among the most influential literature that falls into this category is the book: People. 
States and Fear. 
Originally writtcn by Barry Buzan in 1982 People. States and Fear defined security as 
the pursuit of freedom from threat 122, asserting that there was no point in struggling 
over a more accurate definition of security or trying to come to general agreement on 
its definition. The reason bchind this statement largely arose from Buzan's belief that 
people basically understood what security rcfered to. Buzan argued that security must 
be investigated through the lens of national security-, however be did not concede that 
individual and international dynamics could affect it. Therefore, in trying to specify 
referents of security, Buzan argued that the state consisted of three components: the 
idea of the state; the physical base of the state; and the institutional expression of the 
state - and it was these components that composed the primary referent objects of 
security. From this point, Buzan concluded that relevant threats are mostly those that 
affected the self-determination and sovereignty of the nation-state. 123 Coming from a 
neorealist perspective, Buzan still believes that the security problems of states could 
122 13 uzan ( 199 1 p. 18. 
123 Ibid., p. 65. 
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not be understood without reference to the anarchic system, and the dynamics of the 
anarchic system in turn could not be understood without making specific reference to 
states. 
Aside from framing security in relation to the military, Buzan extended the notion of 
security to include the political, economic, environmental and societal sectors. 124 His 
argument for including these sectors was that although security begins as a military 
field, it is increasingly challenged by other intcrlinked sectors. It is here that Buzan 
contributed a great deal to the study of security. As far as Buzan is concerned, the 
"full richness and meaning of security is to be found in the interplay among [the 
sectors] rather than the primacy of one. " 123 Follo%%ing from this, an understanding of 
complex security threats such as terTorism and organised crime need to consider how 
they emerged and operated among the three levels of analysis (individual, state, 
system). In his conclusion, Buzan suggested that an integrative security policy would 
work simultaneously on the three levels of analysis, while paying attention to the 
positive and negative linkages across sectors. 126 The appeal of such a policy 
formulation is that it requires policy makers to consider the perspective and views of 
other actors - in this way Buzan concluded that it may be possible to elicit collective 
measures among the members of the system so that everyone achieved security. 
124 Buzan, (1991), pp. 19-20 generally describes military security as the interplay between offensive 
and defensive capability of states. and how states perceive each other's perceptions; political security 
concerns the organisational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them 
legitimacy-, economic security rcfers to the access of resources, finance and markets necessary to 
sustain levels of wel rare and state power, societal security concerns sustainability of traditional patterns 
of culture, religion, language. national identity and custom; and environmental security concerns the 
maintenance of local and planetary bio. There as the essential support system of all human life. 
125Buzan (1991), p. 368. 
l-'61bid.. p. 377. 
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One of the most obvious critiques of Buzan is that he depends on maintaining the 
primacy of the state, and thus denies the possibility of change being attributed to sub 
and supra-state actors. 127 Buzan's position loses credibility when considering the role 
of sub-state actors since the late 1980s (for example, in Eastern Europe, the former 
Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan) in bringing about change within both the state and the 
system. Furthermore in paying respect to neorealism in People, States and Fear. 
Buzan adamantly argues that the security of individuals and the international system 
can ultimately only be guaranteed by the state. 128 In light of this argument Buzan 
cannot account for two trends in contemporary society. First, Buzan is unable to 
account for a situation in which non-state actors become the primary guarantors of 
security. FARC, for example, has provided security from government forces for 
people within their area of influence. The same is also true in Central Asia's Ferghana 
Valley where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir allegedly 
provided security for followers of Islam who have been targeted by government 
forces. And in Russia, some Russian organised crime groups have provided security 
functions for the public where the state has been unable to. Second, Buzan's thesis 
does not explain the fact that a number of states, including many in Africa, Latin 
America and the FSU, are unable to guarantee their citizens basic security, or meet 
their citizens' basic social and welfare needs. A counter-argument could be produced 
to highlight that in this context, a state should not be considered a real state if it is 
unable to provide for the basic security needs of its citizens. If this is the case, then 
127 Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School", Review of 
International Studies, vol. 22 (1996), p. 92. 
128 Although state centrism has received considerable criticism within this chapter, the importance of 
the state as an organizing entity and an institution capable of providing security has never been called 
into question. On the contrary, although this thesis argues that non-state actors are increasingly 
important for the study of international security, non state actors cannot be prioritised to the detriment 
of the state - this would essentially repeat the same fundamental mistake made by realists. The degree 
to which the state remains important will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
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the same counter-argument should be applied to non-state actors able to provide basic 
security needs to the people, indicating that the provision of this function makes them 
de facto states. Another problem that beset Buzan was his persistence in keeping 
strategic studies as a distinct core of scholarship within the field of international 
studies. This however goes against his argument that collective security could be 
achieved if it is simultaneously sought within the three levels of analysis. Firmly 
rooted in the realist tradition and primarily concerned about the technicalities of war 
and the predominant role of the state in bringing about any change, security studies 
contradicts the concept of security and any attempt to achieve it. Not only does it seek 
to maintain the status quo, but its very existence has threatened to bring about a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. 
Buzan may also be criticised for the way he chooses to divide and define the security 
sectors included in his study. Although he discussed military, political, environmental, 
economic and societal security, he focused on the state, and paid less attention to non- 
state actors than he afforded them in his introduction and conclusion. Buzan appeared 
careful not to use examples of security threats that emanated from non-state actors, 
thus when he explained the notion of military security, Buzan assumed that the threat 
of force only originated from other states. This narrow understanding of military 
security excludes the threats that are posed by international terrorism and criminal 
organisations, threats that cannot be entirely deterred by professional militaries. 
Considering Buzan's definition of political security as a second example, it is evident 
that he again failed to consider the role of non-state actors in the security predicament. 
Political security refers to any threat aimed at the organisational stability of the state. 
The definition itself could include non-state actors, such as criminal organisations 
57 
pressuring the government on certain policy issues, however it does not appear as 
though Buzan intended the term to be used in this way. As with military security, for 
Buzan a state's political security is only threatened by other states for the sole purpose 
of weakening it prior to military attack. 129 
Although Buzan argued that states could cause disruption in other states, he did not 
seriously consider the possibility that a non-state actor could upset the social or 
political fabric of a state by creating chaos from within. Tbis, however, has occurred 
on several occasions throughout the post-Cold War period, as will be argued in the 
case studies of this thesis. 130 Russian criminal organisations, for example, have 
successfully disrupted the social fabric of territory within the FSU (such as the 
Russian Far East) in order to create an environment that they could control and 
ultimately use to conduct their criminal operations with little interference. Similar 
arguments can be made in response to the societal, economic and environmental 
sectors that Buzan describes. Generally speaking, for Buzan, each of these sectors are 
ielevant only in relation to state actors competing for power in an anarchic 
international system. Thus Buzan, as with other realists and neorealists, failed to 
adequately account for the consequences and trends emerging from globalisation and 
the end of the Cold War. However, although Buzan's work continues to face a 
considerable amount of criticism, the impact People, States and Fear has had on the 
security debate should not be ignored. 
129Buzan (1991), p. 121. 
130Aside from Afghanistan, Burma, Peru and Tajikistan, this is also increasingly evident in the Russian 
Federation (including Chechnya), and Colombia (these last two examples will be expanded in Chapter 
4 and 5). Furthermore, once the organisational stability of the state is completely in question, criminal 
organizations or terrorist groups can legitimize their criminal endeavours by harnessing control of the 
political framework of the state as exemplified in the case of Colombia. 
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Despite the changes brought on by globalisation and the end of the Cold War, the 
nature of international security as defined by traditional realists and neorealists has 
fundamentally remained unchanged. Continued focus on the state as the primary 
level of analysis, coupled with the adamant belief that military dimensions of security 
remain paramount, stand in the way of developing a more methodical understanding 
of contemporary security. The rise of non-state actors, integration of economic 
systems, and the opening of borders are a few realities of the current international 
system that cannot be directly accounted for by the dominant paradigm of 
international relations. With reference to threats emerging from globalisation, Falk 
notes that the "... rise of transnational crime and political violence ... is difficult to 
regulate so long as one relies so heavily on the political will and coercive capabilities 
of traditional sovereign states. The imagination of government bureaucracies is ill- 
adapted to meet the disruptive, extraterritorial threats being mounted. " 131 Therefore 
one task of this thesis is to provide an adapted conceptual framework that incorporates 
realist tenets that have relevance if they are understood in a different context from that 
offered by traditional scholars of the theory. 
Terrorism: the absence of definitional consensus 
Given that terrorism is a tool used primarily by non-state actors, a direct application 
of the dominant realist paradigm does not provide an adequate explanation of its 
existence. This however does mean that terrorism should not be considered part of 
the security agenda. In light of the destructive events 132 through which terrorism is 
13 'Falk (1999), p. 4. 
132 Select examples include the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (December 
1988) killing 259; the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system (March 1995), killing 12 people 
and injuring over 5,000; the bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma (April 1995), killing 168 
people; a string of suicide bombings in Israel that killed 60 people between February and March 1996; 
the attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington (September 
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revealed, the extent to which it poses a threat to security is clear, and will be 
explained in greater depth in Chapter 2. However, as with the notion of 'security' in 
the study of International Relations, 'terrorism' has not received adequate explanation 
in the dominant literature - at least with respect to defining the concept. 
133 As 
Andrew Silke notes, "It seems relatively clear that terrorism research exists in such a 
state and that after over 30 years of enquiry, the field shows little evidence that it is 
capable of making the leap to consistently producing research of genuine explanatory 
and predictive value. "134 This section thus provides an overview and critique of some 
definitions of terrorism, while simultaneously illustrating why traditional security 
mindsets, in their current form, are unable to provide an explanation of this 
phenomenon. 
Through the centuries, the understanding of what constitutes terrorism has evolved 
largely in response to changing political environments. Believed to have originated in 
the first century with the Sicari, 135 terrorism was used almost exclusively as a tool of 
2001), killing around 3,000; and the bombing of nightclubs in Bali (October 2002), killing 
approximately 200. 
133 Reuben Miller, "The Literature of Terrorism-, Terrorism: an International Journal vol. 11, no. 1 
(1988), divided terrorism literature in two general categories: traditional studies and behavioural 
studies. Traditional studies generally deal with historical questions, such as who terrorists are and why 
they use terrorism. Behavioural studies of terrorisniý on the other hand, attempt to explain the 
emergence of terrorism and subsequently how it can be countered. For the most part these studies 
concentrate on psychological profiles of terrorists and terrorist groups, and socioeconomic studies 
seeking answers to the roots of the emergence of terrorist groups and patterns of conflict. Apart from 
these studies of terrorism, the other collection of literature which has attempted to deal with terrorism is 
criminology and criminal justice which actually attempt to deal more specifically with the power and 
implications of terrorism and how it should be countered. For the most part, however, there has been 
little consensus on defining the concept itself - thus allowing for a wide range of literature to emerge 
which is collectively placed under the subject of 'terrorism'. 
134 Andrew Silke, "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism, " 
Terrorism and Political Violence, vo. 13, no. 4 (Winter 200 1), p. 2. 
135 The Sicari were an extreme Jewish faction that emerged after the Roman occupation of Palestine. 
They reportedly attacked their enemies (usually high priests) in broad daylight using a short dagger 
(sica) hidden under their coats. For a more complete discussion of these early terrorists see David C. 
Rapoport, "Religion and Terror. Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots, " in Charles W. Kegley, ed. 
International Terrorism: Characteristics. Causes and Controls- (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 
1990). 
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religious extremist movements. In the eighteenth century, terrorism took on a new 
form as it emerged in France, and elsewhere, amid national tension, revolution and 
social upheaval. It was also during this time that the modem words terror and 
terrorism emerged. 136 During the French Revolution in the 1790s, terrorism was 
associated with revolutionaries who sought to employ the systematic use of terror to 
further their views in France. 'Ibis understanding would later define the tactics of the 
Russian Narodnya Volya (People's Will) which employed a strategy of political 
assassination against the tsarist regime, and to revolutionaries who emerged from 
secret societies in Italy, Ireland, the Balkans, Turkey and Egypt. 
137 It may generally 
be concluded that, prior to the twentieth century, terrorism was a tool employed 
against the political establishment by a minority of revolutionaries who believed that 
killing opponents was more cost effective than any other form of political action. 
138 
However, in response to the rise of revolutionary terrorism, many state authorities 
also subscribed to using terrorism as a means of eliminating potential opposition 
movements. 
The past sixty years has witnessed an explosion of contemporary terrorist motivations. 
Beginning with the 1940s and 1950s, terrorism largely applied to violence conducted 
by nationalist groups fighting against the status quo of colonialism. 
139 Predominantly 
taking place in Muslim countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, terrorism 
became almost synonymous with national or religious struggle. In the 1960s, 
terrorism was employed by nationalist groups, such as the IRA (Irish Republican 
"'These words derived from the Latin verb terrere, to cause to tremble, and deterre, to frighten from. 
137 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 12. 
138 Ibid., p. 16. 
139During this period terrorism was a common tactic used by groups in Malaya, Cyprus, Algeria and 
Palestine. 
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Army) and ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), who were seeking political self- 
determination. Again, in response to a changing political environment, terrorism 
became a tool of ideological 140 groups in the 1970s and 1980s when extreme left and 
right wing groups emerged to try and change the political or economic system of their 
homeland. 141 Although specific terrorist motivations dominated certain segments of 
history, in the 1980s terrorism began to take on an entirely new dimension. From the 
early 1980s through the early years of the 21" century, nationalist, religious and 
millennial, ideological, state, and single-issue terrorism operated simultaneously with 
no single one dominating the scene. In essence terrorism has become a weapon used 
by a wide range of actors around the world. 
But although it may be easy to point to examples of terrorist acts, defining terrorism 
itself is not straightforward. To begin with, the term 'terrorism' has become 
intertwined with 'values'. For example, associating the term 'terrorism' with a 
preconceived judgement (i. e. bad and evil) has clouded the academic exercise of 
seeking to explore roots, causes, organisational dynamics, and security implications 
with minimum prejudice. "Misconceptions and prejudices born in the wake of the 
amorality of terrorist acts - the suffering of victims and the wanton destruction of 
property" can subsequently influence government counter-tefforist policies and 
attitudes. 142 The term 'terrorism' has also been subject to a double standard based on 
an in-group, out-group distinction. As a result, the intricacy of the issue is often 
140 In the context of International Relations, ideology generally refers to a "set of assumptions and ideas 
about social behaviour and social systems" which are often referred to as doctrines. Political ideologies 
are vast and include everything from Marxism, Liberalism and Conservatism, to religious 
fundamentalism, nationalism, and environmentalism. Evans and Newnham, (1992). 
14 'The Red Army Faction in Germany, the Italian Red Brigade, and the Weathermen are examples of 
such groups. 
142 Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research, " in Andrew Silke, ed. Terrorism Research: 
Trends, Achievements and Failures, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 11. 
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undermined in the oversimplified phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's 
freedom fighter'. Finally, terrorism has become embellished with political agendas 143 , 
thus complicating any attempt made at establishing a widely accepted definition. This 
is evident when states such as the U. S. label some groups terrorist, while ignoring the 
terrorist nature of other groups because of political interests. An overview of national 
(i. e. U. S. and U. K. ) lists of proscribed terrorist organisations highlights this 
predicament. Another weakness of most existing definitions of terrorism is that they 
tend to be based on the very specific political agendas of the author - in many cases 
coloured by personal experiences or professional affiliation (i. e. retired military 
officer). As a result, political interests continue to be perpetuated. Furthennore, 
terrorism has mistakenly been associated with everything from common crime to the 
massacre of civilians by military units to the bombing of buildings by anti- 
government dissidents. This imprecise use of the term can largely be attributed to the 
media "whose efforts to communicate an often complex and convoluted message in 
the briefest amount of air-time or print space possible have led to the promiscuous 
labelling of a range of violent acts as 'terrorism. " 144 
A survey of a wide sample of literature on terrorism makes it clear that academics and 
policymakers find defining terrorism a difficult intellectual task. Unfortunately, unlike 
other concepts within the study of International Relations, scholars of terrorism 
cannot be divided into distinct bodies of thought because common assumptions about 
terrorism are not necessarily shared, and most accounts and attempts to define 
terrorism emerge from government bureaucrats or from people with personal 
143 R. Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem", in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart, eds. 
Contemporary Research on Terroris (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 24. 
144Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), p. 13. 
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experience. Furthermore, because the majority of terrorism research is based primarily 
on secondary information, "it is difficult to build theories and paradigms for this 
subject area". 145 As a result, individuals have created their own definitions that tend 
to be framed according to specific political goals and beliefs -a problem noted in the 
previous paragraph. Tbus, in the absence of distinct bodies of thought, one of the 
most coherent ways of assessing existing definitions is by examining the most 
common themes discussed in the literature surveyed, 146 which include: the use of 
violence; the groups' aims and motivations; the choice of targets; the identification of 
the terrorists themselves; and organisational dynamics. 
Violence 
Although most definitions of terrorism mention violence, there is no agreement on 
what violence is and how it should be understood in relation to the phenomenon of 
terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, one of the first scholars in the field of International 
Relations who attempted to define terrorism, refer-red to the violence committed by 
terrorists as indiscriminate, unpredictable, arbitrary and ruthlessly destructive. 147 He 
later refined his description of terrorist violence to include premeditated violence that 
aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror. Furthermore, Wilkinson stated that 
the "acts of violence committed [by terrorists] are seen by the society in which they 
occur as extranormal, in the literal sense that they breach social norms, thus creating a 
sense of outrage. " 148 Richard Falk's definition followed this line of thinking when he 
145 Avishag Gordon, "Terrorism and the Scholarly Communication System, " Terrorism and Political 
Violence, vol. 13, no. 4 (Winter 2001), p. 119. 
1461t should be noted that the literature on terrorism surveyed is in no way exhaustive and that a 
consideration of every definition of terrorism is beyond the parameters of this thesis. Nevertheless, the 
literature selected and discussed within this section includes the work of some of the most prolific 
writers on the subject. 
147 Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrori5M (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 17. 
148Paul Wilkinson, "The Challenge of Terrorism", Conflict, Options and Strategy, (1994), p. 83. 
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asserted that terrorist violence "lacks an adequate moral and legal justification". 149 
The definition provided by Wilkinson and Falk highlight the assumption that 
terrorism is often understood through the political context of the reader's own identity 
and personal values by innately linking the concept to social norms. This view of 
terrorism feeds the notion that terrorism has become intertwined with values, an issue 
previously discussed in relation to the detriment of the field of study. Despite this 
inherent weakness in the definitions provided by Wilkinson and Falk, this 
understanding of terrorism inadvertently critiques realism in that it defies the belief 
that the international system is composed of rational actors who act in specific ways 
when confronted by external pressures. The suggestion that terrorism is 
'unpredictable, arbitrary and ruthless' implies that it is also irrational, and thus does 
not fall into the rational-actor model of realism. 
The idea that terrorist acts have been condemned by the society in which they occur 
as extranormal, and even amoral is only exclusively true for violent acts committed in 
the international domain. For example, the bombing of a French passenger jet over 
Chad in 1989 by Islamic Jihad caused moral outrage throughout France because it 
resulted in 179 fatalities. 150 For groups that operated nationally such a generalisation 
could not always be made. In Peru, Colombia"' and Lebanon, for example, terrorist 
organisations were able to gain public support (to varying degrees) because, in these 
countries state violence was considered to be a historical norm; therefore terrorist 
groups represented a segment of society that sought to overcome state oppression and 
state terror. Some of these terrorist groups also gained legitimacy by providing social 
149Richard A. Falk, "Revolutionaries and Functionaries: the dual face of terrorism", in Kegley, (1990), 
p. 39. 
15OHoffman (1998), p. 190. 
151 The case of Colombia will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Five. 
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welfare programs to targeted communities, programs that the government was either 
unwilling or unable to provide. Historical accounts generally do not argue that groups 
such as M19 and Sendero Luminoso (also referred to as the Shining Path) breached 
social norms within Colombia and Peru respectively, at least during the initial years of 
operation. The opposition to these terrorist groups chiefly came from those who 
wanted to maintain the status quo within their countries, and as a result, subsequently 
found themselves victims of violence perpetrated by the terrorists. The ability of 
terrorist groups to provide an alternative social structure directly questions the realist 
assumption that only the state can guarantee the welfare of its citizens. In this context, 
a terrorist group (i. e. non-state actor) is seen to exhibit the behaviour of a state by 
providing (alternative) social structures, thus underscoring the need to adapt realist 
tenets to accommodate this scenario. 
A second way of relating violence to terrorism emerged from the early works of Brian 
Jenkins. One of his initial definitions described terrorism as including "the threat of 
violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to 
instill fear". 152 Ronald Crelinsten evoked similar understandings of the relationship 
between terrorism and violence by writing that terrorism "is the deliberate use of 
violence and threat of violence to evoke a state of fear". 153 By associating the threat 
of violence with terrorism, as opposed to suggesting that violence is a precondition for 
an act to be considered terrorist, both Jenkins and Crelinsten explicitly highlighted the 
existence of a psychological dimension. After violent acts have been utilised, the 
threat of violence can become a more effective tool than violence itself. This focus on 
152Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: a new mode of conflict, (LA: Crescent Publications, 1975), 
P. 1. 
153 Ronald Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship Between the Controller 
and the Controlled", in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart, eds. Contemporary Research on Terrorism 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1986), p. 6. 
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the psychological dimension of terrorism (i. e. that terrorism is a form of psychological 
warfare) builds on previous attempts made at understanding the nature of the 
terrorism-violence relationship. As a result, the notion that terrorism simultaneously 
incorporates violence and the threat of violence to evoke a sense of fear is a theme 
now used by most academics studying the subject. Comparing this perception of 
terrorist violence with a traditional military understanding of 'psychological warfare' 
highlights the relatively sophisticated nature of the threat posed by non-state and 
internal threats to state security. Contrary to the realist position, the state does not 
only need to be secured from adversarial external states. This embodies the evolution 
of security from a concept that was based on the realist notion of a sharp division 
between the internal and external, to a concept which recognises that the distinction 
between internal and external political dynamics is blurred. 
Despite offering a comprehensive understanding of the role of violence in terrorism, 
both Jenkins and Crelinsten do not clearly draw a distinction between terrorism and 
criminality. Their definition therefore suffers from a degree of imprecision. This is 
evident when Jenkins includes "individual acts of violence" within his definition thus 
implying that isolated incidents of violence, such as arson, murder and armed robbery 
can be terrorist in nature. Jessica Stem makes a similar statement by suggesting that a 
definition of terrorism should be all-inclusive, thus even referring to "murder for its 
own sake. " 154 The intention of neither of these ordinary criminal acts is necessarily to 
produce terror, in many cases they just happen to terrify. On a basic level, such an 
exercise complicates policy prescriptions by confusing the priorities of law 
enforcement and essentially ignoring the larger forces at work in terrorist 
154 Jessica Stem, The Ultimate Terrorists (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 11. 
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operations. 155 Given that the general aim of terrorism is to "generate a prolonged 
condition of anxiety", in order to achieve this aim, acts of violence necessarily have to 
be repeated. 156 The deliberate use of a sustained policy of terror carries with it the 
threat that if certain demands are not met, the violence will continue. Isolated violent 
incidents, on the other hand, pose no further risk to society beyond their immediate 
danger. 157 
More recent definitions written by academics and policy-makers seek to overcome the 
tendency to use value laden terms and to conflate terrorist violence with ordinary 
criminality. Schmidt and Jongman created a relatively comprehensive definition after 
conducting an in-depth analysis of 109 definitions of terrorism from surveys sent to 
academics studying the subject. Although their definition falls prey to numerous 
difficulties that will be discussed later, they do provide some further insight into the 
role of violence. According to Schmidt and Jongman, terrorism "is an anxiety- 
inspiring method of repeated violent action". 158 This statement builds a more 
complete understanding of violence used by terrorists by highlighting that terrorism is 
a repeated action - an isolated act therefore does not constitute terrorism. 
155 Broadening the definition of terrorism to include all forms of criminality defeats the purpose of 
attempting to identify the intricacies of the terrorist phenomenon. By even suggesting, in an academic 
context, that rape can "be seen as a constituent element of an autonomous crime of terrorism, just as 
terrorism can be seen as a necessary ingredient in a violent rape" [H. H. A. Cooper, "Terrorism: the 
Problem of Definition Revisited, " in Harvey Kushner, ed. Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: 
Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21' Century (Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska University 
Press, 2002), p. 5. ], the academic merely adds to the misperceptions; about terrorism that are advanced 
throughout society. Furthermore, this exercise merely undermines the sophistication required for 
authorities to counter the persistence of truly violent and destructive terrorism, such as the September 
I 11h attacks which resulted in the death of over 3,000 people. 
156Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the evolving dynamic. (New York: 
St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996), p. 16. 
157 Ibid., p. 17. 
158Alex Schmidt and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism, (SWIDOC: Amsterdam and Transaction 
Books, 1988), p. 28. 
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Although this was not clear in earlier attempts at defining terrorism, violence is an 
essential characteristic. However, in order not to confuse terrorism with other forms 
of violence it is important to establish some parameters. In light of more recent 
attempts to provide an accurate description of violence and terrorism it may be 
concluded that three elements must be present: the use of violence, the threat of 
violence, and repeated violent acts. Regardless of the form that the violence takes 
(bombings, hijackings, kidnapping, extortion or assassination), terrorism, based on its 
psychological dimensions, continues to work according to the tactical principal, "Kill 
one, ffighten a thousand. " 159 In protracted terrorist campaigns, it is the extent to 
which a group utilises violence that can potentially pose a direct threat to state 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Thus, as will be discussed in the case 
studies of this thesis, contrary to the theoretical assumptions of realism, it is possible 
for nonstate actors to impinge upon the state's authorised and legitimate monopoly on 
the use of violence. 
Tarizets 
A second theme commonly identified within the literature in relation to defining 
terrorism is target selection. Targets are commonly divided into primary and 
legitimate targets. Primary targets represent the ultimate audience over whom the 
terrorists want to exert their influence; this is normally a government or a specific 
national or religious group. Legitimate targets are best described in traditional military 
terminology as 'operational targets'. They are relatively vulnerable and unprotected 
targets that are considered to be worthy of destruction because of the resultant impact 
it would have on the primary target. For example, Western tourists are considered 
159Chal k (1996), p. 19. 
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legitimate targets in Egypt by radical Islamist militant groups seeking to influence 
economic and political policies of Western states. Generally speaking then, terrorist 
groups have a primary target audience whom they are trying to influence (i. e. in this 
case Western governments) by perpetrating violence against an operational target (i. e. 
Western tourists). Within the literature on terrorism, writers generally fall into two 
categories when they describe terrorist targets as part of a general definition of 
terrorism. The first group point to specific segments in society as primary terrorist 
targets, whereas the second group attempts to be more general and inclusive. 
At its most simplistic, terrorist targets are divided into non-combatant (civilian) and 
military personnel. On the one hand Israeli academics tend to focus on the former, 
therefore defining terrorism as "the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against 
civilians or against civilian targets" 
160 and "the deliberate and systematic assault on 
civilians. " 161 By targeting civilians, they argue that the political and ethical norms of 
states that support human welfare are inherently violated. Aside from pointing to 
civilians as the primary targets of terrorism, in many instances academics and policy- 
makers further stipulate that terrorism is only directed against democratic societies. 162 
Military personnel, on the other hand, form a dichotomous target. Although military 
targets are normally considered legitimate within a legal context, they are considered 
victims of terrorism when acts of violence are perpetrated against troops not in 
16('Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter? ", 
www. isn. ethz. ch (December 6,1998). 
16113enjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International 
Terrorisml (New York: Noonday Press, 1995), p. 8. 
162Thackrah (1987), "Terrorism: a Definitional... " asserts that the primary aim of terrorists is to cause 
"instability within democracies. " (p. 41); and Netanyahu (1995), Fighting Terrorism.... regularly notes 
that terrorism is a "form of organised violence directed against democratic societies", p. 7. 
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combat, 163 thus referring to soldiers that are killed "when on leave, eating out in 
restaurants or sleeping in their barracks. " 164 Although it may be argued that military 
personnel are civilians when they are off duty, the reason for isolating them as a 
separate target is to highlight that non-combatants are the focus of most terrorist 
campaigns. Combined with the notion that terrorist violence is usually indiscriminate 
and unpredictable, "all must assume themselves to be potential future targets. " 165 
Attempting to identify and isolate specific groups within society as primary terrorist 
targets adds an unnecessary complication to the understanding of the targeting factor. 
By stating that civilians and off-duty military personnel are the only targets, many 
other potential targets are excluded. For example, can law-enforcement personnel, the 
judiciary, government officials and diplomats be considered 'civilian' together with 
the population at large? If not, does this mean these individuals are never targeted by 
terrorists? Furthermore, by using the term 'civilian' a value judgment is inherently 
made because it exhumes connotations of 'innocent' bystanders, which is not always 
the case (i. e. a prosecutor involved in a case against individual terrorists may not be 
considered 'innocent' by the terrorist group suffering the loss). One way of getting 
around this difficulty of semantics is to use the term 'noncombatants' - thus 
suggesting that terrorist targets are not directly engaged in military combat but that 
163 Acts of violence perpetrated against soldiers on duty are not considered terrorist because soldiers on 
duty are prepared and trained as targets of violence. By arguing that combatants are legitimate targets, 
terrorism becomes confused with guerrilla tactics. The primary difference between terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare is that 'guerrilla' groups have a larger membership of armed individuals "who operate 
as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory" whereas terrorists 
generally "do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize and hold 
territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat". Hoffman (1998), Lnside 
TerrorismI p, 4 1. 
164 Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmidt, "Western Responses to Terrorism: a Twenty-Five Year 
Balance Sheet, " Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992), p. 317. Of the most 
infamous attacks against military personnel was the 1983 Hizbollah suicide-bombing of the US 
Marines barracks in Beirut, killing 241 people. 
165Chalk (1996), p. 14. 
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terrorism is primarily interested in directly targeting referent objects other than the 
state. This therefore highlights the importance of the notion of human security that 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Finally, in suggesting that democracies are the primary targets of terrorist groups, the 
literature implies that undemocratic countries facing terrorism are of no interest. In 
addition to ignoring a history of terrorism in Burma, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
Uzbekistan the potential for terrorism to emerge in other non-democratic countries is 
largely overlooked. This is a dangerous mistake given the nature of the international 
system today. Taking authoritarian countries in the FSU, Latin America and Africa as 
examples, should formidable terrorist groups emerge and pose a serious domestic and 
regional threat, it is highly probable that consequences will spill over into the 
democratic world. For example, relatively easy access to former Soviet arsenals and 
scientists would make nuclear, chemical or biological blackmail a possibility. 166 
Unhindered access to the triborder area in Latin America has also created a location 
where criminals and terrorists can cooperate and/or coordinate international activities 
to the extent that disparate entities and interests could conceivably converge. ' 67 
The problem of identifying specific terrorist targets can be overcome by developing a 
more inclusive understanding of targeting practices. This can generally be done 
through establishing a distinction between the immediate victim and wider audience, 
166 For more information on the potential use of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons 
by terrorist groups, see Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Lacqueur, (1999); and Stem (2000). And 
for an excellent account of the availability of weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet 
Union, see R. W. Lee, Smuggling Armageddon: the Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union 
and Europe, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 
167 John Daly, "The Suspects: The Latin American connection", Jane's Terrorism & Security Monito 
October 2001 and Library of Congress, Terrorism and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area 
(TBA) of South America, Washin2ton. DC. July 2003. 
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and between symbolic targets and targets of opportunity. In his definition of terrorism, 
Wilkinson notes that terrorism is directed at a wider audience than the immediate 
victim, who is chosen as a target randomly or symbolically. 168 A random target thus 
presumes that the immediate victim was merely caught in the 'wrong place at the 
wrong time', whereas a symbolic target suggests that the immediate victim was 
targeted because they represented something larger than themselves - for example a 
diplomat might be targeted because he or she represents a particular state. In 
discussing terrorist targets, Jenkins simply states that normally the intended targets of 
terrorism are the "people watching". 169 Although these are important distinctions to 
make, a more nuanced definition of targeting would permit a greater understanding of 
the subtleties behind the choice of targets by terrorists. Furthermore, it would expand 
the general understanding of terrorist targeting to incorporate the idea that terTorist 
groups carefully select targets that will help them achieve their goals. Historical 
accounts consistently reveal that terrorist groups often chose targets to ensure that 
their message is directed to the intended groups of people, usually the ruling class or 
an opposing religious or ethnic group. For example, Narodnya Volya specifically 
targeted the Tsarist authorities in an attempt to spur a peasants' revolution; the Marxist 
Red Army Faction aimed its actions at the German ruling class by targeting 
businessmen and military officers; and to show their discontent with government in 
the United States of America, militias in the U. S. directly targeted officials of any 
form of government above the county level. 170 By targeting a specific adversarial 
group, terrorists directly inflicted damage on their enemy while sending out a wider 
message. ETA, FARC, the Tamil Tigers and the Red Brigades all assassinated high 
169 Wilkinson (1994), p. 83. 
169 Jenkins (1975). 
170 Hoffman (1998), p. I 11. 
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ranking government officials - thus revealing their ability directly to attack their 
primary target (the goverm-nent). 
A focus on terrorist targeting is an integral component of the definition of terrorism 
because it reveals that there are always multiple audiences for any terrorist act. 
Referred to as 'propaganda of the deed' since the time of the Narodnya Volya, this 
aspect of terrorism highlights that one of the major motivations for utilising the tool of 
terrorism is precisely because it: 
captures the attention of a variety of audiences and allows the terrorist 
to communicate more specific messages tailored to each one. The 
message need not be articulated in words; it can be symbolic (conveyed 
by the target selected, for example) or simply shocking (conveyed by 
the indiscriminate act). 171 
A significant contribution was made with reference to developing an understanding of 
terrorist target selection in the 1980s, with Schmidt and Jongman's distinction 
between symbolic targets (selected) and targets of opportunity (random). 172 This is 
an important advancement because it did not assume that terrorists only directed their 
violence towards innocent bystanders, but also targeted groups of individuals that 
represented their main audience. Furthermore by stating that targets are used to 
"manipulate the main target of attention, turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
demands, or a target of symbolism" 173 it becomes evident that terrorists carefully 
select their targets so that they can be manipulated in order to convey a "complex 
nexus of messages that are clear to everyone. " 174 
17 1 Ronald Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: a Communication Model, " 
Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 84. 
172 Schmidt and Jongman (1988), p. 28. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Crelinsten (2002), p. 84. 
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Target selection is not only an important component of terrorism as a concept; it 
illustrates some important limitations of realism's ability to directly account for this 
phenomenon. First, it shows that the state is not the only actor that needs to be 
secured. Equally important in this respect are individuals, groups of individuals, and 
the international community. This also relates to the destruction of objects by 
terrorists, because targeting buildings or the food chain also creates fear. 175 Second, it 
illustrates that there is an undeniable interplay between the levels of analysis: 
although the primary targets of terrorist acts may be individuals or groups of 
individuals, the symbolism inherent in terrorism has implications that reverberate 
nationally and at times regionally and internationally. 
Aims and Motivations 
Behind the terrorist violence that is directed against targets of opportunity or symbolic 
targets, all terrorist groups are motivated by distinct factors and are trying to achieve 
certain aims through the use of terrorism. Aims and motivations, as they are 
discussed in much of the literature on terrorism, are often differentiated between: 
short term and long term, and between specific and general. 
Considerations of immediate aims are one of the few aspects about terrorism that has 
received widespread agreement - terrorism is primarily used to create a climate of 
"extreme fear or terror". 176 More specifically, the short-term objectives of terrorism 
include attention (focused on the terrorists and their cause through violence); 
acknowledgement (of the terrorist cause); recognition (of the terrorist group as a 
17-5 Jack P. Gibbs, "Conceptualization of TerTorism, " American Sociological Review, vol. 54 (June 
1989), p. 331. 
176 Wilkinson, (1974), p. 17. This is a very basic view that is generally agreed upon within the 
community of terrorism academics and analysts. 
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legitimate spokesman for the cause they represent); authority (to make changes in 
society according to the terrorist group aims); and governance (to eventually 
consolidate their political control). 177 Added to this, shorter term aims of terrorists 
have been defined as "exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an 
audience. "178 Following on from the last point, an associated short-term aim is to 
publicise the group's goals. In this respect, terrorism has been specifically defined as 
"a form of coercive, violent communication". 179 Thus whether or not terrorists 
directly take responsibility for their actions by releasing a communiqu6 - as was the 
case for most of the 1970s and 1980s - their actions in and of themselves are good 
indicators of the aims and motivations of terrorist groups. For example, the September 
11,2001 destruction of the World Trade Centre and the attack against the Pentagon 
could immediately be understood - without a verbal or written claim of responsibility 
- as the result of a grievance against American economic and military power. 
180 
Although the accuracy of these two short-term aims is rarely disputed, academics 
engaged in the study of terrorism do not entirely agree on the long-term goals of 
terrorist groups. Among the most common ways of uncovering these goals has been to 
concentrate on specific typologies, thus essentially arguing that every type of 
terrorism ultimately has different aspirations. Thus unlike the short-term aims, it is 
arguably not possible to pinpoint a common long-term goal that ties all terrorist 
groups together. Despite the many typologies that have been developed over the 
years, six types of terrorism appear most frequently: nationalist/separatist; extreme 
177 Hoffman (1998), pp. 183-84. 
178 Stem (2000), p. 11. 
179 Ronald D. Crelinsten, (2002), p. 83. 
180 In fact, in statements released by Osama bin Laden following the September I Vh attacks, American 
military and economic power in Middle East and American-Israeli relationship were stated as 
justifications for the selected targets. These communiqu6s can be accessed on the Al Jazeera website, 
and translations can be accessed on the Site Institute website. 
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left-wing; extreme right-wing; religious; single-issue; and state terrorism. Generally 
speaking, nationalist-separatist terrorism seeks national self-determination or 
separation (for example, the Irish Republican Army). Extreme left-wing groups 
normally seek Marxist or Maoist objectives, such as an international revolution by the 
proletariat (for example, the Italian Red Brigades). Right-wing groups seek to 
maintain the status quo or defend what they believe to be the national interest (for 
example, militias in the U. S. ). Religious groups generally follow an extreme religious 
dogma, which can include purifying society of 'infidels' or bringing about 
Armageddon (for example, Islamic groups like Hezbollah and millenarian cults like 
the Aurn Shinrikyo). 181 Not interested in changing society as a whole, single issue 
groups promote a single cause that arises within society during a specific time and 
place. The most common examples of single-issue groups include militant 
environmental groups (Earth First! ), some animal rights groups (Animal Liberation 
Front) and various anti-abortion groups that operate in the United States. State 
terrorism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with govenu-nent attempts at 
maintaining total control by suppressing and instilling fear within specific segments 
of that society - usually potential opposition groups. 182 Given the actions of each of 
these groups, it is evident that each presents a formidable threat to state security. 
However, none can be identified exclusively as a threat emanating from outside the 
state, and in most cases they do not necessarily pose a direct military threat to state 
'"This summary was taken from Chalk, (1996), West European Terrorism Hoffman, (1998), Inside 
Terrorism. Kegley, (1990), International Terrorism and Laqueur (1999), The New Terrorism. 
182 For background reading on state terrorism, see, William D. Perdue, Terrorism and the State: A 
Critigue of Domination Through Fea (Praeger Publishers, 1989), and Michael Stohl and George 
Lopez, eds. The State as Terrorist: the Dynamics of Govermnental Violence and Repression, 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984). Specific accounts of state terrorism in Latin America and 
Europe, respectively, are covered extremely well in: Jeffrey Sluka, ed. Death Sguad: The Anthropology 
of State Terror, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), and Paddy Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean 
Hands: ETA. the GAL. and Spanish Democracy, (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001). And for an 
excellent account of state terrorism in the Soviet Union, see, B. Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: sovict 
secret police 1917-1970, (New York: Coward McCann and Geoghegan Inc., 1972). 
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survival - therefore confirming that a strict interpretation of realism is incapable of 
explaining the threat posed by terrorism. 
Discerning various terrorist aims and motivations according to a typology may be 
most useful for a comparative project that seeks to build a more accurate 
understanding of specific groups of terrorists. Such a long list of goals, however, 
hinders any attempt to establish a coherent definition and understanding of the 
terrorist phenomenon in general. As a result, some academics have attempted to 
pinpoint the one, common aim held by all terrorist groups. Crelinsten notes that the 
main motivation of terrorism is simply to maintain or weaken allegiance, Tbackrah 
argues that terrorists seek to change the politico-economic balance of the world, and 
Schmidt and Jongman conclude that terrorism is used "for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons. " 183 Attempts to uncover a single aim inherent to all terrorist groups 
are unsuccessftil largely because they are so broad. For example, Tliackrah makes the 
mistake of assuming that all terrorists want to change the world. Aside from a few 
millenarian groups that began operating in the early 1990s, and the threat emanating 
from the Global Salafist Jihadi Movement, few terrorist groups seek global change - 
for the most part they are only interested in changing the situation within a nation, or 
at most, a region. 
Distinguishing between aims and motivations can help provide a more straightforward 
working definition of terrorism with regard to this component. Boaz Ganor has 
clarified the concept of terrorism by focusing on the political nature of terrorist aims. 
In doing so he notes that the motivation behind the political object is irrelevant to 
183 Schmidt and Jongman (1988), p. 28. 
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understanding the terrorist phenomenon because motives, be they religious, 
ideological or financial, are "empirical regularities" 184 that although they are 
associated with terrorism, they often confuse the analysis of the term. Therefore 
regardless of whether a group is motivated by the word of God, animal rights, or 
profit maximisation, the fact that all such groups use terror tactics to change or 
maintain certain aspects within the domestic, regional or international political system 
is the thread that links all terrorist groups together. As Hoffinan asserts, "Terrorism is 
designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is 
very little. " 185 
Following on from this assertion, regardless of broad aims and motivations, terrorist 
groups primarily seek to ensure that their "influence and control over their constituent 
communities" is never damaged because they depend on a support base - whether that 
be active or passive, direct or indirect. 186 In order to establish and subsequently 
maintain influence over targeted communities, terrorist groups often utilise what Silke 
refers to as 'power resources'. Power resources include: personal power (often 
emerging from a charismatic leader); physical power (using force to 'influence); 
resource power (controlling something that the community wants/needs); and position 
power (also known as 'legitimate' or 'legal' power). 187 It is the extent to which 
terrorist groups are able to assert a combination of all these forms of power that will 
ultimately dictate not only their position within specific communities, but also how 
effective their activities are. Thus as long as a terrorist group successfully asserts 
power via these various avenues, the need to be well-anned in order to be powerful 
194 Ganor (1998). 
185Hoffman (1998), p. 44. 
186 Andrew Silke, "Beating the Water. The Terrorist Search for Power, Control and Authority, " 
Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 76. 
187 Ibid., pp. 78-88. 
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diminishes, as power can be successfully accrued by being "an attentive and aware 
opportunist. "188 Acquiring power resources also contribute to the authority and 
legitimacy attained by a terrorist group within their immediate area of operations. 
Regardless of the motivation of a terrorist group, it is important to understand that the 
aim has always remained constant - terrorism is political. This factor is highlighted in 
Hannon's definition of terrorism: 
terror is not an end in itself, but a means to political power and a way 
to hold political power. The general fear that pervades a political and 
social order, the psychological state of imbalance, and the particular 
and material damage to life and property done by terrorists are 
intended to advance some political purpose, be it short or long-range, 
limited or unlimited. 189 
In attempting to attain various aims and motivations, it may be concluded that most 
terrorist groups in fact seek to assert control over specific segments of territory, or 
over an entire state. As previously stated, this facet further compounds the difficulty 
which realism has in addressing terrorism as a threat that primarily originates from 
non-state actors. Considering terrorist aims and motivations, it is apparent that non- 
state actors are as political as the state itself This, in turn, significantly debilitates the 
realist assumption that the state is the only paramount political actor. The need to 
overcome this limitation of realism is further highlighted in the next section. 
188 Ibid., p. 93. 
'89 Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism TodaL (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. xv. Harmon 
does offer a more sophisticated assessment of the aims of terrorism. In an article published in 2001, he 
argues that there are five strategies of terrorism: the creation of societal dislocation or chaos; 
discrediting or destroying a government; rendering economic damage; rendering military damage; and, 
spreading fear for international effects. These aims are covered in depth in Christopher C. Harmon, 
"Five Strategies of Terrorism, " Small Wars and Insurgencies vol. 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 39-66. 
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The Terrorists 
Although violence, targets, and aims and motivations constitute the defining 
characteristics of terrorism, the ability to identify who is a terrorist further aids in 
clarifying what terrorism is. Unfortunately, as with other aspects of terrorism, 
academics have not reached a consensus on this issue - some argue that individuals 
not attached to a larger group can be terrorists, while others concentrate on organised 
groups. In his book Terrorism and Criminal Justice, published in 1978, Crelinsten 
based his understanding of terrorism on the idea that terrorists are "individuals or 
groups of individuals". 190 Schmidt and Jongman also considered terrorists to be 
"(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors". 191 The argument that an 
individual can be a terrorist faces the same difficulties as the argument that individual 
acts of violence can be terrorism. By using the word 'individual', this definition risks 
the possibility of allowing terrorism to be confused with common criminality, such as 
mass murder and serial rape. According to this criterion, individuals like the 
Unabomber and Carlos the Jackal would be considered terrorist. The Unabomber was 
merely a disgruntled citizen who disagreed with the establishment. 192 To argue that he 
terTorised American society or that he had any considerable long-term aims that 
seriously jeopardised the security of the American state would be difficult. ' 93 Carlos 
the Jackal, on the other hand, was a classic example of an assassin-for-hire, working 
190Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism and Criminal Justice (DC Heath and Company, 1978), pp. 5-6 
191 Schmidt and Jongman (1988), Political Terrorisml p. 28. 
192 For in-depth treatment of the Unabomber and his motivations and actions, see, Ron Arnold, Eco 
Terror: the Violent Agenda to Save Nature - the World of the Unabombe (Free Enterprise Press, 
1997), Alston Chase, Unabomber: the Making of an American Tefforis (W. W. Norton, 2003), and 
John Douglas, The Unabomber, (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1999). 
193 Although it has been argued (in the sources above) that the Unabomber did, in fact, send messages 
to a wider audience through his actions and communiques, because he worked alone the wider 
terrorizing effects of his actions can be compared to those of a mass murderer who leaves written 
messages at their crime scenes and only victimizes women with specific characteristics, such as Ted 
Bundy. Arguably both individuals created a similar degree of terror within society. 
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for the highest bidder. 194 The violent act of an ordinary criminal is not designed to 
have consequences beyond the act itself, nor is it intended to provide a message for a 
wider audience. Instead, the motivations of ordinary criminals are purely selfish and 
personal. 195 
Although some scholars of terrorism argue that a terrorist organisation can consist of 
one individual, over the past decade, that view has commonly been replaced with the 
idea that a group of individuals compose a terrorist organisation. However, consensus 
has not been reached about what types of groups are prone to becoming terrorist. Falk 
argues that terrorists are predominantly revolutionary groups or governments, whereas 
Hoffman argues that they consist of subnational groups and non-state identities. 196 By 
focusing on revolutionary groups as constituting a portion of terrorist organisations, 
Falk excludes a range of other actors. According to Falk's logic groups such as Earth 
First! and Aum Shinrikyo would not be classified as terrorist. Earth First! could not be 
considered terrorist because they are not a revolutionary group in that they do not call 
for a major restructuring of society, but simply want governments and corporations to 
follow strict environmental regulations. Aum Shinrikyo also would not be classified 
as terrorist because it is not revolutionary, nor does it aspire to establish its own 
government; it is a millennial cult advocating the end of the world, and is not 
interested in the restructuring of society, but wants to usher in its complete 
194 This is highlighted in J. Follain, Jackal: the secret wars of Carlos the Jackal (London: Weidenfeld, 
Nicolson, 1998). For more information on the activities of Carlos the Jackal, see also, John Follain, 
Jackal: the Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal (New York: Arcade 
Publishing, 2000), and David Yallop, Tracking the Jackal: the Search for Carlos, the World's Most 
Wanted Man, (New York: Random House USA Inc, 1993). 
195 Hoffman (1998), p. 41. 
196Subnational groups refer to ethnic, nationalist or religious groups that either seek their own state or 
seek to overthrow the status quo. Non-state identities, on the other hand, refer mostly to groups that are 
motivated by something other than ethnicity or religion such as single-issue groups or criminal 
organisations. 
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destruction. Falk is also unable to account for the use of terror as an operational tactic 
by other non-state groups, such as the Italian mafia and the drug cartels of Latin 
America. 
For the most part contemporary terrorism is equated with non-state actors; however, 
governments are also capable of engaging in the use of terror tactics - thus de facto 
constituting a terrorist group. 197 Historically when terror tactics were used by the 
state, they were employed as a tool of military policy to repress the population, 
eliminate opponents and/or break down the enemy. Possessing a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence combined with the authority to assess threats to domestic 
security, states can initiate campaigns of terror at home or abroad as part of their 
security doctrine. 198 Furthermore, when a government's authority and legitimacy is 
directly threatened, they may engage in terrorism as a way of reasserting control over 
their domestic population. This type of state terrorism has most often been identified 
with the Reign of Terror (1793-94) during the French Revolution when the Jacobins 
guillotined and arrested thousands of people in order to eliminate any internal 
counter-revolutionary elements. A more recent example of state terrorism is Stalin's 
Great Purge. 199 This however does not Preclude the support of terrorism and terrorist 
groups by both state officials and states themselves in order to further certain shared 
197 Aside from Falk many other academics believe that governments may be terrorists, including 
Michael Stobl, and Yonah Alexander. 
198Despite international conventions and international law, military campaigns commonly utilise terror 
tactics as part of their effort to weaken the enemy. Although certain acts such as mass rape may seem 
brutal and unnecessary they are unofficially a normal part of warfare. Furthermore, although the 
strategic bombing of power grids, communication centres, and other sites deemed strategic is a tactic 
used by terrorist groups, this does not translate into terrorism if a similar scenario is played out by 
armed military units representing a state. 
199 For an excellent account of state terror during the time of the Soviet Union, see Levytsky, (1972). 
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aims. 200 The terrorists that benefit from state support "should not be confused with the 
bureaucratised agents of state coercion which totalitarian states routinely use to 
induce submission from their own citizens. " 201 An example of state support of 
terrorism is the activities of the Khomeini regime in Iran, 202 which illustrates how 
states can mirror the illegitimacy of terrorist groups, "ignoring the rule of law and 
using stealth and surprise to spread a message of terror and subjugation throughout 
the populace. , 203 The fact that agents of the state can present the greatest single threat 
to citizens, and ultimately the future survival of the state itself, presents yet further 
support for the. argument that realism is unable to adequately explain terrorism. . 
72erational Dvnamics Organisational and 0 
In contrast to the themes in the terrorism literature surveyed in this chapter so far, 
there has been widespread - albeit not total - agreement about how terrorist groups are 
organised, and how their operations are structured. 204 Although the intricacies of 
terrorist groups' organisation do not entirely constitute an integral defining 
characteristic, organisational dynamics are important because they provide good 
indicators of changes taking place within such groups. Awareness of group 
organisation therefore becomes an essential tool that can be used to identify emerging 
trends in the study of terrorism. Furthermore, as will be illustrated in detail in Chapter 
200 For accounts of state sponsored terrorism, see also, Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as 
State-Svonsored Covert Warfare, (New York: Hero Books, 1986), and Raymond Tanter, Rogue 
Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). 
'0' Chalk (1996), p. 21. 
202 Roberta Gurr, The Soviet Union and Terrorism, (London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 
1984), pp. 11-12. 
203 Crelinsten, (2002), p. 87. Less severe versions of state terrorism include the use of torture, political 
killings and disappearances, as exemplified in numerous post-Cold War states, such as Uzbekistan. 
204 As discussed in the section on 'the terrorists', the only area of significant disagreement surrounds 
the question of whether or not individuals could be considered terrorists, or whether terrorism is 
inherently a group dynamic. 
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Tbree, organisational dynamics reflect more significant changes occurring within 
terrorist groups, such as their aims and motivations. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War terrorist groups were commonly organised along 
well-defined hierarchical command and control structures, often with an identifiable 
charismatic leader. 205 Even when terrorist groups utilised cell structures, these cells 
were directly connected with one another. The cell structure of traditional terrorist 
groups has many variations, but tends to be primarily organised around the same 
simple principle wherein each cell is: 
part of a hierarchy and is responsible to a single point of contact above. 
Within each cell, which is typically three to ten persons, a member may 
not even know all of his or her compatriots. When an action is in 
preparation and execution, a person or a cell or a group of cells may act in 
ignorance of the strategic purpose of the action, or even about the full 
dimensions of the organisation which can act decisively and quickl Y. 206 
Despite being organised in cells, the central organisational structure of traditional 
terrorist groups is hierarchical and has an identifiable leadership. 
Because members of traditional terrorist groups belong to an identifiable organisation, 
207 
their objectives are also clearly defined . Furthermore, these groups have always 
been relatively small with most limiting membership to fewer than 50 members. 
Some groups with wider territorial agendas, such as ETA and the IRA, have professed 
to have between 200 and 400 members. A very few - Abu Nidal for example - had 
205 Thomas Copeland, "Is the 'New Terrorism' Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for 
Terrorism, " The Journal of Conflict Studiesl vol. 21, no. 2 (Winter 2001). Hoffman (1998), p. 43, 
directly argues that this organisational aspect of terrorist groups is integral to defining the terrorist 
phenomenon. 
06 Harmon (2000), p. 98. 
207 It is worth noting that it is not the intention of this thesis to argue that traditional terrorist groups no 
longer exist - on the contrary, traditional groups like ETA continue to operate. However, even 
traditional groups evolve over time, and may therefore find it in their interest to evolve. Furthermore, a 
'new' group of terrorist groups have emerged as a result of the changes which have occurred in the 
international system. 
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over 500 members. 208 Professional training was a requirement for members of 
terrorist groups to ensure that operations were not to be compromised by amateurs. As 
a result these traditional terrorist groups often depended on state sponsors to cover the 
financial costs involved in terrorist training, and to organise terrorist acts. 209 For 
example, Iran sponsored Hizbullah to conduct terrorist operations in Lebanon during 
the 1980s under the name of 'Islamic Jihad. 2210 Finally, it was common for these 
groups to issue communiqu6s after conducting acts of terrorism taking credit for the 
211 action and describing it in great detail . Some of these stereotypical traditional 
groups, which are no longer operational, included the Japanese Red Army, the Italian 
Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhoff Gang. Traditional groups that continue to 
operate today include Sendero Luminoso and ETA. 
Taking advantage of the information revolution as it developed through globalisation, 
terrorist groups have learned how to use technological developments to maximise 
their organisational and operational effectiveness. As a result, many groups operating 
in the early years of the twentyý-first century increasingly organised themselves in 
networks 212 which are believed to be'ýmore flexible and responsive than hierarchies in 
reacting to outside developments, and to be better than hierarchies at using 
,, 213 information to improve decision-making. These emerging networks are 
208 Hoffman, (1998), p. 206, cites these figures from the United States Defense Department. 
209 Throughout the 1990s various terrorist training camps were identified throughout the world, 
including several training camps in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, in Yemen, the Sudan, and 
Afghanistan. 
210 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: the Politics of the Western Hostage Crisisl (Basingstoke 
and London: Macmillan, 1997). 
21 1 An excellent account of communiqu6s issued by various European terrorist groups operating in the 
1980s is, Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, Europe's Red Terrorists: the Fighting Communist 
Organisations, (London: Frank Cass, 1992). 
212 The network model of terrorism will be presented in detail in Chapter Two as a part of a larger 
aradigm seeking to explain and understand the changing nature of security in the 21' century. 
" John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militanc , (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 46. 
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"transnational, amorphous and diffuse"214 therefore allowing terrorists to engage in a 
wider range of activities. 2 15 At the same time, however, the motivations of 'new' 
terrorist groups appear to be less comprehensible than traditional groups and their 
structure and membership is scattered 216 throughout the region in which they operate, 
if not throughout the world. Increasingly terrorist groups are treating decentralisation 
as the "prized key"217 of future success. For this very reason the realist security 
paradigm is especially ill-equipped to provide an explanation of the emerging nature 
of terrorism. With networked organisations the blurring between the domestic and 
international levels of analysis becomes even greater, demonstrating that the state can 
no longer focus only on exogenous threats if it is to ensure security. On the contrary, 
states are increasingly forced to focus on threats that emanate inside as well as outside 
of state borders. 
Another important development in the post Cold-War evolution of terrorist groups is 
that a new cadre of terrorist has emerged. Referred to as 'amateur terrorists' by 
Hoffinan, these terrorists lack professional training, but have access to resources and 
others methods of terrorism through a host of informal sources, such as through the 
internet, bookstores, or mail-order publishers. 218 In comparison with their professional 
counterparts, amateur terrorists are equally deadly in their actions, however because 
of their indirect linkages, they have proven even more elusive to track and 
anticipate. 2 19 Furthen-nore, the absence of a strict organisational framework means 
214 Copeland (2001). 
21 5 This is expanded in John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar and 
Information Age Terrorism, " in Ian Lesser, et a]., eds, Countering the New Terrorism, (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1999). 
216 Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects, " in Lesser, et a]. (1999), p. 9. 
217 Hannon (2000), p. 124. 
2'g Hoffman (1998), p. 203. 
219 Hoffman (1999), p. 21. The exemplary example of successful amateur terrorist is Aum Shimikyo 
and their efforts leading to the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995. 
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that amateur terrorists have fewer constraints placed on their actions. Equally 
interesting is the point that professional terrorists appear to have manipulated the 
presence of amateur terrorists - using them as pawns or as expendable operatives. 220 
At the same time, however, professional terrorists have become increasingly 
sophisticated and operationally competent. Even more than in the past, these 
professionals are: 
demonstrably more adept in their tradecraft of death and destruction; 
more formidable in their capacity for tactical modification and 
innovation in their methods of attack; and more able to operate for 
sustained periods while avoiding detection, interception, or capture. 221 
In other words, terrorist groups appear to be constantly learning from their 
predecessors. Tbis, combined with the fact that contemporary groups have developed 
networks that utilise both professional and amateur terrorists, has strengthened the 
efficiency and security of terrorist operations, thereby posing a growing threat to 
states. 
Increasingly since the 1990s this terrorism has revealed a capacity to mirror 
traditional military threats, especially in the context of terrorist groups successfully 
manipulating weak or failed states. For example, the safe haven that Afghanistan 
provided to a variety of terrorist groups made it a likely target of military retribution if 
terrorism posed a threat to Western powers (i. e. the U. S. ). This was the case in former 
U. S. President Bill Clinton's order of missile attacks on Afghanistan following the 
220 Hoffman, (1999) argues that this was the case with a wave of attacks that were perpetrated in France 
between July and October 1995 by the Algerian GIA. Although the professional terrorists of the GIA 
were believed to be responsible for the initial bombings, "like-minded amateurs - recruited by GIA 
operatives from within France's large and increasingly restive Algerian expatriate community - were 
responsible for at least some of the subsequent attacks. " (p. 27). For more detailed accounts of the 
bombing campaign, see Susan Bell, "16 hurt in Paris nail-bomb blast, " Times (London), 18 August, 
1995; Alex Duval Smith, "Police fight 'war' in French suburbs, " Guardian (London), 01 November 
1995; Craig Whitney, "French Police Arrest Suspected Leader of Islamic Militant Group, " New York 
Times, 03 November 1995. 
221 Ibid., p. 25. 
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1998 bombing of U. S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and the U. S. led 'war on 
terrorism' that was initiated by Washington following the September II th terrorist 
attacks that were perpetrated by the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda network. 
Finally, another characteristic of post-Cold War terrorism is the fact that terrorist 
groups no longer regularly claim credit for their actions. As noted earlier, issuing 
communiqu6s was common for most traditional groups operating in the 1970s and 
1980s - especially if the attack was particularly spectacular. 222 Few of the several 
significant terrorist attacks that have taken place since the early 1990s have been 
"credibly claimed - much less explained or justified as terrorist attacks - by the 
groups responsible. 1,223 As Hoffinan succinctly notes: 
The implication of this trend is that violence for some terrorist groups is 
perhaps becoming less a means to an end (that therefore has to be 
tailored and explained and justified to the public) than an end in itself 
that does not require any wider explanation or justification beyond the 
group's members themselves and perhaps their followers. Such a trait 
would confonn not only to the motivations of religious terrorists but also 
to terrorist "spoilere' - e. g., groups bent on disrupting or sabotaging 
negotiations or the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts. 224 
Although violence, targets, aims and motivations, the identification of terrorists, and 
organisational dynamics are common themes raised in definitions of terrorism, it is 
evident that most academics do not arrive at the same conclusions. This selective 
survey of existing definitions reveals the confusion surrounding analysis of the 
terTorist phenomenon. Since 1989, the search for a common definition unfortunately 
222 'Spectacular' attacks generally refer to acts of terrorism that are especially destructive or lethal. 
223 Hoffman (1999), pp. 27-28. Included among the attacks that were never claimed were the 1995 sarin 
gas attack on the Tokyo subway system; the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Office Building in 
Oklahoma; and the series of Bombay car bombings that killed 317 people in 1993. For a more in-depth 
discussion of why terrorists are no longer claiming credit for their attacks, see Bruce Hoffman, "Why 
Terrorists Don't Claim Credit - An Editorial Comment, " Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 9, no. I 
(Spring 1997). 
224 Hoffman (1999), p. 2 8. 
89 
has received little attention, and it appears as though academics and policy-makers 
have agreed to disagree. The inability to reach definitional consensus has been 
worsened as a result of changes occurring within terrorist organisations as a result of 
globalisation and the end of the Cold War. 
Globalisation, for example, has directly altered the terrorist phenomenon in a number 
of ways, 225 the most evident being that through the speed and ease of transportation 
and communication systems terrorism has become an international phenomenon. 
Aside from giving terrorists the opportunity to conduct violent acts with ease in 
several different countries, terrorists have utilised the media as a way to broadcast 
their aims and heighten the feeling of terror produced. The international nature of 
terrorism and media coverage of incidents has also arguably resulted in a 'copy-cat' 
effect, wherein a wide-range of previously non-violent groups turn to the use of 
terrorist tactics to advance their own political goals. This has been the case in the 
United States where militias turned to the use of terrorism against the state - 
epitornised in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City 
which killed 168 people. 226 
One of the greatest dangers associated with the evolution of the nature of terrorism is 
that the term itself has become increasingly complex. As previously mentioned, acts 
ranging from murder and rape to armed robberies and hijackings are commonly 
included as part of the terrorist phenomenon - especially by the popular press. Not 
225This is not a new argument, Hoffman (1998) and Laqueur (1999), for example, discuss the impact of 
international changes on terrorism. 
226 Bruce Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism, " Studies in Conflict and Terroriým, vol. 24, 
no. 5 (2001), p. 427. The development of domestic terrorism in the United States is covered well in, 
James Motley, U. S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism, (Diane Publishing Company, 
1993), and Robert Snow, Terrorists Among Us: the Militia Threat, (Perseus Books, 2002). 
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only has this weakened the ability of most states to deal with terrorist incidents, but 
the absence of a concrete understanding of what constitutes terrorism has placed 
society in general at the mercy of those who intentionally use the term to gain support 
for their own political ends. For example, prior to their second military campaign in 
Chechnya in 1999 Russian authorities regularly referred to the need to counter the 
emergence of destructive terrorist forces without being able to prove the existence of 
terrorist groups or connect alleged terrorist attacks on Russian soil with these 
groups- 227 
If the notion of terrorism is to be clarified, it must be approached with as few 
preconceptions as possible, and viewed with less emotion. As with murder, 
assassination and kidnapping, there should be no misunderstanding as to what 
constitutes terrorism - regardless of who the terrorists are, where they conduct their 
operations, and what motivates them. With the knowledge that, through the process of 
globalisation, terrorism in one state has repercussions in others, it is in the interest of 
the international community to have a clear understanding of the term. At the very 
least, a list of common characteristics that are essential for differentiating terrorism 
from other forms of criminality or warfare should be a priority for academics and 
policy makers. Thus based on the changing nature of the international system and 
international society, a working definition 228 of terrorism can be outlined. Terrorism, 
227 More explicit examples of this will be presented in Chapter Four. 
228 The importance of outlining a working definition of terrorism cannot be underestimated. As Stem 
(2000), p. 12 notes, definitions are essential for two reasons: they determine the data researchers collect 
and analyse, thus influencing our understanding of trends and predictions for the future; and, 
definitions influence how we respond to terrorism. 
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within the context of this thesis, explicitly refers to a phenomenon that includes the 
following five characteristics: 229 
1) Terrorism is the conduct of premeditated violent acts or the threat of violence 
that is perpetrated by members of an organised group. 230 As a result, an 
isolated incident caused by an individual is not referred to as terrorist. 
2) Terrorism is designed to create fear among an adversary or specific segment of 
society. 
231 Fear is the intended result of terrorism, not a by-product. 
232 
Therefore, terrorism is a tool of intimidation and/or coercion. 
3) Terrorism is used to achieve a predetermined political objective, normally an 
attempt to influence political behaviour. 233 
4) Because terrorism is political in nature it is often discretionary, therefore 
terrorists will often choose their targets carefully. 234 
5) Although the ultimate goal of terrorism may be to destroy the group's 
opposition, terrorism is primarily concerned with breaking the will of its 
enemy and forcing it to submit to the group's demands. 
229 As Cooper (2002), p. 3 accurately notes in his discussion of the problems of terrorism definitions: 
"whatever the discrepancies detected by others, the definitions at least provide starting points for 
debate. " Given the sheer volume of definitions of terrorism that abound in a variety of academic 
disciplines, this caveat should necessarily accompany any attempt to define terrorism. 
230 An organised group refers to two or more people who come together to plan and execute acts of 
violence. More specifically, terrorist organisations are normally hierarchical in nature and organised 
into cells. Not only does this ensure greater secrecy, but it also protects the identity of the leadership. 
23 1 This characteristic emerges from the arguments of the Copenhagen School and Post-Realism 
(explained in greater detail in Chapter Two) which assert that the state is not the only referent object 
with respect to security. Thus, as this point implies, referent objects can include specific individuals, 
social groups, the state itself, or components of international society. 
232 Based on this characteristic, although ordinary criminality (arson, murder, rape, etc. ) may terrorise 
the direct victim, they may not be considered terrorist because fear is only a by-product of the criminal 
act itself. 
233 This characteristic highlights the importance placed on the element extracted from Subaltern 
Realism (explained in detail in Chapter Two) which asserts that the state remains an essential 
component of security despite the changing international environment. Although terrorism may be 
perpetrated against individuals, groups, the state or international society in general, most terrorist 
groups conduct their actions in order to influence the political behaviour of a specific state or group of 
states. It is therefore important to highlight the fact that the state continues to play an important role in 
understanding what terrorism encompasses. 
234 Although terrorist targets may appear to be randomly chosen by the victims of the attack, targets are 
normally carefully chosen depending on the message the terrorist group wants to send. 
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Organised Crime: the 'Godfather Syndrome' 
As with the concepts of 'security' and 'terrorism', outdated perceptions about the term 
'organised crime'also persist. Understood in a traditional framework, organised crime 
is still largely viewed as groups of criminals motivated solely by the prospect of 
financial gain with the assumption that the implications of their actions are restricted 
to the state in which they operate. Defined as such, organised crime does not present 
an international security threat; nor does it present a threat to the sovereign state 
because it is not in its interest to replace the state or its functions. After providing an 
outline of the dominant understanding of organised crime, this section will assess the 
impacts of globalisation and the end of the Cold War have had on it, and argue that 
the evolving nature of organised crime can no longer be explained using traditional 
mindsets. Taking advantage of international changes, organised crime in the post- 
Cold War era poses a threat to security at every conceivable level: individual, state, 
and regional and to international society itself. 235 As with the previous section, the 
inadequacies of realism in contributing a direct explanation of the threat posed by 
organised crime will be simultaneously presented, where applicable. 
A survey of early literature addresses organised crime reveals that it was largely 
understood from a classic criminology perspective. 236 As a result, developments in 
international society or the international system were not considered important 
enough to warrant a change in the way that organised crime was understood by 
235 This aspect will be expanded in Chapter 2. The main purpose of this section is to question the 
traditional understanding of organised crime given the opportunities that have emerged for criminal 
enterprises from globalisation and the end of the Cold War. 
236 Classic criminology refers to an academic discipline that focuses on crime and criminality within 
the state, and specifically within communities. As a result of focusing on micro-levels of analysis, 
criminology generally defines crime as any action that defies the criminal code of the state in question. 
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governments and most academics who studied the subject. 237 Organised crime was, 
and largely remains, commonly viewed as one of a number of criminal deviances that 
occur at a local level. Historically, it is a concept that emerged in the United States on 
the eve of prohibition, coined by the Kefauver Commission on interstate criminal 
commerce. The definition of the term almost exclusively emphasised "the pursuit of 
illicit profits through a group actiVity.,, 238 TbiS focus on the economic dimension of 
organised crime persisted and was further emphasised when the United Nations 
adopted the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Despite international 
developments, the UN adopted a traditional definition of organised crime that is 
outlined in Article 2 of the convention as "a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing 
one or more serious crime or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit. "239 
Most of the academic literature on organised crime appeared in the 1970s and largely 
emanated from North America and Italy. North American academic literature was 
mainly based on investigations into the mafia as it emerged and developed in the 
United States. As a consequence of these origins, organised crime was understood as 
a centralized, family based group that controlled specific illegal markets to gain 
financial profit. 240 This view, promoted by Abadinsky, argues that organised crime 
groups have ethnic consistency, further suggesting that organised crime is used as an 
237 Emilio C. Viano, Global Organised Crime and International Security, (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., 1999), p. 2. 
23g Fabio Armao, "A 'Standard' Crime: Why Mafia Win Success, " paper presented at the Workshop on 
Organised Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, EPCR 29th Joint Sessions Conference, Grenoble, 
France, 6-11 April 200 1. 
239 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 2; this document can be 
accessed at: http: //www. unodc. org/unodc/en/crime - 
cicp_convention. htmi (February 2005). 
240Maria Luisa Cesoni, "Mafia-Type Organizations: the Restoration of Rights as a Preventive Policy, " 
in Viano, ibid., p. 158-9. 
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instrument of social advancement for underprivileged minorities. 241 Italian literature, 
on the other hand, was based on socio-economic models of the national mafla, 
wherein criminality was an indulgence of the powerful to be used as a business 
undertaking that was almost entrepreneurial in nature. 242 
The term 'mafia' 243 itself has been traced back to ninth century Sicily when it was 
under the rule of Arab invaders, and the mafia came to be known as a patriotic 
clandestine society that conducted guerrilla warfare from the hillside against foreign 
invaders. The 'mafia! remained a politically motivated secret society throughout the 
nineteenth century when its primary purpose was to offer justice and protection to the 
peasants of Italy 244 from wealthy absentee landlords. At this stage, primarily because 
of its political focus, the Sicilian mafia could be considered more terrorist than 
criminal in nature. However by the end of the century the mafia found it financially 
advantageous to work with the landowners, thus beginning a long relationship 
between mafia groups and the Italian bureaucracy. 245 
Despite considerable political experience with organised. crime groups, 246 Italian 
academics viewed the mafia simply as a group of people organised around 'familial' 
241 Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, (Chicago, Illinois: Nelson Hall, 1990). 
242 Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, (New York: Appleton, 1971), p. 12. 
243'Mafia' is an Arabic word that translates to'place of refuge, originally referring to the hillside refuges 
where oppressed Sicilian inhabitants fled to escape their Arab rulers. The same thing happened during 
the eleventh and fifteenth centuries when the Sicilians were faced with Norman and Spanish invaders, 
respectively. See Jay Rober Nash, World EncycloMdia of Organized Crime (London: Headline Book 
Publishing, 1995,2nd edition), p. 476. 
244This is true for the two oldest mafia groups in Italy, the Sicilians and the Calabrians. 
245 For accounts of the rise of the Sicilian mafia, see, A. Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village: 1860- 
1960 ' (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the Business 
of Private Protection (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
246 The political nature of organised crime throughout its history in Italy will be discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
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syndicates in order to profit from illegal enterprise. 247 Organised crime, and more 
specifically the term 'mafia!, referred to the methods or modus operandi of criminal 
endeavour with three components: the use of force, intimidation or threats; a 
hierarchical structure that was maintained through the use of secrecy; and the 
assurance of political protection from the legal structure to ensure continuity over 
time. 248 As a result the Italian penal code finally defined organised crime in 1982 as a 
group whose 
members make use of intimidation derived from their association, and 
the ensuing subjection and 'gagging' in order to commit crimes or to 
manage either directly or indirectly, or otherwise control, business 
activities, concessions, authorizations, public markets or public 
services, or to obtain unfair profits or advantages for themselves or 
others. 249 
The American experience with organised crime, on the other hand, began in the late 
1800s. Although the Italians did not form the first organised crime groups in the U. S., 
the extent of violence and activities perpetrated by Italian groups convinced the 
American government that organised crime was solely a problem brought to the 
United States from Italy. Thus the first official definition of organised crime was 
therefore based on the Italian model. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, included in the United States Federal Statutes, defines organised crime 
as "the unlawful activities of members of a highly organised, disciplined association 
engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to 
gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labour racketeering, and other 
unlawful activities of members of such associations. " 
250 More advanced academic 
247David L. Carter, "International Organised Crime: emerging trends in entrepreneurial crime, " in 
Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds. Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: a 
reade (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1997), p. 136. 
248A]bini (197 1), p. 88. 
249Cesoni (1999), pp. 160- 1. 
25OQuoted in Sabrina Adamoli, Andrea diNicola, and Ernesto U. Savona, Or-ganised Crimg Around the 
World (Helsinki: HEUNI, 1998), p. 4. 
96 
research into the organised crime phenomenon in the United States, however, did not 
emerge until the early 1970s when a group of scholars began to question the notion 
that organised crime was an entirely Italian enterprise. As a result academics 
including Joseph Albini, Francis lanni and Elizabeth Reuss-lanni began to look at 
other ethnic criminal groups 251 in order to find common defining characteristics. On a 
general level, four essential characteristics can be extracted from their work: the use 
of violence; the use of corruption; continuity over time; and engagement in a variety 
of types of crimes. 252 
Given the rising interest in defining and understanding the notion of organised crime, 
especially within American academia, quite comprehensive definitions of organised 
crime eventually emerged. One of the definitions most commonly referred to within 
texts on organised crime originated in the works of criminologist Howard Abadinsky. 
According to Abadinsky, all organised crime groups may be defined as: 
A non-ideological enterprise that involves a number of persons in close 
social interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis for the purpose of 
securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities. 
Positions in the hierarchy and positions involving functional 
specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or fhendship, or 
rationally assigned according to skill. Permanency is assumed by the 
members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in 
pursuit of goals. It eschews competition and strives for monopoly over 
particular activities on an industry or territorial basis. There is a 
willingness to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or maintain 
discipline. Membership is restricted, although non-members may be 
involved on a contingency basis. " 253 
25'The organised crime groups primarily researched were Irish, American, Jewish, African, Colombian 
and Chinese. 
252Compiled from Albini (1971) and Francis lanni and Elizabeth Reuss-Tanni, A Family Business: 
Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crim (New York: Russell Sage, 1972). 
253 Abadinsky (1990), p. 7. 
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Following along the lines of Abadinsky's definition, a survey of the work of a group 
of other academics 254 suggests that a more specific list of common characteristics of 
organised crime exists. First, as Abadinsky quickly points out, organised crime groups 
are non ideological. Second, because they are able to adapt in order to meet demands 
for their services, organised crime groups have continuity over time. Third, the 
adaptability of organised crime is facilitated by a social history of corruption and a 
significant control over given territory in which it can operate freely and profitably. 
Fourth, organised crime is at its most efficient when membership is restricted, 
commonly along ethnic ties. Finally, organised criminal groups are hierarchical in 
nature with a top command that is able to coordinate and implement a variety of tasks 
including the use of force, recruitment, control of profits, corruption of key 
government officials and civil society, and the enforcement of group loyalty. 
Although the identification of the essential characteristics of an organised. criminal 
group largely emerged from the United States based on the American experience with 
such groups, the common definitional characteristics discussed above were also 
relevant to organised crime as it exists elsewhere in the world. Thus similarities 
between the Colombian drug cartels, Japanese Yakuza, Chinese Triads, and other 
groups based in Nigeria, Turkey, and even Albania can be discerned. 255 What the 
254 Anthony Maingot, "The Decentralization Imperative and Caribbean Criminal Enterprises, " in Tom J. 
Farer, ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book, (New York: 
Routledge, 1999) p. 150. The references he uses to compile his list of characteristics are F. Hagan, 
"The Organized Crime Continuum: a further specification of a new conceptual model, " Criminal 
Justice Review no. 8 (1983): 52-58; M. Maltz, "On Defining Organized Crime, " Crime and 
Delinquency, no. 22 (1976): 33846; Dennis J. Kenny and James 0. Fluckenauer, Organized Crime in 
America (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995); and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia, (Harvard 
University Press, 1996). 
255 For some examples of similarities between traditional criminal groups, see, Gambetta, (1996), 
David Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: the Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld 
(London: Robert Hale Press, 2003), Robert Kelly, Encyclopaedia of Organized Crime in the United 
States: From Capone's Chicago to the New Urban Underworld, (New Haven, Connecticut: Greenwood 
98 
above definitions of organised crime have in common is that they regard organised 
crime as a domestic problem - one that emerges within a state, and conducts criminal 
actions within state borders. This understanding of organised crime, however, is out- 
dated in light of the changes that have occurred in the world since 1989. 
The growth of economies of production and the evolving financial infrastructure, the 
decline of the sovereign nation-state, immigration, border porosity, trends in 
technology, and the relative disorganisation of law enforcement in newly independent 
states have presented significant opportunities for 'old' and emerging criminal 
organisations alike. 256 And while the operational success of many groups was 
improved by taking advantage of at least one of these factors, those that took 
advantage of several changes in the international system experienced an 
unprecedented evolution. As will be seen from the discussion that follows, it can be 
concluded that the traditional understanding of organised crime no longer accurately 
describes organised crime in the early years of the twenty-first century. The threat 
posed by organised crime has escalated from that of local menace to security threat, 
posing a direct challenge to national and international security. 
Economies ofProduction, The Financial Infrastmaure & Global Markets 
The idea of economies of production 257 related to criminal organisations is not a new 
concept. For example, since the 1970s peasant farmers in Latin America have been 
growing drug crops for the drug cartels because they were more profitable than other 
agricultural commodities, and there was a stable demand for drug-crops as consumer 
Press, 2000), and Dian Murray and Qin Baoqi, The Origins of the Tiandihui: the Chinese Triads in 
Legend and Histo , (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994). 
256 Ibid., pp. 28-30. 
257 This concept generally refers to the notion that people and corporations will choose to produce a 
commodity that is the most profitable. 
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demands rose. Economies of production, in the context of the international drug trade, 
have produced an extremely lucrative commodity sold on the black economy. Similar 
to the Latin American predicament, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
introduction of a market economy led to an unprecedented growth in the informal 
economy in the FSU. Although the informal economy existed throughout the Soviet 
era, by the early 1990s it had arguably become the cornerstone of the livelihood of 
communities in many post-Soviet states. This can partially be attributed to the growth 
of the global market for illicit narcotics during the 1990s, 258 resulting in increasing 
demands for raw materials used in drug production. For example, with the dissolution 
of the Soviet empire, the Central Asian republics experienced a rapid growth in the 
number of organised criminal groups operating within the region to gain a foothold in 
the expanding drug trade. 259 Given the dire economic situation within Central Asia, 
organised criminal groups easily persuaded local farmers to grow and cultivate drug- 
crops, or to act as drug 'mules'. The situation grew to such an extent that, in and 
around the city of Osh, Kyrgyzstan alone, tens of thousands of people became 
involved in the growing, processing and transportation of raw opium. 260 Although 
illicit narcotics provide the most obvious example of economies of production in 
relation to criminal markets, a list of other commodities are also relevant to this 
argument. For example, given the lucrative nature of the diamond trade in several 
Afirican states, such as Angola and Sierra Leone, the illicit trade in diamonds (with the 
258 For specific statistics illustrating rising global drug demand, see the United Nations Annual Drug 
Reports available at: http: //www. odccp. org. 
259 The drug trade expanded in Central Asia because of increased cultivation and production originating 
from Afghanistan. By the mid-1990s Afghanistan was responsible for supplying over 80 per cent of 
global opium stocks. More information about the expansion of the Afghan market can be found in the 
various publications on Afghanistan released by the United Nations Drug Control Programme annually. 
These reports are available on http: //www. odccp. org. 
2'OA]exander Zelichenko, "Drug Situation in Central Asia, " The Times of Central Asia vol. 1, no. 11 
(20 May 1999), p. 12. 
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illegal trade in timber) formed a cornerstone of the informal economy in these 
are . 
261 
Another important component of the global economy that has provided unprecedented 
opportunities for organised crime is its financial infrastructure. The emergence and 
development of a global financial system and offshore banking has provided 
opportunities for the transfer of legal and illegal funds in an environment that is 
extremely difficult for governments to control or track. Facilitated by improvements 
in communication, computer technology and transportation, the offshore banking 
world has become a "Bermuda Triangle". 
262 In other words, because of sophisticated 
technology that has emerged relatively recently, criminal organisations are able to "set 
up a complex system of concealment by e-mail, fax, and phone from anywhere in the 
world. If a government is hot on the trail of a criminal's assets, skilled launderers can 
move it from one financial maze to another in seconds. " 
263 As a result of taking 
advantage of these technological advances and prevailing financial environment, 
organised crime has progressively posed an increasing threat to the sovereign state. 
The ability of criminal organisations to coordinate transnational operations directly 
challenges the ability of the sovereign state to control non-military security threats 
within its borders. This further highlights the need for realism to overcome its 
261 Nicholas Shaxson, "Transparency in the International Diamond Trade, " Global Corruption Report 
2001, (Transparency International). For more information, refer to: Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: 
Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stonesl (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
2002); Christian Dietrich, "Blood Diamonds: Effective African-Based Monopolies, " African Security 
Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (2001); and, Assis Malaquias, -Diamonds are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: the 
impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy, " Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 3 (2001). 
262 Jack A. Blum, "Offshore Money, " in Farer, (1999), p. 62. 
263 Ibid., pp. 61-62. For a detailed account of the intricacies of the money-laundering process, see, Peter 
Lilley, Dirty Dealing: the untold truth about global money launderim, (London: Kogan Page Ltd., 
London, 2000). 
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predilection for an exclusive focus on the state as the only actor in security, and treat 
non-state actors equally in the security equation. 
Immijzration & Border Poros 
In addition (and to some degree associated with) transformations in the global 
economy, immigration and the porosity of borders has also significantly altered the 
ways in which organised crime operates and is organised. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the reduction of regional barriers to trade and financing, the establishment of 
free trade zones and the lowering of passport controls throughout Europe and the 
foriner Soviet Union have all added to the opportunities seized upon by organised 
crime, and the challenges posed to the primacy of the nation-state in the realm of 
international politics. 
Although, for example, Italian mafia groups and Chinese triads have taken advantage 
of immigrant communities in the United States throughout the twentieth century, 
increases in immigrants after the Cold War proved to be an important resource and an 
additional lucrative source of income for various other organised criminal groups. For 
example, Russian communities in North America and Israel have provided the 
foundation for Russian organised crime to extend their activities into these 
countries. 264 Border porosity, on the other hand, has essentially guaranteed the ease 
and speed of cross border travel, thus providing new market opportunities for 
criminals and making it easier for them to avoid arrest - especially given that their 
only adversaries are states that "still conduct most of their activities through 
264 See Mark Galeotti, "Russia's criminals go global", and "Israel - Mafiya Promised Land", Jane's 
Intelligence Review vol. 12, no. 3 (March 2000). 
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,, 265 functional and geographic bureaucratic hierarchies. This freedom of mobility has 
allowed Russian organised crime to enter markets in Europe and Asia and develop 
easy smuggling routes for contraband, thus strengthening their position as leading 
actors within the world of organised crime. The emerging nature of organised crime is 
therefore inherently free of state boundaries, "in that they trail their activities across 
,, 266 several jurisdictions. 
Similarly, Colombian drug cartels have also taken advantage of the opening of 
borders to find alternative ways to secure their drug production and trafficking 
operations and to expand the global cocaine market. 267 Since the early 1990s 
Colombian cartels began to penetrate their neighbours' borders - namely Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru - to diversify their risks. 
268 As a result, the entire region is finding 
itself faced with a similar threat; a threat that may emanate from one particular state, 
but necessarily affects the others as a result of its actions. Furthermore, Colombian 
cartels have also successfully taken advantage of the opening of borders in the 
European Union 269 and throughout the FSU to expand the global cocaine market. 
Historically cocaine has not been a common drug in Europe or the FSU, and demand 
is relatively low in comparison with the U. S., but there have been indications that 
Colombian attempts have met with success. This indicates that it would be a mistake 
265 James Rosenau, Turbulence in World PoliticsI (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1989). 
266 Jamieson (2001), p. 378. 
267 For an excellent overview of how the opening of borders, combined with the deregulation of the 
transportation and financial sectors have helped the illicit drug trade, see, Stephen E. Flynn, "The 
Global Drug Trade Versus the Nation State: Why the Thugs are Winning, " in Cusimano (2000), pp. 49- 
53. 
268 The impact of the movement of Colombian cartels is illustrated in the following articles: "Bolivia: 
War on Coca, Discredited Political System, " Geopolitical Drug Watch, no. 7 (April 2002), and "Peru: 
Disastrous Legacy, " Geopolitical Drug Watch no. 2 (November 2001). 
269 "Spain: the New Route of Colombian Traffickers, " Geopolitical Drug Watch, no. 1, (July/August 
2001). See also the United Nations World Drug Report, (Vienna: Office for Drugs and Crime 
Prevention, 2002). 
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to continue to believe "that the international system is the sum of its nation-states" 
because drugs and other illicit commodities are "trafficked by nonstate actors who 
find borders essentially meaninglesS.,, 270 Furthermore the existence of state borders in 
light of an increasingly interconnected world creates numerous other opportunities for 
the expansion of crime by "generating variations in levels of taxations, 
'subsidisation', and prohibition, by creating problems of legal jurisdiction, and by 
raising investigative CoStS.,, 271 
International Unzovernabili 
International ungovernability is probably the most important factor that has 
transformed the understanding of contemporary organised crime. Generally speaking 
this refers to the growing inability of states to govern, manage, and provide adequate 
or effective services to its citizens, 272 thus directly calling into question the relevance 
of the Westphalian state system in the twenty-first century. According to William 
Olson, there are twelve common features of the nature of ungovernability 273 that 
highlight the potential problems associated with such a crisis of governance. These 
include the declining ability of governments to build and maintain infrastructure 
(from social services to roads and railways); collapsing economies giving rise to 
informal and illegal economies; increasing goverm-nent corruption; incompetent state 
institutions that can no longer protect individuals; bloated government sectors that 
270 Flynn (2000), pp. 4546. 
271 Monica Serrano, "Transnational Organised Crime and International Security: Business as Usual, " in 
Matts Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. Transnational Organised Crime and International Security, p. 
16. 




These features of ungovernability are not entirely new as nation-states throughout the past have 
experienced a crisis of governance based on a combination of these factors. However, since the fall of 
the Soviet Union, as opposed to the last century, the world has experienced a rising number of states 
faced with the inability to govern. Exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union, international 
ungovemability seems to be becoming the norm within Latin America, Africa, and the FSU. 
104 
absorb more resources but produce less service; rising levels of social violence; 
disappearance of the rule of law with a simultaneous rise in arbitrary government 
authority; the personalisation of politics wherein politics is not seen as a shared 
experience but as something used for personal gain; declining sense of shared values 
or purpose; growing risk of separatist, religious or ethnic identities; lack of 
willingness to compromise; and the decline of any credible means to mediate 
interparty disputes. As discussed above, ungovernability in this context is one factor 
responsible for the rise in the number of weak, failing and failed states in the 
international system. 
The connection between the crisis of governance and the evolution and growth of 
organised crime can be highlighted, more specifically, within the context of the 
former Soviet Union (notably the Russian Federation), and Latin America; but also in 
Africa and South/Southeast Asia. For example, although the traditions and sources of 
criminal grievances in Russia were established and developed before the fall of the 
Soviet Union, 274 the collapse of the existing structures of authority and legitimacy 
provided a necessary opportunity for the emergence of Russian organised crime 
(ROC). For example, the rapid erosion of central authority - reducing the ability of the 
government to build and maintain the state's infrastructure - played an important role 
in opening the doors for ROC. Centrally controlled law enforcement deteriorated and 
the entire criminal justice system essentially collapsed, thus granting criminal 
274 For more information on the historical arguments explaining the emergence of Russian organised 
crime see Joseph D. Serio and Vyacheslav Razinkin, "Thieves Professing the Code: The Traditional 
Role of Vory v Zakone in Russia's Criminal World and Adaptations to a New Social Reality, " Low 
Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcemen vol. 4, no. I (Summer 1995), Joseph Serio, "Organised Crime 
in the Soviet Union and Beyond, " Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcemen , vol. 1, no. 
2 (Autumn 
1992), Mark Galeotti, "Organised Crime in Moscow and Russian National Security, " Low Intensity 
Conflict and Law Enforcemen vol. 1, no. 3 (Winter 1992), and Phil Williams, "Introduction: How 
Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime? " Transnational Organized Crime vol. 2, nos. 2/3 
(Summer/Autumn 1996). 
105 
organisations an ideal opportunity to take advantage of minimal border controls, 
inconsistent legal norms, and limited coordination among the justice systems of the 
successor states. 275 
Furthermore, the failure of Russia and the other Soviet successor states to provide a 
regulatory framework for the transition to and management of a new economic system 
resulted in the collapse of a number of domestic economies. The transition to a market 
economy and initial efforts at privatisation therefore invited criminal participation 
because criminal structures were the only ones with the capital required for 
investment. This allowed ROC to infiltrate and control key sectors of the national 
economies of the former Soviet republics. Thus aside from gaining a considerable 
foothold over the illicit economy, Russian organised crime has made considerable 
inroads in the legitimate economies of the FSU. Successes in illegal business 
conducted largely by Russian criminal groups led to growth in the Russian black 
economy by a factor of two between 1994 and 1996, whereas the formal economy 
decreased by ten per cent. 276 As will be argued in Chapter Four, the rise of ROC has 
directly threatened the survival of the Russian state on a number of fronts, including 
economic, social and political. More importantly at this point, the dynamics of ROC 
and other criminal organisations operating in the world has reduced the ability of 
realism - in its dominant form - to explain security in the prevailing international 
envirom-nent. Not only does the impact of organised crime cross the domestic- 
international divide of realist thought; but criminal organisations as nonstate actors 
pose a considerable threat to state security - which is no longer confined to the 
275Louise 1. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State? ", 
Journal of International Affairs vol. 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 484. 
276U. S. Agency for International Development, "Maintaining Country Progress in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Newly Independant States, " Washington, D. C., September 1997, p. 30. 
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military sector, but also threatens the "identity, and by inference, the cohesion" of a 
society. 277 
It is evident that changes in international society and in the international system as 
discussed in this chapter have created a number of opportunities that organised 
criminal groups have taken advantage of, and which have challenged the utility of the 
realist paradigm. As David Carter notes, "Ironically, the same factors that promise 
greater human rights and a better quality of life for many in the world also bring 
increasing criminal activity and creative illegal initiatives from organised crime 
groups. , 278 In spite of this new post-Cold War environment, few academics have 
endeavoured to adapt the traditional understanding of organised crime. Instead the 
term continues to be associated with "the Prohibition era in the United States and 
Mario Puzo's The Godfathee', and thus "obscures the magnitude of what has become 
a critical challenge to democratic governance, to transition and modernisation 
processes in many parts of the world, and to national and international security.,, 279 
Criminal organisations have essentially been left free to take advantage of 
globalisation and the uncertainty following the end of the Cold War to consolidate 
their activities worldwide. As Alison Jamieson argues, there have been three major 
changes to organised crime since the early 1990s: "it has become more transnationally 
organised, has de-regulated and de-localised v9280 These changes have, for the most 
277 Crelinsten (2002), p. 103. 
278David L. Carter, "International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Enterpreneurial Crime" in 
Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds. Understanding Global Organized Crime in Global 
Perspective: A Reade (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 138. 
279 Roy Godson and Phil Williams, "Strengthening Cooperation Against Organised Crime: A New 
Security Imperative, " in Cusiman (2000), p. 113. 
280 Alison Jamieson, "Transnational Organised Crime: A European Perspective, " Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorisml vol. 24, no. 5 (2001), p. 378. 
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part, taken place in the context of the wider transformations occurring within the 
international system - however, the definitional godfather syndrome of organised 
crime still persists. In addition to the traditional characteristics of organised crime, it 
is essential that a number of other features be considered in order to understand how 
the evolving international environment has altered this phenomenon. Thus, generally 
speaking, for an organised crime group to be considered transnational '281 it Must: 
conduct major operations across national borders; violate the laws of more than one 
state; possess the ability to move large quantities of cash virtually freely world-wide; 
have developed strategic alliances with other major criminal groups to enhance their 
own operations; and be capable of penetrating governments and business 
internationally to protect and promote its transnational operations. 282 
Transnational organised crime (TOC) groups are thus more sophisticated than local 
organised crime groups. They also have more capital at their disposal, and they use 
whatever means are necessary (for example, violence, bribery or intimidation) to 
promote their activities in a world that has become increasingly open. Although 
organised crime is not new, its evolution through 
the dispersion of technology, global mobility, expertise skills for hire, 
cheap and easily acquired weapons of mass lethality, and the vast illicit 
capital and financial resources of modem organised crime permit it to 
threaten, rival, and undermine the stability of nation-states, and to 
corrupt civil society in many parts of the world. 283 
29 1 This thesis will use the term 'transnational organised crime' instead of international organised 
crime, global crime, or multinational crime because it is a term that is most accurate in describing the 
phenomenon in question. The word 'transnational' correctly focuses on the fact that it is the nature of 
TOC to engage in organised illicit activity that crosses borders. 
282 These characteristics have been compiled from the works of the following authors: Alison Jamieson, 
Peter Lupsha, Louise Shelley, Emilio Viano, and Phil Williams. 
283 Peter Lupsha, "Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State", Transnational Organized 
Crimel vol. 2, no. I (Spring 1996), p. 23. 
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More specifically, the hierarchical pyramid-shaped structures once characteristic of 
organised crime have been replaced by "less visible criminal networks in which 
national identity is subordinate to function or skill" and which commonly outsource 
services (money-laundering, high-tech crime) to specialised agents. 284 Furthermore, as 
previously discussed, it has the necessary elements to undennine democratic 
institutions, to stand in the way of economic development, and to under-mine interstate 
relations. In other words, TOC now poses a formidable security threat. 
Despite this predicament, few governments or international organisations have 
attempted to account for the evolution of organised crime in their official definitions 
so that both traditional and transnational criminal groups are covered. To date, the 
most encompassing definition of organised crime emerged from the Expert Group on 
Organised Crime of the Council of Europe in 1997.285 It is therefore this definition of 
organised crime - with one exception - that will be used as the working definition of 
TOC in this thesis. According to the European Commission, for a group to be 
considered an organised criminal group, it must fulfil four mandatory criteria, and at 
least two of seven optional criteria. 286 The mandatory criteria are that an organised 
criminal group must consist of a collaboration of at least three people that are 
gathered for a prolonged or indefinite period of time. Furthermore they must be 
suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences with the objective of 
pursuing profit and/or power. The optional criteria include: having a specific division 
284 Jamieson (2001), p. 378. 
285 Although this definition will be used in this thesis, several weaknesses have been noted by Fabio 
Armao, (2001). He notes that most existing definitions of both organised crime and TOC 
"decontextualise organised crime from political and social reality" and thus are unable to fully 
comprehend the origins or development of the phenomenon itself; and they ignore the inherent 
differences among different types of organised crime, such as white collar crime and street gangs. As a 
result, it is inferred that organised crime can be political in nature. This line of reasoning will be 
expanded in Chapter Three. 
28'Adamoli et al (1998), p. 9. 
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of labour; using some form of internal discipline and control; exerting influence on 
the public and private sectors; using commercial or business-like structures; engaging 
in money-laundering; and operating on an international level. Although the Council of 
Europe include using violence or other means suitable for intimidation as an optional 
criteria, for the purposes of this thesis, the use of violence will be treated as a 
mandatory criteria of organised crime. Within the academic literature there exists 
disagreement as to whether or not violence should be included as a mandatory or 
optional criterion, however the arguments in favour of including violence appear to be 
the strongest. As Naylor, Maltz and Berdal and Serrano argue, it is precisely the 
reliance on corruption and the threat or use of force as a feature that "distinguishes 
,, 287 organised crime from 'ordinary criminality'. 
Historically the presence of organised crime and its associated operations were 
difficult to uncover within communities and the nation-state. This difficulty has 
merely increased as a result of the evolution of organised crime into transnational 
crime. Regardless of where they operate, criminal organisations - like terrorist groups 
- are not necessarily immediately distinguishable from civilian populations. This is a 
cause for concern because the activities of organised crime undermine the political, 
economic, and societal security of states in ways that only become apparent when the 
process is well advanced. 
288 These implications are best understood in the context of 
the international drug trade, as noted by Griffith in the following quote: 
The international narcotics industry is, in fact, not an industry at all, 
but an empire. Sovereign, proud, expansionist, this Underground 
Empire, though frequently torn by internal struggle, never fails to 
2" Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. Transnational Organised Crimg and International Security, p. 
19; Naylor, (1997), p. 33; and Maltz, (1976), p. 341. 
288Roy Godson and Phil Williams, "Strengthening Cooperation Against Transnational Crime, " 
Survival vol. 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), p. 69. The case for considering transnational crime a security 
threat will be discussed later in this chapter. 
110 
present a solid front to the world at large. It has become [today] as 
ruthlessly acquisitive and exploitative as any nineteenth-century 
imperial kingdom, as far-reaching as the British Empire, as 
determinedly cohesive as the American republic. Aggressive and 
violent by nature, the Underground Empire maintains its own armies, 
diplomats, intelligence services, banks, merchant fleets, and airlines. 
It seeks to extend its dominance by any means, from clandestine 
subversion to open warfare. 289 
Conclusion: Terrorism, Organised Crime & Limitations of Traditional Concepts 
Changes since the 1990s have given rise to what Max Manwaring calls the 'grey area 
phenomenon'. Although this concept was adopted to refer to the changing nature of 
low intensity conflict, it has become synonymous with "threats to the stability of 
nation-states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and 
organizations"290 which involve "immense regions or urban areas where control has 
shifted from legitimate governments to new half political, half-criminal powers., 291 
This notion exemplifies the evolving character of terrorism and organised crime, 
highlighting the propensity for terrorism and TOC to be bound together by "their 
willingness to pursue their goals by attacks on individuals, ethnic groups, or other 
states to frighten and coerce a large number of others to impose their particular 
beliefs. " 292 Terrorism and organised crime therefore have the potential to become one 
of the most significant problems for international security in the new millennium, if 
they have not already done so. 
289 James Mills, The Underground Empire (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1986), p. 3, as quoted 
in Ivelaw Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics, " International Journal 
(Winter 1993-94), p. 5. 
290 Peter Lupsha, "Gray Area Phenomenon: New Threats and Policy Dilemmas, " unpublished paper 
presented at the High Intensity Crime/Low Intensity Conflict Conference, Chicago, Illinois, September 
27-30,1993, pp. 22-23, as quoted in Edwin G. Corr, ed. "Introduction, " Gray Area Phenomenon: 
Confronting the New World Disorder (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), p. xii. 
291 Xavier Raufer, "Gray Areas: A New Security Threat, " Political Warfare, (Spring 1992), as quoted in 
ibid. 
292 Scott B. MacDonald, "The New 'Bad Guys': Exploring the Parameters of the Violent New World, " 
in ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, globalisation and the fall of the Soviet 
Union have introduced unprecedented changes to international society and the 
international system. Aside from affecting economic, political, and social relations 
within and between states, the notion of security as understood prior to 1991 by the 
realist tradition has been undermined. Once relegated to 'low politics' and largely 
examined within a domestic context, issues such as terrorism and TOC have evolved 
considerably as a result of the international environment in transition. Consequently, 
not only has the ability of the dominant literature on security, terrorism and organised 
crime been challenged, but it also appears as though these dominant views are unable 
to directly address the potential for these concepts to converge as depicted within the 
notion of grey area phenomenon. Having identified common characteristics that 
define terrorism and organised crime, these concepts can be placed in a framework of 
reference that provides guidelines that are necessary to evaluate the nature of twenty- 
first century violence. Furthermore, adopting and/or periodically reviewing what is 
understood by the use of the terms terrorism and organised crime supports the notion 
that issues change depending on space and time. 293 This allows for an evolving, and 
consistently coherent, understanding of phenomena that affect international security. 
Considering the problems associated with the traditional ways of conceptualising 
security, terrorism and organised crime in a decade characterised by uncertainty and 
change, a 'new' framework for conceptualising security threats in the twenty-first 
century is needed to develop an understanding of the emerging security environment. 
Any reconstituted framework will need to account for factors that are now considered 
to be prevalent in the international environment, and thus have an impact on how 
293 Thackrah (1989), "Terrorism: a Definitional Problem, " p. 25. 
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security is explained and understood. Some of these factors include the blurring of 
boundaries between external and internal security, and the challenge posed to state 
sovereignty by nonstate actors. Focusing on these factors will either reinforce the 
limitations of realism in explaining threats emanating from non-state actors, or 
highlight the need to re-visit the main tenets of realism by adjusting key beliefs to 
account for non-state actors. Although realism may have had explanatory power 
during the Cold War period, it would be academically irresponsible merely to 
reinforce realism in a fundamentally different international environment. As 
Kolodziej notes: 
Neither scientific inquiry nor human self-knowledge is promoted by 
blind commitment to a singular philosophical view, or to group-think 
canons that substitute assertion for reflection and discerning 
judgement in deciding what security is, what security problems are, 
and how they should be studied or resolved. ... 
*** Let the limits of the problem to be solved 
determine the 
scope and parameters of empirical and normative theory rather than 
impose a particular theory of politics and security that defines what 
has to be described, explained, and rationalised ... Critical to the task 
of the security scholar and practitioner is the challenge of defining 
those dimensions as inclusively as possible. 294 
It will therefore be the task of Chapter Two to present an alternative view of security 
that will help develop an understanding of the security threats specifically posed by 
terrorism and TOC as independent phenomenon, and as phenomena that are 
increasingly converging as a result of the national, regional and international 
environments in which they operate. 
294 Kolodziej (1992), pp. 435-3 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Reconceptualising Security: the promise of critical security studies 
Based on the arguments presented in Chapter One it may be concluded that the 
traditional ways of looking at security are not sufficient to explain security threats in a 
post-Cold War, globalised world. As a result academics in International Relations 
have been rethinking and reassessing the nature of threats that dominate the 
contemporary security environment. The purpose of this chapter is thus to introduce a 
'new' way of thinking about security. Elements from the current debate (the third 
debate') about security in the field of International Relations will be isolated and used 
to argue that terrorism and organised crime are no longer solely domestic concerns 
but affect security on various levels of analysis, and across a number of sectors. T'he 
chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, concepts from recent 
theoretical debates in International Relations literature referred to collectively as 
'critical security studies' and 'post-realism', will be used to assess 'new' security 
threats. In the second section, these concepts will be placed in the context of two 
emerging strands of thought that present globalisation and the concept of 'netwar' as 
proto-paradigMS2 that can be used to help clarify the nature of the post-Cold War 
security environment. Sections three and four will apply these conceptual elements to 
terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC) respectively. By applying criteria 
from these theories that attempt to explain and understand contemporary security and 
using them to reconceptualise these phenomena, the twenty-first century nature of 
terrorism and TOC as security threats can be illustrated. Finally the chapter will 
1 Within the field of international relations, there are currently three commonly recognised theoretical 
debates: the first debate was between realism and idealism; the second was between realism and neo- 
realism; and the third is generally regarded as a debate between structuralists and post-structuralists. 
2 According to James H. Mittelman, "Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm? ", International Studies 
Perspectives. vol. 3 (2002), a 'proto-paradigm' can be used to describe an intellectual line of thinking 
that has the potential to become a well 'worked-out framework'. 
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highlight the overall benefits of the ideas selected from critical security studies, which 
also enhance key applicable realist tenets highlighted in Chapter One and how they 
can be used to explain the convergence of security threats (i. e. as illustrated in the 
crime-teffor continuum) presented in Chapter Tbree. The reformulated understanding 
of security presented in this chapter will constitute the analytical framework applied 
to the two case studies in Chapters Four and Five. 
Critical Security and Post-Realism: understanding security in an evolving world 
Critical security studies (CSS) takes the individual as the true point of reference for 
security (human security). Although primacy is given to the individual, critical 
approaches do not necessarily deny the centrality of the state as the locus of obligation 
and effective political action. Instead, critical theory generally strives to understand 
more fully the dynamics, structures, possibilities and reorientation of the state. 3 Most 
critical security approaches believe it is necessary to rethink who must be secured, the 
agenda of threats, and the role of the state in the emerging security order. 4 
CSS encompasses a variety of branches that begin from similar assumptions about 
security, but diverge into several different methodologies and conclusions. With 
respect to establishing a general understanding of security most critical theories, 
including post-structuralism and post-realism, advocate similar basic claims. The 
most important in relation to this thesis are that security is not regarded as an 
objective condition; that disparities in material forces (such as the extent of a state's 
military or economic power) are not the only causes of insecurity; and that the object 
3 Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), p. xvi. 
4 Ibid., p. xvii. 
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of security is neither stable nor unchanging. 5 Based on these claims, critical 
approaches tend to focus on how objects to be secured are constituted, and how 
particular issues are labelled security threats. These key questions are encompassed in 
the core CSS propositions about critical security. 6 CSS thought generally regards 
security as a socially constructed phenomenon that changes as a result of perceptions 
in specific times and places. This is drawn from the belief that knowledge about 
subjects, structures and practices of international politics is not objective because the 
world is constructed by observers and actors. As a result, research should concentrate 
on using interpretive methods that examine how actors understand the organisation of 
their social world; leading to the development of a contextual understanding and 
practical knowledge as opposed to predictive theory. 7 
Taking the above as the common assumptions of critical security studies, two distinct 
approaches that fall under the broad field of critical theory will be assessed in greater 
detail because of the relevance of their perspective on security to the concerns of this 
thesis. These approaches are the Copenhagen School, and what may broadly be 
referred to as Post-Realism. Each of these strands of thought will be treated as 
separate entities in order to uncover characteristics that will be used to build a 
conceptual framework for this thesis. This section will present the benefits of these 
approaches for explaining and understanding the prevailing dynamics of twenty-first 
century security - especially in relation to organised crime, terrorism and their 
5 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and 
Methods, " Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 40 (1996), p. 242. 
6 These propositions form a basic core of critical security. However, because critical security studies 
include a wide range of perspectives, it is possible that not all critical security theorists will agree with 
all the propositions. 
7 Krause & Williams (1996), p. 243. 
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convergence - and highlight the reasons why these schools of thought have greater 
explanatory potential than traditional realism. 
The Copenhmzen School 
Primarily associated with the 'widener' debate described in Chapter One, it may be 
argued that the Copenhagen School also falls under the category of critical security. 
This is largely because the Copenhagen School not only broadens the range of threats 
to be included within security, but also attempts to deepen the security agenda by 
including a number of levels of analysis and actors. The 'Copenhagen School' was 
given its name by Bill McSweeney, 8 who used the label to refer to the works on 
security produced collectively by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap deWilde at the 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. This group of academics 
began working on joint projects on security in an attempt to respond to the criticisms 
pitted against Buzan's People, States and Fear. The basic difference between the 
Copenhagen School and other'wideners' is the former's distinction between state and 
society. The Copenhagen School contends that security must combine both state 
security (i. e., concerned with sovereignty) and societal security (i. e., concerned with 
identity). 9 Furthermore, the Copenhagen School also differs from traditionalists and 
earlier 'wideners' in that they argue that security is not only about war and the use of 
force. On the contrary, in the view of Copenhagen School theorists, issues which are 
not directly related to war and the use of force can nevertheless be considered security 
threats. 
8 Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, " Review of International 
Studies, vol. 22 (1996). 
' Krause and Williams (1996), p. 243. 
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The Copenhagen School seeks to go beyond merely broadening the issues included 
within security by exploring the logic of security itself, to find out what differentiates 
security and the process of securitisation from the politicisation of a security threat. 10 
Securitisation refers to the instance when an issue is presented as an existential threat 
that requires emergency measures, thus justifying actions outside the normal bounds 
of political procedure. It answers the questions when, why and how elites label issues 
and developments as security problems. Politicisation, on the other hand, refers to the 
process through which issues become part of public policy, and thus require 
government decision and resource allocation. Copenhagen School theorists therefore 
define security as a 'speech act' that gains its content through discourse and political 
constellations. Thus in order for an issue to become a security threat, it must go 
through a distinct process, beginning with gaining recognition as an existential 
threat. II The issue must also be granted emergency action by the authorities, and to 
become ultimately securitised, the audience must accept it as such. 12 Although the 
Copenhagen School accepts that security is a subjective concept (i. e. it is determined 
by actors), they go one step further by stating that security is intersubjective and 
socially constructed. They arrive at this conclusion by asking the following questions: 
Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that 
should survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, 
point to something as a threat, and thereby get others to follow or at 
least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? This quality is not held 
in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a 
discursive, socially constructed, intersubjective realm. 13 
10 Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Security After the Cold War, " Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 32, no. I 
(March 1997). 
11 According to the Copenhagen School, an existential threat refers to something that threatens the 
'definition of what constitutes' a group as a collectivity (or a state as a state) and is therefore warranted 
emergency action. As Buzan et al write, "If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be 
irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way). " Barry 
Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap deWilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 24. 
12 Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 23-27. 
13 Ibid., p. 3 1. 
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Buzan et al further believe that the most important question security studies needs to 
ask is whether or not an issue should be securitised. Because they regard security as a 
socially constructed concept, the Copenhagen School raises questions about the 
relationship between actors and analysts in defining and understanding security, and 
placing responsibility on them for ultimately framing something as a security issue. 14 
In addition to offeTing a relatively new way of looking at security, two specific points 
raised by the Copenhagen School particularly help explain the contemporary nature of 
security. One is their rather sophisticated multisectoral approach to security. The other 
is the continuing importance they assign to the state. 
As Buzan did in his book People. States and Fear, the Copenhagen School also list 
and define five security sectors: military-, environmental; economic; societal; and 
political. Unlike Buzan, however, the Copenhagen School makes a greater effort to 
include non-state actors within these sectors, thus eliminating much (but not all) of the 
state-centrism in Buzan's earlier work and in the realist paradigm. These sectors, 
although treated independently, are interrelated parts of complex wholes. Therefore in 
order to understand them, their relationship to each other needs to be understood.. By 
utilising five security sectors and accounting for the increasing role of non-state 
actors, the Copenhagen School overcomes one of the major pitfalls of realist attempts 
to explain contemporary security: it acknowledges that a military threat posed by an 
exogenous state is not the only way in which security can be threatened. 
Unfortunately the Copenhagen School does not give each sector equal weight at any 
given time. According to Buzan et al the societal sector has increasing significance in 
the post-Cold War world because they believe that identity claims and disputes (i. e. 
14 Buzan (1997), p. 15. 
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akin to the Balkan conflict) are likely to flourish. Furthermore, the Copenhagen 
School has been inefficient in the way they have arrived at their five security sectors. 
The environmental and economic sectors are fairly inclusive and comprehensive; 
however there is considerable overlap between the military, political and societal 
sectors. With a focus on security issues that emerge from migration, horizontal and 
vertical competition and depopulation, the societal sector fits more appropriately 
under military security as defined by the Copenhagen School. Finally, the political 
sector can easily become more focused by eliminating the overlap with the military 
sector. Although some overlap between these sectors may be unavoidable, if the 
reason for separating them in the first place is to make analysis more accurate, then 
the individual sectors should be as comprehensive as possible. Although the five 
sectors are underdeveloped, the multisectoral approach itself is important in 
understanding the security threats presented in this thesis. For organisational and 
explanatory purposes, each of these five sectors will be dealt with independently, but 
where applicable the relationship between sectors will be highlighted. 
According to the Copenhagen School, and echoing realism, the military security 
agenda essentially deals with the ability of states to maintain their territorial integrity 
against internal 15 and external 16 military threats. However, unlike realism, the 
Copenhagen School also acknowledges the ability of states to secure themselves 
against non-military threats such as rival ideologies, and ultimately threats such as 
TOC and terrorism. Furthermore, whereas traditionally only the state served as a 
's Internal threats are primarily concerned with the ability of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, 
territorial integrity, and the machinery of the government when challenged by citizens taking the form 
of revolutionary movements, militant separatists, and terrorist or criminal organisations. Buzan et al 
(1998), p. 50. 
16 External threats to military security include the interplay between actual armed offensive and 
defensive capabilities of the state and the perception of capabilities and intentions between the two 
states. Ibid., p. 5L 
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referent object for military security, recognising the existence of tensions between the 
state and civil society in many areas of the world, the Copenhagen School has 
incorporated additional referent objects. With reference to this specific sector, referent 
objects can be divided into four loosely grouped categories: non-state referent objects 
(i. e. groups seeking statehood); prestate referent objects (i. e. tribes/clans characteristic 
I 
of the Caucasus/Central Asia and Africa); abstract referent objects (i. e. balance of 
power, international society, weapons nonproliferation and international law); and 
'other' referent objects (religion, revolutionaries, militias and criminal 
organisations). 17 Despite the range of actors that have the potential to influence the 
dynamics of the military sector, the logic of threats and vulnerabilities is limited to the 
interplay between the military capabilities of any two actors (i. e. state and non-state 
alike), and the degree of amity and enniity - which Buzan et al define as the outcomes 
of the (de)securitisation process. 18 Furthermore, the establishment and maintenance of 
military security is dependent not only on military strength, technology and strategy, 
but also on traditional factors including geography, history, and political relations. 
Although it has been increasingly argued that in the post-Cold War era 19 military 
security is not a leading international concern (i. e. because there is no longer a threat 
of nuclear confrontation between superpowers), the Copenhagen School recognises 
that military security has merely shifted from the global-national level to the regional 
and local levels. For example, in many of the newly independent regions of the FSU, 
conventional weapons still pose a significant danger and thus fuel the potential for 
17 Ibid., pp. 52-55. 
18 Ibid., p. 58. According to Buzan et al., "Once the process of securitisation has locked into enmity as 
the framework of relations, threats and vulnerabilities will be perceived primarily in terms of the 
military capabilities of possible aggressors. " 
19 This argument largely developed from the literature on Democratic Peace Theory. For an overview 
of these arguments see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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conflicts to emerge and escalate, as has been the case in Chechnya and Tajikistan. A 
similar situation exists in Africa, where the proliferation of conventional weapons is 
often considered a major factor for the escalation of tensions into violence. In these 
areas the danger is not necessarily one of external military intervention, but of the 
international community ignoring events that may eventually disrupt the regional and 
international system by "creating holes in the fabric of international society". 20 This 
has already occurred in Central Asia as a result of the instability in Afghanistan from 
the drugs trade and widespread militancy. 21 As criminal organisations in Central Asia 
have increasingly turned to narcotics trafficking as a source of profit, they have 
created regional instability in order to ensure that smuggling routes from Afghanistan 
are protected. In 1999 and 2000, two significantly large incursions occurred on the 
southern borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during which trafficking groups 
engaged in armed battles with regional border posts in order to distract authorities as 
large shipments of narcotics were escorted over the border. 22 
The relationship between environmental sector and security, on the other hand, is less 
obvious. Different scholars 23 have presented environmental security as ranging from a 
political and military issue to an issue of social welfare. Considering the wide range 
20 Buzan et al (1998), p. 70. 
21 In spite of the belief that the U. S. led 'war on terrorism' would create regional stability by 
eliminating the Taliban and installing a democratic government, Central Asia is still faced with the 
continued prospect of instability because of the continued operations of the regional drug trade, and 
growing indications of a radical Islamic backlash against countries seen as being overly cooperative 
with Washington. 
22 See Svante Cornell and Regine Spector, "Central Asia: More than Islamic Radicals, " The 
Washington Ouarterly vol. 25, no. I (Winter 2002). 
23 For a survey of the prevalent views on environmental security see the following references: Jessica 
Blitt and Thomas Homer-Dixon, eds. Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment. Population and 
Security (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998); Daniel Deudney, "The Case 
Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security, " Millennium, vol. 19, no. 3 (1990), 
pp. 461476; P. H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, " 
International Security, vol. 18 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Stephan Libiszewski, "What is 
Environmental Security? ", ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 6, Centre for Security Studies and Conflict 
Research, ETH Zurich/Swiss Peace Foundation, 1992; Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The 
Environmental Basis of Political Stability. (London: Island Press, 1995). 
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of actors attempting to securitise the environment (including social movements, 
government departments, and international organisations) Buzan et al explain the 
environmental sector as one that consists of two overlapping agendas: the scientific 
and the political. The scientific agenda is largely used as evidence to legitimise 
securitisation moves; the political agenda, on the other hand, is concerned with three 
areas. First, it seeks to increase state and public awareness of environmental issues on 
the scientific agenda; second, it attempts to promote the acceptance of political 
responsibility for dealing with these issues; and third, it attempts to answer political 
management questions (including problems associated with international co- 
operation, free riders, and enforcement). 
24 Within these areas of concern, the 
environmental agenda addresses a host of issues including energy problems (such as 
the depletion of natural resources and pollution), population problems (for example, 
politically and socially uncontrollable migration), civil strife caused by war-related 
environmental damage and violence related to environmental degradation. 
25 Referent 
objects in the environmental sector include the environment itself and/or the nexus 
between civilisation and the environment (i. e. the risk of losing achieved levels of 
civilisation as a result of environmental degradation). Buzan et al conclude that only 
threats from the relationship between human activity and the ecosystem has a logical 
connection with security, including, for example, greenhouse gas emissions and 
environmental exploitation that disturbs the economic base and social fabric of 
society. 26 Based on this argument, terrorist groups could threaten the environment 
through the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, while criminal 
organisations could threaten environmental security through activities including 
24 Ibid., p. 74. 
25 See Ibid., pp. 74-75 for a more comprehensive list of what is included in the environmental sector of 
the Copenhagen School. 
26 Ibid., p. 80. 
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illegally dumping waste, trafficking in nuclear materials and exploiting natural 
resources. Because environmental security largely emerges as a result of the struggle 
between human power and the "dynamics of its own culture -a civilisational issue 
that expresses itself mainly in economic and demographic dimensions and that 
potentially affects the degrees of order in the international system and its 
subsystems", 27 the Copenhagen School asserts that the key to understanding this 
sector is in the notion that it is within human power to break the connection between 
environment and security. 
As with the environmental sector, the economic sector is controversial and highly 
politicised. 28 For the Copenhagen School, the liberal agenda dominates the economic 
sector. Thus in seeking the consolidation of a global economy, the primary question 
that emerges is how the widening gap between the rich and poor can be handled, 
while simultaneously removing many state powers and functions. 29 In an attempt to 
address this question, the agenda of the economic sector concentrates on several 
issues 30 including fears that a strengthening global economy will empower criminal 
organisations, fears that trade in certain types of military technology will proliferate, 
and fears that the spread of industrialisation and mass consumption will place further 
pressures on the global environment. With the opening of the Russian economic 
market immediately following the fall of Communism, for example, criminal 
organisations were among the only entities in Russia that could afford to purchase the 
state corporations which were being privatised. As a result, it may be concluded that 
27 Ibid. 
28 According to the Copenhagen School, this controversy largely arises from the fact that in a capitalist 
system, the actors in a market are supposed to feel insecure so that the market produces its efficiencies. 
Ibid., p. 95. 
29 Buzan et a] (1998), pp. 96-97. 
30 For a discussion of all the issues that have been termed in conjunction with economic security, see 
Ibid., p. 98. 
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Western pressures for Russia to quickly integrate into the international market 
actually helped Russian organised crime (ROC) gain control of several lucrative 
economic sectors within the Russian Federation, such as the aluminium and banking 
industries. 
The idea of economic security, as presented by Buzan et al, also incorporates a vast 
number of referent objects, including the state, (groups of) individuals, and the global 
market itself. Although the Copenhagen School admits that it is difficult to make an 
argument for economic security in relation to individuals and firms, they do 
acknowledge that there are specific scenarios in which these actors can be referent 
objects. For example, if a particular firm is the economic cornerstone of a community, 
its demise would have an immediate effect on the economic security of the 
community and individuals in that community. Furthennore, a specific firm could be 
considered a referent object if its collapse directly affects the stability of the national 
and/or the international economy (for example, large manufacturing firms or banks). 
31 
Economic sector security threats also illustrate the inter-relationship between levels of 
analysis. For example, the trend towards global financial liberalisation can undermine 
the welfare state, attack national currencies, and force the deregulation of interest 
rates and fiscal policy, thus severely damaging the domestic economy in question. 
These consequences can, in turn, affect security at a local level by threatening the 
provision of basic human needs or the survival of the state. 
32 The rise of ROC and 
FARC - as depicted in Chapters Four and Five - provide excellent illustrations of the 
ways in which non-state actors can impede national economic policy by claiming 
control over leading domestic economic sectors. This power over the economic 
31 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Ibid., pp. 100- 10 1. 
32 Ibid., p. 115. 
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resources of the state then threatens the survival of the state and the welfare of its 
citizens. Based on this understanding of economic security, the Copenhagen School 
further asserts that 
economic activity fairly easily triggers survival issues in all of the 
other sectors - sometimes on the basis of economic failures (e. g. 
negative development and the rise of black economies) and 
sometimes on the basis of economic successes (e. g. cultural 
homogenisation, loss of autonomy in military production, pollution, 
the gutting of state functions). This overspill quality means that much 
of what is talked about as "economic security" has in fact to do with 
logics of survival in other sectors. 33 
In most instances, the sector threatened by economic instability is the societal sector. 
Although the societal sector has received the greatest attention by the Copenhagen 
School, it will be treated as equal to the other four security sectors in this thesis. 
Buzan et al argue that, in the context of international security analysis, the key to 
society is "those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social 
group. Society is about identity [ ... ] individuals identifying themselves as members of 
a community. " 34 According to this, many forms of organised crime and terrorism as 
discussed in Chapter One directly pose a threat to the security of specific groups, in 
addition to the security of nation-states. The strength of incorporating the societal 
sector in an understanding of security lies in the fact that it draws attention to 
emerging security threats before they pose a direct threat to the state. Although TOC 
and terrorism may ultimately pose a direct threat to the security of the state, the 
potential threat they pose is initially revealed at a lower level of analysis (i. e. 
individual or community). 
33 Ibid., p. 116. 
34 Ibid., p. 119. 
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Tbreats to societal security can be grouped into two general categories: migration, and 
rival identities. Large-scale migration potentially threatens the home identity due to a 
shift in population composition, such as that caused by refugee movements. Rival 
identities occur through horizontal and vertical competition. On the one hand, 
horizontal competition refers to the penetration of "values and practices from an 
outside culture [that] can distort or even destroy an indigenous culture. , 35 This 
situation occurred in Afghanistan with the penetration of the Taliban -a group that 
imported a foreign system of beliefs that threatened the social and cultural make-up of 
the nation. Vertical competition, on the other band, refers to integration or 
disintegration projects that "threaten to submerge or fragment existing identitieS.,, 36 
For example, the rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone 
threatened and fragmented targeted sections of the local population in an attempt to 
gain widespread territorial control. Referent objects potentially threatened by 
horizontal and vertical competition include tribes, clans, nations, ethnic minorities, 
civilisations, religions and race. Tbus, for example, given that organised crime in 
some regions of the former Soviet Union (such as Central Asia and the Caucasus) 
have emerged along clan lines, violent rivalries between criminal organisations could 
represent a threat to the existence of other clans. 
The final sector the Copenhagen School includes in their approach to security is the 
political, which generally refers to the ability of specific actors to ensure the stability 
of their social order. From the onset it should be noted that this sector is the widest 
sector in that it may be argued that all security is political - securitisation for Buzan et 
3' Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Liberalism and Security: The contradictions of the liberal Leviathan 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper No. 23 (1998), p. 22. 
36 Ibid. 
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a], after all, is a political act. However, this sector can be isolated to specifically deal 
with threats to the legitimacy or recognition of political units (including the loss of the 
state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence), or the essential patterns among 
political units (such as structures, processes and institutions). 37 The threats posed by 
terrorism and organised crime are especially relevant to the political sector because of 
the impact their activities have on the political realm. For example, both phenomena 
directly threaten the legitimacy of states and political institutions - this is evident in 
the use of political corruption by criminal groups. Terrorism and organised crime can 
also challenge the ability of the state to maintain a monopoly over the use of 
legitimate violence; as illustrated by terrorist groups who attain control over parcels of 
territory. Furthermore, the political sector is threatened when an adversarial non-state 
actor threatens the processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation. This is 
often the case when governments engaged in counter-tefforism circumvent the human 
rights of all citizens in the name of eradicating terrorists. 
Although the main referent object of the political sector is the state - as argued by 
realism - the Copenhagen School admits that other political organisations can also act 
as referent objects. Emerging quasi-suprastates like the European Union would 
qualify; some self-organised, stateless societal groups such as clans, tribes and 
minorities can serve as referent objects if they have strong political institutions; and 
transnational movements that are able to mobilise a strong following, such as 
religious and ideological movements, can also serve as referent objects. 
38 In addition 
to these actors, political security also includes a host of systemic referent objects that 
include institutions, structures and processes in the international system. The 
37 Buzan et al (1998), p. 142. 
38 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
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Copenhagen School refer, for example, to sovereignty, human rights, self- 
determination and racial equality as principles that warrant action in their defence. 39 
Despite treating the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors 
as distinct entities, it is evident that all five sectors can be linked in a variety of 
different ways. As Buzan et al themselves highlight, a key advantage of this sectoral 
approach to security is that it does not completely discount traditional security studies 
but "maintains interoperability between the old and new approaches, enabling the 
latter to incorporate smoothly the insights of the former. , 40 Furthermore, this 
approach is considerably more inclusive than traditional approaches, not only because 
it allows for a wide variety of issues to be carefully considered as security threats, but 
because it creates room for the role of non-state actors in the security process. The 
Copenhagen School therefore contributes to an understanding of the contemporary 
security environment primarily because of this sectoral approach to security, and 
because it considers the interplay between the individual, state and international. 41 In 
breaking down the concept of security into sectors, a more in-depth study of terrorism 
and organised crime can be achieved in order to illustrate why these evolving 
phenomena constitute threats to security in the twenty-first century. However because 
looking at individual sectors is not enough, the Copenhagen School also highlights the 
importance of cross-sectoral analysis. As Buzan et al note, 
39 Ibid., pp. 147-149. 
40 Ibid., p. 196. 
41 It is not my intention to suggest that the Copenhagen School is able to perfectly deal with the notion 
of security in the post-Cold War world, on the contrary, the purpose of this section was to highlight the 
benefits of using their mutlisectoral approach to security. It is therefore important to note that many 
criticisms can be made of this school of thought. For a preliminary overview of such criticism see 
McSweeney (1996), "Identity and Security... ", and Michael C. Williams, "Modernity, identity and 
security: a comment on the 'Copenhagen controversy'". Review of International Studiesl vol. 24, no. 3 
(July 1998), pp. 435-439. 
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Disaggregating security into sectors has been helpful in distilling 
distinctive patterns of vulnerabilities and threats, differences 
regarding referent objects and actors, and different relationships to 
territorializing and deterritorializing trends in the system. The number 
of cross-linkages, however, stands as a massive warning against 
treating the sectors as closed systems. 42 
Thus, in linking the sectors together, the multisectoral approach advocated by the 
Copenhagen School also illustrates the extent to which post-Cold War security issues 
threaten all realms of society. 
Post-Realism 
In response to the continuing primacy of the realist paradigm, largely in the policy 
arena, any reconsideration of international security needs to come to terms with 
realism. More specifically, it needs to come to terms with the way that realism 
produces and limits knowledge of foreign affairs, how it describes and structures 
political practice, and how it needs to be adapted to meet the changes in international 
politics and security. 43 As such most individual academics regarded as post-realists 
maintain some realist assumptions (such as the primacy of the state and the idea of 
international anarchy) while attempting to make realism more applicable to the 
contemporary era. Two distinct forms of post-realism will be considered in this 
section: Utopian Realism, and Subaltern Realism. Both of these approaches have the 
potential to provide insights into the contemporary nature of security, specifically its 
ability to account for evolving issues such as terrorism and organised crime. 
Utopian Realism is a relatively new, and thus underdeveloped, strand of thought 
within the study of International Relations that has its origins in the work of Ken 
42 Buzan et al (1998), p. 167. 
43 Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds), Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international 
relations, (East Lansing: Michingan State University Press, 1996), p. 3. 
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Booth. The premise behind Utopian Realism is to contribute to the development of a 
more comprehensive framework for international security in response to changes 44 
that have slowly taken place throughout the world since 1989, and in response to the 
diffusion of threats. 45 Utopian Realism incorporates the World Society School, 
alternative security thinking, classical international relations, critical theory, peace 
research, strategic studies and neorealism, 46 as a means of moving beyond the limits 
of realism by offering a more thorough understanding of the forces that shape who 
gets what, when and how. 47 Booth argues that humans are the ultimate referent 
objects, but at the same time he does not ignore the importance of the state as an 
influential conduit in the distribution of social, political and economic goods and as 
the primary actor responsible for regulating the lives of its citizens. 48 This point is one 
the strongest components of Booth's Utopian Realism because it acknowledges that 
the state has certain functions that "are rarely performed by other organisations", such 
as being: 
" the major collective unit processing notions of threat; 
" the mantle that cloaks the exercise of elite power; 
" the organisational expression that gives shape to communal 
'identity' and 'culture'-, 
- the chief agglomeration of competence to deal with issue areas out 
ofjurisdictional boundaries; 
" These changes include the growth of complex interdependence, the erosion of sovereignty, advances 
in communications, the declining utility of force, degradation of nature, population growth, the growth 
of the global world economy, the dissemination of world weaponry, growing scope of non-state actors 
and the growth of more local and global identities. See Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation, " 
Review of International Security Studies , vol. 17 (1991), p. 315. 45 In describing threats, the following quote provided by Booth illustrates the fact that he is determined 
to build a theoretical framework within which many 'new' but pressing issues can be included. 
"... threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations across the world derive primarily 
not from a neighboues army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, 
scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease. " See 
Booth (1991), p. 318. 
46 Ibid., p. 317. 
47 Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Realism in Theory and Practice, " International Affairsl vol. 67, no. 
3 (1991), p. 534. 
48 Ken Booth, ed. Statecraft and Security: the Cold War and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 340. 
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- the manager of territory/geographical space - including 
functioning as the 'receptacle' for income; and 
- the legitimiser of authorised action andpossession. 49 
Precisely because the state remains the only institution believed to be capable of 
performing the above functions, non-state actors threaten the state in part because 
they want to gain control over these functions themselves. As Holsti rightly argues, 
although internal conflict is the most important type of conflict in the post-Cold War 
era, wars are still about the control of the state apparatus and territory. 50 This may 
partially explain why a non-state actor which successfully gains control over parcels 
of territory, such as the FARC, can be considered a 'state within a state'. 
The guiding principle of security, however, should not be to increase the power of 
one's own state, because the inherent danger of focusing on the state, as revealed in 
the realist tradition, is that the state is falsely treated as "an actor with humanoid 
qualities .,, 
5 1 Furthermore, Booth's perspective on the role of the state improves on 
realist thought because it does not build the "illusion that states have impenetrable 
walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. "52 
Instead Booth asserts that states need to begin acting, as Hedley Bull writes, as "local 
agents in the world common good. " 53 Booth thus avoids one of the inherent problems 
of realism by overcoming the assumption that security can only be defined in terms of 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity without including people. 
49 Olav F. Knudsen, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritising Securitisation, " Security 
Dialogu , vol. 
32, no. 3 (September 2001), p. 363. 
30 Kalevi Holsti, The State. War. and the State of War, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
5' Knudsen (200 1), p. 3 64. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Booth (199 1), "Security in Anarchy... ", p. 539. 
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Aside from the notion that the state remains an integral actor in international politics, 
but that it necessarily acts among a host of other referent objects such as international 
law and diplomacy, the assertion made by Utopian Realism that "[T]he personal, the 
political, and the international are a seamless web" 54 also provides insight into the 
nature of contemporary security, especially with respect to the post-Cold War 
understanding of terrorism and TOC. Thus regardless of whether these phenomena 
initially appear to be local, national, international or global in scope, their actions 
regularly have an effect on the levels of analysis just above and below their immediate 
target. For example, although the activities of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) 
in Sierra Leone sought to replace what was considered to be a defunct and corrupt 
government, RUF rebels often collaborated with government forces to coordinate 
"movements to rob civilians, transfer of arms from one side to the other, the 
avoidance of pitched battles", and both sides have "exploited diamond resources and 
cash crops at the expense of the civilians" and at the expense of the establishment of a 
peaceful political order. 55 Regardless of the violent and exploitative activities of the 
RUF, the moral authority of the state and international community was ultimately 
threatened because the former was complicit in RUF activities, whereas the latter 
remained silent. 
Finally, the way in which Booth uses the term 'utopia' in defining his theoretical 
approach to international relations gives legitimacy to the development of policy 
prescriptions used to counter security threats. Booth does not use this term in an 
absolutist sense as good but unachievable in society, but defines 'utopia' as something 
54 Ken Booth, "Security and Self. Reflections of a Fallen Realist, " in Krause and Williams (1997), 
Critical Security Studies p. 83. 
55 David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, " in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds. 
Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000), pp. 36-37. 
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that represents the idea that the world does not have to look like the one we are 
familiar with, instead it can be used as the basis for a critical re-evaluation of what is 
believed to exist (reality) while allowing us to envision a better way of being and 
living. 56 Although Booth uses the term 'utopia' he does not set high standards for what 
to expect in the near future, instead he argues for the necessity of establishing minor 
reformist steps that will slowly produce the likelihood of a better future. 57 This 
relatively basic point forms the foundation of any policy framework that is developed 
to counter security threats, such as terrorism and organised crime, which are deeply 
entrenched within societies such as those within the FSU and Latin America. 
Commenting on the Italian mafia, a comment by judge Giovanni Falcone may also be 
used in the context of the FSU, and Latin America: 
No one will understand that we are facing a phenomenon so serious, 
so deeply rooted in the social fabric of our society and so much part 
of the system that it is impossible to expect tranquillizing answers 
within a short period. That should be our starting point. 
58 
Booth's Utopian Realism presents a relatively open approach to security that can 
absorb, and thus deal with, a range of threats. The fact that it stresses the interrelated 
nature of the three units of analysis provides an excellent platform from which to 
specifically explain the threats posed by TOC and terrorism - something the realist 
paradigm is unable to do. 
As with Utopian Realism, Subaltern Realism was developed by an individual: 
Mohammed Ayoob. The primary motivation for reformulating realism, according to 
Ayoob, was because it did not explain issues of conflict as they exist in the Tbird 
56 Booth (199 1), "Security in Anarchy... ". pp. 534-536. 
57 As far as Booth is concerned this can be done through the gradual improvement of human rights, the 
attempt to spread economic justice, and by trying to reduce the risk of war and conflict every year. 
58 Alison Jamieson, 'The Modern Mafia: its role and record, ' quoted in Alison Jamieson, ed. Terrorism 
and Drug Trafficking in the 1990s (Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1994), p. 66. 
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World. Ayoob argues that traditional theories of international relations are weak on at 
least three accounts. First, they cannot explain the fact that two of the major military 
powers today (Russia and China) share characteristics of "prototypical" Third World 
countries, "especially in the political arena where their state boundaries, state 
institutions, and governing regimes are under challenge to significant degrees. "59 
With their distorted economies, these countries are vulnerable to internal disruption, 
and potentially to chaos, as has been the case throughout much of the Third World. 
This is evident in Latin America with the rise and evolution of the FARC regardless 
of the shape of the government in Bogota or Washington, and regardless of their 
various coordinated attempts to disrupt FARC's control over Colombian territory and 
over the production and distribution of cocaine. A similar situation also emerged in 
the Russian Federation where Moscow has attempted to assert its influence over 
Chechnya, allegedly to bring order to a region where terrorism and organised crime 
has run rampant. Second, given the consequences of globalisation, including border 
porosity and increasing economic interdependence, the industrialised democratic 
countries can no longer guarantee their ability to "insulate themselves against Third 
World conflict and disorder", 60 or conflict and disorder in newly independent states. 
Given the control that ROC holds over Russian society, for example, the United 
States was unable to protect itself from the economic threat caused by a leading 
Russian criminal group in 1999 when it used the Bank of New York to launder 
billions of dollars. 61 
59 Mohammed Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World, " in 
Stephanie G. Neuman, ed. International Relations Theory and the Third World, (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1998), p. 33. 
60 Ibid. 
61 The Bank of New York scandal is now considered one of the largest financial scandals to hit the U. S. 
It is estimated that the Bank of New York was used to launder up to US$15 billion. Raymond Bonner 
and Timothy L. O'Brien, "Activity at Bank Raises Suspicions of Russian Mob Tie, " New York Times, 
20 August 1999, p. 1. 
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Finally, traditional theories of international relations are unable to account for the 
effects of threats, other than politico-military ones, to security. As Ayoob writes, 
"acts of terrorism and drug smuggling, both intimately linked, either as cause or as 
effect, to conditions of domestic disorder and conflict in parts of the Third World (for 
example in Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan and Latin America), can target, and have 
targeted, major powers in the global North, as well as countries in the global South. "62 
The fact that instability in Afghanistan provided a safe haven for criminal and terrorist 
groups, including Al-Qaeda, highlights the inherent linkages between levels of 
analysis in the world today. Left to operate freely, Al-Qaeda was able to coordinate 
large-scale acts of terrorism culminating in the September 11,2001 attacks in the U. S. 
Considering the international response that emerged from these attacks, the role of 
non-state actors in the international political domain is now irrefutable, and must be 
accounted for by scholars of international relations and security. 
Thus in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses inherent in realism and to account for 
these factors Ayoob developed Subaltern Realism around four primary assumptions. 63 
In contrast to realist assumptions, he asserts that issues of domestic and international 
order are linked, and issues of domestic order must receive analytical priority if 
current conflictual situations in the world are to be understood. This is largely 
premised on the point that most conflicts in the world are primarily the by-products of 
state-making. Ayoob also asserts that issues of domestic order and conflict do not 
exist independently of external influences (regional or international). As a result of 
the permeability of most states by outside political and economic actors (including 
62 Ayoob (1998), p. 34. 
63 Ibid., p. 35. 
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non-state actors), external variables need to be integrated into any explanation of 
order and conflict. Finally, links between the domestic and international explain "the 
nexus between intrastate and interstate conflicts and the intertwining of state-making 
enterprises with regional balance of power issues. " 64 These assumptions indicate that 
Ayoob primarily places security in the political realm. As he writes in The Ihird 
Morld Security Predicament, security is: 
used in the restricted sense of applying to the security of the state - in 
terms of both its territory and its institutions - and to the security of 
those who profess to represent the state territorially and 
institutionally. In other words, security-insecurity is defined in 
relation to vulnerabilities - both internal and external - that threaten 
or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both 
territorial and institutional, and governing regimes. 65 
Although Ayoob presents a very specific form of realism in an attempt to explain the 
Third World predicament, which in itself is open to criticism, he succeeds in 
highlighting some factors that merit consideration in the post-Cold War environment. 
Of greatest importance, as with Booth, is his assertion that the state "as the linchpin of 
the political reaW' 66 remains an essential component in understanding contemporary 
security issues. 
Within the context of Subaltern Realism, the importance of the state will persist for 
66as long as the international system continues to be primarily a system of states, and 
state interests continue to be the primary motivation for international interactions. "67 
The state therefore remains the only actor that can logically provide domestic order. 
Thus for states that find themselves entrenched in the state building process of the 
post-Cold War world, the primary goal is to develop credible and legitimate political 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ayoob (1995), pp. 8-9. 
"Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective, " in Krause and Williams 
(1997), pp. 139. 67 Ibid. 
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structures that can provide order, as they do in consolidated states. 68 Despite focusing 
on the importance of the state in the provision of security, Ayoob does acknowledge 
that other realms of human and social activity cannot be ignored. As he writes: 
when developments in other realms, ranging from the economic to the 
ecological, threaten to have immediate political consequences, or are 
perceived as having the potential to threaten state boundaries, political 
institutions, or governing regimes, then these other variables have to be 
taken into account as a part of the state's security calculus. 69 
The view that the state continues to dominate international security is also advanced 
by Sorensen, who argues that a strong state is required for creating and sustaining 
individual and national security. 70 Not"Only is this true with regard to military issues, 
but it holds true for other security issues including terrorism and TOC. The state is 
the most important macro institution in deciding how 'old' and 'new' threats will 
emerge, and what their consequences will be for individuals, groups, the state itself, 
and potentially the region or international system. Without a stable political order, 
66social and individual values are meaningless; they cannot be realised, nor can they be 
protected from assault, violence and chaos 197 1 For these reasons, the contemporary 
security environment has been characterised by competition for control over the state 
and its functions -a competition no longer limited to state actors. 
An equally important contribution, useful within the context of this thesis, is that 
although emphasis is placed on the state, Ayoob recognises the significance of other 
referent objects. For example, in his definition of security quoted above, threats can 
be posed to 'those who profess to represent the state' as well as to state structures 
681bid., p. 13 1. 
691bid., p. 129. 
70Georg Sorensen, "Individual Security and National Security: the State Remains the Principal 
Problem, " Security Dialogue vol. 27, no. 4 (1996), p. 374. 
71 Gabriel Ben Dor, State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State, (New 
York: Praeger, 1983), p. 244, as quoted in Ayoob (1995), p. 183. 
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themselves. In this case, the targeting of civil servants by transnational criminal 
groups or terrorist groups would equate to a direct threat to the integrity of the state 
they represent. Furthermore, Ayoob highlights the fact that a government or territory 
does not have to be directly taken over by an enemy, but merely has to be threatened 
with being 'weakened'. Thus any issue can become part of the security calculus of a 
state if it threatens "to have political outcomes that either affect the survivability of 
state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states 
and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international 
PolitiCS.,, 72 
Finally, Ayoob's work on Subaltern Realism helps to illuminate a fundamental shift 
in the post-Cold War security environment from a situation in which states perpetrate 
violence to one in which violent conflict is predominantly waged by non-state actors 
against states. In many cases this conflict originates in weak, failing or failed states 
where several groups vie for control over the institutional and material resources of 
the state. As discussed in Chapter One, non-state actors are increasingly seeking to 
establish their positions in an environment characterised by an absence of legitimacy 
on the part of the state and the ruling regime. Thus Ayoob is able to account for the 
conclusion that ... Hobbesian wars' ('bellum omnium contra omnes) may almost 
supercede the 'Clausewitzian wars' fought by states against other states. 9ý73 As will 
become evident in the two case study chapters, non-state actors in the form of TOC 
72 Ayoob (1995), p. 9. An earlier attempt made by Ayoob to define security in political and state-centric 
terms while maintaining that security is simultaneously multifaceted and thus connected to other social 
realms, see, Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World, " World Politics, vol. 
43, no. 2 (January 199 1), pp. 25 7-83. 
73 Bjorn Moller, "The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction, " Paper 
presented at the 18 Ih General Conference of the International Peace Research Association, Tampere, 
Finland, 5-9 August 2000. Also see, Donald Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New 
Pattern of Internal Wa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: 
The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and 
William Reno, Warlord Politics and African Statesl (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
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and terrorism have successfully hi-jacked the activities required for successful state- 
making. Thus the FARC, and to a certain degree ROC, have: expanded and 
consolidated territorial and demographic control; maintained order among/over the 
population where their order has been imposed; and extracted resources from the 
territory and population in order to support their activities. 74 
As the discussion in this section reveals, both the Copenhagen School and Tost- 
Realism' have promulgated a view of security that begins to effectively account for 
components of the current security environment. The multisectoral approach of the 
Copenhagen School, combined with Booth's alternative view of anarchy, the nexus 
between the personal, political and international, and the assumption that the state 
remains an essential (albeit not the only) component of security, are able to begin 
accounting for the security threats posed by terrorism and TOC. Although these 
theoretical strands undoubtedly provide a better understanding of security threats than 
the realist tradition, their explanatory power is heightened when placed alongside two 
emerging 'proto-paradigins': globalisation and netwars. 
Globalisation and Neihvars: Emerging Security 'Proto-Paradigms 75 
As discussed in Chapter One, the globalisation process has had a significant impact on 
the evolution of security in the post-Cold War era. Although the academic study of 
globalisation has only received serious attention for little more than a decade, 
74 These three points are quoted in Ayoob (1995), pp. 22-23 as being activities essential for state- 
making. If these activities are impeded by criminal and terrorist groups, it follows that (a) these groups 
have posed a direct threat to the state's ability to maintain a legitimate monopoly over the use of 
violence, and to fail on the essential state task of securing the future of the population; and (b) these 
groups represent a legitimate challenger to the state if they are subsequently able to fulfill these 
components of state-making and ultimately assume control and power over the territory in question. 
75 'Proto-paradigm' is a term used by Mittelman (2002) to describe the vast grouping of globalisation 
literature - which combined, be argues, encompasses a coherent body of literature which has the 
potential of becoming a paradigm in its own right. 
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globalisation does offer a relatively new concept through which analysts can "seek to 
comprehend reality. "76 Despite the diversity found in globalisation writings, 
according to Mittelman there appears to be general academic consensus that 
globalisation allows for "multiple globalising processes, including at the 
macroregional, subregional, and microregional. levels as well as in localities", and as 
such globalisation inherently "blurs many dualities - state and non-state, legal and 
illegal, public and private, and so on - that are customary" in the discipline of 
International politiCS. 77 It is this general outlook on how the emerging dynamics of the 
world operate that gives theoretical discussions about globalisation contribute to the 
development of a conceptual framework of security. 
As is the case with critical security theories, the globalisation approach to 
international relations seeks to correct the anomalies that persist within the discipline 
due largely to the continued primacy of realist traditions. As discussed in Mittelman 
(2002), there are five major points of contention that plague the understanding of 
international politics. First, the term 'international studies' falsely suggests a focus on 
the relation between nations, when in fact the field is predominantly focused on the 
relation between states; second, the field inaccurately separates national from 
international spheres of activity; third, the discipline mistakenly continues to focus 
exclusively on the centrality of the state; fourth, territoriality remains central to the 
understanding of international politics, as reflected in the importance placed on state 
borders and state sovereignty; and fifth, the discipline is preoccupied with "engaging 
in intramural studies over concepts, often without sufficient attention to the 
76 Mittelman (2002), p. 2. 
77 Ibid., p. 4. 
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,, 78 phenomena themselves. These weaknesses that persist within the realist tradition 
have been the focus of many scholars writing on globalisation. Thus despite 
representing a young theoretical tradition in itself, there are several shared 
propositions of globalisation studies. One of these shared propositions is that many 
contemporary problems are global in nature and thus cannot be explained by focusing 
on a particular nation-state. Although, for example, the origins of a criminal 
organisation can be traced back to a specific territory, if its operations are 
transnational then that group can only be effectively countered via a coalition that 
includes all states in which that group is known to operate. Globalisation also 
constitutes a structural transformation in world order, thus suggesting that it is not 
always beneficial to study the "here and now", but an understanding of the security 
environment requires placing it into historical context. It also constitutes a series of 
continuities and discontinuities with the past - although the globalisation process 
itself may have begun centuries ago, it is important to note that it has been accelerated 
by contemporary history. Furthermore, suprastate and substate forces are believed to 
dictate the need for new ontological priorities that constantly take into consideration 
forces from above and below. In response to the shifting nature of the international 
system, the state is searching for ways to reinvent itself either by embracing 
globalisation or resisting it. Finally, underpinning the emerging order is a "set of new, 
deeper, tensions', 79 which are highlighted by the disunity between the fundamental 
principle of state sovereignty - territoriality - and the fundamental principle of 
globalisation - deterritorialisation. As Mittelman notes: "with the development of new 
technologies, especially in communications and transportation, the advent of a 
$network' society (Castell, 1996), and the emergence of a 'nonterritorial region' 
78 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 79 These propositions are explained in greater detail in Ibid,, pp. 7-8. 
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(Ruggie, 1993), there is a marked shift toward a more deterritorialised world .,, 
80 This 
trend further questions the ability of the realist tradition to offer an explanation of the 
security environment that can adequately account for these developments. 
The development of a 'deterritorialised' world is very evident in the post-Cold War 
operations and organisation of TOC and terrorism. However, the nature of this 
defining characteristic of contemporary society is succinctly explained in the context 
of 'netwars'. 81 Generally defined, netwars are used to refer to contemporary wars 
which seldomly involve military confrontation between states, but involve combatants 
that: 
come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden's al- 
Qaeda, drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico, and 
militant anarchists like the Black Bloc that ran amok during the Battle 
of Seattle. Other protagonists are civil-society activists fighting for 
democracy and human rights - from Burma to the Balkans. What all 
have in common is that they operate in small, dispersed units that can 
deploy nimbly - anywhere, anytime. They know how to penetrate and 
disrupt, as well as elude and evade. 82 
Expanded as an explanatory concept of emerging conflict and international security 
dynamics by Arquilla and Ronfeldt of the RAND think tank in the U. S., netwars are 
presented as entities that are intrinsically dual in nature. They are composed of 
conflicts waged on the one hand by terrorists, criminals and ethnonationalist 
extremists, and on the other hand by civil-society activists. Although civil-society 
activists are increasingly important sub-state actors in international politics, the 
so Mittelman (2002), p. 6. M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996); John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International 
Relations, " International Organisation vol. 46 (Summer 1993), pp. 561-83. 
81 'Netwars' is a concept developed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. For their early discussions of 
'netwars' see, The Advent of Netwar, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-789-OSD, 1996) and In 
Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-880- 
OSD/RC, 1997). 
'2 John Arquilla and David Ronfeld4 eds. Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1382-OSD, 2001), p. v. 
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discussion here will focus on the use of netwar by terrorists and criminal 
organisations. 
According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, netwars emerged from the ongoing information 
revolution, which - as proponents of globalisation also argue - has altered the nature 
of conflict in two major ways. First, by "favouring and strengthening network forms 
of organisation', 83 to the detriment of hierarchical forms of organisations, the rise of 
networks has facilitated the migration of power to non-state actors. This is primarily 
because non-state actors find it easier to organise into "sprawling multiorganisational 
,, 84 'networks more readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors. Second, asthe 
information revolution deepens, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that the conduct and 
outcome of conflicts increasingly depends on access to information and the ability to 
communicate information. Furthermore, in order to operate effectively, actors 
engaged in netwars must incorporate five levels of theory and practise into their 
operations: narrative; doctrinal; technological; social; and organisational. 
The narrative level refers to the way in which the group portrays its "experiences, 
interests, and values" to communicate a sense of "cause, purpose, and mission. , 85 The 
purpose is to connect their membership, and generate an external perception that the 
group - be it terrorist or criminal - is not entirely a negative entity. For this reason 
Colombian drug traffickers view themselves "in a positive light as anarchonationalists 
who do good for their communities, for example through financial donations to 
churches, hospitals and schoolS.,, 16 Doctrines, in this context, explain why members 
83 Ibid., p. 1. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), p. 328. 
96 Ibid., p. 329. 
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of networks operate strategically and tactically without necessarily resorting to a 
central command or leader. The focus here, therefore, according to Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, is on the existence of shared principles and practises. Operationally a shared 
doctrine is important because it provides the motivation for groups to engage in 
swarming: "a campaign of episodic, pulsing attacks by various nodes of [the] network 
- at locations sprawled across global time and space where [the network] has 
advantages for seizing the initiative, stealthily. "87 The technological level assesses the 
capacity of networks to disperse information and communications, and coordinate 
their activities - either via advanced technologies or by traditional capabilities such as 
human couriers. Of all theoretical levels of the netwar, the social level is inherently 
the weakest in all networks. This level refers to the ways in which network members 
are connected to one another, suggesting that strong personal ties are required to hold 
the network together. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, "compared to tribal/clan 
and hierarchical forms of organisation, networks have more difficulty instilling, and 
enforcing, a sense of personal identity with and loyalty to the network. "88 Finally, the 
organisational level explicitly defines how the network is organised - i. e. what does 
the network look like. Although all levels are equally important, Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt argue that the defining characteristic of netwars is their organisational 
design. 
Netwars are organised into one (or any combination) of three basic network designs: 
the chain or line network; the hub, star or wheeled network; and/or the all channel or 
full-matrix network. The chain or line network (Figure 2.1) is the simplest form of 
network and is best described as a smuggling chain "where people, goods, or 
87 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), p. 367. 
88 Ibid., p. 342. 
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information move along a line of separated contacts, and where end-to-end 
communication must travel through the intermediate nodes. "89 
FIGURE 2.1" 
The hub, star, or wheeled network (Figure 2.2), on the other hand, is more 
soPhisticated, and thus requires a higher degree of organisation. This form of network 
is best described as a "franchise or a cartel where a set of actors are tied to a central 
(but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate 
and coordinate with each other. "91 
FIGURE 2.2 92 
Finally, the all-channel network (Figure 2.3) is the most intricate form of network that 
operates among sub-state actors. Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest that this type of 
network exemplifies militant groups where "everybody is connected to everybody 
else .,, 
93 This network best describes the organisation of emerging breeds of terrorist 




93 Ibid., p. 8. 
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groups, such as al-Qaeda, which operate a collaborative transnational network of 
militants. With minimum hierarchy, groups such as al-Qaeda allow for decentralised 
decision-making and operations, local initiative and autonomy. As such, all-channel 
networks in general, may appear "acephalous (headless), and at other times 
polycephalous (Hydra-headed). ý04 
FIGURE 2.395 
The intricate nature of the all-channel network dictates that, of the three designs, it is 
the most difficult to sustain over a protracted period of time. It is believed that 
effective performance is dependent upon the presence of "shared principles, interests, 
and goals - at best, an overarching doctrine or ideology - that spans all nodes and to 
which the members wholeheartedly subscribe. , 96 
It is important to note that regardless of the form of network utilised by a netwar 
actor, each network generally operates according to the same overriding principles 
and organisational design. For example, each node in the diagrams above can refer to 
an individual, group, organisation or even a state. The nodes may differ in size and 
membership (inclusive or exclusive); they may be segmentary or specialised (engaged 
94 Ibid., p. 14. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Arquilla, Ronfeld4 Zanini (1999), p. 5 1. 
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in similar activities or they may undertake a division of labour); and the boundaries 
between nodes, or of the network itself, may be either well defined or blurred and 
porous. 97 In addition to these characteristics, networks have three basic sets of 
features. First, communication and coordination within networks tend to change 
according to the activity at hand. Second, internal networks often develop links 
outside the network (often crossing national boundaries). Third, internal and external 
ties are usually facilitated by shared norms and values 98 - whether they are based on 
ideology (as is the case for. terrorist groups) or economics (in the case of organised 
criminal groups). All of this means that networks far exceed the capabilities of the 
traditional hierarchical state actor tied by defined boundaries and actions. Networks 
"defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between state 
and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and military, 
police and military, and legal and illegal. "99 The advent of netwars and networked 
actors poses a significant challenge to realism, Primarily because realism is 
formulated to address the hierarchical state actor. 
As with globalisation, the advent of networked actors in the context of netwars 
represents a critical aspect of post-Cold War security that realism is incapable of 
explaining: the rise of a new generation of non-state actors in a world that is no longer 
strictly defined by territorial boundaries. Although neither of these 'proto-paradigms' 
represents a refined body of academic knowledge, the concepts of globalisation and 
netwars both bring several important and pressing arguments into the current 
theoretical debate about the changing nature of security. In many ways the literature 
97 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (200 1), p. 8. 
98 Zanini and Edwards, "The Networking of Terror in the Infonnation Age, " in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
(2001), pp. 31-32. 
99 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (200 1), p. 14. 
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on globalisation and netwars identify "silences and establish new intellectual space - 
certainly one criterion by which to gauge an ascendant paradigm. "100 Combined with 
the advances made by critical security studies described above, the work on 
globalisation and netwars bring practical components to a debate traditionally focused 
on conceptual frameworks. Ilius the specific combination of the Copenhagen School, 
Post-Realism, globalisation and netwars, provides a solid framework that can be used 
to reconceptualise terrorism and TOC as they exist in the twenty-first century. 
Criteria for Assessing Security Threats in the Post-Cold War Era 
Based on the specific claims extracted from the critical security studies literature and 
the globalisation and netwar proto-paradigms overviewed above, this section isolates 
five criteria to help illuminate the ways in which TOC and terrorism pose threats to 
contemporary security. After providing a summary of these criteria, their utility will 
be tested by directly applying them to the concepts of terrorism and TOC as they have 
evolved since 1991 in order to establish whether these phenomena truly constitute 
security threats. 
The first claim, extracted from the Copenhagen School, is that a multisectoral 
approach to security provides greater insights into the post-Cold War security 
environment than traditional theories of security. A multisectoral approach bestows 
upon analysts and academics the following benefit: 
By working from the inside of the classical discussion, we can take the 
concepts of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and show how, 
on the collective level, they take on new forms under new conditions. 
We can then strip the classical discussion of its preoccupation with 
military matters by applying the same logic to other sectors, and we 
can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to 
loo Mittleman (2002), p. 10. 
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society. With this we maintain a mode of thinking, a set of rules and 
codes from the field of "security" as it has evolved and continues to 
evolve. 101 
Taking this argument a step further, if it can be established that terrorism and TOC 
directly threaten a combination of the military, societal, political, economic and 
environmental sectors, they should - de facto - qualify as security threats. 
102 This 
overcomes much of realism's predisposition to argue that threats are solely defined in 
military terms -a characteristic which does not account for the subversive political 
activities of terrorism and TOC. 
The second element that can help understand terrorism and TOC is the nexus between 
the personal, political (domestic) and international (promoted by the Copenhagen 
School, Utopian and Subaltern Realism, and globalisation). This linkage across units 
of analysis is important because, in an era characterised by the process of 
globalisation, it highlights the fact that security threats have implications beyond the 
immediate target. For example, a terrorist attack that occurs in the heart of Moscow 
threatens the individuals directly targeted; however it also threatens the state's ability 
to provide security for its citizens. The international system may also be threatened by 
the same incident if, for example, the terrorists represented a foreign group, or if 
Russian terrorists attacked an international target such as the Russian headquarters of 
the International Monetary Fund, or a foreign embassy in Moscow. The 
acknowledgement that there is an interplay between units of analysis permits the 
recognition that isolated domestic events can pose threats to regional and ultimately 
'O'Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1995), p. 51. 
102 Given that there is no agreed formula within International Relations for deciding which issues 
should be considered security threats, the Copenhagen School's multisectoral approach will be 
privileged in this thesis. Concluding that a specific phenomenon threatens so many sectors within 
society (national and international) suggests that it should be regarded as a threat in general. Given that 
traditional threats, such as war, also threaten each of the five sectors, it is logical to label any issue that 
threatens each sector a security threat. 
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international security, thus overcoming realism's refusal to accept that domestic order 
and conflict are inextricably linked to regional and international order and conflict. 
Furthermore, accepting the link between levels of analysis also accounts for 
nonterritoriality - the premise that something can occur everywhere and nowhere. 
Based on this assumption, it may be argued that state officials in Washington prior to 
September 11,2001 were unable to recognise that terrorist groups thriving in 
Afghanistan had the capability to pose a direct threat to the U. S. As such, they were 
theoretically incapable of explaining how sub-state actors thousands of miles away 
were able to coordinate a violent attack on American territory. Although he focused 
on the immediate territorial surroundings and not the international system, Ayoob was 
correct to assert that: 
Since no state lives or dies in complete isolation, what happens within 
the borders of failed or failing states can have major implications for 
nearby states. As Liberia, Afghanistan, and Somalia demonstrate, 
anarchy within individual Third World states is bound to spill over 
state boundaries in the form of refugees, sanctuaries for war-ring 
groups, gun running, drug trafficking, and other fallouts that are likely 
to heighten tensions between neighbours. 1 03 
Another criterion that will be used to provide an understanding of contemporary 
terrorism and TOC is that the state is no longer the only referent object. Bringing 
additional referent objects to the fore - such as people, widely accepted rules, norms 
and values - improves our understanding of the nature of security. According to this 
view of security, TOC and terrorism would easily classify as security threats because 
both phenomena directly threaten individuals, international law and sovereignty by 
nature of their activities and existence. Although the state remains an important 
referent object, undermining the integrity of state institutions and established social 
103 Ayoob (1995), p. 174. 
151 
norms and values can create a far more devastating attack on the survivability of the 
state than a direct military attack. 
The fourth point that will be used to develop a more comprehensive understanding of 
the security threat posed by TOC and terrorism within the framework of this thesis is 
the assumption that the state remains an essential, although not the only, component 
of security. Based specifically on the Subaltern Realism idea of the state, two 
generalisations can be made. First, the state is the primary referent object of most 
threats. If a state is incapable of responding to challenges that significantly undermine 
its authority, legitimacy (including its inability to maintain a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence) and stability (thus resulting in the collapse of effective 
governance), it may result in insecurity for the individual and international levels of 
analysis. Therefore, should the governments of Colombia and the Russian Federation 
and their respective state institutions increasingly be undermined by organised 
criminal activities, they risk becoming 'criminal-syndicalist' states. According to the 
Russian Organised Crime Task Force at the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, DC, such a state consists of interactions among corrupt 
officials, professional criminals, and businessmen with little interest in complying 
with existing laws. 104 Already present to some degree in both states, such a ruling 
coalition would definitely not place a high value on the interests of the general 
population - thus simultaneously posing a direct threat to the individual level of 
security. Limitless state resources would continue to be diverted through mass 
embezzlement, and a perfect environment would be created for lucrative illicit 
activities such as trafficking in drugs, arms or natural resources - thus posing a direct 
104 William H. Webster et al., Russian Organized Crim (Washington, DC: The Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1997), p. 21. 
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threat to international society at large. 105 Thus in this thesis it is argued that the state 
remains the linchpin of the political realm because it remains the only actor able to 
attain and hold power and legitimacy. This is the primary reason why non-state actors 
seek control over state functions. For example, drug cartels operating in Colombia in 
the 1980s gained community influence by building more public housing than the 
government, building schools and clinics, providing rural electrification, repairing 
local sewage systems, and even providing physical protection from terrorist groups 
operating in parts of the countryside. 106 Even the Yakuza in Japan continuously 
attempt to portray themselves in a positive light to the community - for example, it 
was the Yakuza and not the Japanese government who were the first to assist the 
victims of the 1995 Kobe earthquake. 107 
With the acknowledgement that state and non-state actors are equal referent objects, 
an adapted realist approach could be used to highlight non-state actors' interest in 
gaining or seeking to gain control of the state. Although the idea of the state as a 
sovereign all-powerful entity is losing merit, by realising the continued importance 
associated with functions of the state, non-state actors can (and have, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five) successfully manipulate the prevailing 
national enviromnent. 
Given the continued importance of the state in providing security for its citizens, and 
in engaging with the international system, it follows that the state is a central 
105 In this example international society is threatened in each sector specified by the Copenhagen 
School: politically, economically, militarily, cnviroru-nentally, and on a societal level. 
" Angela S. Burger, "Conundrum: Illicit Narcotics and Theoretical Approaches in International 
Politics, " Paper presented at the 40'h Annual International Studies Association Convention, Washington 
D. C. (16-20 February, 1999). 
107 Mark Galeotti, "Underworld and Upperworld: Transnational Organised Crime and Global Society, " 
in Josselin and Wallace (2001), p. 211. 
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component in the quest for security and stability from the individual to the global 
level. Regardless of the initiatives that citizens or the international community 
implement to counter threats such as terrorism and TOC, without considerable support 
from state institutions, such as the judiciary and law enforcement, it would be difficult 
to ensure the security of citizens, state security, and ultimately regional and 
international stability. Thus it is evident that the importance of the state has not 
entirely diminished in the realm of security. However, it would be nalve to conclude 
that the state has not fundamentally changed as a result of contemporary international 
developments - such as those accompanying globalisation. With respect to the state, 
"the core circumstances remains entrenched while some of its major features have 
altered. "108 For example, state sovereignty has been called into question and states 
have been forced to redirect their attention to meet both supraterritorial and territorial 
interests. 
Despite the continued importance of the state, the state cannot exclusively be regarded 
as the only referent object in the study of security. Thus the Copenhagen School, 
Booth's Utopian Realism and the globalisation 'proto-paradigm' all bring to the 
ongoing debate on international security an "effort to incorporate a broader ontology 
of structures and agents. "109 This is partially done by focusing on alternative referent 
objects and actors and by presenting a redefinition of security that includes the ability 
of the state to protect its people. To begin with, the arguments presented in these 
writings highlight the importance of understanding that the world is 'polycentric'] 10 
and it consists of linked processes. As a result, economics, politics and society are 
treated as a seamless web, and explanatory levels consistently include levels above 
108 Scholte (2000), p. 133. 
109 Mittelman (2002), p. 6. 
110 Ibid., p. 6. 
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and below the state. As noted by Buzan et al (1998), but equally attributable to most 
theoretical positions represented in this chapter: 
We do not take the state or sovereignty as representing fixed limits, but 
we are skeptical of individualism as the traditional alternative to state 
centrism. We therefore form a picture of a world of multiple units, 
which might be called postsovereign realism. Thus units can be 
overlapping (in contrast to the exclusivity of sovereign territorial 
states), but this does not necessarily lead to any benign transnationalism 
in which the focus is on the multiple identities of individuals 
relativising all units and collectivities. Although each individual in a 
world of overlapping units is a 'member' of several units, instead of 
focusing on any such softening effects produced by overlap, we study 
how the units can continue to conduct power politics [ ... ] Each unit has 
a possibility of becoming the reference for security action, but since the 
different units overlap and are placed at different levels, there is no 
fixed line between the domestic and international - what is internal to 
one unit can be interunit when one thinks of other units. III 
These viewpoints also improve on realist thought which strictly places security in the 
context of a state protecting its government and territory. The slight definitional 
alteration of including the ability of a state to protect its population can in itself 
subsequently account for the "destruction and death caused by non-state actors, from 
terrorist to drug traffickers". 112 As Wisgerhof argues, this is important when: 
the objective of the non-state actors is not to beat an army in the field, 
but to kill or cause panic within the civilian population itself These 
actors may have no interest in 'threatening' the survival of the state, 
either in the form of government or the international recognition of its 
boundaries. However, by taking the battle directly to the people, these 
non-state groups pose a challenge to the state's ability to protect its 
residents from other actors. " 3 
We will see in the case studies discussed in Chapters Four and Five that the primary 
threat from non-state actors is initially focused on the individual level. However, each 
111 Buzan, et a]. (1998), p. 47, fn 7. It is equally important to note that Buzan et al believe domestic 
security relations may be interunit precisely because "in these places the most powerful referent objects 
are smaller than the state. " 
112 Ibid. 
113 Amy E. Wisgerhof, -International Non-State Terrorism and the Transstate Paradigm, " Low 
Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 77. 
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case study will reinforce the argument that the state remains an important security 
target. 
The fifth and final criterion incorporated into this thesis' framework for understanding 
twenty-first century terrorism and TOC is that security cannot be understood without 
going beyond the academic debates about concepts, and explicitly focusing on the 
phenomena themselves. In this view, therefore, the study of international security is 
not about philosophising, but it is about engaging in a debate that is focused on 
finding ways at least to ensure international order, if not ultimately ensuring 
international peace. Thus by understanding the operational (globalisation) and 
organisational (networks) dynamics of contemporary security threats, attempts to 
understand how they threaten security on various levels of analysis and how they can 
be countered becomes, in practise, a less obfuscated exercise. It is therefore essential 
that International Relations scholarship be reflexive in the sense that explanatory 
levels are shifted above and below the state. 114 Based on the extensive literature 
attempting to define security, Kolodziej is correct to observe that "those working in 
security studies can no longer assume that others share their views about what 
security is and how to study it.,, I 15 The extracted assumptions about the nature of 
security provided here will be tested in the following two sections by applying these 
claims to terrorism and TOC. This conceptual framework will also be used in the next 
chapter to formulate an alternative way of explaining the complex nature of the 
various relationships that have developed between TOC and terrorism, and the 
subsequent implications this has for security. 
114 Ibid. 
"sEdward A. Kolodziej, -Security Studies for the Next Millennium: Quo Vadis?, " in Stuart Croft and 
Terry Terriff, eds. Critical Reflections in Security and Change (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 
p. 18. 
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Reconceptualising Terrorism as a Security Threat 
Terrorism as a concept has received little more than token attention in the security 
studies literature. As Fred Halliday states, "The hypostatization of terrorism in 
academic writing on IR has been one of the disciplines more sloppy chapters. 
Terrorism, in the sensational sense in which it has normally been used, is a subaltern 
feature of International Relations. " 116 However, given the nature of contemporary 
terrorism, this phenomenon provides an example of the changing nature of security as 
it is outlined in the conceptual framework described in the previous section. Based on 
the notion of existential threat presented by Buzan et a], the most straightforward way 
of demonstrating that terrorism constitutes a security threat is to illustrate the threat it 
poses to the five security sectors identified by the Copenhagen School. 
Terrorism poses a threat most obviously to the military, political and societal sectors. 
If military security is seen as the ability of "the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, 
territorial integrity, and [ ... ] the machinery of government 
in the face of challenges 
from its citizens"' 17 (a definition that corresponds to the conceptual framework of this 
thesis), there exist numerous examples of terrorism posing a direct security threat. 
Groups including the Italian Red Brigades, Hizbollah, the Shining Path, FARC and 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have all waged intense campaigns of violence which 
were sporadically successful in disrupting civil peace and the operation of 
government. Laqueur notes of the Red Brigades, 
The Red Brigades engaged in some 14,000 terrorist attacks within their 
first ten years. [ ... ] The legal system was almost paralysed, since 
jurors 
116 Fred Halliday, " 'The sixth great powee: on the study of revolution and international relations, " 
Review of International Studies vol. 16 (1990), p. 209, fh. 7. 
117 Ayoob (1995). 
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were afraid to fulfil their duty-, not all judges were prepared to be 
heroes, and the police were by and large unprepared to deal with this 
unprecedented challenge. 118 
In this situation it is evident that the attacks of the Red Brigades could be considered 
a direct military threat against the state - through the use of violence, state institutions 
and agents were directly targeted. This example, however, is further evident in the 
operations of the IRA. 
The IRA, operating for decades from Northern Ireland, has based its operational 
doctrine on the strategy of ancient military strategists such as Sun Tzu. As Harmon 
surnmarises: the IRA "strike hard but then disengage; concentrate for attacks but 
disperse quickly-, move fast; ... fare] ... adaptable; change methods constantly; surprise 
is key, master intelligence. "' 19 For this very reason the IRA is often considered to be 
one of the world's most challenging and innovative terrorist groups. Although this 
basic strategy has been adopted by many terrorist groups, the operational successes of 
the ERA reveals that the group has posed a military threat to the United Kingdom - if 
not to the territorial integrity of the entire state, then at least to the ability of the state 
to control the use of violence in Northern Ireland, and to maintain civil peace. This 
military dimension to the IRA threat is exemplified in the following quote: 
British helicopters are capable of considerable range, high speed, and 
night operations, and they have often cornered 'Provos'. But the IRA 
has responded, with heavy machine guns and even mortars, downing 
several helicopters and threatening all others. In one striking case, the 
IRA bombed an army convoy - but only after correctly predicting that 
when it did so British reinforcements would arrive by helicopter and 
land at an obvious and appropriate spot. All went as the IRA expected, 
so its second bomb at the landing site inflicted even more casualties 
than the earlier explosion. 120 
llgLaqueur(1999), p. 29- 
119 Hannon (2000), p. 84. 
120 Ibid., p. 85. 
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Furthermore, in the case of the IRA, the extent to which the British government fails 
in their task to maintain peace within society in Northern Ireland as a whole is also 
illustrated. Aside from the perpetual presence of armies and gunmen on the streets, 
the "Republican strategy [since the mid-1980s] required a certain level of violence - 
but only enough to distort the private and public life of the North, and to make sure 
that the military arm was properly exercised. " 121 In this sense the IRA has posed a 
formidable threat in the military sector. 
The threat posed to the military sector is also evident within the FSU. A considerable 
amount of terrorist activity occurred during the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996. 
Apart from military engagement between Chechen and Russian forces, Chechen 
groups were responsible for a number of significant terrorist incidents that flowed 
over Chechen borders into Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Russia itself. 
Tbus the seizure of Russian towns and a series of bombings considerably complicated 
the attempts made by an already-weak Russian military to maintain its territorial 
integrity and bring order to the Caucasus. 122 
Aside from posing a threat to the military sector, the political nature of terrorism 
would presuppose that it poses a threat to the political security of a state. According to 
the Copenhagen School, political security is "about the organisational stability of 
121 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA. (London: Corgi, 1989), p. 387. 
122Dennis Pluchinsky, "Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: A Primer, A Puzzle, A Prognosis, " 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 21 (1998), p. 126. Pluchinsky cites a number of examples 
including the June 1995 seizure by over 100 rebels of the Russian town of Buddennovsk in which over 
100 people were killed, and hundreds more held hostage; and a series of bombings in June and July 
1996 during which trains, train stations, subways, and trolleys were targeted in Moscow, Volgograd, 
and Trubnaya. 
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social order(s)". 123 It concerns non-military threats to states and political units other 
than states, and to system-level referents (for example, international society or 
international law). As outlined in the previous section, political threats are essentially 
about "giving or denying recognition, support, or legitimacy. " 124 Although the 
overlap with the military sector is quite apparent here, there are examples of a terrorist 
group posing a threat to the actual existence of entire national political structures (as 
opposed to the mere ability of a state to control the machinery of government). During 
the campaign in the 1970s by Uruguay's Tuparnaros, which was aimed at destroying 
the capitalist economic system of the country, this group kidnapped and murdered 
several businessmen, diplomats and government leaders. Although the Tupamaros' 
leadership never gained control over Uruguay, they were indirectly responsible for 
changing the national political structure. The wave of terrorist activity in Uruguay 
"resulted in a drift from democracy toward authoritarianism as ultra-conservatives 
intensified repressive measures against the Left. Terrorism was destroyed, but so too 
was the democratic state. " 125 
Terrorism conducted within Imperial Russia between 1861 and 1907 also illustrates 
the political threat posed by terrorism. During this span of fifty years, terrorist groups 
including Narodnya Volya (People's Will) engaged in campaigns of violence against 
the Tsarist government in the hope that they would lead Russia into the modem world 
by forcing reform, beginning with the replacement of autocracy with a form of elite 
democracy. The violence perpetrated by the terrorists contributed to the downfall of 
the Tsarist government. As Norman Naimark notes: 
123 Buzan et a]. (1998), p. 14 1. 
124 Ibid., p. 142. 
125 Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 115. 
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the terrorists forced the empire to change its course, alter its laws, and 
abandon the hopes and plans of its best representatives. [ ... ] In order to 
conquer terrorism, the state undermined and ultimately abandoned 
some of its own educational, legal and military programs. In other 
words, the autocracy subverted its own progress, contributing to the 
revolutionary stonn in which it ultimately collapsed. 126 
The final direct threat posed by terrorism is to the societal sector, which is generally 
defined as the ability of members of a social group to protect their "ideas and 
practices". 127 Throughout the history of terrorism various ethnic and religious groups 
have been the targets of terrorist organisations. The potential for terrorism to continue 
to threaten this sector is especially evident in the post-Cold War era as clashes 
between ethnic and religious groups have become almost characteristic of newly 
independent states, weak and failed states. Well into 2004 Hamas remained 
committed to eliminating Israel and all Jews. Imam Sheik Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin 
reportedly declared, "Six million descendants of monkeys (i. e. Jews) now rule in all 
the nations of the world, but their days, too, will come. Allah! Kill them all, do not 
leave even one. "128 
In addition to radical and militant Islamist terrorist groups, Jewish and Christian 
terrorism has also proliferated over the past decade. Buzan et al directly acknowledge 
the societal threat posed by the growth of militias in the United States which have 
emerged to "defend the 'true America' against what their members regard as a 
coalition of all kinds of decadent racial and sexual minorities and liberal state lovers 
126Norman N. Naimark, "Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia, " Terrorism and Political Violence 
vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1990), p. 188. 
127 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 119. 
128ADL Special Background Report, Hamas. Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood, p. 4, as 
quoted in Iloffman, (1999), p. 98. 
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who curb the autonomy of straight, white Americans to live a 'real' American life. ,' 
29 
Finally, within the former Soviet Union acts of terrorism also illustrate societal threats 
as groups from Russia and Central Asia - both of which are ethnically and religiously 
diverse - are increasingly hostile towards one another. This is true, for example, of 
Chechnya and Dagestan where acts of terrorism are increasingly targeted against 
ethnic Russians - often on Russian territory. An example of this occurred in October 
2002 when a group of Chechen terrorists took hundreds of people hostage at a 
Moscow theatre, demanding an end to the war in Chechnya and the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Chechen territory. 130 
Other than the direct threat posed to the military, political and societal sectors, 
terrorism, in certain instances, can also pose a threat to the environmental and 
economic sectors. This is especially true in the post-Cold War era given developments 
in technology and the globalisation and integration of economic systems as discussed 
in Chapter 1. Terrorism can potentially threaten the environmental sector through its 
use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons. The millennial cult Aum 
Shinrikyo conducted the first successful terrorist attack using chemical agents in 
March 1995 when they unleashed a nerve gas attack in the subways of Tokyo. 131 
Given access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and technology (largely 
from within the former Soviet Union), 132 it is not difficult to foresee terrorists 
129Buzan et al. (1998), p. 130. 
130 "Kremlin Blames Chechen Leadership for Theatre Crisis, " Russia Reform Monito no. 980 (28 
October 2002). 
13 'Hoffman (1999), pp. 121-127. 
"217or a very comprehensive account of the nuclear black market see Rensselaer W. Lee, Smuggliniz 
Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe, (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998). 
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attempting to contaminate water sources in urban areas, or attempting to produce a 
nuclear capability - the environmental effects of which would be self-evident. 133 
Finally, terrorist organisations can threaten the economic sector by pursuing an 
economic strategy, normally for financial gain, in order to obtain funding for more 
traditional terrorist operations. Terrorist groups may also directly target the economic 
security of individuals and a state. For example, terrorist groups engaging in 
kidnapping, money-laundering and political corruption directly and negatively affect 
the national economy of the state in which they are operating. 134 This has been the 
case with the National Liberation Army and FARC which have damaged the 
Colombian economy through their involvement in the narcotics industry, kidnapping, 
and money-laundering. 135 Aside from posing a threat to the economic sector through 
criminal activities, terrorist organisations also directly affect economic security as a 
result of the targets they choose, and where they choose to conduct their terrorist acts. 
In targeting tourists in Egypt and hotels frequented by tourists, Ja'maat Islamiya 
seriously affected Egypt's tourist industry - one of the most lucrative industries in the 
state. Finally, responding to technological advances in communications, terrorist 
groups may acquire the potential to destroy banking systems, wreak havoc on stock 
markets, or destroy electrical power grids, all in the name of achieving political 
objectives. 
133 For a continuously updated list of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological 
material, see the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at: 
http: //cns. miis. edu. 
13'An explanation of how these activities directly result in a loss to the legitimate national economies of 
Russia and Colombia are covered in Chapters Four and Five respectively. 
135 it is believed that these two terrorist organisations; have the economic power of some of the largest 
commercial entities in Colombia. Their activities, which also regularly include bank heists, theft of 
highway cargo, bombing oil pipelines, and taxing construction and public works projects, result in a 
direct loss to the national economy. Furthermore the government faces additional costs associated with 
securing strategic targets, and funds extorted by the both ELN and FARC. For additional information 
see Christopher C. Hannon, Terrorism Today. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 64-65. 
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The few examples selected to illustrate the argument that terrorism is a threat to 
security further reveal the intricate nature of terrorism. Terrorism is not only a threat 
directed at nation-states. The fact that terrorist groups have targeted individuals, their 
home state, and international targets, demonstrates that security threats in the post- 
Cold War era link individual, national and international structures and actors. This 
merely illustrates the significance of Utopian Realism's argument that the "personal, 
political and international are a seamless web". It also confirms that the state is not the 
only referent object, but is one referent object among many others. Furthennore, 
terrorism threatens not only tangible entities (the state, and the individual), but also 
are intangible concepts related to states and society, such as human rights and 
international law. Furthen-nore, specific terrorist organisations and/or activities cannot 
be isolated in one security sector. Thus although the example of the IRA was used to 
illustrate the military sector, this specific organisation simultaneously poses a threat to 
other sectors. Tbrough their bombing campaigns which have destroyed buildings and 
infrastructure, the Irish Republican Army has indirectly threatened the economic 
security of Northern Ireland and the UK. Furthermore, by targeting the Protestant 
community, the Irish Republican Army also poses a threat to the societal sector. 
This section has thus shown that terrorism threatens the five security sectors presented 
by the Copenhagen School: military-, political; societal; environmental; and economic. 
Considering that terrorist groups can successfully threaten these sectors, it may be 
concluded that terrorism does, in fact, pose a threat to security. 
164 
Reconceptualising Organised Crime as a Security Threat 
Organised crime has received even less attention than terrorism within the field of 
International Relations primarily because it was believed to be solely a problem of 
domestic, if not only community, politics. Furthermore, International Relations theory 
has not considered organised crime as posing a significant threat to either national or 
international security, nor has it seriously considered the ability of criminal 
organisations to affect the political and economic balance of a state or region. 136 As a 
result of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, there is considerable evidence 
suggesting that this oversight should be rectified and that organised crime - or more 
specifically, TOC - be given more attention by the field of International Relations. 
This section therefore seeks to use the multisectoral approach of the Copenhagen 
School to illustrate why organised crime constitutes a threat to security. As with the 
previous section, this will simultaneously illustrate how the conceptual framework 
established in this chapter can account for the presence of TOC as a security threat. 
Like terrorism, TOC has the potential to threaten the military, political, societal, 
environmental and economic sectors of security. 137 Beginning with the military 
sector, TOC has already played a role in the emergence of regional instability, 
suggesting that transnational criminal organisations pose a direct military threat to 
national and regional security and stability. For example, fighting over the 'Green 
Line' in Lebanon was primarily about control over the drugs trade rather than a 
conflict in which two religions were pitted against one another. In the FSU TOC has 
also played a role in the emergence of regional instability in Chechnya, the Crimea 
136 It should be noted that some IR theorists have made reference to organised crime as a security 
threat, but without expanding on how or why organised crime poses a threat. 
137 All of the examples mentioned in the following paragraphs will be dealt with more thoroughly in the 
case studies presented in Chapters 4-5. The examples provided in this section are intended for general 
illustrative purposes only. 
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and arguably within the states of Central Asia. Organised crime in Chechnya, for 
example, arguably pushed politicians in Moscow to revert to armed force in 1994 and 
to maintain a much more vigilante and assertive foreign policy in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. 138 Furthermore, should ROC gain greater control over Russian politics, a 
non-democratic, criminal government in Moscow could pose a significant threat to the 
independence of its near abroad. 139 In these cases ROC represents an external danger 
to the security of other former Soviet states. 
Politically, organised crime poses a threat through its widespread use of corruption 
and its penetration of political institutions at home and abroad. These activities 
inherently weaken government control, which subsequently works to corrode public 
confidence in the ruling government. Prior to serious attempts to counter the Mafia in 
Italy, the Italian government faced significant challenges to its legitimacy and ability 
to govern. 140 In postcommunist Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic, "the state 
itself [became] an exponent of organised crime" and organised crime subsequently 
became the "central pillar of economic and political power. "14 1 As will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4, the ROC also significantly challenges Russia's attempts 
at democratisation. Furthermore, other government structures, including law 
enforcement and the judiciary, are losing their legitimacy in the face of rampant 
organised crime throughout the Russian Federation. In several cases, including that of 
13 8 Galeotti (2001), p. 212. 
139 Such has been the case with warlords in Somalia, and the effects organised crime has had in 
provoking military confrontations in Sierra Leone. Criminal organisations involved in the drugs trade 
have also used their own military capabilities to engage with government forces in order to protect their 
interests. This has been evident in Colombia, Peru, Burma and Afghanistan. 
'4OFor a comprehensive assessment of the Italian Mafia and Italy's attempts to fight its increasing 
power see Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia: Italy's Fight Against Or-ganised Crime. (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000). 
141 Berdal and Serrano, "Transnational Organised Crime' and International Security: the New 
Topography? ", in Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. Transnational Organized Crime and 
International Security: Business as Usual?. (London: Lynne Reinner Pulbishers, 2002), p. 199. 
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Colombia, Russia and Italy, criminal organisations have also posed a considerable 
challenge to the state by engaging in a concerted campaign of violence and 
undermining the ability of the state to provide basic security and welfare services 
Apart from the threat posed to the political sector on a state level, TOC also 
challenges the political security of states throughout the international system. This is 
largely accomplished by the ability of transnational criminal groups to penetrate 
international borders virtually undetected. As a result the concept of state sovereignty 
is losing much of its validity. Not only are states increasingly unable to stop criminal 
organisations from penetrating their borders, they are also unable to control the 
activities conducted by international criminal organisations within their borders. For 
example, more than one-third of all crimes committed in Berlin between 1991 and 
1998 have been attributed to Russian organised crime. 142 
The impact which organised crime has on the societal sector is more difficult to 
capture than its impact on the military and political sectors. Based on the definition of 
the societal sector provided in the first section of this chapter, however, TOC can pose 
a formidable threat. Buzan et al argue that migration-related organised crime can 
exacerbate the "cycle of poverty in the South", 143 in addition to creating tensions 
between the perceived ethnic identity of the organised criminal group with that of 
their host country. The influx of Russian immigrants to Canada and the United States 
after the Cold War, for example, provides an illustration of this phenomenon. 144 As 
142 Jeffrey Robinson, The Merger How Organised Crime is Taking Over Canada and the World, 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), p. 177. 
143 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 138. 
144 Robert Friedman, Red Mariva: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America, (Boston, Little Brown, 
2000) and U. S. Department of Defense, The Rise of a Criminal Superpower. Orizanized Crime in 
Russia. Report prepared by Mark Galeotti, December 1995. 
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Russian communities emerged in various parts of North America, the appearance of 
ROC closely followed. Based on increasing incidents of violence perpetrated by these 
criminal organisations, the Russian community itself is increasingly becoming a target 
of discrimination as all ethnic Russians - regardless of age or occupation - are 
assumed to be part of the Russian criminal epidemic. 
Organised crime also potentially threatens the environmental sector. As Louise 
Shelley notes, "Because organised crime groups are oriented toward immediate 
profits, their activities (cultivating drugs on unsuitable soil, harvesting and selling of 
protected species and illegally overfishing sturgeon for the lucrative caviar trade) 
often lead to serious environmental damage. " 145 The Camorra of Italy has included 
the illicit disposal of toxic and industrial waste as one of their newest sectors of 
criminal activity. 146 Furthermore, potentially the greatest danger to the environmental 
sector emerges from illegal trafficking in radioactive materials. Evidence already 
exists that criminal organisations, including those based in Italy and Russia, have 
trafficked in weapons-grade material. 147 
Given the extremely large amounts of money involved in the activities of organised 
crime, it is not difficult to see that the economic sector is seriously threatened by 
transnational organised criminal activity. Apart from the effects of fraud on 
145 Louise Shelley, "TOC: An Imminent Threat to the Nation State?, " Journal of International Affairs, 
vol. 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 471. 
1461t is interesting to note that the Italian Environment Ministry reported in 1995 that of the 26 million 
tonnes of solid waste produced in Italy, only 19 million was disposed of officially. The Italian 
government estimates that this business brings criminal organisations an annual revenue between 
US$3-3.6 billion. Ministero dell'Interno, Rapporto sulla Criminalita Organizzata in Italia (1995) Rome 
June 1996; U. Marchetti, G. Ganza, A. Pansa, "Impegno Investigativo e strategie inquirenti in Italia, " in 
The Waste Industry: Italy-America Achieving a Crime-Free Market, New York, 5-6 June 1997, 
conference papers published by New York University School of Law and Eurispes, Rome, December 
1997, pp. 62-81, as quoted by Jamieson, (2000), p. 239. 
""For more specific examples of Italian examples, see Ibid. For examples of the involvement of 
Russian groups see Chapter 4. 
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individuals, large fraud operations have affected national financial systems and have 
the potential to destabilise the international capital market. 148 Finally, the existence of 
enormous profits from organised crime "may also make economic management a 
much more difficult task, due to their impact on inflation, their distortion of sectoral 
development and the diversion of the wider distribution of scarce resources within 
society. " 149 
Considering the examples provided, 150 it is evident that organised crime does pose a 
threat to the security sectors described by the Copenhagen School. As with the threat 
posed by terrorism, organised crime also constitutes a security threat within the realm 
of International Relations - as recognized by the emerging field of critical security 
studies. Combined with the fact that TOC has evolved considerably over the past 
decade, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that this phenomenon remains a 
national law enforcement problem. In fact, given the evolutionary nature of both 
terrorism and TOC, it follows that any attempts to understand and subsequently 
counter these threats must also be adapted to the post-Cold War environment. 
Conclusions: Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and the Underlying 
Assumptions of Twenty-First Century Security 
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties that traditional International Relations 
theories have had in addressing security in the post-Cold War environment, this 
chapter has argued that a combination of elements extracted from the Copenhagen 
School and selected Post-Realist writers can be used to aid in explaining and 
148 Examples illustrating this argument are plentiful, and include: the BCCI Affair, the Bank of New 
York Scandal, and the indirect implications of the annual turnover in the illicit drug trade. 
149 John McFarlane and Karen McLennan, Transnational Crime: the New Security Paradigm, Strategic 
Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 294 (May 1996), The Australian National University, p. 7. 
150 More in-depth examples of how terrorism and organised crime threaten the five security sectors will 
be provided in the case studies. 
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understanding the threats to security posed by organised crime, terrorism, and their 
convergence. More specifically, this chapter has briefly illustrated how terrorism and 
organised crime pose independent threats to security based on the criteria extracted 
from the broad school of critical security studies, combined with emerging paradigms. 
These elements include: a multilateral approach to security; the interconnectedness of 
the three levels of analysis (individual, state, and international); the assumption that 
the state remains an essential (but not the only) component of security; the fact that 
the state is no longer the only legitimate referent object, but is considered equal to a 
host of additional referent objects including the individual, groups, the international 
system, and intangible concepts such as shared norms and values (i. e. as exhibited in 
international law and diplomacy); and the assumption that theory is not static and 
must therefore be continuously measured because of the ever-evolving nature of the 
security threats that they must account for. 
Based on the discussions provided in this chapter, it may be concluded that the 
elements isolated in the conceptual framework presented here have several advantages 
over realism: 
First, the multisectoral approach of the Copenhagen School provides the necessary 
tools with which specific issues can be assessed as potential threats to security. As 
the previous two sections revealed, a strong case can be made for arguing that 
terrorism and transnational organised crime, as they exist in the current international 
environment, should be considered security threats. 
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Second, the theoretical approaches chosen here do not necessarily stray from the 
traditional understanding of security in that they accept the importance of the state as 
an actor within international politics. Threats against the state, therefore, should still 
be considered important for three reasons. First, the state remains the only actor that 
can adequately provide its citizens with security based on the fact that, in most cases, 
the state maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Second, given the 
continued primacy of the state in international politics, it remains an important 
element in terms of countering threats to its security and that of its citizenry. Third, 
the conceptual framework introduced in this chapter addresses the inherent 
weaknesses within traditional theories by accounting for the increasing relevance of 
non-military threats and non-state actors in the arena of international relations. 
By establishing that terrorism and TOC each pose a general threat to security, it may 
be deduced that the convergence between terrorism and TOC would thus, in theory, 
present a security threat of exponential magnitude. Furthermore, the convergence of 
these two threats would suggest the importance of ensuring that any initiatives 
developed to counter it can account for the evolving nature of the international 
system, which can generally be described in the following manner: 
the 1990s have demonstrated that terrorism has heartily survived the 
atrophication of communism and the end of the Cold War. Terrorism 
flourishes as a small-group activity, as a component of insurgency and 
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revolutionary warfare, and as an adjunct of the new organised crime. 
"'Christopher Harmon, Terrorism Today (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 139. 
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A 'new organised crime' that promises to "undermine fragile new democracies, sap 
the strength from developing countries, threaten our efforts to build a safer, more 
prosperous world. " 152 
The arguments provided in the first two chapters of this thesis provide the basis for a 
detailed investigation into the nexus between security threats. A study of the 
relationship between threats brings with it the potential to further illustrate the 
intricate nature of post-Cold War security. Chapter Tbree will therefore explain the 
logic and dynamics behind the relationships that have emerged between TOC and 
terrorism. Using the conceptual framework developed here, the next chapter will 
bring together theory and the actual phenomena that are responsible for producing 
insecurity throughout the entire spectrum of levels of analysis, presenting a model that 
provides an understanding of terrorism and TOC in the context of twenty-first century 
security. 
152 U. S. President Bill Clinton as stated in his address during the 50'h Anniversary of the United 
Nations, U. S. Information Agency Wireless File, 23 October 1995, as quoted in MacFarlane and 
McLennan (1996), p. 15. 
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Chapter Three 
Explaining and Understanding the Crime-Terror Continuum (CTC) 
The purpose of this chapter is to build on the conceptual framework presented in 
Chapter Two by proposing a new model capable of explaining the contemporary 
security threats of terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC). Referred to as 
the crime-terror continuum (CTQ in this thesis, this model identifies six major 
relationships that exist between the terrorist and criminal worlds, from strategic 
cooperation and alliance formations to the complete convergence of motivations. The 
CTC seeks to move away from the traditional confines of International Security 
Studies, and thus reveals how the key assumptions of the International Relations 
discipline to explain and understand conflict and instability have, in fact, been eroded. 
For example, the CTC illustrates that: the state can no longer be considered a unitary 
actor but is one actor among many that compete for control over state funcions; the 
state no longer exclusively maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence; 
the state is incapable of guaranteeing individual security-, the idea of anarchy defined 
in relation to states has lost its explanatory power; and it is superficial to continue 
dividing the world along territorial boundaries - whether national or regional - 
because levels of analysis have become interdependent and interchangeable. 
To explain the CTC, this chapter will begin by discussing the existing International 
Relations literature that has addressed components of the CTC. The chapter will then 
explore the six aspects of the crime-terror continuum, outlining the major 
characteristics of each, followed by a more detailed overview of what is referred to as 
the 'convergence thesis'. Finally, this chapter will outline the organisational and 
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operational similarities emerging between terrorism and TOC as a result of the nexus 
that has developed between the two phenomena. The relevance of the conceptual 
framework presented in Chapter Two will thus be further highlighted. 
The evolving international security environment has created a situation in which 
numerous scenarios - once unthinkable - have become common occurrences. For 
example, criminal and terrorist groups regularly engage in strategic alliances to 
provide goods and services for one another. Russian organised criminal groups have 
cooperated with FARC to exchange drugs for arms, and allegedly to provide money- 
laundering opportunities. Criminal and terrorist groups have also taken advantage of 
territory inadequately controlled by states - such as the Northwest Frontier Province in 
Pakistan, the tri-border area in South America, and Afghanistan - to advance mutual 
interests and areas of potential cooperation. In addition to groups taking advantage of 
uncontrolled territory abroad, criminal groups in, for example, Russia, Chechnya, 
Kosovo and Albania, have successfully taken advantage of widespread instability in 
their own countries to increase their criminal operations and secure political 
aspirations. Finally, terrorist groups including Abu Sayyaf (Philippines) and the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have used the veneer of political motivations 
to engage in lucrative criminal operations. 
These developments highlight the dynamic characters of terrorism and TOC, as both 
phenomena have evolved significantly as a result of a combination of factors, many of 
which are associated with globalisation and the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, 
the shifting operational and organisational dynamics of these threats since 1991 has 
received little attention within academic or policy-making communities, and thus 
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remain poorly understood. The relative inability of government analysts and policy- 
makers to respond to the changing nature of post Cold War security has thus left the 
world unprepared to address major transnational challenges. Thus as contemporary 
security threats continue to evolve, and phenomena such as terrorism and TOC 
continue to learn from each other's strengths and weaknesses, individuals, states and 
the international community are left to deal with a host of culminating threats - as 
exemplified in the unprecedented terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda on 
September 11,2001 in the United States. 
In the current international environment, security must be understood as a cauldron of 
traditional and emerging threats that interact with one another, and at times, converge. 
It is this condition that this chapter will explain. 
Background to the Crime-Terror Continuum 
The existence of links between organised crime and terrorism is not a completely new 
phenomenon. Aspects of bilateral relations have existed since the 1970s in the Middle 
East (Lebanon) and Asia (the Golden Triangle), and since the 1980s in Latin America, 
where drug cartels and terrorist groups have engaged in de facto strategic alliances. ' 
During the 1970s and 1980s terrorist and criminal groups entered into cooperative 
relationships primarily for operational purposes. In Colombia, for example, the 
cocaine cartels based in Medellin and Cali regularly hired FARC and guerrillas from 
1 The alliance created between drug traffickers and terrorist groups in Latin America is specifically 
referred to as 'narco-terrorism', and has generated some academic attention. Key to the study of narco- 
terrorism was the seminal book (Narcoterrorism) written by Rachel Ehrenfeld in 1990 (New York: 
Basic Books). Despite the inroads made by Ehrenfeld in introducing links that exist between TOC and 
terrorism, many academics and policy-makers dismissed her writing because it failed to account for the 
differences between organised crime and terrorism. Critiques include: Abraham Miller and Nicholas 
Damask, "The Dual Myths of Narcoterrorism, " Terrorism and Political Violence (Spring 1996); and 
R. T. Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War, " Transnational Organised Cl'ýe, (Winter 1995). 
Ehrenfeld's arguments are increasily relevant and persuasive in the international environment which has 
developed since the end of the Cold War. 
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the April 19th Movement (M19) to provide security at cocaine plantations. The 
terrorists received revenues which they used for their operations, and the cartels found 
an efficient way to secure their lucrative illicit business. Throughout the 1980s the 
Colombian security predicament was one that was succinctly summarised by Max 
Manwaring as a ... Hobbesian Trinity' of illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and 
paramilitary organisations [which] are creating a situation in which life is indeed 
'nasty, brutish, and short. ,, 2 
Although these early relations between politically motivated and criminal entities 
could be considered extremely clinical and business-like in nature, such ties are one of 
the most important transformations in international relations that have had a growing 
impact on the nature of contemporary security. The relationship between organised 
crime and terrorism grew in importance after 1991 as a result of various strategic 
factors, including the end of the Cold War and the most recent wave of globalisation - 
as described in Chapter One. Although there have been some post- 1991 attempts made 
within the field of International Relations to understand the strengthening ties between 
TOC and terrorism, most of this literature has focused more generally on the nexus 
between crime and political violence in the context of civil wars, and not specifically 
between TOC and terrorism. 
The most prolific early attempt to understand the nexus between crime and politically 
motivated violence was made by Mary Kaldor who introduced the concept of 'new 
wars'. Although Kaldor continued to use the term 'wars' when discussing post-1991 
conflicts in order to place emphasis on their political nature, she stressed that new wars 
2 Max Manwaring, Non-state actors in Colombia: threat and response Strategic Studies Institute, 
(Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, May 2Z), p. 1. 
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"involve a blurring of the distinction between war (usually defined as violence 
between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime 
(violence undertaken by privately organised groups for private purposes, usually 
financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by 
993 states or politically organised groups against individuals). Thus Kaldor focused on 
the changing nature of security, one in which the traditional explanatory models did 
not apply because new wars involved actors with transnational connections in which 
distinctions between levels of analysis could not convincingly be made. According to 
Kaldor, analysts looking at post-1991 conflict could not distinguish between "What is 
private and what is public, state and non-state, informal and formal, between what is 
11 4 done for economic or political motives . 
Another attempt to understand the evolving international security environment was 
made by Donald Snow in his book Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New 
Internal Conflicts. Arguing that the post-Cold War context is fundamentally different 
from the Cold War era, Snow introduces his concept of 'uncivil wars'. These wars are: 
less principled in political terms, less focused on the attaim-nent of some 
political ideal. They seem more vicious and uncontrolled in their conduct; 
one cannot find the restraining influence of Maoist or other political 
philosophies. Instead, these wars often appear to be little more than 
rampages by groups within states against one another with little or no 
apparent ennobling purpose or outcome; they are, indeed, uncivil wars. 5 
In acknowledging that the ideological basis for traditional insurgent warfare (notably 
Communism or Maoism) has largely disappeared, Snow suggests that the post-Cold 
War era is characterised by two predominant forms of non-ideological conflict: 
3 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p. 2. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO. 
and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1996), pp. 1-2. 
177 
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criminal insurgencies and ethnic insurgencies. According to Snow, the main purpose 
of criminal insurgencies is to destabilise parts of a country by "forcing the removal of 
government authority" and then terrorising the local population "as a preface to 
engaging in criminal actiVity.,, 7 Examples of this are abundant and include conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bolivia and Colombia. Ethnic insurgencies, on the other hand, 
have received widespread attention within the International Relations literature, and 
simply refer to violent conflict that emerges as a result of ethnic differences. However, 
what makes post-Cold War ethnic insurgencies especially concerning is the lack of 
purpose or intent to create any form of peace. As in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, 
their purpose is merely to cause destruction. As Snow concludes: 
The criminal insurgents, including the narco-insurgents, have their own 
economic gain as their motive, not some ennobling societal goal to 
which an appeal can be made. Ethnic violence may be waged for 
political gain (keeping anti-Tutsi Hutus in power had something to do 
with incitement of the Rwandan slaughter), but its purposes are hardly 
ever ideological in the sense of offering an alternative, and presumably 
superior, form of governance. 8 
Writing earlier than Snow and Kaldor, but bringing similar contributions to this study 
of the crime-terror nexus, was Steven Metz. In a working paper published by the 
Strategic Studies Centre of the U. S. Army War College in 1993, Metz argues - as 
Snow does - that post-Cold War insurgencies are different than those that existed 
during the Cold War. According to Metz, the key to understanding emerging 
insurgencies is to acknowledge that they are based on psychological components. 9 In 
other words, the inability of primarily Third World states to meet the psychological 
(social welfare) needs of their populations results in growing fi-ustration and discontent 
6 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
7 Ibid., p. 56. 
8 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
9 Steven Metz, "The Future of Insurgency, " Strategic Studies Working Paper, (U. S. Army War College, 
Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1993). 
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- which could subsequently be manipulated by insurgent groups. The key to Metz's 
argument, and of particular relevance for this thesis, is the distinction he makes 
between spiritual insurgency and commercial insurgency. Spiritual insurgency is 
considered to be a left-over of the Cold War era, and remains driven by "the problems 
of modernisation, the search for meaning, and the pursuit of justice. "10 Commercial 
insurgency, on the other hand, is driven by a psychological foundation that may be 
summarised as a "warped translation of Western popular culture which equates wealth, 
personal meaning, and power. "" 
Although Kaldor, Snow and Metz do not focus exclusively on the relationship that has 
developed between terrorism and TOC, their work is important because it considers 
the loss of ideological motivations in relation to post-Cold War conflict. Furthermore, 
they suggest that there is a blurring between economic and political motivations of 
violence. The same contribution is also inherent in other academic attempts to 
illustrate the nexus between crime and terrorism. For example, Max Manwaring added 
to this debate by suggesting the existence of a 'grey area phenomenon' 12 , especially in 
territory not under state control. 'Grey area' refers to the inability to pinpoint the exact 
nature of a threat - be it criminal, ideological, or violence without cause. However, 
instead of extrapolating the dynamics of a 'grey area phenomenon' to produce a more 
vivid and comprehensive understanding of the nature of the converging threats he 
alluded to, Manwaring focused on providing policy guidance to U. S. government 
actors. In fact, it is worth noting that some policy-makers have also attempted to 
10 Ibid., p. 1. 
" Ibid. 
12 Max Manwaring, ed. Grey Area Phenomenon: Confronting the New World Disorde (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993); the foundations of which were developed in Max Manwaring, ed. 
Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflic, (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1991). 
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highlight the existence of a nexus between organised crime and terrorism. For 
example, before a hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, 
Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate of the 
International Criminal Police Organisation discussed the threat posed by the 
convergence of organised crime, drugs trafficking and terrorism. 13 Although Mutschke 
focused on structural links that existed between the groups, he did mention groups 
considered to be hybrid in nature (i. e. simultaneously criminal and political) - such as 
Albanian organised crime and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Chris Dishman of 
the U. S. Commission on National Security, writing in Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, also acknowledged that politically motivated terrorist groups could 
transform into criminal entities, and vice versa, given changing circumstances. Some 
of his findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
Apart from the work of the academics noted above, who focus more generally on the 
nature of international security, other recent writings touching on the relationship 
between politically-motivated violence and criminality have emerged from ongoing 
debates about civil wars. Scholars contributing to these debates have largely drawn on 
the importance of the post- 1991 environment in creating conditions that have changed 
internal conflict, and thus call for a revolutionary change in thinking about civil wars. 
Most of these works focus on the interaction between greed and grievance as 
motivations. Some regard greed as the single motivating factor for civil war, whereas 
others focus on grievance - while recognising the importance of the dynamics of greed 
in sustaining conflict. Although their work has been groundbreaking in many respects, 
it still lacks the required detail and explanatory power needed to address the various 
13 Ralf Mutschke, "The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organised Crime, Drugs Trafficking and 
Terrorism, " Annual Repo , (Lyons, France: International Criminal Police Organisation, December 2000). 
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levels of relations that exist between terrorism and TOC. These works are most 
relevant to one aspect of the CTC ('black hole syndrome'), but can also be applied to 
the evolution of terrorist groups into criminal organisations - both of which are 
explained in detail in the next section. 
Among the first academics to focus on the political economy of internal wars after the 
Cold War was Mark Duffield, as exemplified in his contribution to the book War and 
Hunger: RethinkinR International Relations. 14 In his chapter Duffield argues that the 
post-Cold War era has ushered in an age of "protracted and complex emergencies, "Is 
premised on the decline and collapse of formal economic structures in many parts of 
the world - notably Affica. In this environment, Duffield argues that dominant groups 
and classes can only ensure political survival if they engage in "parallel and extra-legal 
activities which themselves promote inter-ethnic tensions, asset transfer, conflict and 
population displacement. " 16 Duffield refined his arguments through the 1990s to focus 
on an analysis of war economies - these, Duffield argues, are "adaptive structures 
based on networked forrns of parallel transborder trade. " 17 Duffield recognises the 
impact of the decline of the state and the rise of globalisation and networked 
structures. He notes: 
The ending of the Cold War changed this situation [superpower rivalry] 
and has had a big impact on the strategies of existing violent actors and 
those that have emerged subsequently. Lacking external patronage, 
warring parties have been forced to develop their own means of 
economic sustainability. Reflecting the logic of globalisation, this has 
14 Mark Duffield, "The Political Economy of Internal War, " in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, eds. 
War and Hunger: Rethinking International Relations, (London: Zed, 1994). 
15 Ibid., p. 64. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Mark Duffield, "Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies, " in Mats Berdal and David 
Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2000), p. 69; also see: Mark Duffield, "Post-Modem Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment 
States and Private Protection, " Civil Wars vol. 1, no. I (Spring 1998). 
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often meant moving beyond the state in the pursuit of wider alternative 
economic networks. ' 8 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have also argued that economic motivations of civil 
wars have become increasingly important in the current international environment. 
Economists by trade, Collier and Hoeffler have written several reports for the World 
Bank which focus on the economic motivations of civil war. 19 In their research they 
divide civil war into two categories: the quest for 'justice', and the quest for 'loot. 20 
The justice model focuses on motivations for rebellion that are commonly cited in the 
International Relations literature, for example, "the rectification of perceived 
injustice"21 which may include innate hatreds between racial or national groups, and 
socio-economic inequality. The looting model, on the other hand, suggests that the 
motivation of certain civil wars is solely "the capture of loot". 22 In this situation, 
capturing loot is not determinate upon victory, but is dependent on the perpetuation of 
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler cite the rebellions in Angola and Colombia as examples 
of rebellion remaining "economically profitable for very long periods despite having 
little prospect of military victory. , 23 In essence, it is argued that rebel leaders use 
grievance (or a sense of perceived injustice) to recruit followers, and continue to 
,, 24 "incite grievance for their business to be profitable. In this instance the political is 
blatantly manipulated for economic gain. 
'a Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
19For example, see: Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War, " Oxford 
Economic Papers, vol. 50, no. 4 (1998), pp. 563-73; Collier and Hoeffler, Loot-Seeking and Justice- 
Seeking in Civil War, (Washington, D. C.: World Bank Development Research Group, 1999); Collier 
and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wa (Washington, D. C.: World Bank Development 
Research Group, 2001). 
20 Collier and Hoeffler (1999), p. 1. 
21 Ibid, p. 6. 
22 Ibid., p. 1. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity, - Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, no. 6 
(December 2000), p. 850. 
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The importance of economic motivations in explaining civil war has been ftirther 
developed by William Reno. 25 Key to Reno's argument is that internal warfare needs 
to be understood "with reference to economic motivations that are specifically related 
to the. intensification of transnational commerce in recent decades, and to the political 
economy of violence inside a particular category of states. 9126 Although Reno does not 
suggest that economic gain is the only motive that drives conflict in weak states, he 
does point out: 
some internal warfare, and the rise of so-called warlords and other 
armed factions, develops out of a particular Cold War-era relationship 
between private power, commerce, and state institutions in weak states. 
It is this dynamic that shapes and guides the pursuit of interests and that 
enhances the salience of economic interests in this equation. 27 
Following on from the suggestion that political and economic motivations exist 
simultaneously in conflict scenarios, David Keen explicitly argues that the political 
and economic necessarily interact. 28 Although Keen discusses in detail the economic 
functions of warfare, he focuses his attention on the interaction of political and 
economic agendas and stresses the importance of investigating "how violence is 
generated by particular political economies. , 29 Furthermore, because civil wars evolve 
over time, Keen presents evidence indicating that a 
growing proportion of civil wars appear to have started with the aim of 
taking over or retaining the reins of the state or of breaking away in a 
secessionist revolt and appear to have subsequently mutated (often 
very quickly) into wars where immediate agendas assume an 
increasingly important role. These immediate agendas (notably 
economic agendas) may significantly prolong civil wars: Not only do 
25William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998), and Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars, " in Berdal and 
Malone, eds. (2000). 
26 Reno (2000), p. 44. 
27 Ibid. 
28 This argument was initially introduced in David Keen, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil 
Wars, " Adelphi Pare No. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1998), and developed further in: Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, " 
in Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000). 
29 Keen (2000), p. 22. 
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they constitute a vested interest in continued conflict, they also tend to 
create widespread destitution, which itself may feed into economically 
motivated violence. 30 
The above arguments allude to a multisectoral approach to security by focusing on the 
interplay between economics, politics, and military threats. They also highlight the 
linkages between units of analysis by discussing the state in reference to non-state 
actors - thus indicating that the state can no longer be treated as the only actor that 
matters in International Relations. Taking advantage of the inherent confusion 
embedded within the transitional post-Cold War environment, non-state actors - 
specifically TOC and terrorist groups - have come to epitomise the threats posed to 
security in the twenty-first century. 
Explaining the Crime-Terror Continuum 
Thus far there has been no thorough academic analysis specifically addressing the 
relationship between organised crime and terrorism. Within the context of the 
contemporary security environment numerous points in the relationship between 
organised crime and terrorism can be isolated, each of which is intended to highlight 
the evolving nature of security. The CTC is referred to as a continuum precisely 
because it may be used to trace past, current and the potential future evolution of 
security threats. It also alludes to the fact that a single group can slide up and down the 
scale depending on the environment in which it operates. The most unstable and 
threatening point along the CTC is the fulcrum point, where criminal and political 
motivations simultaneously converge and are displayed in the actions of a single 
group. What the CTC primarily demonstrates is that the differences commonly 
identified between transnational organised crime and terrorism are currently defunct. 
30 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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When assessing contemporary security threats, the reality is that it has become 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between political and criminal motivations. As 
summarised by Schweitzer, 
Such distinctions that had existed [between organised crime and 
terrorism] are fading fast. A few terrorist and criminal organisations 
already rely on the same global infrastructures for their illegal ploys, take 
advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states 
under siege, and seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from 
narco-trafficking and other crimes. Whether mercenaries are hired to do 
the bidding of drug lords or of terrorist kingpins, the hit tearns share a 
single motive in employing violence - earning their financial keep. 31 
Taking this as a starting point, the CTC in its most basic form can be illustrated as 
follows: 
Figure 3.1: The Crime-Terror Continuum 
Transnational Organised Crime 'Convergence' Terrorism 
As depicted in figure 3.1, organised crime and terrorism traditionally exist at opposite 
ends of a threat spectrum based on motivation. Traditional organised crime is 
motivated by profit-maximisation, whereas terrorism has traditionally been motivated 
by political aims. Placed at opposite ends of a continuum of motivations, the 
motivations driving the two phenomena are thus theoretically capable of converging at 
a central point. Transnational organised crime is situated on the far left, with 
31 Glenn E. Schweitzer, A Faceless Enemy: the origins of modem terrorismI (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing, 2002), p. 288. 
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traditional terrorism situated on the far right - each holding distinct and separate 
positions. At the fulcrum of the continuum lies the point of 'convergence', where a 
single entity simultaneously exhibits criminal and terrorist characteristics. The 
relationship between organised crime and terrorism, however, is significantly more 
complex than figure 3.1 suggests. In assessing the relationship that has developed 
between criminally and politically motivated groups, seven points along the 
continuum, as depicted in figure 3.2, are discernible. These points, however, can be 
divided into four general groups: alliances (1), operational motivations (2), 
convergence (3), and the 'black hole' syndrome (4). 
Points I through 3 strictly illustrate the relationship that exists between organised 
crime and terrorism as concepts. Thus point I highlights scenarios where two distinct 
groups come together, whereas points 2 and 3 reflect two degrees of convergence of 
organised crime and terrorism within a single entity. Point 2 is based on the 
convergence of tactics only, whereas point 3 is based on the convergence of all related 
group factors, including: organisational dynamics, tactics, motivational drives and 
membership composition. Movement between the points, as illustrated in the two case 
studies of this thesis, is based on a combination of external pressures, changing 
environmental contexts, and strategic decisions made within the group. Point 4, on the 
other hand, illustrates the environment that is created when the convergences 
highlighted in point 3 thrive. Explained in greater detail on page 210, the Black Hole 
syndrome, facilitated by the existence of weak states, ensures that the most complex 
relationships between organised crime and terrorism are allowed to persist and 
eventually take over territorial control. 
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Figure 3.2: The Crime Terror Continuum 
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The first level of relationship that exists between organised crime and terrorism is the 
alliance. As illustrated in diagram 3.2, alliances exist on both ends of the CTC 
spectrum: criminal groups forming alliances with terrorist organisations, and terrorist 
groups seeking alliances with criminal organisations. The nature of alliances between 
groups varies, and can include one-off, short-term and long-term relationships. 
Furthermore, alliances include ties established for a variety of reasons such as seeking 
expert knowledge (i. e. in money-laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making) or 
operational support (i. e. access to smuggling routes). In many respects alliance 
formations are akin to relationships that develop within legitimate business settings. 
They may be characterised as practical - in terms of time and finances - efficient, and 
entertained only for as long as required to fulfil a specific goal. As Shelley succinctly 
concludes, "cooperation with terrorists may have significant benefits for organised 
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criminals by destabilising the political structure, undermining law enforcement and 
,, 32 limiting the possibilities for international cooperation. 
Alliances between criminal and terrorist groups emerged as early as the 1980s in very 
specific cases that saw both groups benefit from such a relationship. As previously 
mentioned, the first documented alliances were created in Latin America between 
terrorist groups such as Colombia's FARC and the Shining Path of Peru, and the 
infamous drug cartels. In exchange for securing drug laboratories, these terrorist 
groups collected a local tax from the drug trade. A similar situation existed in 
Southeast Asia during the 1980s when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
established ties with the Indian mafia. 33 In exchange for weapons, the LTTE sold illicit 
narcotics on behalf of their Indian partners. 
The relationship that exists between criminal and terrorist groups has become 
increasingly sophisticated. The most commonly-cited alliances operate in the realm of 
the international drug trade. For example, Colombian authorities have reported that the 
Medellin cocaine cartel hired the ELN to plant car bombs in 1993 because they did not 
have the capabilities to conduct terrorist acts themselves. 34 Furthermore, FARC has 
entered into alliances with criminal groups outside of Colombia, including Mexican 
drug trafficking groups. Although FARC has denied this relationship, multiple sources 
indicate that FARC sends cocaine to Mexico in return for arms shipments. 35 A similar 
32 Louise Shelley, "Identifying, Counting and Categorizing Transnational Organised Crime, " 
Transnational Organised Crime vol. 5, no. I (Spring 1999), pp. 12-13. 
33 This alliance is discussed in Kshitij Prabha, "Narco-Terrorism and India's Security, " Strategic 
Analysis, vol. 24, no. 10 (January 200 1). 
34 Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1996), p. 53. 
33 See: "Colombian Rebel Connections to Mexican Drug Cartel, " Statement by Richard Boucher, 
Spokesman for the U. S. Department of State, 29 November 2000, 
http: //www. fas. org/irp/news/2000/1 I/irp-001 129-col. htm (Downloaded 03 November 2002); and Luis 
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relationship was established by FARC with Russian criminal groups who sent arms to 
Colombia in exchange for cocaine shipments. 36 
In addition to relatively straightforward alliances based on the provision of specific 
services, more sophisticated relationships have emerged between criminal and terrorist 
groups. This is best exemplified by international smuggling operations (chain 
networks) that move various commodities ranging from illicit narcotics and weapons 
to human cargo between countries and continents. For example the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU) entered into a strategic relationship with the Afghan drug mafia 
and Central Asian criminal groups to ensure that shipments of heroin could be safely 
transported between Afghanistan and the Russian Federation and the Caucasus. It is 
also believed that militants linked to al-Qaeda established connections with Bosnian 
criminal organisations to establish a route for trafficking Afghan heroin into Europe 
via the Balkans, 37 and that criminal networks in southern Thailand have smuggled 
small-arms into Sri Lanka and the Indonesian conflict zones of Aceh, Sulawesi and 
MalukU38 - to arm terrorist groups. 
A similar relationship is evident in the Balkans between the Albanian mafia and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) before and during the conflict in Kosovo. After the 
fall of the Albanian government in 1997, the Albanian mafia secured its authority over 
heroin trafficking routes through the Balkans. At approximately the same time, the 
Gutierrez Esparza, "La Mafia Rusa en Mexico, " Memorandol 29 July 2001, http: //latamcent. org. mx 
(Downloaded 03 November 2002). 
36 Jerry Seper, "Mexicans, Russian Mob New Partners in Crime, " The Washington Timesl 20 August 
2001; "Peru: a spy story replete with arms, drugs-dealers and bears, " CNN, 08 September 2000; and, 
"Farclandia, " a discussion of narco-states cited in the transnational crime section of the Centre for the 
Study of International Security website (Washington, D. C. ): http: //www. csis. org. 
37 Kurt Eichenwald, "A Nation Challenged: the Money, " The New York Times 10 December 2001, p. 
Al. 
38 Anthony Davis, "The Complexities of Unrest in Southern Thailand, ", Jane's IntellijRence Reviewl vol. 
14, no. 9 (September 2002). 
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KLA was established to seek an independent state from Serbia. As noted in a report 
published in the Mashington Times, a very specific relationship developed between the 
political wing of the KLA - the Kosovo National Front (KLF) - and Albanian criminal 
groups to smuggle heroin. These ties thus "provided a well-oiled arrangement: the 
profits from the Pristina cartel, estimated to be in the 'high tens of millions', were 
funnelled to the KLA, where they were used primarily to buy weapons, often in 'drugs 
,, 39 for arms' arrangements. This relationship, however, is significantly more complex 
than the straightforward alliance discussed here. As will be illustrated in subsequent 
sections, both the Albanian mafia and KLA could be considered hybrid groups based 
on the nature of their activities throughout the 1990s. 
As illustrated in the examples cited above, in most instances the ties which have 
developed between organised crime and terrorism have been isolated to specific 
geographic regions. This indicates that it is in the interest of criminal and terrorist 
groups - invariably within unstable regions - to form alliances to ensure that an 
environment conducive to both their needs is sustained. Political instability is in the 
interest of terrorists because it diminishes the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of 
society - the audience from whom terrorists seek to gain support. Political instability 
is also in the interest of criminal groups seeking to maximise criminal operations. This 
is especially true for groups engaged in wide-scale smuggling of licit or illicit 
commodities. For this reason, crime-terrorist alliances have been especially common 
in Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. 
39 "KLA Buys Arms with Illicit Funds, - The Washington Times, 04 June 1999. 
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Increasingly, however, alliances between organised crime and terrorist groups have 
evolved to include a greater international dimension. As a result ties have been formed 
between splinter groups in the FARC and Russian Organised Crime; and between 
ETA and the Italian Mafia . 
40 Furthen-nore, the ongoing activities in Paraguay's triple 
border area highlight the extent to which criminal and terrorist groups have found it in 
their interest to seek mutually beneficial partnerships. 41 These examples illustrate the 
benefits to terrorists and TCOs of participating in alliances. However, they also reveal 
that alliances inherently constitute a greater threat to security than terrorism or TOC as 
independent phenomena. Manwaring summarises this threat: 
Together, the alliance has the economic and military power equal to or 
better than that of most nation-states in the world today. This alliance 
also has another advantage. All three groups possess relatively flat 
organisational structures and sophisticated communications systems that, 
when combined, create a mechanism that is considerably more effective 
and efficient than any slow-moving bureaucratic and hierarchical 
government system. That combined organisational advantage is a major 
source of power in itsel f 42 
Despite the existence of alliances between organised crime and terrorist groups - and 
the operational purposes they have served in the past - such groups will avoid forming 
alliances if they can. Instead as the 1990s Progressed, it became increasingly apparent 
that criminal and terrorist groups were seeking to "mutate their own structure and 
organisation to take on a non-traditional, financial, or political role, rather than 
, 943 cooperate with groups who are already effective in those activities. The primary 
reason for acquiring in-house capabilities was to ensure organisational security, and to 
secure organisational operations. In doing so criminal and terrorist groups could avoid 
40 For example, see: Martin Arostegui, "ETA has drugs-for-weapons deal with Mafia, " United Press 
Internationall 03 October 2002. 
41 See: Mutschke (2000); and Mario Daniel Montoya, "War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay's Triple 
Border, " Jane's Intelligence Review vol. 13, no. 12 (December 2001), pp. 12-16. 
42 Manwaring (1993), p. 8. 
43 Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime and Transformation, " Studies in Conflict and TerrorismI vol. 24 
(2001), p. 48. 
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the inherent problems present in all alliances, including: differences over priorities and 
strategies; distrust; the danger of defections; and the threat that alliance could create 
competitors . 
44 Thus, as illustrated in the next section, several criminal and terrorist 
groups operational since the 1990s can effectively and efficiently engage in both 
criminal and terrorist activities. 
Point 2: Or-aanised Crime and Terrorism as Operational TOOIS 
Criminal groups using terrorism as an operational tool and terrorist groups taking part 
in criminal activities as an operational tool constitute the second component of the 
CTC. Although the use of terror tactics by criminals can be traced back into the history 
of organised crime, 45 as a generalisation terrorist engagement in organised crime to 
secure profits for future operations did not seriously emerge until the early 1990s. 46 In 
both cases, however, the post-Cold War era drove many criminal and terrorist groups 
to shift their operational focus. As a result, criminal groups have increasingly engaged 
in political activity in an effort to manipulate operational conditions present in the 
rising numbers of weak states; whereas terrorist groups have increasingly focused on 
criminal activities to replace lost financial support from state sponsors. 
Traditional criminal organisations and several transnational criminal groups have 
regularly used terror tactics in order to fulfil specific operational aims. Although these 
groups have, at times, apparently engaged the political - it is essential to clarify that 
their intention was not to change the status quo, but merely to secure their operational 
44 Phil Williams, "Criminal Cooperation: trends and patterns, " Jane's Conference on Transnational 
Organised Crimel 20-21 September 2000. 
4' As will be discussed later in this chapter, the rise of the Sicilian Mafia was completely intertwined 
with a political agenda that included attaining territorial control over much of the region of Sicily, and 
subsequently Neopolitana by the Camorra. 
46 The exception to this is the criminal operations conducted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 
1970s and 1980s as a source of fundraising. 
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environment. As Dishman notes, criminal organisations use "selective and calibrated 
violence to destroy competitors or threaten counternarcotic authorities. As such, a 
violent attack directed by a TCO is intended for a specific 'anti-constituency' rather 
than a national or international audience, and it is not laced with political rhetoriC., 47 
Despite utilising terror tactics, such as bombings and assassinations, the primary 
motivation of these groups remained illicit profit-maximisation. The attacks conducted 
by the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting in 
over 500 deaths, 48 was comparable to (if not outweighed by) the violence perpetrated 
by Colombian terrorist groups such as the FARC and ELN during the same period. 
Prior to this period of violence, the FARC declared war on the government of 
Colombia in the early 1980s in response to a widespread government attempt to crack 
down on the cocaine trade. A communiqu6 issued by the Medellin cartel demonstrates 
the group's own dedication towards the overt use of terrorism: 
We declare total and absolute war on the government, the industrial 
and political oligarchy, the journalists who have attacked and outraged 
us, the judges who have sold themselves to the government, high court 
extraditing judges and presidential and sectorial (social, business and 
labour) associations, and all who have persecuted and attacked US. 49 
A similar situation was associated with the rise of the Italian Mafias in the early 
twentieth century. In order to consolidate their operations in the first half of the 
twentieth century, the Mafia took military control (via the use of violence) over 
territory in western Sicily, which created a system of power in direct confrontation 
with the state. Not only did the Mafia undermine state sovereignty by taking military 
and judicial control over parts of Italy, but it also hindered the. "ability of the Italian 
state to develop by taking possession of state functions, notably the monopoly over 
47 Dishman (2001), p. 45. 
49 Clawson and Lee (1996), p. 5 1. 
49 "Drug Lords vow War on Colombia, " The Los Angeles Times, 25 August 1989. 
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violence, taxation and law; and by taking away the ability of the state to provide for its 
,, 50 citizens. The ability to legitimise its use of violence, at least within the confines of 
specific territories, guaranteed the existence of the Mafia system, which was 
"functional to the accumulation of resources to invest in illicit markets, but also to gain 
consent necessary to infiltrate legitimate society. "51 
The practise of obtaining political objectives through the use of terror tactics became 
common once again in the 1990s as a result of a relatively successful government 
drive to counter the influence of the Italian Mafia in the country. 52 As early as 1990, 
the Italian government's AntiMafia Commission reported that because the Mafia 
controlled political, institutional and economic powers and threatened the state with 
the use of violence, it was evident that "the present strategy of the Mafia is no longer 
cohabitation with the legal power, but its progressive evisceration. , 53 Further 
illustrating this point, Jamieson argues that a bombing campaign directed at tourist 
attractions by the Italian Mafia in the early 1990s revealed a distinct deviation from 
the understanding that organised crime sought to remain unnoticed by the majority of 
the population. Instead: 
The traditional Mafia groups have learned to use the magnifying glass 
of symbolic violence to reach a wider audience: in 1993 the Sicilian 
Mafia carried out a series of car bomb attacks in the Italian mainland 
near historic sites such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the 
church of St. John Lateran in Rome; plans were laid to blow up the 
Leaning Tower of Pisa. The aim was not to eliminate an enemy, but to 
intimidate public opinion and Parliament into abrogating recently 
passed antimafia legislation. 54 
50 Fransesco Marelli, "The State Policy, the Sicilian Mafia and Political Violence, " Paper presented at 
the 29"' ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, France, p. 1. 
51 Fabio Armao, "A 'Standard' Crime: Why Mafia Win Success, " paper presented at the 29,4 ECPR 
Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, France, p. 2. 
52 For an excellent account of Italy's fight against organised crime, see: Alison Jamieson, The 
Antimafia, (London and New York: Macmillan Press Ltd and St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000. ) 
53 Mare] li, (200 1), p. 9. 
54 Alison Jamieson, "Transnational Organised Crime: A European Perspective, " Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism vol. 24 (2001), p. 379. 
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Terror tactics were thus used by the Mafia to "subvert anti-Mafia actions and 
legislative moves, these bombings were meant to openly challenge the political elite 
and send a message to the 'powers-that-be'. 55Comparable with any traditional terrorist 
group, the Mafia engaged in terrorism as a tactical tool to "force government leniency 
,, 56 and negotiation. In relation to the CTC, the Mafia could easily be regarded as an 
entity that naturally "seeks to have its own power, at times acting from within the 
institutions, at times combating these institutions. It is an organisation that skilfully 
switches register between order and disorder, so as to increase its own sphere of 
,, 57 dominion. 
Similar to criminal groups engaging in terrorism, many terrorist groups have become 
well versed in the conduct of criminal operations. In response to the virtual elimination 
of state support after the end of the Cold War, criminality was the most pragmatic 
avenue to secure finances for future terrorist operations. Equally important to note is 
that terrorists who engage in criminal activities "ostensibly retain paramount political 
objectives, and as such, ill-gotten monies serve only as a means to effectively reach 
their political ends. "58 The illicit drug trade is the most common criminal activity in 
which terrorist groups have been involved. Since the 1970s groups such as FARC, 
Basque Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA), the PICK, and Sendero Luminoso 
have all been linked to the drugs trade by well-documented evidence. 59 These groups 
55 Sebastyen Gorka, "The New Threat of Organised Crime and Terrorism, " Jane's Terrorism and 
Security Monito (2000). 
56 Dishman (200 1), p. 4 7.91h 
57 Renate Siebert, "Mafia and Anti-Mafia. Concepts and Individuals, " Paper presented at the 2 ECPR 
Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, France, p. 2. 
58 Dishman (2001), p. 47. 
59 For a good overview of the pre-1991 involvement of terrorist groups in the drug trade see Mark 
Steinitz, "Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade, " The Washington Ouarterl , 1985. 
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remain involved in the drug trade, and were joined in the 1990s with a new following 
including Hizbullah and the IMU. It is alleged that Hizbullah protects heroin and 
cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley, 60 and evidence strongly indicates that the 
IMU (prior to the September 11,2001) controlled drug trafficking routes into Central 
Asia from northern Afghanistan. 61 Although the evidence is fragmentary, researchers 
and journalists have reported that the LTTE has also trafficked heroin from the Golden 
Crescent through India and Sri Lanka to the West. 62 
As depicted in previous paragraphs, terrorist groups have commonly been associated 
with trafficking in illicit narcotics. However, they have also engaged in a wide variety 
of other crimes such as fraud and human smuggling. According to Rohan Gunaratna, 
al-Qaeda's financial network in Europe, dominated by Algerians, is largely reliant on 
credit card fraud. 63 Estimates given to Gunaratna by security and intelligence agencies 
indicate that nearly US$I million a month has been raised from these alternative 
criminal avenues. 64 Furthermore, European security agencies have admitted that 
prosecuting terrorists engaged in credit card fraud has been a daunting task because 
"al-Qaeda's cadres are continually learning new techniques to evade detection, 65_ 
60 The Jerusalem Post, "US May Hit Hizbullah Drug Trade, " 17 June 1997; and International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, US Department of State, 1996. 
6' This connection was confirmed in a report commissioned by the United Nations Drug Control 
Programme in 1999. Alexander Zelichenko, Analiticheskiy Obzor Narkosituatsia v Zone Deistviya 
Mezhdynarodnoho Antinarkotikovoho Proyekta OON 'Oshskiy Yzel', Unpublished report; see also: 
"CACI Forum Summary: Drugs: A Threat to Central Asian Security, " available at 
http: //www. cacianalyst. org/ForumSummaries/Drug_Conference. htm (accessed II May 2000); and, 
Scott Peterson, "Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics, " The Christian Science Monitor, 01 
August 2001. 
62 Daniel L. Byman, et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, (Santa Monica, CA.: 
RAND, 2001); Stefan Leader and David Wiencek, "Drug Money: the Fuel for Global Terrorism, " 
Jane's Intelligence Review vol. 12, no. 2 (February 2000). 
63 This is also discussed by Michael Radu, "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges, " 
Orbis, vol. 46, no. I (Spring 2002). 
64 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Oaeda: Global Networks of Terro (London: Hurst & Company, 2002). 
65 Ibid., p. 65. 
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illustrating the extent to which al-Qaeda has manipulated processes of globalisation 
and its networked organisation. 
Factions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have also been involved in various 
organised criminal activity including smuggling cars, tobacco and drugs, running 
extortion rackets and prostitution rings, and engaging in fraud. It has, for example, 
been reported that the IRA funds its arms deals with approximately 0 million annual 
profits made primarily from tobacco smuggling from Eastern Europe. 66 Clawson and 
Lee described the IRA's involvement in monopolizing the taxi and bus market of 
Belfast by purchasing large numbers of cabs and buses and threatening the 
competition. The actions of the IRA forced the Belfast bus service to retire over 300 
buses, thus costing the city an estimated US$15 million. 67 
The LTTE, on the other hand, has gained attention because of the inroads the group 
has made in smuggling human cargo. in fact, the smuggling of human beings has 
become the mainstay of LTTE financial procurement. 68 LTTE members knowingly 
traffic people to the West via their networks in Canada, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, they have also utilised Thailand as a major transhipment 
point, and a centre for obtaining forged identification. 69 The extent of LTTE 
involvement in human smuggling is exhibited in a single example cited by Byrnan et 
al: "in June 2000, the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department uncovered one 
66 Liam Clark and David Leppard, "Photos Link More IRA Men to Colombia, " The Sunday Times 28 
April 2002, p. 10; also quoted in Nick Fielding, "Ulster's E18 million Terrorist Gangs Turn to 
Smuggling, " The Sunday Times 07 July 2002, p. 10. For further details of the links between terrorism 
and organised crime in Northern Ireland, see: The Threat Assessment 2002: Serious and Onganised 
Crime in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force, 2002); and Richard 
Evans, "Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in Northern Ireland, " Jane's Intelligence Reviewl vol. 
14, no. 9 (September 2002), pp. 26-29. 
67 James Adams, The Financing of Terrorism, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 173. 
6' Byman et a]. (2000). 
69 Ibid., p. 52. 
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major LTTE smuggling ring, involving an estimated 600 to 700 people who had been 
,, 70 trafficked to the European Union on forged visas. Given that the LTTE charge 
between US$18,000 and US$32,000 per transaction, the profits of such operations are 
71 substantial . 
Points 3 to 5: The Converzence Thesis 
As the 1990s progressed and both criminal and terrorist groups combined economic 
and political capabilities, it became apparent that many groups had lost sight of their 
original motivations and aims. 'nus at the start of the twenty-first century a growing 
number of groups simultaneously displayed characteristics of transnational organised 
crime and terrorism. Furthermore, in assessing the development of these hybrid 
organisations, it is evident that the motivations, organisation, and operations of 
criminal and terrorist groups have also converged - thus making it analytically 
difficult to make a distinction between the two phenomena. 
The 'convergence thesis' refers explicitly to the idea that criminal and terrorist 
organisations could converge into a single entity which initially displays 
characteristics of both groups simultaneously-, but has the potential to transform itself 
into an entity situated at the opposite end of the CTC from which it began. 
Transformation thus occurs to such a degree "that the ultimate aims and motivations of 
the organisation have actually changed. In these cases, the groups no longer retain the 
defining points that had hitherto made them a political or criminal groUp.,, 72 In an 
article written on 'grey area' threats, Xavier Raufer's explanation of the new world 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Dishman (200 1), p. 48. 
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disorder that emerged following the end of the Cold War reinforces this point. Using 
Karl Marx's analogy of "revolution as water on the stove, " Raufer writes: 
Until it reaches the boiling point, the water changes only in terms of 
degree. Once it hits 212" and become steam, it changes its nature. 
Compared to a revolt, or a riot, a revolution represents a change in the 
nature, not the degree, of a country's socio-political reality. The same 
is true of the new threats. In scientific parlance, the end of the bipolar 
order has caused the mutation of a host of organisms that used to be 
purely terrorist groups or purely criminal groups. In other words, they 
have abruptly and unexpectedly shifted from machines to lifeforms. 73 
According to Raufer 'machines' represent strategic-level violence perpetrated by non- 
state actors which were funded, and thus ultimately controlled, by state actors. Thus 
most terrorist groups that operated during the Cold War could be classified 'machines' 
because their dependency on state support was almost complete. Tifeforms', on the 
other hand, refer vaguely to "complex entities that are very hard to identify, 
understand and define within inadequately explored territories and movements.,, 74 It is 
these entities that encompass the notion of 'converging threats'. 
In its most basic form, the convergence thesis includes two independent, yet related, 
components. First are criminal groups that display political motivations; and second, 
terrorist groups which are equally interested in criminal profits, but ultimately begin to 
use their political (ideological) rhetoric as a fagade for solely perpetrating criminal 
activities. The direct implication of arguing that ideological rhetoric may become a 
fagade for criminal activity is that these groups should no longer be considered 
terrorist, but simply referred to as criminals. In the context of this thesis, it is important 
to remember that groups are capable of sliding up and down the CTC - and depending 
73 Xavier Raufer, "New World Disorder, New Terrorisms: New Threats for Europe and the Western 
World, " Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1999), p. 35. Raufer first introduced 
his thoughts about grey area threats in: Xavier Raufer, "Grey Areas: a New Security Threat, " Political 
Warfare (Spring 1992). 
74 Raufer (1999), p. 36. 
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on the environment in which they operate they are also capable of transforming 
themselves. An associated purpose of introducing the CTC is to acknowledge and 
simultaneously to prioritise the need to understand the changing dynamics of terrorist 
or criminal groups as they engage with their environment and vice versa; and because, 
as will be illustrated in the case studies, it is possible that both crime and politics will 
continue to colour aspects of the group's existence, such as recruitment. 
Understanding how the group manipulates its criminal and political nature in various 
circumstances will help policy-makers locate the group's strengths and weaknesses. 
The same is true in the context of criminal terrorism. Although it could be argued that 
criminal terrorist groups should merely be referred to as terrorist, this would be to 
ignore the hybrid nature of this threat. Despite focusing predominantly on the 
acquisition of illicit profits, these groups still depend on the use of terror tactics to 
secure their criminal positions. This means that to understand the evolution of these 
entities, both criminal and political aspects must be acknowledged and analysed 
continuously. 
The first category of the convergence thesis can further be subdivided into two parts. 
First, it includes groups that have used terror tactics to gain political leverage beyond 
the disruption of judicial processes or attempts to block anti-crime legislation (which 
is a common tactic utilised by organised crime in order to secure their operations). 
Instead they are interested in attaining political control via direct involvement in the 
political processes and institutions of a state. Second, it includes criminal organisations 
that initially use terrorism to establish a monopoly over lucrative economic sectors of a 
state. In controlling economic sectors - including strategic natural resources - and 
financial institutions, these entities aim ultimately to gain political control over the 
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state itself This is based on the premise that in a contemporary world dominated by 
the dynamics of the free market economy, economic strength is the obvious 
prerequisite for political power; and political power subsequently sustains both the life 
of the organisation and its activities - be they criminal and/or political. As Raufer 
further notes, "Grabbing control of financial institutions can both bring home the cash 
and advance political ambitions. Many groups, of course, will retain narrow portfolios 
of objectives, targets, and methods; others are becoming conglomerates of causes. tM 
In this situation it is integral to be able to determine "if an ostensibly criminal gang is 
engaged in crime for personal gain or whether this criminal activity is an adjunct to 
political violence. "76 
The second component of the convergence thesis addresses terrorist groups that 
become so engaged with their involvement in criminal activities (as discussed in the 
previous section) that they merely maintain their political rhetoric as a fagade for 
perpetrating criminal activities on a wider scale. Ilere is growing evidence to indicate 
that, despite increasingly focusing on criminal activities, terrorist groups "maintain a 
public fagade, supported by rhetoric and statements, but underneath, they have 
transformed into a different type of group with a different end game. , 77 No longer 
driven by a political agenda, but by the proceeds of crime, these formerly traditional 
terrorist groups continue to engage in the use of terror tactics for two primary reasons. 
The first is to keep the government and law enforcement authorities focused on 
political issues and problems, as opposed to initiating criminal investigations. Based 
on the general observation that governments appear more adept at fighting crime than 
75 Ibid., p. 289. 
76 Ronald Crelinsten, "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy, " in Lesser and 
Hoffman, et al., eds. (1999), p. 85. 
77 Dishman (2001), p. 48. 
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fighting terrorism, this is viewed as an important advantage. Second, terror tactics 
continue to be used as a tool for these groups to assert themselves amongst rival 
criminal groups. Furthermore, by continuing to portray their political component to the 
public, these terrorist groups are able to manipulate the terrorist support network that 
had previously been put in place. For example, they continue to focus on political 
grievances (combined with financial rewards) in order to attract recruits - providing 
justifications for what would normally be regarded as purely criminal acts. Tlius by 
simultaneously focusing on criminal and political goals, these groups are able to use 
two sets of networks which allow them to "shift focus from one application of 
terrorism to another, or to pursue multiple applications simultaneouSly. qM 
The greatest single threat to international security emerging from the CTC, however, is 
exhibited at the fulcrum point of the continuum. Identified as the 'Black Hole', it is at 
this point where the convergence between criminal and political motivations within a 
single group allows that group to subsequently gain economic and political control 
over a state. Should this situation occur there are two prevailing environments that 
may threaten to emerge. First, the 'black hole' can produce a failed state - such as 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Liberia - that lacks central authority, and thus 
displays the characteristics of anarchy. Second, the 'black hole' can produce a criminal 
state, such as North Korea, Myanmar, and potentially the Russian Federation. Using 
terror tactics to retain their power and control over these states, government elites of 
these countries use their official positions to engage in lucrative illicit activities for 
personal enrichment or to create a territorial safe haven for other transnational. criminal 
organisations. Essential to the emergence of a black hole syndrome is a weak or failed 
state where government authority, legitimacy and territorial control does not exist or 
78 Lesser et al., eds. (1999), p. 98. 
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has been significantly challenged to the point where the state is fragmented and 
therefore various components of the state (i. e. economic or political system, legitimate 
monopoly over the use of violence) become vulnerable to the relative power exerted 
by commercial terrorist or political crime groups. 
Figure 3.3: Converging Threats 
Organised Crime Tefforism 
C- Commercial Terrorism 
Political Crime 
The first threat subsumed under the convergence thesis is political crime. Political 
crime refers to the situation in which a criminal organisation - in addition to engaging 
in criminal activity - seeks overt political objectives through the use of terrorism. 
Thus, political criminal groups simultaneously display the characteristics of both TOC 
and terrorist entities according to the definitions provided in Chapter One. It would 
therefore be inaccurate to identify these groups as being either solely criminal or 
terrorist, thus necessitating new thinking about the actual threat they pose. 
Most academic literature on organised crime continues to argue that criminal 
organisations are entirely motivated by economic gains. Although this conclusion may 
remain true for traditional criminal groups operating in the world today - such as the 
Japanese Yakuza and most Chinese Triads - this narrow argument fails to 
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ABB- 'Black Hole' Syndrome 
acknowledge the emergence of transnational organised crime and the evolving 
international security environment. Affected by the dynamics emerging from 
globalisation and the end of the Cold War, growing numbers of criminal organisations 
have evolved into new entities. Thus in addition to displaying the characteristics of 
transnational organised crime noted in Chapter One, these groups have further adapted 
to the post- 1991 environment by transforming their structures, strategies and activities. 
These latter additions to the characteristics of transnational criminal groups have, in 
many ways, created hybrid entities that simultaneously seek criminal and political 
objectives through the use of terrorism. These groups can be distinguished from TOC 
in general by specifically referring to them as political criminal organisations (PCOs). 
Structurally, PCOs resemble traditional terrorist groups in that they are cell and 
network based (as described in Chapter Two). Furthermore, in response to the 
prevalent international environment, these groups are no longer hierarchical, but 
increasingly appear non-hierarchical, decentralised and fluid in their organisation. 79 
As a result, leaderships are easily replaceable, enabling the groups to fulfil their aims 
well into the future. Partly because of their non-hierarchical nature, PCOs are 
extremely flexible and professional in their operations. This professionalism has led to 
the more efficient and effective exploitation of economic and political developments in 
numerous states - especially weak states. For example, PCOs have exploited flaws in 
legal, banking and tax systems not only to find new criminal opportunities, but also to 
locate and secure financial and physical safe havens. It is the desire to secure a safe 
haven that has subsequently produced a stepping-stone for PCOs to focus on political 
79 Ground breaking work on the changing organisational dynamics of organised crime has been made by 
Phil Williams on transnational organised crime in general, and Mark Galeotti on Russian and Chechen 
criminal structures. A useful illustration of network-based organized crime structures is provided by 
Mark Galeotti, "Globalising Crime: Networks and Alliances in 21' Century Underworld, " Cross Border 
Controll Issue 14 (2000), p. 35. 
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objectives. Securing political power within a state has become an effective avenue that 
inevitably leads to more lucrative criminal endeavours that circumvent methods of 
national detection because most state security organs and government bodies have 
been successfully, and directly, penetrated. 
A second scenario that has provided the impetus for PCOs to seek political objectives 
emanates from the argument that economic power and political power are inseparable. 
A PCO is hybrid for the very reason that it has a membership base that has historically 
associated money with political power and vice versa. This situation is most apparent 
in the former Soviet Union and many Affican states. Some of the most powerful 
criminal organisations that emerged in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, for 
example, included the same people who held prominent positions in the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. As former officials of the Communist Party, these 
individuals naturally continued to associate political power with economic advantages. 
As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, the structure of some of the 
most powerful Russian criminal organisations simultaneously (and consciously) 
sought overtly political objectives alongside their criminal aims. 
As a result, PCOs operate their criminal and political strategies in tandem to produce 
an environment once only associated with terrorism: to "break or ruin the sense of 
social and political calm in a country". 80 In successfully producing such a climate, 
PCOs can proceed to build an alternative or parallel government. This is evident in 
several regions of the Russian Federation - including the Maritime Province of the 
Russian Far East. In many ways, organised criminals in Russia - and similarly in 
so Hannon (2000), p. 54. 
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Albania - have found that "in order to mobilise sufficient power to resist the state, 
they must move their organisations beyond pure criminalism with its limited appeal to 
most citizens and add elements of political protest. , 81 Commenting specifically on the 
rise of the Albanian Mafia, officials of the International Criminal Police Organisation 
(Interpol) have called it a 'hybrid' group because their activities indicate that its 
"political and criminal activities are deeply intertwined. 9,82 Mutschke further notes that 
the Albanian mafia is intrinsically linked to "Panalbanian ideals, politics, military 
activities and terrorism, " explaining why Albanian criminal organisations used their 
83 
criminal profits to purchase arms and military equipment for the KLA from 1993 . 
Contributing to the convergence between crime and politics in Albania is the fact that 
Albanian criminal and terrorist groups have an interchangeable membership and 
recruitment base - essentially posing as terrorists by day and criminals by night. 
The most striking example of a PCO is the Colombian drug cartels. Although details 
will be provided in Chapter Five, the following quote exemplifies the hybrid nature of 
these groups: 
The attachment of drug traffickers to their country, and to their regions of 
origin, goes beyond strategic calculation. They were/are deeply rooted in 
their cultures, traditions, and regional societies. Not only have they 
shared their wealth with their cities, and invested a significant amount 
(but not most) of their fortunes in their country, but they have also 
revived local cultures, rebuilt rural life, strongly affirmed their religious 
feelings, and their beliefs in local saints and miracles, supported musical 
folklore (and were rewarded with laudatory songs from Colombia bards), 
made Colombian football teams (traditionally poor) the pride of the 
g1 Metz (1993). 
8211alf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, International Criminal Police 
Organisation, -The Threat Posed by Organised Crime, International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism, " 
Written testimony to the General Secretariat Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Crime, 13 December 2000. 
83 Ibid. 
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nation, and revitalised the dormant economies and social scenes of 
Medellin and Cali. 84 
Commercial Terrorism 
The second part of the convergence thesis is termed commercial terrorism. 
Commercial terrorism generally refers to a situation in which traditional terrorist 
groups that initially engaged in criminal activities to secure funding for their 
operations, have over time primarily sought to secure and focus on their criminal 
activities. Organised crime thus becomes either (a) the primary concern of the terrorist 
group in question, 85 or (b) is given equal priority with the group's political aims. The 
concept of commercial terrorism fills a gap in the academic literature by highlighting 
the point, as Schweitzer notes, that equally "propelling terrorists is the power of their 
most recent prop - money". 
86 This context can best be summarised as 'fighters turned 
felons' who adopt "drugs, arrns, illegal migrants, and even diamonds" as their new 
'best ftiend. 87 
An example that highlights the transformation of a staunch political group into a 
predominantly criminal one is that of FARC . 
88 By the mid-1990s, following the death 
of Jacobo Arenas - the groups' ideological leader - FARC deepened its involvement 
in the regional drugs trade from that of the protector of drug crops on behalf of cocaine 
cartels to 'middleman' between farmers and cartels. This sbift directly resulted in the 
group acquiring more profits from the trade, and subsequently more power within 
Colombia. Thus, by 2000, it was believed that FARC controlled 40 per cent of 
94 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 111, End of the 
Millenniuml (Maiden, Mass.: Blackwood Publishers, 1998), p. 199. 
85 See FN 76. 
86 Schweitzer (2002), p. 33. 
87 Jamieson (2001), p. 382. 
88 This example will be expanded on in Chapter Five. 
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Colombian territory, and received revenues of US$500 million annually from illicit 
narcotics. Supplementing its bankroll from drugs, FARC also engaged in other 
criminal activities, including kidnapping and extortion. Referring to both FARC and 
the ELN, Wilkinson concludes that because of the level of their involvement in 
organised crime, 
... it is clear that this has made them, both in reality and popular 
perception, little more than a branch of organised crime, decadent 
guerrillas rather than genuine revolutionaries, irredeemably corrupted 
by their intimate involvement with narco-traffickers and their cynical 
pursuits of huge profits from kidnapping and from their 'protection' of 
coca and opium production, processing and shipping facilities. 89 
In Colombia, groups once considered to be "impassioned and ideological", such as 
FARC and ELN, have "lost their old revolutionary 'purity' and turned their terrorism 
in a new direction - development as criminal cartels. "90 
Two groups in Europe appear to have followed a similar transformation to that of 
FARC: the Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (i. e. the Ulster Defence 
Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force) and the KLA. Despite observing cease- 
fires since the mid-1990s, the growing involvement of loyalist groups in serious and 
organised criminal activity (i. e. drug supply, smuggling contraband goods, and 
extortion) raises questions about their true motivations. As with FARC, loyalist 
paramilitaries seek to maintain instability because they are unwilling to relinquish their 
criminal interests; or endanger an environment that has proven to be conducive to their 
criminal activities. Since the 1970s the loyalist terrorist groups began to engage in 
criminal activities as their primary source of revenue. Over the decades, however, a 
subsidiary engagement in crime for operational funding grew to become the focus of 
89 Wilkinson (2001), p. 113. 
90 Harmon (2000), p. xvii. 
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these groups. Silke concludes that loyalist financing has always been a means to an 
end (i. e. political violence), however, as loyalist terrorist groups continue to focus on 
funding through organised crime during ceasefire years, there is a danger that 
financing has become a group end in itself9l This concern has been highlighted in the 
annual threat assessments of the Organised Crime Task Force of the U. K. 
government. 92 Loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland therefore provide a prime 
example of a "mutated terrorist group who invested significant energies into 
committing profit-driven criminal acts. 9,93 
The KLA is a terrorist organisation which finds itself in an environment full of 
criminal opportunities. Confusion between political and criminal interests has been 
created within the KLA's membership and its splinter group the National Liberation 
Army (NLA). 94 Situated at the heart of the 'Balkan Route', which is known for its role 
in shipping Asian opiates to the European market, the KLA/NLA quickly seized the 
opportunity embedded in conflict to become involved in criminal activities. Tbus, as 
conflict in the Balkans created increasingly deteriorating conditions, it became evident 
by the end of 1999 that the KLA manipulated its political rhetoric for criminal 
intentions. As with FARC and IRA factions, the KLA/NLA was interested in armed 
95 conflict primarily to secure smuggling routes. For example, Interpol has noted the 
KLA as a "key player" in the drugs-for-arms business in the late 1990's, helping to 
91 Andrew Silke, "Drink, Drugs and Rock'n'Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland Part 
11, " Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 23 (2000), p. 124. 
92 See the annual threat assessments available on the OCTF website: http: //www. octf. gov. uk 
93 Dishman (2001), p. 49. 
94 For more information on the criminal-political nexus in the Balkans, see: National Security Council, 
International Crime Threat Assessmen (Washington, D. C.: National Security Council, 2000); and 
Xavier Raufer, La Mafia Albanaise (Lausanne: Favre, 2000) provides a very detailed argument about 
how the Albanian mafia is political by nature and thus seeks political objectives. 
95 Ibid. 
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transport US$2 billion worth of drugs into Western Europe annually. 96 The extent to 
which the KLA exhibits criminal-political motivations is aptly described by Raufer in 
the following quote: 
Tbere's not such a thing as rebels and militias on the one hand and the 
Albanian mafia on the other. In the Albanian world - in Albania and in Kosovo and in the Albanian-populated part of Macedonia - you have 
clans and in those clans you have a mix of young men fighting for the 
cause of national liberation, young men belonging to the mafia. It's 
absolutely impossible to distinguish between them. They obey the same 
clans, they have the same logic, the same world-view, and to 
discriminate between one guy who's one day selling heroin and the 
next day fighting in the mountains is absolutely impossible. 97 
A similar situation is also evidently occurring in Asia, where groups such as Abu 
Sayyaf and the IMU have increasingly focused their attention on financial motivations. 
Since 2000 Abu Sayyaf was primarily engaged in criminal activities such as 
kidnapping operations, and most recently, operating marijuana plantations in the 
Philippines. The group was originally founded in 1991 with the financial support of Al 
Qaeda, officially ascribing to the same revolutionary Islamism as Osamah bin Laden 
(i. e. radical Salafism). However, following the death of the group's founder 
Abdurrajak Janjalani in 1998, Abu Sayyaf factions increasingly focused on crime. 98 As 
a result, the group was seen to "straddle the divide between revolutionary Islamism 
and common criminality" to the point that the jihadist ideology of Al Qaeda merely 
"served to provide a veneer of ideological legitimacy to a movement that is heir to a 
centuries-old tradition of Muslim Tausog resistance to Christian colonialism and a 
time-honoured local kidnap-for-ransom industry. "99 The IMU, on the other hand, was 
96 Mutsche (1999). 
97 Inteview with Xavier Raufer on Radio Netherlands, 03 August 200 1. 
98 Anthony Davis, "Resilient Abu Sayyaf Resists Military Pressure, " Jane's Intelligence Review 
internet version posted 12 August 2003 at http: //wwwjanes. com. 
99 Anthony Davis, "Philippines Fears New Wave of Attacks by Abu Sayyaf Group, " Jane's Intelligence 
Review, internet version posted 24 March 2005 at http: //wwwjanes. com. 
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always involved in the regional drugs trade - specifically in trafficking Afghan opiates 
into Central Asia. Although the group strongly voices its intentions to overthrow the 
government of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and establish an Islamic state in the 
region, IMU operations since 1999 indicate that its primary motivation was to secure 
smuggling routes. Between late 1999 and the end of 2001 the IMU was responsible for 
transporting up to 70 per cent of the heroin and opium transiting through Central Asia 
- which is significant given that an estimated 60 Per cent of opiates produced in 
Afghanistan were trafficked via Central Asia during those years. 100 Following 
developments in Afghanistan - notably since the US led 'war on terrorism' began in 
2001 - and the alleged death of Juma Namanganiy, military commander of the IMU, it 
is even more likely that a disenfranchised and dispersed IMU will focus on its criminal 
operations. As was the case with the evolution of FARC following the death of 
Arenas, the IMU has also lost the ideological foundation - found in Namanganiy's 
leadership - that was required at least to portray the fagade of a group dedicated to 
Islamic ideals. 
The 'Black Hole'Syndrome 
The third and final component of the convergence thesis - the 'black hole' syndrome - 
is the epitome of the CTC. This part of the continuum specifically refers to situations 
in which weak or failed states foster the convergence between TOC and terrorism, and 
ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of criminal-terrorist groups. 
The 'black hole' syndrome encompasses two situations: first, where the primary 
motivations of groups engaged in a civil war evolves from a focus on political aims to 
a focus on criminal aims; second, it refers to the emergence of a 'black hole' state -a 
100 Mutschke (1999); see also references quoted in FN 62. 
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state successfully taken over by a hybrid group as defined in the previous two sections. 
What these two scenarios have in common, and the reason why they perfectly 
illustrate the most extreme point along the CTC, is that they reveal the ultimate danger 
of this new security threat: the creation or promotion of a condition of civil (or 
regional) war to secure economic and political power. States that fall within this 
category include Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, North Korea, Sierra Leone, and 
Tajikistan. Furthermore, areas in Pakistan (the Northwest Frontier Province), 
Indonesia and Thailand - where government control is extremely weak - are also in 
danger of succumbing to the 'black hole syndrome'. 
To begin with, evidence suggests that the dynamics of civil wars, just like the 
dynamics of traditional organised crime and terrorism, have changed. They have 
evolved from wars fought for ideological or religious motivations to wars hijacked by 
criminal interests and secured by terror tactics. As David Keen comments, 
"Increasingly, civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated 
into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are paramount. While ideology 
and identity remain important in understanding conflict, they may not tell the whole 
story. "101 The end of the Cold War, coupled with the decline of superpower support 
(proxy wars) indirectly caused a decline in the strength of revolutionary political 
ideologies in groups such as UNITA, the Khmer Rouge and Myanmar's Khun Sa. All 
of these groups thus have "gravitated from a strong ideological agenda to one 
dominated by economic aims. "' 02 Comparable to terrorist groups which have lost sight 
of their political ideology as a result of having to depend on criminal activity for their 
survival, these groups also appear to have betrayed their ideological ideals in the 
101 David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 11. 
102 Keen (1998), p. 34. 
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interest of holding on to power at whatever cost. 103 Two examples that illustrate this 
aspect of the 'black hole' syndrome are Afghanistan and North Korea. 
Afghanistan could be considered a 'black hole state' since the 1989 withdrawal of 
Soviet troops for several reasons. First, although factions fighting in the Afghan civil 
war (i. e. the Northern Alliance) officially articulated ideological goals, their 
involvement in criminal activities and frequent changes in group allegiances and 
alliances, indicates that group survival was their paramount concern. In the absence of 
any central authority capable of establishing widespread stability and order, warlords 
were able to divide 104 the country into local fiefdoms to secure territorial control 
through which they could sustain activities such as the production and trafficking of 
opiates and the smuggling of weapons and a variety of licit commodities (i. e. 
pharmaceuticals) across the border with Pakistan. Second, as a result of incessant 
instability sustained by rival warlord factions, Afghanistan became an important safe 
haven, congregation, and training point for a number of terrorist groups including Al 
Qaeda, the GIA, and numerous Pakistan-based groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and 
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, as well as transnational criminal organisations involved in 
illicit trafficking, such as the Dawood Ibrahim Group (Pakistan), Central Asian-based 
criminal groups and ROC implicated in arms trafficking. The cauldron of terrorist and 
criminal interests converging and cooperating in Afghanistan therefore illustrates the 
dangers inherent in the 'black hole syndrome'. Not only was Afghanistan destroyed by 
incessant domestic instability, its very essence as a 'black hole state' meant that it 
103 The betrayal of revolutionary ideals is not a new phenomenon in and of itself. The leaders of many 
revolutionary movements throughout history (French, Russian) betrayed their ideals in order to hold on 
to the power they acquired. What is being argued here, however, is that an apparently new dynamic has 
been added to the equation - one that sees ideological groups not only engage in state terrorism to hold 
on to power, but use the state monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in order to profit from illicit 
activities, such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling. 
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directly threatened the security of the wider region. Furthermore, Afghanistan proved 
to be a direct security threat to the United States, Southeast Asia, and the rest of the 
world, primarily because it fostered the rise and global reach of al-Qaeda. 
While it exhibits some characteristics of a weak state, the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) is most illustrative of a criminal state. Officials of the 
DPRK have been directly engaged in criminal activities since the 1970s. For example, 
in 1976 the Norwegian government expelled all the staff of the North Korean 
embassy, alleging they were involved in the smuggling of narcotics and unlicensed 
goods-105 The DPRK intensified its criminal activities since the late 1990s - arguably 
because the leadership in North Korea has been replaced "by a younger group, less 
committed to the dogma of socialism and seemingly more eager to experience the 
good life. "' 06 An indication of this development is the government's establishment of 
'Bureau 39', an official government body tasked with generating hard currency by any 
means, including drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering and piracy. 107 
The second scenario, on the other hand, refers to the situation where political-criminal 
organisations (PCOs) or commercial terrorist groups perpetuate their existence and 
activities by promoting domestic and/or regional instability. Although political goals 
may have played a role in the initial emergence of instability, after time it becomes 
evident that economic motivations take precedence. Terror tactics are utilised to 
sustain criminal activities, and it may be concluded that many ongoing civil wars are 
merely draped in ideological rhetoric to gain legitimacy and to ensure a steady supply 
105 Mark Galeotti, "Criminalisation of the DPRK, " Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (March 
200 1), p. 10. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Douglas Farah and Thomas Lippman, "North Korea 'Cashes in on Drugs, "' The Washington Post 
reprinted in Guardian Weeklyl 04 April 1999, p. 16. 
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of new recruits. There is growing evidence that these non-state actors are producing 
alternative economic and political structures in the absence of a strong state. In fact, 
criminal and terrorist groups in weak states have already constituted de facto 
governments which imitate the characteristics of formal state activities, despite 
perpetuating their involvement in activities considered illegal by formal state 
structures. 108 These groups are ultimately able to exercise their authority "through 
established power structures and obedience is rewarded and disobedience is punished 
often with the use of violence. The pervading culture of violence undermines attempts 
at conflict resolution and peace-building. "109 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, elements of this part of the 'black hole' 
syndrome were introduced by Steven Metz in his division of future insurgencies as 
either spiritual or commercial. Spiritual insurgencies are akin to traditional revolutions 
in that they are intricately linked to the search for ideological meaning. These 
insurgencies are commonly organised around the rejection of a regime - more 
specifically the rejection of the social, economic and political system associated with 
the regime. 110 Although the struggle for the leadership of spiritual insurgencies is 
about power, the followers of these movements are commonly motivated by the search 
for personal meaning. Based on this basic description, the most pure form of a 
contemporary spiritual insurgency is militant religious fundamentalism as displayed in 
the Middle East. 
Commercial insurgencies, on the other hand, define personal meaning by material 
possessions - not by spiritual needs. Metz describes commercial insurgencies as 
"'Willett (2002), p. 191. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency. (U. S. Army War College, 10 December 1993). 
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"widespread and sustained criminal activity with a proto-political dimension that 
challenges the security of the state. ""' Following this line of argument, it may be 
suggested that this aspect of the 'black hole' syndrome is the natural progression of 
PCOs or commercial terrorist groups gaining economic and political control over a 
parcel of terTitory or an entire state. In an effort to secure an environment conducive to 
their criminality, these entities may seek to wreak havoc and instability in the areas of 
their main operations. A successful PCO or commercial terrorist group, however, will 
effectively challenge the legitimacy of a state, and ultimately replace the state in many 
(if not all) of its functions. In this situation, the state's monopoly over legitimate 
violence is overtaken, state sovereignty is directly challenged, and the role of non-state 
actors in international relations is highlighted as a primary - as opposed to secondary - 
state actor. The basic characteristics are evident in numerous examples, including 
ongoing instability in the Balkans, 112 the Caucasus, ' 13 southern Thailand and Sierra 
Leone. ' 14 
Taking Sierra Leone as an example, the descent into state terrorism was not 
accompanied by an exclusive "logic of political violence, " but it was intertwined with 
the "logics of banditry, hedonism and brutality" and was intrinsically linked to the 
illicit trade in diamonds. ' 15 Crime was an integral component of the Revolutionary 
United Forces (RUF) that took precedence over any political aim. Any belief in the 
11 'Metz (1993). 
112 Mueller, (2002) and Kaldor, (1999) provide detailed accounts of the criminal-political nexus in 
Yugoslavia and Sarajevo respectively. 
113 On the political nature of organised crime in Chechnya, or conversely the criminal nature of Chechen 
politics, see: Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1998); and Anatoliy Kulikov, "Trouble in North Caucasus, " Military Review, (July- 
August 1999). 
114 For an excellent analysis of the convergence of terrorism and organised crime in southern Thailand, 
see: Anthony Davis, "The Complexities of Unrest in Southern Thailand, " Jane's Intelligence Review 
vol. 14, no. 9 (September 2002), pp. 16-19. 
115 Yusuf Bangura, "Understanding the Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War, " 
Africa Development, vol. 22, nos. 3/4 (1997), pp. 130-133. 
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existence of a political component to the violence that penetrated Sierra Leone 
throughout the 1990s is amply eradicated once the following points are considered: 
The 'rebellion' has had no known spokesmen or political program; it 
does not seem to have the goal of gaining political power. It has no 
reason to appeal politically to the population in the areas in which it is 
active; its 'strategy' is marauding terror of the subject population and 
denying control to the government so that the government cannot 
suppress its lawlessness. The fact that government forces have been 
known to act as atrociously as the rebels does not improve matters. 116 
In both aspects of the 'black hole' syndrome, it may be concluded that war has 
provided "legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at 
the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The 
waning parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions 
of power and for access to resources. " 117 Thus regardless of whether these civil wars 
were initially ideological and transformed into a criminal struggle, or emerged because 
of the successful operations of PCOs or commercial terrorist groups, they share several 
common characteristics. 
To begin with, conflict that besets the 'black hole syndrome' has no clear military 
objective and lacks political purpose. Instead, military units constitute "little more than 
marauding bands acting quite independently of any order and showing no discipline 
whatsoever in the actions they were committing. "' 18 Furthermore, where political 
motivations do follow the criminal activities of belligerents in violent conflicts, it is 
evident that the perpetuation of conflict, as opposed to victory, becomes a priority in 
order to create ideal conditions for TOC to flourish. ' 19 Groups that thrive within 'black 
116 Snow (1996), p. 78. 
117 Kaldor (1999), p. I 10. 
118 Snow (1999), pp. 109-111. 
119 Berdal and Serrano, eds. (1999), p. 199. 
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hole' environments are all equally motivated by the "accumulation of wealth, control 
of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, 
these elements represent usable power - power to allocate values and resources in 
society. " 120 
Converging Characteristics 
For reasons discussed in detail in Chapter One, the dynamics of the post-Cold War 
environment have, in many ways, enabled a convergence between transnational 
organised crime and terrorism on several levels. Given the various levels of 
convergence discussed in this chapter, it is further evident that each group has adapted 
and transformed to mirror the characteristics of the other. In seeking alliances and 
cooperation, criminal and terrorist groups have increasingly learned from one another, 
thus emulating activities (i. e. smuggling and money-laundering) and/or organisational 
dynamics (i. e. networks, cell-structure) because other groups' success in using them. 
As a result, both criminal and terrorist groups operating in the world today 
increasingly exhibit a similar structure, and are often simultaneously engaged in 
similar criminal and political activities. Considering how terrorism and TOC have 
transformed since the early 1990s, six similarities between contemporary forms of 
TOC and terrorism can be identified. 
One of the most obvious similarities between contemporary TOC and terrorist groups 
is that they both utilise cell-based structures. Traditionally associated with terrorist 
groups, cell-based structures were adopted by many criminal groups in the 1990s, 
predominantly because they provided additional security for the group's leadership. 
'20 Manwaring (1993), pp. 7-8. 
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Harriss-White has concluded that TOC in weak states have responded to the evolving 
post-1991 intemational environment by incorporating the structure of traditional 
terrorist groups into their own. Referring specifically to criminal organisations 
involved in the drug trade in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Afghanistan, she 
notes that these groups "consist of specialised cells separately managing production, 
transport, distribution, money-laundering, communications, physical protection and 
recruitment. The most advanced telecommunications, weapons, means of transport and 
counter-intelligence technologies are used to enforce property rights. "12 1A common 
structure of a cell-system used by transnational criminal organisations is illustrated in 
Diagain 3.4, depicting Colombian cartels in the 1990s. Both types of groups, 
however, also increasingly utilise networks as described in detail in Chapter Two. 
Diagram 3.4: Cell-Based Criminal Structures 
121 Harris-White (2002), p. 3 1. 
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A second similarity bet\\ eel) TOC and terrorism is that the actIN Mes of' both gr()ups 
cross the national-regional-international divide. The criminal and political activities 
perpetrated by either TOC or terronst groups often cross all the levels of analysis - 
although they may occur locally, their implications may resound nationally and even 
globally. One example of this was the September 11,2001 terrorist acts in the U. S., 
although the impact of illicit smuggling by TCOs (i. e. anns, drug and hurnan 
smuggling) is equally illustrative. Details of how criminal and terrorist activities cross 
the levels of analysis will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five. 
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Tbird, for operational and tactical reasons, both TOC and terrorism commonly take 
advantage of safe havens and diaspora communities. Safe havens are primarily valued 
by transnational organised crime and terrorism because they invariably serve as a 
forum in which ideas, contacts and operational know-how can be exchanged between 
groups. Considering this function of safe havens (in association with failing and failed 
states), it would be difficult to argue that places including Afghanistan, the Tri-Border 
area of Paraguay, and Lebanon did not facilitate the development of criminal and 
terrorist groups. As with safe havens, diaspora. communities 122 are also manipulated by 
terrorist and criminal groups to support their operations. Although diasporas have 
overtly collected funds for terrorist groups in Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka and Kosovo, for example, both TOC and terrorist groups are known to extort 
money from their diaspora communities, and coerce them into providing additional 
services such as saf6 houses. 123 The fourth notable similarity between TOC and 
terrorism is that both groups use similar targeting and deployment techniques, and thus 
are dependent on sophisticated intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities. 
Fifth, the operations of both terrorist and transnational criminal organisations are 
dependent on establishing relations with the government and public. Apart from 
corrupting state authorities as a way to secure their operations, both types of groups 
have increasingly sought either to secure collusive relations with governments or to 
penetrate government institutions directly. Equally important for both terrorists and 
TCOs is to build a relationship with communities whether at the local, regional, 
national or international levels -a function that depends on the type of group and the 
122 According to Byman et al. (2001), diasporas merely refer to immigrant communities established in 
other countries. 
123 Byman et al. (2001). 
221 
kind of legitimacy they seek. As a result, they regularly seek to control media outlets, 
and establish charities to increase their own legitimacy in the eyes of the general 
public. The extent to which both terrorists and TOC groups seek to incorporate a 
sophisticated programme of government and public relations will be detailed in the 
case studies of this thesis. 
Sixth, and central to the focus of this thesis, is that contemporary terrorism and TOC 
both depend on external sources of funding in order to perpetrate their activities. Tbus 
regardless of where a group falls on the CTC, it will utilise terror tactics to make its 
criminal actions secure. Associated with this is the premise that the defining 
characteristic of 'converging' threats is that all operations and leadership aspire to 
secure four things: profit; control over territory and people; the ability to conduct their 
activities without obstacle; and legitimacy. Contemporary security threats such as 
TOC and terrorism have been able to attain most of these aims by adapting to the 
environment in which they operate. As a result, they have also transformed their 
organisational and operational dynamics in order to sustain their existence into the 
twenty-first century. 
Conclusion: Understanding the Crime-Terror Continuum 
The CTC seeks to provide an explanation of the changing dynamics of the post-Cold 
War security environment as it relates to TOC and terrorism. In doing so, its primary 
purpose is to highlight that security threats are not static phenomena, but are 
continually in a state of flux. It is therefore evident that the nature of TOC and 
terrorism - which is converging - are dictated by the continuously evolving 
environment in which they are found, and by the relationships in which they are 
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engaged. Thus depending on the prevailing operational and international environment, 
groups can - and evidently do - slide across the continuum. Furthermore, the CTC 
illustrates that security is no longer solely about military objectives, but has been 
joined by "economically driven interests in continued fighting and the 
institutionalisation of violence at what is for some clearly a profitable level of 
intensity. "124 The combination of political and economic motivations and a group 
prepared to attain them through the use of terror tactics reveals the inherent dangers of 
the CTC and of contemporary security threats. These dangers are exacerbated by the 
interplay between levels of analysis. Not only do transnational criminal and terrorist 
groups cross national borders as a consequence of their existence, but the impact of the 
activities in which they are engaged inherently affect a range of levels from the 
individual to global. 
In addition to the fact that the security threats posed by terrorism and TOC inherently 
cross levels of analysis, the CTC also highlights the importance of relinquishing a 
state-centric approach of International Relations because the state is losing, and in 
some cases has lost, its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Once this 
happens, it exacerbates conditions in which conflict merely becomes a continuation of 
economics (not politics) by other means. ' 25 The role of some non-state actors and their 
successes in taking state ftinctions from the state thus necessitate closer analytical 
attention and gives credence to the argument that the state is in decline. 126 
124 Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000), p. 2. 
125 David Keen, 'Incentives and Disincentives for Violence' in Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000), p. 27. 
126 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), P. vii. 
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Despite arguing that the state is in decline, control over state functions remains an 
integral component of international politics today. As a result, an increasing number of 
state and non-state actors are continuously seeking to gain control over functions once 
limited to the state. The result of this diffusion of authority to non-state actors is that 
state is losing its capacity to retain the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. 127 
Contributing to this are the implications of the rise of the economic imperatives of the 
post-Cold War era. Facilitated by the spread of capitalism and market-based 
economies, non-state actors are realising that "economic aims can be furthered by 
controlling the state. "' 28 In this context it is understandable to see that criminal and 
political motivations have become intertwined. Furthermore, considering growing 
evidence that non-state actors have taken on a host of roles once reserved exclusively 
for the state, such as imposing and collecting taxes, issuing and providing alternative 
social structures 129 , the state can only be seen as one actor among many equals. 
It is therefore evident that the CTC, as presented in this chapter, builds on the 
conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two. In light of the changing nature of 
post-Cold War security, it is important that International Relations theory adapt in 
order to be able to address security threats that have transformed to the prevailing 
environment in which they seek to operate. The CTC was thus introduced as a way to 
explain the changing nature of security in the twenty-first century - specifically the 
threats of terrorism, TOC, and their convergence. Using the key assumptions about 
contemporary security presented in this thesis, along with the CTC model, the next 
two chapters will gauge the extent to which this 'new' way of thinking about security 
127 Anna Leander, 'Globalisation and the Eroding Monopoly of Legitimate Violence, ' Conference paper 
presented at 'The Global Constitution of Failed States, University of Sussex, 18-20 April 200 1. 
128 Keen (1998), p. 15. 





can explain security developments on two continents. Chapter Four will measure this 
model against the transformation of organised crime in the Russian Federation - 
seeking to answer whether or not Russian organised crime simultaneously constitutes a 
form of terrorism that can be called 'political crime'. Chapter Five will focus on the 
development of FARC in Colombia to discover whether or not a traditional terrorist 
group can exchange a political ideology for a financial ideology, thus constituting an 
example of 'commercial terrorism'. Within each chapter, every aspect of the CTC will 
be outlined in relation to the specific case studies. 
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Chapter 4 
(Re) establishing Power through Terror: 
The Ilybrid Nature of Russian Organised Crime 
"In today's world, mafias are becoming more aggressive than ever. "' 
"While organised crime in the West occasionally collaborates with certain incumbents, Soviet 
organised crime was, from the outset, inextricably enmeshed in the system of power. It operated in full 
compliance with the official pattern of political and economic incentives. "2 
When discussed in the context of the Russian Federation, terrorism is commonly 
isolated either to the historical realm of 'Narodnya Volya' 3 and the imposition of state 
terror introduced by Vladimir Lenin and refined by Josef Stalin4, or it is discussed in 
the contemporary context of combined nationalist-separatist and Islamist militant 
actions, primarily emanating from the case of Chechnya. Although these examples 
indicate that the Russian Federation has had experience with terrorism, it is the 
country's experience with organised crime in the post-Cold War period that 
demonstrates how the nature of security has evolved within the realm of the CTC. In 
tracing the rise of Russian Organised Crime (ROC)5 it is apparent that this 
phenomenon illustrates a criminal group that mirrors a traditionally defined terrorist 
1 A. Korchak, Totalistic Organizations: From Maria to Global Terro (Boulder, Colorado: Social 
Sciences Monographs, 2002), p. 87. 
2 Virginie Coulloudon, "The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite, " East European Constitutional 
Reviewl vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 74. 
3 An excellent study of Russian terrorism by revolutionary extremists is: Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt 
Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993). 
4 For a comprehensive overview of Soviet state terrorism, see: Roberta Goren, The Soviet Union and 
Terrorisml (London, Boston and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), and Boris Levytsky, The 
Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1917-1970, (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 
Inc., 1972. ) 
5 There is limited agreement within the academic community that studies the emergence of organised 
crime within the FSU on how it should appropriately be labelled - terms used have included the 
Russian 'mafiya' and post-Soviet organised crime. Most authors on the subject (Galeotti, Williams, 
Shelley), however, normally refer to organised crime in the region as 'Russian' organised crime, 
focusing on the one common characteristic among the vast majority of groups operating in the FSU, the 
shared ability to speak Russian. 
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group through its operational use of terror tactics, and its interest in dictating the 
political agenda of the state. Although this chapter will not argue that ROC has 
travelled the length of the CTC from a criminal to terrorist group, it does reflect a 
security threat that was convergent from inception. Thus by occupying point three of 
the CTC (Diagram 3.2), ROC revealed the capacity to simultaneously occupy points 
one (alliance formation) and two (operational use of terror tactics). Based on this 
premise, this chapter will make three inter-connected arguments. First, through an 
overview of the rise of ROC it will demonstrate that ROC is a criminal organisation in 
accordance with the definition of organised crime provided in Chapter One. Second, 
the disposition of ROC as it developed from the Soviet period into the post-Soviet era 
reveals that it is an entity simultaneously exhibiting economic and political 
motivations - thus allowing it to be plotted on the CTC. Third, the relevance of the 
alternative view of security discussed in Chapter Two will be highlighted in reference 
to the security threats posed by ROC as a hybrid security threat. 
Although other criminal organisations, such as the Albanian mafia 6, the Italian mafla 7, 
and D-Company (India), may be used to illustrate the CTC, ROC stands out as a 
leading example of 'political crime' (CTC - point 3) for three primary reasons, which 
will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections. First, the Russian model of 
organised crime is extremely ruthless and sophisticated in its methods. Since the early 
1990s, ROC was distinguished from other criminal organisations by its uninhibited 
6 The political nature of the Albanian mafia is described in Xavier Raufer, Le Mafia Albanaise, 
(Lausanne: Editions Favre S. A., 2000), Uros Komlenovic, "Crime and Corruption after Communism - 
State and Mafia in Yugoslavia, " East European Constitutional Review vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1997), 
accessed at http: //www. law. nyu. edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/stateand mafia. htm] (20 April 2000). 
7 The political nature of the Italian mafia at various points in history are discussed in detail in: Tom 
Behan, See Naples & Die: The Camorra and Organised Crime " (London and 
New York: I. B. Tauris 
Publishers, 2002), John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia, (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 2004), Henner Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi: Origin, Power and Myth, (London: C. Hurst & 
Co. Publishers Ltd., 1998), Alison Jamieson, The Antimaria: Italy's Fight Against Organised Crime 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000). 
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use of intimidation and violence to promote and protect its operations. Second, ROC 
is considered among the most 'international' criminal organisation, operating on most 
continents. At the same time, however, ROC has maintained considerable influence at 
the local level. Third, this form of organised crime historically held a special 
relationship with political authorities and political parties, thus providing a precedent 
from which organised crime in contemporary Russia became enmeshed within the 
corridors of power. The combination of these three factors contributed to the 
emergence of a scenario wherein organised crime had the ability to "mobilize the 
forces of the state when necessary to attain its goalS.,, 8 
ROC: Defining Key Characteristics from Lenin to Putin 
Despite the common Western belief that organised crime is a new phenomenon in 
Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union, organised crime operated in the 
region for at least a century. Several accounts of the rise of ROC note that the 
phenomenon itself is deeply rooted in Russian tradition 9 and Soviet practice. 10 As 
Galeotti noted, the rise and evolution of ROC in historical and political context reflect 
four key factors integral to understanding organised crime in Russia-" First, the 
political culture in Russia has a tradition of using crime and terrorism. Second, a sense 
of political and economic government alienation of the mass population created a base 
from which ROC could recruit. Third, an almost 'traditional' link between criminals 
and rulers has always existed in modem Russia. Fourth, a deliberate 'strategy of 
8 Roy Godson, Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World, (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 5. 
9 See, for example: Mark Galeotti, "The Mafiya and the New Russia, " Australian Journal of Politics 
and History vol. 44, no. 3 (1998), pp. 415-429; Coulloudon, "The Criminalization of Russia's Political 
Elite, " East European Constitutional Review 6: 4 (Fall 1997), pp. 73-78. 
10 Among the most notable academic contributions that discuss the rise of organized crime in the 
context of the Soviet system arc: Konstantin Simis, USSR: the Corrupt Societyl (New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 1982); A. Vaksbery, The Soviet Mafia, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
199 1); W. A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet i (London: M. E. Sharpe, 199 1). 
11 Galeotti, (1998), pp. 416-417. 
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tension' was created with organised crime on the part of certain political actors 
throughout modem history. This inherent connection between criminality and political 
interests/power could be traced from the Tsarist period to the post-Cold War era, 
reflecting the importance of this dynamic in the Russian context and confirming that 
ROC has an innate political component that ultimately facilitated its inclusion in the 
CTC as an example of political crime. 
The Rise of the Russian Criminal-Political Nexus: the Soviet Experienc 
Throughout the long history of the Russian Federation, at no point has the Russian 
state been characterised by the rule of law. On the contrary, Russia is usually 
described as an absolutist state that preferred to exercise absolute power "over the 
lives of subjects and willingly sacrificed them in its own interests, regardless of the 
letter or spirit of the law. "12 As a result, Russian history is scattered with accounts of 
resistance (in the form of banditry as well as passive resistance) that formed in 
opposition to widespread suppression and oppression at the hand of state officials and 
institutions. It is this development of resistance, comparable with the rise of the 
Sicilian mafia, which likely formed the historical roots of ROC. 13 More specifically, 
the success of resistance often depended upon an ability to accrue finances through 
criminal activity. For example, the pre-revolutionary Bolsheviks financed themselves 
through bank robberies, and via alliances they formed with bandit groups who 
provided safe houses and armed force at a price. 14 Furthermore, bands of criminals 
also allied themselves with the authorities. For example, the Cheka secret police drew 
12 Galeotti (1998), p. 417. 
13 Victor Chalidze, Criminal Russia, (New York: Random House, 1977), Chapter 1. 
14 lbid, Chapter 2. 
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heavily on criminals as informers and executioners, and Vladimir Lenin enlisted 
criminal groups to "swell the treasury of the fledgling Communist Party. " 15 
Despite the absence of detailed historical accounts referring to pre-Soviet relations 
between criminal gangs and political actors, it is evident that there was an explicit 
interest by political actors to harness the benefits that criminals could bring to their 
quest for unrivalled power. In the 1920s criminal gangs were strategically used by the 
Russian authorities to consolidate the internal physical prowess of the Communist 
Party. Under Josef Stalin, criminals in gulags' 6 were initially used to maintain order 
among political prisoners, and ultimately used to help the state expand its capacity to 
"intimidate and eliminate enemies. "' 7 Stalin also used Soviet criminal groups to help 
destabilise Western economies by printing massive quantities of counterfeit money. 18 
This relationship ultimately paved the road to the creation of new criminal elite in 
Russia with direct ties to the Communist Party and the secret police. 19 In learning how 
to harness the emerging criminal underworld, which was often understood as "the 
most organised expression of the anarchic-libertarian spirit in Russian history", 20 the 
Communist Party was able to ensure that organised crime did not divert energy into 
political protest, as was the case in 19th century SiCily. 21 
The criminal gangs that formed alliances with government authorities during the 
Soviet era were collectively known as the Suki ('bitches). This group of criminals 
15 Coulloudon (1997), p. 75. 
16 Federico Varese, "What is the Russian Mafia? ", Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcementl vol. 5, 
no. 2 (Autumn 1996), p. 129. 
17 Shelley in Godson (2003), p. 207. 
181bid. 
19 Chalidze (1977), Chapter 2. 
20 Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Gilinski, The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against 
Democrac (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 112, pp. 303-304. 
21 See: John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
2004). 
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broke away from the notorious Vorovskoi mir (Thieves' World or vory), who sought 
to ensure stability within the criminal underworld, and to co-ordinate the various 
criminal elements emerging from the prison system. Forming an ideological 
opposition to the state, this collection of criminal gangs maintained order throughout 
the criminal world by developing numerous self-governing laws, including forbidding 
members to take up arms on behalf of the state. 22 In an attempt to lead the criminal 
underworld the vory fulfilled four functions: the collection and dissemination of 
intelligence; the organisation of criminal groups in the execution of activities; the 
regulation of inter-group activities; and decision-making. 
23 Although the Vorovskoi 
mir was an important force in the criminal underworld, internal fractures developed 
during the Second World War between members who violated the criminal code by 
taking up arms on behalf of the state (Suki), and those who decided to remain in 
prison. As a result of collaborating with the state during the War, the Suki introduced 
an alternative code to that of the Vorovskoi mir., one that promoted cooperation with 
the state authorities. 24 
Over the next sixty years the links between Soviet organised crime and the Soviet 
bureaucracy became very close. 25 The Suki increasingly cooperated with Party 
bureaucrats and thus lost the respect of their fellow criminals. As a result the vory 
regained an important role in the criminal underworld. However criminal cooperation 
22 Joseph D. Serio, "Thieves Professing the Code: The Traditional Role of Vory v Zakone in Russia's 
Criminal World and Adaptations to a New Social Reality", Low Intensity Conflict and Law 
Enforcementl vol. 4, no. I (Summer 1995), p. 73. 
23 Ibid., pp. 80-81. Furthermore, according to Frederico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection 
in a New Market Economy. (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 2001), pp. 146-147, members of the 
Vorovskoi mir were governed by strict regulations that included defined rituals for initiating new 
members and a rudimentary court system. 
24 Ibid., p. 74. 
25 For excellent historical overviews of the rise of Soviet organised crime, see K. Simis, USSR: Secrets 
of a Corrupt Society (London: J. M. Dent, 1982), A. Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia. (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1991) and W. A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. (London: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1993). 
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with the state did not intensify until after the death of Stalin in 1953.26 At this time 
criminals recognised that the traditions of the Vorovskoi mir were interfering with the 
ability of organised crime to adapt to the prevalent economic and political conditions. 
The principle of operating in opposition to the authorities became overshadowed by 
financial motivations, and the institution of the vory declined significantly. This 
transition within the criminal world occurred primarily during the era of Leonid 
Brezhnev 27 (1964-1982) when the black market grew exponentially, as did the 
willingness of state administrators to accept bribes and goods in exchange for 
patronage. 28 Involvement in the black market, which exacerbated product shortages in 
the Soviet Union, brought enormous benefits to illegal private entrepreneurs and 
ROC, thus by "the late 1980s the dominant figures were the avtoriteti - self-made 
men who had come to power by acquiring money, prestige, and personal followers, 
not by undergoing initiation rites or adhering to a code of condUCt.,, 29 The 
interconnection between state, business and crime ensured that the black market was 
not simply tolerated, "but actively encouraged the development of a symbiotic 
relationship between members of the party apparatus and various kinds of traffickers 
,, 30 and illicit entrepreneurs. An authoritarian regime seeking to secure its own interests 
combined with a command economy to create an environrnent that could be 
characterised as a giant kleptocracy - or a "system whose dominating features [were] 
force, extortion and tribute, rather than voluntary exchanges on a market .,, 
3 1 Due to 
26 Vsevolod Sokolov, "From Guns to Briefcases: the Evolution of Russian Organised Crime, " World 
Policy Journal (Spring 2004), p. 69. 
27 For more details of organized crime under Brezhnev, refer to J. Millar, "The Little Deal: Brezhnev's 
Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism, " Slavic Review vol. 44, no. 4 (1988), pp. 694-706. 
28 Sokolov (2004), p. 69. 
29 Ibid., p. 70. 
30 Williams (2002), p. 52. 
31 Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: a bad case of predatory capitalism. (London: 
University College London Press, 1999), p. 19. 
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the authoritarian nature of the Communist Party, power within the political-criminal 
nexus at this point favoured the political elements. 
The balance between the political-criminal nexus, however, changed with the rise of 
Mikhail Gorbachev and his introduction of glasnost and perestroika (political 
transparency and economic reform respectively). Both of these policies contributed to 
the transformation of organised crime in the Russian Federation from "a covert 
feature of Soviet life to a highly visible feature of Russian life. 932 Partially due to the 
decline of the vory and the intricate relationships established between the profiteering 
underworld and the state, Soviet organised crime consolidated and grew throughout 
the uncertainties of the 1980s. As Galeotti noted, "it used its wealth, its contacts and, 
ultimately, coercive power to redefine its relationship with the new political elite and 
economic structures. " 33 In fact, between the late 1980s and mid- I 990s, ROC began to 
exhibit new characteristics as a result of the emerging environment in which it was 
operating. The transition to a market economy, for example, attracted more people to 
the criminal underworld, who ultimately were able to secure greater financial 
resources than the traditional vory could accrue within the Soviet gulag system . 
34 As a 
result, even many of the vory-v-zakone (the leadership cadre of the Vorovskoi mir) 
dropped the crucial requirement that a true member could only enter this criminal 
fraternity after serving a long prison sentence. In fact, by the early 1990s the prison 
system no longer functioned as a check on who was eligible to join the Vorovskoi mir. 
Not only were younger criminals initiated into the Vorovskoi mir as a result, but the 
32 Williams (2002), p. 52. 
33 Mark Galeotti, "The Russian Mafjya: Economic Penetration at Home and Abroad, " in A. Ledeneva 
and M. Kurkchiyan (eds), Economic Crime in Russia, (Kluwer Law Press, 2000). 
34 Varese (200 1), p. 169. 
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overall barriers to joining had deteriorated significantly. 35 The impact Gorbachev's 
reforms had on weakening the power of central government ultimately undermined 
the state's legitimacy, a predicament that came to plague the newly-independent 
Russian Federation. The state became weaker, while "criminal enterprises multiplied 
and expanded 106 This would prove to have important implications for state-ROC 
relations after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Rising financial benefits promised by the introduction of elements of a market 
economy, inflated criminal ranks, and sustained political interest in maintaining 
criminal alliances created a predicament by the end of the 1980s that was described by 
the official government newspaper, Pravda, as 'social entrepreneurship'. This 
phenomenon thrived in an environment in which newly created commercial entities 
and joint ventures with companies inside the Soviet Union and abroad worked to 
legitimise illicit relationships, and as a result, in the final months of the Soviet 
Union's existence "there was a re-shaping of traditional alliances from relationships 
based on power to those based on money and access to state resources.,, 37 This 
predicament was facilitated and compounded by the further collapse of the central 
state in 1991. The successor state in the Russian Federation was "unable to enforce 
the rule of law, or provide the market with such essential services as property 
protection and contract enforcement". 38 ROC immediately sought to fill the void 
created by the emergence of de facto 'anarcho-capital ism', 39 and thus sought to 
undertake state functions. Thus by the time that the Soviet Union collapsed in 
35 Ibid. 
36 Sokolov (2004), p. 70. 
37 Shelley in Godson, (2003), p. 211. 
39 Sokolov (2004), p. 70. 
39 This is a term used by Sokolov (2004) to describe the anarchic (i. e. unregulated) economic 
conditions of the post-Soviet attempt to engage with market capitalism. 
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December 1991, the balance within the political-criminal nexus began to sway in 
favour of the criminal elite, providing a ftirther demonstration of the symbiosis of 
economics and politics within the Russian context. 40 
Takimz Advantaze of Uncertainty: the rise ofa 'new'and influential ROC 
The Vorovskoi mir and the Suki played an important role in the development of ROC, 
not least of which because their existence highlights the traditional relationship 
between crime and politics in the Russian Federation. But by the mid- I 990s they were 
no longer illustrative of the new wave of organised crime evolving in the post-Soviet 
environment. Although this emerging form of ROC, generally speaking, does comply 
with the definition of organised crime used by the Council of Europe '41 a brief outline 
of characteristics unique to post-Soviet groups will make clear, that ROC is a 
phenomenon that is distinct from most organised crime groups that operate elsewhere 
in the world, a phenomenon that is complex and diverse, and "not always well 
organised and is not invariably criminal in all its aspects. " 
42 Furthermore, it will 
establish a framework that will be used to further argue that organised crime in the 
Fortner Soviet Union (FSU) has culminated in the creation of a new breed of security 
threat that, for various reasons, cannot be dealt with in the same manner as more 
traditional criminal organisations such as the Japanese Yakuza or Posse Comitatus. 
To begin with, unlike the Italian mafia or the Chinese Triads, ROC is not exclusively 
comprised of a single ethnic group - despite being commonly referred to as 'Russian' 
organised crime by state officials, media and academia throughout the world. Instead 
40 Coulloudon (1997), p. 73. 
41 See Chapter One, pp. 57-58. 
42 Williams (1996), p. 12. 
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ROC was originally divided into groups commonly based on territorial ties, not only 
within the Russian Federation, but throughout the former Soviet Republics. 43 Even 
this organising principle, however, can lead to confusion as the names of many 
criminal groups no longer coincide with their present headquarters or area of 
operation (i. e. 'Tambov', St. Petersburg's leading group, is named after the city from 
which its first members originated). Even in the few cases that ROC groups were 
composed of members of a dominant ethnic base, such as the Thechen mafiya', they 
, 44 evolved to include "Georgians, Dagestanis, Kazakhs and even Slavs. Furthermore, 
having already "'actively colonised the underworld of other post-Soviet states, 
encouraging local criminality, 9,45, the groups' membership becomes increasingly 
multiethnic as ROC penetrated countries beyond the FSU. Thus, for example, Russian 
criminal groups operating in the United States and the United Kingdom absorbed 
American and British nationals into their operations. It should, however, be noted that 
despite a multiethnic and multinational membership, the most important (i. e. 
powerful) criminal groups remain based predominantly in Russia. This reveals how 
vast the threat of contemporary ROC is: by its very nature it is international and thus 
46 cannot be confined to or dealt with by a single state. 
43 The names groups adopt, for the most part, represent the region or city district from where they 
began operating. Some common groups in Moscow city, for example, are: Tsentralnaya, SoIntsevskaya, 
and Podolskaya; in St. Petersburg: Tambovskaya, and Kazanskaya; in Yekaterinburg: Uralmashskaya 
and Tsentralnaya. 
44 Mark Galeotti, "Inside the Russian Mafiya, " Jane's Intelligence Revie3y, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 2000), 
P. 9. 
45 Mark Galeotti, "Organised Crime in the Former Soviet Union: Roots, Resources and Responses, "
unpublished manuscript. 
46 The international nature of ROC is also true of other criminal groups operating in the world today, 
such as the Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, and Chinese Triads. Differentiating ROC from these other 
groups, however, is the fact that the original membership of organised crime groups in post-Soviet 
Russia was commonly international (for example, bringing together citizens from Russia, Georgia, and 
the United States to form a single group). Other criminal organisations, on the other hand, were usually 
exclusively built around a single ethnic base - and subsequently expanded their operations by closely 
following immigration flows of their own people to countries including Canada and the United States. 
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The elusive character of ROC is compounded by its organisational dynamics, which 
emerged as an operational necessity in the post-Soviet period. ROC is not structured 
according to the historically dominant mafia model which has a formal hierarchy (i. e. 
a godfather flowing down to a general membership). Instead it has a fluid structure 
that forms around territorial or industrial interests 47 , usually on an ad 
hoc basis. Figure 
4.1 illustrates the prevalent structure of ROC, highlighting how divergent interests 
come together. This network closely resembles the all-channel network described by 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) and illustrated in Figure 2.3. According to Galeotti, the 
core of the structure is defined by a lose notion of 'group identity', essentially 
referring to anything that all members may share, including ethnicity or town of origin 
- these individuals are brought together through 'internal links, including an interest 
in conducting a specific operation or to respond to a mutually identified threat. Within 
the network, a 'strategic ally' represents a long-term alliance or short-ten'n partnership 
with another network or criminal organisation - this is contrasted to a 'component 
partner' who is part of a small-scale alliance between an isolated part of the network 
and elements of another network or criminal group that operates independent from 
any strategic alliance. In the context of this thesis, an alliance created within the CTC 
would occupy one of these two positions. The position of 'client' and 'supplier' refers 
to the networks' need to hire external expertise (i. e. for money laundering or 
assassins), or the networks' ability to provide services or goods to customers. As a 
result of this networked dynamic, ROC has the organisational flexibility to form 
various "transgroup and transnational linkages, each with its own characteristics. "48 
Furthermore, the advantage of a networked organisation is that it is "explicitly 
47 The structure of ROC is discussed in depth in: Andrei Konstantinov, Banditsky Peterburg. 1703- 
2003: Itogi Ei)okhi (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2004), and Andrei Konstantinov and Malcolm 
Dixelius, Banditskaya Rossiya (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001). 
48 Mark Galeotti, "Globalising Crime: Networks and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century 
Underworld, " Cross Border Control Issue 14 (2000), p. 35. 
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inclusive, working freely across national borders and with gangs cooperating 
transnatlonally to maximlse profits and minii-nise nskS,,. 49 
Figure 4.1 Network-Based Organised Crime Structure, 4ý" 
A 'Pt 
Another key difference between ROC and traditional organised crime groups is that 
the most powerful groups in the FSU, and therefore those most relevant to this thesis, 




"I Mark Galeotti argues that there exist six types of organised crime groupings in the former Soviet 
Union, 'gangsters'. 'specialists', 'traders'. 'pseudo-businessnien', 'conglomerates', and 'co-ordinators 
or authorities'. Gangsters generally refer to the traditional type of organised crime that concentrate their 
activities on a combination of illegal activities and are commonly used as 'muscle' by other groups. As 
their name suggests, specialists exploit a single resource or skill. such as money launders (with time 
these groups normally diversify or are incorporated into larger groups), 'traders' on the other hand 
focus their efforts on dealing in illegal and legal merchandise. 'Pseudo-businessnien' concentrate on 
financial crimes, and normally attempt to hide their operations behind legal endeavours; and, 'co- 
ordinators' and 'authorities' are the elite of criminal organisations and mostly act as the arbitrators of 
the criminal world. Finally. Galeotti uses the term 'conglomerates' instead of 'composite-criminal' 
groups. See Mark Galeotti. -Mafiya: Organised Crime in Russia. " Jane's Intelligence Review - Special 
Report, No. 10 (1996). Frank Cilluffo and Gerard Burke, eds., Russian Organised Crime: Global 
237 
A Network-based Organised Crime Structure 
The importance of these groups emanates from the uniqueness of their membership 
base at inception, incorporating professional criminals (Vory v Zakone), former 
members of the Communist Party elite, former and serving members of the state 
security organs, and the new class of entrepreneurs. Stefan Hedlund summarises this 
group of individuals very succinctly when he writes: 
They are defrocked communists and their scions, who are trying to 
reconstitute and plutocratically expand the elite privileges and status 
they enjoyed as party members and state servants under Soviet 
socialism in conjunction with other aspirants, especially the Mafia. 
They are a new breed of Czarist servitor in the sense that their power 
derives from state service, or state solicitude, but they lack the security 
that comes with hereditary wealth, titles and entitlements. 52 
Conglomerates are regarded as "mature and diversified criminal organisations which 
operate across the whole array of mafiya activities and usually also across regional 
and even national boundaries. v953 These groups grew from the relatively chaotic 
environment that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and have successfully 
maintained, "one foot in the black market, the old criminal world, and another foot in 
the official world, the world of politics and the old structure of the party. , 54 As the 
authority and power of the state in the Soviet Union declined and then collapsed, the 
individuals who ran the Soviet bureaucratic structures and industrial enterprises were 
left in possession of vast human, material and administrative resources. In retrospect, 
it is apparent that the former Communist political elites "decided that, in keeping with 
the Soviet tradition of uniting political and economic power, they could 
Organised Crime Proiec CSIS Task Force Report (Washington, D. C.: CSIS, 1997), uses the term 
'composite criminal groups'. 
52 Hedlund (1999), p. 21, quoted from S. Rosefielde, Russian Market Kleptocracy (unpublished 
manuscript). 
33 Galeotti (1996), p. 7. 
54 Statement of Louise Shelley to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Restoration 
Watch No. 2: Russia's Organised Crime, " Decision Brief No 94-D 39 Washington D. C.: The Center 
for Security Policy (1994), p. 13. 
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simultaneously occupy political office and own newly privatised companies. "" Thus, 
the confusion of the immediate post-Soviet period allowed these individuals to 
maintain control of state resources, which further granted them the financial position 
required to obtain unfair business advantages during the initial stages of privatisation 
in Russia and in other former Soviet countries in transition. 
Immediately prior to Russia's privatisation drives in the early 1990s, several 
fraudulent activities were perpetrated by conglomerate groups in an attempt to 
destabilise economic institutions within Russia while simultaneously providing 
additional capital that would eventually be used to purchase state assets. 56 Access to 
capital and an environment fon-ned by Russian Democrats who pushed "for an 
accelerated transition to the market economy without social and institutional 
control99,57 created the conditions for "the take-over of one of the largest, and naturally 
wealthiest countries of the world". 58 Thus once the government decided to begin 
privatising its industries in 1992,59 ROC was placed in an advantageous position as it 
was one of the only groups in Russian society that had access to significant amounts 
of free capital. Furthermore, ROC capitalized on 'insider' information as a result of its 
government ties. Privatization was subsequently easily manipulated, not only because 
55 Coulloudon (1997), p. 75. 
56 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998), p. 188. 
57 Ibid., p. 189. 
58 Ibid. 
59 The official logic behind privatisation was to "relocate the ownership of large state enterprises to 
managers, workers and the remaining populace, the latter acting as outside shareholders. This was 
initially carried out through a citizen-wide distribution of vouchers intended to stimulate the economy 
in a competitive, self-motivated environment. " Patricia Rawlinson, "Russian Organised Crime: moving 
beyond ideology, " in Vincenzo Ruggiero, et a]. (eds), The New European Criminology: Crime and 
Social Order in Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 255-256. Although the Russian 
privatisation drive looked ideal in theory, in practice it produced a situation wherein organised crime, 
with excess capital, could easily acquire vouchers and stocks from Russian citizens to gain a 
controlling interest in valuable properties. As Rawlinson notes, faced with serious inflation and price 
liberalisation, many ordinary citizens who had used their personal savings to keep pace with price 
increases were forced to sell their vouchers at well-below their market value. 
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of the nature of ROC, but because the government lacked any interest in putting a 
legal and/or supervisory framework in place. 
The unregulated privatization process had two major consequences. First, state assets 
were sold at unreasonably low prices. For example, the six largest aluminiurn 
enterprises were sold for U. S. $62.2 million; and, of the 500 largest Russian 
enterprises privatised by sale at auction, 324 went for a dismal average of US$4 
million. 60 As a result of these 'sale' prices, the government's income from 
privatisation between 1992 and 1996 was only 0.012 per cent of the total budget 
receipts - revealing the extent to which privatisation was conducted, "hastily, 
unsysternatically, without scientific foundation, ignoring foreign experience and in a 
19 61 number of cases completely flouting elementary legality, . Second, the law in the 
Russian Federation, and most former Soviet republics, allowed for the 'real owners' 
to conceal their identities by using front men and front companies, and a maze of 
subsidiary firms. 62 This environment subsequently helped create a situation in Russia 
wherein by 1994 ROC was believed to control 55 per cent of capital in the country, 
and 80 per cent of all voting stock. 63 
In addition to gaining preferential treatment during the privatisation process, the ties 
which ROC had to the state and its power-wielding institutions also provided access 
to a plethora of foreign networks that were developed during the Soviet period. This 
60 R. W. Dellow, "Russian Organised Crime, " Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paver, E97 
(March 1998), p. 6. More specific example of privatisation scandals are included in Stefan Hedlund, 
Russia's 'Market' Economy: A bad case of predatory capitalism (London: UCL Press Ltd., 1999). For 
example, Hedlund (p. 236) notes that Norilsk Nike], valued at more than US$1.4 billion, should have 
attracted starting bids of at least US$530 million once the government announced that it would be 
privatised. The winning bid, however, was only US$251 million. 
61 Ibid. 9 pp. 6-7. 62 Williams (2002), p. 53. 
63 Reported by Viktor Ilyukhin, Chair of the Russian Parliamentary Security Committee to ITAR- 
TASS, 13 May 1994. 
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established network significantly helped ROC gain advantages in their quest to 
conduct illicit activities 64 on an international scale - an opportunity that was not 
accorded to traditional criminal groups during initial stages of their development. One 
of the most important ROC networks emerged from links established when the Red 
Army was stationed in various European and Affican countries, links that proved to 
be easily exploitable for criminal purposes. 65 Thus the relationship that developed 
between emerging criminal organisations and members of the former Soviet elite has 
given ROC the trade craft and resources needed to pursue additional objectives to 
profit maximisation, which in turn has provided them with the ability to exploit, and 
essentially integrate themselves into state institutions, structures and the civil service. 
The relationship that existed between ROC and state security organs was a significant 
asset to organised criminal groups in their search for involvement in the licit and illicit 
world. For example, ROC was purportedly in a position to access and plunder military 
arsenals; use state aircraft for smuggling purposes; and avoid customs inspections at 
the borders with little problem during the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 
Union. This was one instance of a relationship that is extremely complex, but for 
analytical purposes could be divided into three categorieS. 66 First, direct relations were 
established between state security personnel and criminal organisations because these 
authority figures were simultaneously members of an organised crime group. Second, 
there are criminal groups that originated from the ranks of the military, commonly 
referred to as 'gangs with shoulder-boards'. With intricate links to government 
64 These include, but are not limited to, trafficking in illicit commodities (women and children, 
narcotics, arms, antique art, precious metals); prostitution; gambling; and widescale money laundering. 
65 Guy Dunn, "Major Mafia Gangs in Russia, " Transnational Organized Crime vol. 2, nos. 2/3 
(Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 63. 
66 Mark Galeotti, "The Challenge of 'Soft Security': Crime, Corruption and Chaos, " chapter in D. 
Averre and A. Cottey, eds., Ten Years After 1989: new security challenges in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 73. 
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officials and criminal organisations, these groups remained quite independent, taking 
advantage of the resources and opportunities presented to them as members of the 
armed forces. For example, during an investigation into the murder of a known 
organised crime figure and former Warrant Officer in the military Valery Dlugach 
(a. k. a. 'Globus'), in March 1993, investigators from the Russian Ministry of Security 
uncovered a group of senior military officers engaged in selling combat arms. 67 
The third form of relationship derives from military units, and/or military personnel 
that provided services and resources to criminal groups. For example, the 201 st Motor 
Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, reportedly used military transport to smuggle 
narcotics to distribution centres in the Russian Federation 68 ; and the 16th Spetsnaz 
Brigade in Chuchkogo were reputed to be a source of contract killers for contract 
murders ordered by ROC. 69 The most important aspect of the relationship between 
ROC and security organs is that, in return for providing non-traditional means of 
support 70 that was lacking as a result of the power vacuum created from the demise of 
the Soviet Union, ROC was able to take advantage of a large pool of extremely 
specialised resources and expertise. 71 Therefore, not only is the 'conglomerate' 
composition of ROC a unique characteristic, but the special relationship with security 
67 "Mafia is Recruiting Hired Killers Among Men in Shoulder Boards, " The Current Digest of the Post 
Soviet Press vol. XLV, no. 37 (1993), p. 26. 
68 This connection was confirmed in a report commissioned by the United Nations Drug Control 
Programme in 1999. Alexander Zelichenko, Analiticheskiy Obzor Narkosituatsia v Zone Deistviva 
Mezhdynarodnoho Antinarkotikovoho Provekta OON 'Oshskiy Yzel', Unpublished report; see also: 
"CACI Forum Summary: Drugs: A Threat to Central Asian Security, " available at 
http: //www. caciana]Yst. org/ForumSummaries/Drug_Conference. htm (accessed II May 2000); and, 
Scott Peterson, "Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics, " The Christian Science Monito 01 
August 2001. 
69 Galeotti (2000). 
70 This support mainly refers to the money paid to security personnel for their tacit cooperation in the 
provision of goods and/or services. Given that the Russian government has been unable to adequately 
provide for their soldiers and law enforcement personnel throughout the 1990s, ROC did not have a 
difficult time in finding collusive participants. 
71 Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Weapons Proliferation and Organised Crime: the Russian Military and 
Security Force Dimension, - INSS Occasional Pape no. 10 (June 1996). 
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organs further differentiated ROC from most other criminal groups operating in the 
world. 72 Although organised crime groups in other countries have developed 
connections with state institutions, the extent of these connections did not compare 
with the Russian predicament. According to Anna Repetskaya, "At one fine point, two 
lines - the power ministries and the criminal world - intersected. The criminal world 
was admitted to secret facilities. The power ministries - to the criminal world. "73 
In addition to differences in composition and relations with the state and its security 
organs, ROC may also be differentiated from the majority of traditional organised 
crime groups in that its primary goal is not exclusively the search for profit 
maximization. Organised criminal groups in the FSU also have political objectives, 
evident through the types of links they established with legitimate business and 
bureaucracy and through their direct involvement in the political processes of Russia 
and former Soviet republics. Argued in subsequent sections of this chapter, many of 
the activities of ROC were conducted with the aim of achieving political legitimacy, 
or at least political acceptance, and lobbying their respective national governments for 
legislation favourable to their interests. Traditional criminal organisations, on the 
other hand, generally avoid drawing unnecessary attention to themselves or their 
operations, and therefore merely attempt to induce select politicians to covertly 
protect their interests (i. e. through the use of corruption). 
74 
72 It should be noted that several criminal groups in Thailand, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
and Pakistan display similar 'conglomerate' characteristics. 
73 Anna Repetskaya, "85 Suspected Criminals Run for Duma Elections, " OMRI Daily Digest, no. 193 
(04 October 1995), 
74 On a basic level parallels can be drawn between ROC and the Colombian cartels at this stage, 
however, as a thorough understanding of ROC is developed in this chapter and those that follow, the 
inherent differences will become apparent. Despite comparable experiences it should be noted that the 
most important difference between these two case studies is that Russia is a former superpower that 
still possesses dangerous weapons arsenals and expertise that can be accessed by criminal elites. 
243 
As has been argued thus far, it is evident that from its very inception, the post-Soviet 
variant of ROC was not only given a perfect membership base with which to conduct 
illicit business ventures, but its members innately strove for political power and 
control. After conducting an intricate study of crime and corruption, Coulloudon 
insightfully asserted: "While organised crime in the West occasionally collaborates 
with certain incumbents, Soviet organised crime was, from the outset, inextricably 
enmeshed in the system of power. It operated in full compliance with the official 
,, 75 pattern of political and economic incentives. Although this statement was written to 
describe organised crime in the Soviet Union, it appears to be one of few 
characteristics that Soviet and post-Soviet organised crime continue to share. 
Furthermore, in their bid for political power, ROC has also influenced the ideology, 
culture and moral values of modem Russian society as it began to develop in the 
newly democratic state. 76 As Maximenkov and Namiesnowski wrote, this was 
already visible in the influential role criminal groups played in the print media, 
electronic media, and entertainment industries. For example, the glorification of 
organised crime was exhibited in the Russian movie industry where several movies 
promoting unity between law enforcement and criminal figures were produced in the 
early 1990's. 77 In addition to the entertainment industry, a notable proportion of the 
print and electronic media in Russia have been used to disseminate 'propaganda of the 
75 V. Coulloudon (1997). 
76 Leonid Maximenkov and C. Namiesniowski, "Organized Crime in Post-Communist Russia", 
Commentary no. 48 (September 1994), p. 5. 
77 The hit film Ptison Romance, for example, depicted a romance between a male prison inmate and a 
female police investigator, and featured a prison escape arranged by the investigator who fled with the 
inmate. The underlying message was that there can be a "happy marriage between law enforcement 
and organised crime. " This glorified depiction of organised crime in Russian popular media is 
compounded by the speculation - argued by Maximenkov and Namiesniowski - that the Russian movie 
industry has been used to launder money. Ibid., p. 6. 
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criminal subculture. 78 According to Ovchinsky, this included the conscious 
glamorisation of the criminal world and the creation of a positive image of criminal 
structure representatives and corrupt state officials. 79 IbiS influence on the media 
indirectly supported the power gained by ROC in several ways, including: promoting 
criminal elite into elected bodies of power; discrediting economic legislation that ran 
counter to criminal interests; and, disseminating false information about criminal 
representatives and state officials to influence public opinion in the political arena. 80 
Based on these preliminary observations, it could be suggested that ROC actively 
sought to become a major player not only within government, but within society in 
general .81 This interest was indirectly facilitated by the failure of the new Russian 
state, and other newly independent post-Soviet states, to meet most social obligations 
deemed to be the responsibility of a sovereign state. The failure of the state to address 
the social necessities of their citizens fed into the power acquired by organised crime, 
which subsequently became "a reflection of the absence of credible and legitimate 
mechanisms to control social interaction and create some sense of common order. "82 
In other words, this highlights the ability of non-state actors, in the post-Cold War era, 
to directly challenge the state for territorial and bureaucratic dominance. 
78 Vladimir Ovchinsky, "Corruption, Media and Law Enforcement Agencies, " conference paper 
presented at Corruption Within Securi! y Forces: A Threat to National Securit , cosponsored by The 
George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 14-18 May 
2001, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
8' Although traditional organised crime groups have commonly been portrayed in the popular media 
elsewhere in the world, this has not directly influenced national ideology or culture. Quite the opposite, 
in fact, is the case as groups such as the Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza and Italian Maria are 
normally portrayed in a negative light. 
82 Galeotti (1998), p. 418. 
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Finally, the post-Soviet model of organised. crime is considered more egregious than 
other criminal organisations because it displayed an uninhibited use of intimidation 
and violence to promote and protect its operations. 
Part of this ruthlessness could be attributed to the fact that the lower operational levels 
of ROC were relatively disorganised, however, as Mark Galeotti noted, "this does not 
mean that it is not efficient, but that it is characterised as a series of networks rather 
than formal structures. " 83 In other words, aside from the leadership, most criminal 
groups in the FSU used mobile lower levels made up of members who were not 
necessarily loyal to their own groups. Although these groups may have had oaths of 
membership in the past (ie. the vory v zak-one), most groups in the post-Soviet 
environment discarded the requirements for such a loyal basis. As a result internal 
discipline was not as rigid as in traditional organised crime groups, thus allowing 
members more freedom in their actions - which further explains the rampant violent 
nature of ROC. This was exacerbated by the experience of fighting in the Afghan 
War, common among many lower rank criminals. Active military duty in which there 
was permanent exposure to the risk of death "reduced the sense of danger and created 
a specific readiness to die. 9M 
Given the prevailing post-Soviet criminal environment, it is evident that ROC does 
possess a number of characteristics that differentiate it from traditional criminal 
organisations. Although criminal groups in the Russian Federation are distinct entities 
within the global criminal underworld, it is a position that ROC has worked to gain 
93 Mark Galeotti, "The Russian Mafiya: Economic Penetration at Home and Abroad", in A. Ledeneva 
and M. Kurkchiyan, Economic Crime in Russia. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000) 
84 Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: the use of force in the making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 11. 
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since 1991. In the early years of its evolution, ROC successfully took advantage of 
privatisation, protection rackets and other illegal activities that brought it considerable 
wealth. This wealth, however, was not directly or immediately translated into power, 
thus forcing larger groups to seek ways to influence the decision-making process of 
government and eventually secure "a new position within the Russian hierarchy. ', 85 
This was made increasingly possible as the conglomerate criminal groups solidified 
their membership base, thus creating a new elite that "naturally reoccupied the power 
structures, forging their own links with industry and the military"86 and creating a 
network of "vested interests, special pleading, and patronage"87 deep within the 
political system. Combining ROC's composition, political aspirations and willingness 
to use violence, it can be concluded that it is "the intermingling of all of these factors 
that makes the criminal activities [of ROC] so 'untouchable ....... 88 and that 
subsequently gave ROC the impetus - directly and indirectly - to engage with the 
terrorist realm. 
Entertaining Alliances: discerning economic from political agendas 
As argued in Chapter Tliree, the first 'type' of relationship that often emerges between 
terrorism and organised crime is an alliance. Alliances allow each group to remain 
committed to their defined aims, normally because of the short-term, business-like 
nature of such associations. The notion of an alliance is not a new phenomenon to 
Russia, but has roots in the Soviet system under Josef Stalin. Stalin used organised 
85 Peter Daniel DiPaola, "The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian 
Mafjya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, " 
http: //www. law. indiana. edu/gisj/vo]4/nol/dippgp. html (14 October 1998). 
86 Coulloudon (1997), p. 77. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Margaret E. Beare, "Russian (East European) Organised Crime Around the Globe, " a conference 
paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Customs Service, and Australian 
Federal Police Transnational Crime Conference, Canberra, 9-10 March 2000. 
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crime to help maintain order by conducting violent intimidation in lieu of the state to 
such an extent that criminals aided in state purges. In retrospect it may be concluded 
that this historical dimension laid the foundation for the emergence of allegations 
about a contemporary relationship between state terrorism and organised crime. It has 
been argued that, in an effort to attain state control over the population while pushing 
certain domestic security policies, President Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir 
Putin both used criminal groups in conjunction with state security services to 
perpetrate major bombings against the civilian population. 89 Despite the historical 
precedent of state terror using organised crime, the certainty about these allegations 
remains elusive and difficult to substantiate, and will therefore not be dealt with in 
this thesis. 
In addition to allegations of forming an alliance with the state's use of terrorism, ROC 
has engaged in alliances with terrorist entities in order to continue to expand its 
operations globally. Since the early 1990s, ROC has thus engaged in alliances with 
Chechen militants, Afghan mujahideen and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al Qaeda. It is through these 
alliances that the dynamics of the first point of the CTC, in relation to the Russian 
context, is best illustrated. 
By nature, ROC is a regional phenomenon - as discussed in previous sections. 
However, in addition to establishing operations throughout the Russian Federation 
89 Many of these allegations are outlined in Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, Blowing Up 
Russia: Terror From Within (New York: S. P. I. Books, 2002). In addition to arguing that the special 
services were instructed to foment war in Chechnya, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko argue that the FSB 
were ordered to conduct acts of terrorism that would be blamed on Chechen militants in order to gain 
public support for Russian actions in Chechnya. Bombings for which the FSB has been accused of 
orchestrating include the 1999 attacks in Ryazan, Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk. 
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and in other former Soviet states, ROC simultaneously established a global foothold. 
Facilitated by a membership willing to travel and harness personal networks 
(including networks that extended through diaspora communities), it was an interest 
to build alliances with licit and illicit political entities that expanded ROC operations 
into some of the most unstable, yet lucrative, regions of the world. The search to 
maximise profits, combined with an innate attraction to manipulate the political 
environment, provided ROC with both an interest and opportunities to become 
involved with terrorist elements. Three key examples of alliances created between 
ROC and terrorist groups include the relationships developed between ROC and 
Chechen militants (as discussed in subsequent sections), the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al-Qaeda. 90 
The relationship between ROC and FARC began in the early 1990s after one of the 
leading drug trafficking groups - the Cali cartel - reportedly discovered a potentially 
lucrative cocaine market in Russia. 91 It was reported that FARC-member Julian 
Castano, with representatives of Mexican organised crime, met with representatives of 
the SoIntsevo gang in Russia from 1992.92 These meetings allegedly formed a large- 
scale network that used Russian ports, Moscow and St Petersburg to distribute cocaine 
into the Russian Federation. By 2001, government sources (i. e. the Federal Security 
Services) were quoted as stating that Russia was a principal market for Colombian 
90 Given word constraints placed within this thesis, only the relationship between ROC and FARC will 
be discussed here, and in Chapter Five. For an overview of the relationship established between ROC 
and Al Qaeda see: John Daly, "Viktor Bout: From International Outlaw to Valued Partner, " Terrorism 
Monito vol. 2, issue 20 (21 October 2004); "No Information About Russian Arms for Al Qaeda, " The 
Associated Press (21 February 2002); "Al Qaeda Linked to Russian Arms Broker, " Los Angeles Times 
(16 February 2002); and, "Revealed: Al Qaeda's Arms Dealer, " Sunday Times (17 February 2002). 
91 "Mafia Rusa Conectada a Carteles Colombianos (Russian Mafia Connections to Colombian 
Cartels), " La Prensa, 28 February 2001, accessed at http: //www- 
ni. laprensa. com. ni/archivo/2001/febrero/28/nacionales/nacionales-20010228. htmI (03 November 
2002). 
92 "Russia Becoming Principal Market for Colombian Cocaine, " Johnson's Russia Listl No. 5581 (05 
December2001). 
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cocaine, attracting an estimated 40 tons of cocaine per year. 93 Furthermore, evidence 
suggests that Russian groups supplied FARC with weapons since the early 1990s in 
exchange for cocaine. 94 It may be suggested that the FARC's successes (as discussed 
in further detail in Chapter Five) after 1995 were in part due to their involvement with 
Russian organised crime. Russian weapons, for example, allowed the FARC to arm its 
nearly doubled membership base of 15 '000.95 Thus, not only have Russian criminal 
syndicates affected the political environment of the FSU, but they appear to have 
engaged in providing resources that contributed to the sustained instability 
experienced in Colombia. 
An Internal Capacity for Terrorism: Responding to Operational Necessities 
The discussion above of the relationship between ROC and various terrorist groups 
has confirmed that alliances are entertained primarily for practical purposes. In most 
cases described in the previous section, alliances opened additional opportunities for 
ROC, while simultaneously (and not necessarily intentionally) extending their reach 
across borders. Although the evidence reveals an interest on the part of terrorist 
groups and ROC to cooperate in criminal operations, there have been no recorded 
instances of ROC seeking reciprocal services (i. e. seeking a terrorist group to conduct 
an act of terrorism on a pre-determined ROC target). Instead of soliciting external 
entities to conduct acts of violence at their bequest, ROC has willingly engaged in the 
use of violence and intimidation to promote and protect their interests. The use of 
93 "Russia Becoming Principal Market for Colombian Cocaine, " Johnson's Russia List, No. 5581 (05 
December2001). 
94 See Sue Lackey and Michael Moran, "Russian Mob Trading Arms for Cocaine with Colombian 
Rebels, " MSNB. C. com 19 April 2000, accessed at http: //www. msnbc. com/news/391623. asp? )m=-13N, 
and Kirk Semple, "The Submarine Next Door, " The New York Times Magazine, 03 December 2000. 
95 Bruce Michael Bagley, "Globalisation and Transnational Organised Crime: The Russian Mafia in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, " hiama fCoca, 31 October 2001, accessed at 
http: //www. mamacoca. org/feb2002/art-bagley_globalized_organized_crime_en. htmi (19 April 2002). 
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terror tactics has been employed by other criminal groups (i. e. the Italian mafia and 
drug cartels in Colombia) 96 as a way to disrupt the activities of government and law 
enforcement that threaten their operations. 97 This relationship is best summarised by 
Alison Jamieson: 
In many cases the line which separates terrorism from organised crime 
has become blurred, in that both forms of criminality use violence or 
the threat of violence to achieve their ends, both sustain themselves 
financially through control of 'criminalized' resources such as drugs 
and arms, and both have a political strategy. Nonetheless, one can 
generally distinguish between the ideological content of political 
terrorism and the pragmatic goals of organised crime: whereas the 
primary aim of politically inspired violence is the pursuit of specific 
objectives involving the overthrow of a government and/or the status 
quo. The political agenda of an organised crime group is determined 
by the quest for power, impunity and profits. Organised criminals seek 
to penetrate and suborn the state and cohabit with it, using terrorist 
98 tactics to intimidate the State when their privileges are at risk... 
Despite a history of organised crime engaging with terrorism as an operational tool, 
ROC's use of terror tactics has been more egregious than any other criminal group in 
history. As will be demonstrated below, the use of terror tactics by ROC has been 
used to attain "power, impunity and profits". however, the Russian experience can be 
distinguished from others because ROC has sought to alter the prevailing status quo. 
96 With some groups, other than ROC, there also appears to be a thin line between their criminal 
operations and their use of terrorism to acquire political influence. This is especially true for the 
Colombian drug cartels who are known to have penetrated state power wielding institutions. The 
primary difference, however, between ROC and the Colombian case is that the Colombian cartels were 
able to utilise domestic terrorist groups (ie. FARC) in their favour. ROC, on the other hand, has only 
been able to depend on its own resources with respect to conducting violent operations. This argument - 
which falls under the rubric of 'narco-terrorism' has been covered extensively in Rachel Ehrenfeld, 
Narco-Terrorisin (London: HarperCollins, 1990). 
97 For a general overview of how these groups have used violence, refer to the following sources: 
Alison Jamieson, "Mafia and Political Power, 1943-89, " International Relations, vol. 10, no. I (May 
1990); Alison Jamieson, "Mafia and Institutional Power in Italy, " International Relations vol. 12, no. I 
(April 1994); David Scott Palmer, ed., Shining Path of Peru. (London: Hurst, 1992); Charles Bergquist 
et al., Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historial Perspective, (Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 1992); Mark Galeotti, "The Albanian Connection, " International Police Review, no. 10 
(1998). 
98 Alison Jamieson, The Antimaf ia: Italy's Fight Against Organised Crime, (London: Macmillan Press, 
2000), p. 1. 
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Apart from an obvious interest in acquiring profits, the criminal elite of the FSU have 
also sought - at various times - to gain direct control over the political and economic 
spheres of the Russian Federation, and other former Soviet republics. This not only 
worked to ensure that power was attained, but it also promoted the maintenance of an 
ideal criminal environment. With these objectives in mind, ROC adopted the use and 
the threat of terrorism to ensure that society - at various levels - was both incapable 
and afraid of interfering with criminal operations conducted by conglomerate criminal 
groups. The ability of ROC to use terrorism as a tactic to promote its own interests 
can be highlighted and measured against the five characteristics of terrorism outlined 
in Chapter One. These characteristics include: the use or threat of premeditated 
violence; the creation of fear among an adversary or specific segment of society, 
careful target selection; political objectives which normally include an attempt to 
influence political behaviour, and, the goal of breaking the will of the opposition and 
forcing it to submit to specified demands. Taking these as the basic requirements for 
any terrorist organisation, it may be argued that ROC had not only come to comply 
with these requirements, but also succeeded where traditional terrorist groups have 
not. 
Targeted Violence and the Spread ofFea 
Violence and/or the threat of violence do not emerge in a vacuum, but are dependent 
on the success of targeting strategies employed by a criminal or terrorist group. As 
outlined in Chapter One, Schmid and Jongman (1988) provided the most useful 
understanding of targets by distinguishing between symbolic targets and targets of 
opportunity. This argument was taken a step fiirther by C. J. M Drake who classified 
targets according to four categories - symbolic, functional, logistical and expressive - 
252 
each of which is loosely based according to terrorist motives. 99 Symbolic' 00 targets are 
chosen to directly solicit a response or reaction in the psychological target (i. e. high- 
ranking govenu-nent officials); functional targets are people or objects who represent a 
direct threat to the existence of the terrorist group (i. e. police or intelligence officers 
or headquarters); logistical targets generally include individuals or installations that 
are attacked to "provide or safeguard the group's resources"101; and, expressive 
targets refer to "an emotional response to a situation, rather than a part of an overall 
strategy. "' 02 
Upon analysing the activities of ROC it becomes evident that it has strategically used 
all four categories of targeting to create an environment in which it has overseen, and 
continues to oversee, the transfer of state power to its own interests. Successful 
targeting, as this section will illustrate, has also ensured that ROC - through its 
actions - displays the first three characteristics required to be considered a terrorist 
group: the use or threat of violence; careful target selection; and the spread of fear 
among specified segments of society. Furthermore, ROC's successful use of target 
selection, violence, and the subsequent manipulation of fear throughout the Russian 
Federation, has produced a sense of insecurity that can be understood with reference 
to the alternative view of security outlined in Chapter Two. 
99 C. J. M Drake, Terrorists' Target Selection. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 9. It should be 
noted that these targets are not exclusive, thus a target can be chosen for more than one reason. 
100 These include attacks against prominent individuals; low-level attacks aimed to create an 
inconvenience and act as a reminder that the terrorists will continue to perpetrate violence until their 
demands are met; and 'spectacular' attacks which are intended to cause serious damage in order to 
Flace inflated attention on the terrorists presence. Ibid., p. 10. 
01 Included in this category are criminal activities (ie. robberies, kidnapping, hijackings) used for 
strictly financial purposes. Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
102 Ibid., p. 14. 
253 
Using violence and the threat of violence to ensure the success of their goals, ROC 
created an undeniable sense of fear within key segments of society. The primary 
target of ROC, as with many other traditional terrorist and criminal groups, has been 
state authorities, especially politicians and those in the judiciary, law enforcement, 
and military institutions. In addition to these more obvious targets, criminal 
organisations in the FSU also successfully targeted the business community and the 
general public. The following quote, describing a relatively quiet week in Russia in 
the early 1990s, sets the tone for this section: 
A huge bomb blast killed a St. Petersburg businessman; masked 
assassins murdered a businessman from Bratsk in front of his family; 
an aide to the speaker of the Russian parliament was shot in the back of 
the head; and a gang from the Yaroslavl region were reported to have 
murdered at least 15 people and buried them in concrete so that they 
could steal [and sell] their homes. 103 
Symbolic Targeting: Government Representatives 
Regarded as symbolic and/or functional targets, politicians are generally targeted by 
ROC for two main reasons. First, because they have the power to directly influence 
legislation that is presented and passed in parliament. Second, because they hold the 
potentially powerful positions which criminal elites themselves want to control. Thus, 
by using terror tactics, ROC has placed itself in a position in which it could deter or 
block any potentially destructive government policy, and ultimately influence the 
electorate and government officials into electing or appointing their members into 
potentially powerful government positions. Since 1991 there have been a significant 
number of political representatives that have been assassinated while serving in office. 
103 James Meck, "Russia sinks as crime wave rises, " Guardian Weekly, 08 November 1998. Note that 
the news stories used in this quote only represent killings that made the news during the week, a large 
percentage of violent crimes perpetrated by criminal organisations is not necessarily reported. 
254 
Although it is difficult to tie all of these deaths to ROC, in an overwhelming majority 
of cases (especially the most news worthy), the available evidence points to ROC. 
Three examples will serve to illustrate ROC's ability to target leading state officials 
seeking to circumvent their activities. 104 In April 1994 a Duma deputy from Khimki, 
Andrei Aizderdzis, was murdered. Despite having six eyewitnesses to the murder, the 
police were unable to compile an identification of the assassin. 105 With no known 
links to the criminal world, and no evidence that Aizderdzis collected a second 
income (i. e. from illicit activities), the authorities still ascribed his death to a contract 
murder resulting from business contacts. Despite this official explanation of his death, 
the most logical reason - as indicated in press reports - emerges from his membership 
in the New Regional Policy Group of Deputies where Aizderdzis took responsibility 
for publishing a newsletter entitled "Kto yest kto (Who is who)? " which included a 
long list of "crime kingpins" in the FSU. 106 This suggests that retribution at the hands 
of ROC was the most likely explanation for his murder. 
The second example - and the most publicised cases of a government official killed as 
a result of attempts to uncover the operations of criminal organisations and their links 
to government leaders - is that of the murder of Duma deputy Galina Starovoitova in 
St. Petersburg in November 1998. During her political career, Starovoitova reportedly 
offended a number of high-ranking officials, including senior members in the General 
Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Security Service, as well as St. Petersburg 
104 Since 1994, there have been 9 assassinations against leading Liberal Russian Duma deputies. These 
are the murder of Andrei Aizderdzis and Valentin Marternyanov in 1994; Sergei Skorochkin and Sergei 
Markidonov in 1995; Lev Rokhlin and Galina Starovoitova in 1998; Mikhail Sirota in 2001; Vladimir 
Golovlev in 2002; and, Sergei Yushenkov in 2003. 
105 Vadim Belych, "A Deputy to the State Duma is Killed, " Izvestia, 26 April 1994, p. 1. 
106 Ibid. 
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Governor Vladimir Yakovlev as a result of her anti-corruption crusade. At the time of 
her death, Starovoitova was investigating ties between government officials and 
criminal groups in St. Petersburg, while publicly opposing the election of known 
criminal deputies to the local legislative assembly. 107 Part of this investigation 
included an attempt to uncover Yakovlev's alleged ties to organised crime, during 
which she had reportedly come into possession of an audio tapelog linking Yakovlev 
to one of the leading mafia groups in the city. 109 
Apart from her independent investigations into criminal-government links, 
Starovoitova was also actively involved in the upcoming elections to the St. 
Petersburg Legislative Assembly as the chairperson of the 'Northern Capital', a 
coalition of democratic forces. 110 Although she was not a candidate in the elections 
herself, Starovoitova was openly seeking to have as many 'Northern Capital' 
democrats elected into the local legislative assembly as possible. As Viktor Ilyukhin, 
Chairman of the Duma Security Committee noted, 
Galina Starovoitova had thoughts of controlling the St. Petersburg 
Legislative Assembly. But St. Petersburg is a rather criminalised city. 
Criminal groups have carved up spheres of influence. I am firmly 
convinced that some serious conflicts and frictions arose between 
power-hungry criminal elements and Starovoitova's interests ... 
IH 
107 "Dead State, " Izvestia 24 November 1998, p. 1. 
108 It is important to note that although the tape did not contain direct conversations with Yakovlev, the 
conversations did suggest that he was directly linked to criminal groups. David Satter, "Black 
Russians: the mob makes a bid to rule Russia, " National Review, 21 December 1998, p. 29. 
109 Brian Whitmore, "The Strange Investigation of Galina Starovoitova's Murder, " PRISM: A 
Biweekly on the Post-Soviet States, vol. 5, issue 2 (29 January 1999), p. 1. Starovoitova was also 
investigating criminal-government-business ties in the establishment of a private commercial company 
to be called the National Security Academy. In connection with this company several people had been 
murdered, including a close friend of Starovoitova and former head of the Petersburg tax service, 
Dmitry Filippov. If Starovoitova did possess information about criminal involvement in the National 
Security Academy, this merely provides an additional motive for her murder. For details of this 
hypothesis, see: Viktoria Voloshina, "A Fatal Choice, " Moskovskiye novosti, no. 46 (22-29 November 
1998), p. 2. 
110 Viktor Paukov and Vadim Tyagniryadno, "Galina Starovoitova Was Being Tailed and Her Phones 
Were Tapped, " Vremya MN 23 November 1998, p. 1. 
111 "Politicians on Starovoitova's Murder, " Kommersant, 24 November 1998, p. 2. 
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Starovoitova's activities in the period leading up to her death gives credence to the 
theories about her murder that focus on her attempts to counter criminal influence in 
St. Petersburg. Regarded as the centre of criminal penetration of political structures, 
the fact that Starovoitova was murdered during the time of the St. Petersburg 
legislative assembly elections suggested that her death could be attributed to "one of 
the dirtiest political campaigns in recent Russian history [that] featured some 
unprecedented methods of political struggle. ". and an election in which an estimated 
50 per cent of candidates were connected to criminal groups. ' 12 
Finally, the assassination of Sergei Yushenkov provides a third illustration of how 
leading politicians seeking transparency within the political system were targeted by 
ROC. Yushenkov, like Aizderdzis, was considered a leading liberal politician who 
sought to uncover political corruption in Russia and release evidence in support of 
allegations that the Russian Security Services were responsible for a wave of 
bombings in apartment blocks in 1999 that resulted in the death of hundreds of 
Russian citizens. ' 13 These bombings acted as a catalyst for Moscow's decision to 
begin its second campaign in Chechnya - an act that Yushenkov also publicly 
denounced as illegal. The absence of any evidence linking him to criminal structures 
or business dealings further suggests that his assassination was the result of his search 
for government transparency and accountability. Grigorii Yavlinsky, leader of the 
liberal Yabloko party, stated in an interview regarding Yushenkov's death: "This is 
112 Victor Sergeyev, "Organized Crime and Social Instability, " in Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. 
Breslauer, eds. Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder? (Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 
165-6. 
113 "Russian MP's death sparks storm, " www. rusnet. nI (19 April 2003); Michael Wines, "Leader of 
Western-style liberal party slain outside Moscow home, " New York Times, (18 April 2003); and, Nabi 
Abdullaev, "Liberal Russia's Yushenkov Shot Dead, " Moscow Times (18 April 2003). 
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undoubtedly a political assassination. It would be political in any version because it 
shows that criminal structures threaten politicians at every level. "' 14 
Another group of politicians commonly targeted by ROC - especially in the 
transitional period of the 1990s - were those who sought to place greater controls and 
transparency over economic programmes at the local, regional or national levels. 
Legislative economic controls threatened to limit the ability of criminal groups to 
infiltrate legitimate economic sectors. In the case of ROC, this represented a direct 
challenge to their apparent aim of gaining authority and legitimacy within Russian 
society. With respect to Drake's classification of targeting strategies, in addition to 
being symbolic and functional, these targets were also logistical in nature. The 
assassination of vice Governor Mikhail Manevich, head of the St. Petersburg City 
Property Committee, in August 1997 illustrates this point. Over the course of three 
years, Manevich was intent on pushing ahead economic reforms and privatisation in 
St. Petersburg. Displeased with the results of Russian privatisation since 1991, he 
increasingly campaigned for the rule of law to be respected and implemented in the 
business world. ' 15 With his evident personal ethic, combined with his ability to have a 
"large say in who became the owner of former state assets", 116 Manevich had become 
a significant obstacle for criminal organisations seeking to expand their legitimate 
business interests in the city. 
114 Gregory Feifer, "Russia: Assassination of Liberal Lawmaker Seen as Attack on Democratic 
Values, " Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. (18 April 2003), accessed at http: //www. rferl. com on 
date of publication. 
115 St. Petersburg Times, 25 August 1997. Manevich also advocated the selling of St. Petersburg 
municipal properties for the going market prices - unlike previous privatisation drives throughout 
Russia that commonly sold state property and factories at prices well below fair market value. For an 
insightful account of Russia's experience with privatisation, refer to Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' 
Economy: A bad case of predatory capitalism, (London: UCL Press Limited, 1999). 
1 "'The Daily Telegraph, 19 August 1997. 
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Despite the inclusion of government officials in the composition of conglomerate 
criminal groups, ensuring that ROC enjoyed preferential treatment since 1991, ROC 
continued to target political representatives to protect their interests and existence 
from government initiatives. Attempts to secure control over political representatives 
through campaigns of violence became so widespread that in 1994, Iosif Kobzon, a 
singer with links to the key criminal groups, suggested in an interview with the 
newspaper Komsolmolskaya Pravda that the State and criminal structures should call 
a truce: "it is necessary to sit down at the table, so to speak, and negotiate through 
mediators, public councils, or the press. "' 17 Public statements of this type - commonly 
associated with government attempts to seek dialogue with terrorist groups - 
illustrated the presence ROC had gained in Russian society by the mid-1990s, 
suggesting that ROC had successfully assumed the role of a non-state actor that had 
the potential to become a political force. 
Functional Targeting. ý The Judiciary and Law Enforcement 
In addition to directing violence against politicians, ROC also singled out the 
judiciary 118 and law enforcement as functional targets in order to promote and protect 
its interests. On an operational level, these officials were targeted when seen to pose 
an immediate threat to ROC, either by threatening apprehension, by initiating a 
criminal investigation into a group (especially with the purpose of uncovering 
criminal connections to government personnel), or simply by refusing to accept a 
bribe. In 2000, the Russian Interior Ministry estimated that seven to 15 internal affairs 
117 Frederico Varese, "What is the Russian Mafia?, " Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcementl vol. 
5, no. 2 (Autumn 1996), pp. 135-136. 
118 In St. Petersburg and Astrakhan, 2 judges were murdered in 1998, and 5 were severely beaten 
between 1995 and 2000. Radio Free Eurove and Radio Liberty 21 August 2000. 
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employees died daily during the performance of their duties. ' 19 Although lack of 
evidence means that all of these deaths have not officially been attributed to criminal 
organisations, media reports have speculated that many, in fact, were. 120 The evidence 
which is discussed below suggests that the ROC ensured that judicial investigators 
attempting to seriously undermine criminal groups were either intimidated or 
murdered, thus successfully instilling a general sense of insecurity throughout both 
professions. 
One of the first recorded incidents of ROC displaying ruthless tactics towards the 
judiciary, and subsequently creating widespread terror, occurred in Dagestan in 1993 
during a court case at the Supreme Court building. While judges were hearing a case 
against members of a Chechen criminal organisation, gangsters broke into the court 
room and opened fire. Several persons were subsequently injured, and when court 
reopened, the prosecutor instantly reduced the charges. 12 1 An attack similar in nature 
occurred in February 1999 in the region of Samara, which is noted for having one of 
the highest crime rates in the Russian Federation. The regional police department 
embarked on a major campaign to curtail the fighting between criminal groups. As a 
result of this attempted anti-crime effort, it is believed that criminal organisations 
retaliated by setting the regional police department building on fire, resulting in over 
60 deaths and the destruction of documents that could have been used to indict 
119 Interfax, 30 August 2000. 
120 Some of the most famous contract murders on law enforcement personnel in Russia include: the 
October 1999 murder of Colonel Mikhail Biryukov, deputy head of the Tambov Regional Internal 
Affairs department and previous head of the Tambov Regional Criminal Investigation Department 
(Itar-Tass 06 October 1999); the October 1999 murder of Major Sergei Fillipov, head of the 
department for combating banditry at the Novosibirsk Regional directorate for countering organised 
crime (Itar-Tass 03 October 1999); and the July 2000 attack against Lieutenant General Vladimir 
Shults, deputy director of the Federal Security Service and Major General Aleksandr Morozov, head of 
the Northwest Regional Directorate for Combatting Organised Crime and Corruption (BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, SU/3902 B/1,26 July 2000). 
121 MVD press release, 26 October 1993, as quoted in Stephen Handelman (1995), Comrade 
Criminal... p. 24. 
260 
members of organised criminal groups. 122 Other examples include the assassinations 
of: Radik Yagutyan, Chief of Samara, regional Prosecutor Investigations 
department 123 ; Anatoly Stepanov, Deputy Minister of Justice 124 ; Galina Borodina, 
acting head of Moscow region Justice Department 125 ; and A. Sinitsyn, deputy 
prosecutor of Bratsk, Eastern Siberia. ' 26 Although they have made a concerted effort 
to fight ROC in spite of inadequate manpower, equipment shortages, inadequate 
training, and pay shortages, the retribution which law enforcement Personnel and the 
judiciary have faced from ROC has created an environment in which very few 
investigations are investigated thoroughly.. 
Logistical Targeting: Legitimate Business Sectors 
A third group of individuals commonly targeted by ROC have been people connected 
to the licit business world - especially in economic sectors of interest to criminal 
organisations. The legitimate business sector represents a logistical target for ROC 
because, in addition to criminal activities, ROC is aware of its economic benefits and 
the associated political power which results from success in licit business. 
Furthermore, legitimate business plays a vital role in the operations of illicit criminal 
activities - especially because the tacit cooperation of banks and business enterprises 
is needed to facilitate the laundering of illicit profits. Interested in maximising their 
122 "Organized Crime is Suspected in Samara Fire, " The Russian Journal vol. 4, no. 4 (22 February 
1999). 
123 Boris Belyakov, "Samara Regional Prosecutor Investigations Department Chief Killed, " Itar-Tass 
(26 June 1994). 
124 Stepanov handled matters pertaining to the offices of the defence attorney and notary, and therefore 
was privy to documentation that revealed links between government officials and organised clime. 
Unwilling to succumb to alleged corruption attempts, it was likely Stepanov's determination to 
prosecute the guilty that led to his death. Grigory Sanin, "Anatoly Stepanov's Skull is Crushed With a 
Hatchet, " Segodriya, 24 May 1996, p. 1, as quoted in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 
48, no. 21 (19 June 1996). 
125 "Moscow Regional Official Found Shot Dead, " Deutsche-Presse Agentur (25 June 1996). 
126 A. Sinitsyn, was killed in January 1999 allegedly because of his successful fight against members of 
the Bratsk criminal group. The Bratsk were allegedly the most influential group in Eastern Siberia in 
1999. "Press Surveys, " Organized Crime Watch, vol. 1, no. 4 (May/June 1999), p. 6. 
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financial standing, criminal elites in the 1990s embarked on a campaign to gain direct 
control over lucrative and legitimate business ventures in Russia. This was 
accomplished through three strategies. 127 First, with its large capital reserves, ROC 
extended loans to entrepreneurs in return for placing their own people in controlling 
positions within the new enterprise in order to influence the decision-making process 
directly. Second, ROC indirectly influenced business by gaining control of banks; and 
third, business executives were threatened if they failed to cooperate with the criminal 
group that established control over the geographic area in which the business was 
located. 
Logistical targeting - through the combined use of careful target selection and the 
indiscriminate use of violence to spread fear - became such a priority by 1992 that the 
Russian media noted how "orders began to be placed [by criminal elites] for the 
elimination of 'recalcitrant' bureaucrats, prominent commercial dealers, 
, 028 entrepreneurs, and bankers, with the aim of penetrating their business. As the 
discussion below illustrates, these orders were carried out to an extreme, transforming 
the dynamics of fair market competition into a zone of violent conflict. Successful 
targeting of private industry at all levels created an environment in which an estimated 
70-80 per cent of businesses operating in Russia paid 10-20 per cent of their profits 
for protection ('krysha') to ROC. 129 Furthen-nore, the ways in which ROC targeted 
legitimate business sectors underscores the differences between ROC and traditional 
criminal organizations. Unlike traditional groups who are primarily interested in 
short-term, speculative and liquid investments, ROC has shown a keen interest in 
businesses that supply commodities which are in high demand on the international 
127 Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 20 July 1995. ý 
128 Izvestia Analytical Centre, "Criminal Russia, " Izvestia, 21 October 1994, p. 5. 
129 Galeotti (2000), p. 8. 
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market (i. e. heavy industry). 130 ROC's evident desire to achieve dominance over key 
economic enterprises suggests they were always interested in long-term profit 
maximisation, while simultaneously highlighting their indirect political agenda 
through attempts to gain a degree of control over the national economy. 131 
The private banking industry was among the first business sectors targeted by ROC, 
especially during the first half of the 1990s, because control over banking would 
greatly simplify money-laundering and provide important information for groups 
involved in protection rackets. ' 32 The inherent power ascribed to banks within market 
economies also meant that gaining control over banks would indirectly contribute to 
the potential political power ROC gained, 133 by intertwining "its activities and 
influence into the foundations of the emerging Russian state. " 134 A premeditated 
campaign against the Russian banking community arguably began in December 1993 
with the murder of Nikolay Likhachev, Chain-nan of Rosselkhozbank 135 , and 
130 Rensselaer W. Lee 111, Smuggling Armageddon: the Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet 
Union and Europe. (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), p. 52. 
13 1 The implications of this will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
132 Direct control over banks was an important source of intelligence for ROC through the 1990s 
because bank records provided detailed personal information on customers, allowing for careful target 
selection with respect to extortion and protection rackets. 
133 In addition to the political and economic power associated with owning banks, gaining control over 
the industry also has pragmatic reasons that contribute to the overall success of ROC. Given that 
Russian banks lack considerable regulatory controls and legislation, such extensive control over the 
banking industry by ROC is not essential, especially since money can easily be deposited without 
question of its origin - thus making money laundering an extremely obstacle free venture. There are, 
however, three primary reasons that adequately explain the importance of gaining influence in the 
sector. First, control provides advantages and protection in the long term should the government ever 
seriously impose and enforce regulations. Second, if ROC groups directly control a bank, its capital 
resources can be used for the groups' own purposes; and if they do not entirely own the bank, criminal 
organisations can easily demand preferential credit (this has been a key reason for the murder of many 
bank managers who refuse to cooperate). And third, control over the banking sector helps facilitate 
extortion and corruption. For example, access to business details helps ROC groups identify potential 
blackmail targets. These points are expanded in Phil Williams (1996), "Introduction-, " pp. 16-17. 
134 Nicola J. Lowther, "Organised Crime and Extortion in Russia: Implications for Foreign 
Companies, " Transnational Organized Crime vol. 3, no. I (Spring 1997), p. 32. 
135 Ibid. p. 15. 
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continued through the decade. 136 Utilising violence, therefore, as the key tool for 
acquiring economic control and subsequently political power, resulted in 116 bankers 
being threatened between 1993 and 1997 - 79 of which were subsequently killed, and 
36 wounded. 137 From 1997 to 1999 the number of bankers killed increased to over 
100.138 In August 1995, the MVD All-Russian Scientific Research Institute estimated 
that criminal groups operating in Russia alone controlled over 400 banks and 47 
exchanges. 139 By 1999, it was ascertained that ROC had a controlling interest in 50-85 
per cent of all Russian banks. 140 
Although penetration of the banking industry granted ROC ample opportunity to 
launder their profits and gain a foothold within the state's economic structures, 
criminal groups also attempted to gain control of legitimate business for the same 
reasons. As a result, businesses unwilling to enter into a partnership, or simply 
unwilling to succumb to extortion threats, were commonly targeted with violence both 
to remove them as an obstacle to ROC and to serve as an example to others. Carefully 
orchestrated contract murders had a significant impact on the business community in 
the years following privatisation. For example, of the 521 confirmed contract killings 
136 Officials of the Russian Central Bank who have attempted to initiate regulations that would threaten 
the activities of criminal groups have also been targeted by ROC. Sergei Dubinin, Chairman of the 
Central Bank survived a bomb attack in March 1996. It is believed that ROC wanted to eliminate him 
because Dubinin revoked the licenses of several commercial banks controlled by criminal organisations 
for violating banking regulations. Violence and contract murders in the industry subsequently led the 
Association of Russian Banks to release a statement highlighting the following concern, "the terror that 
criminals have unleashed [ ... 
I Is becoming broader in scope and assuming extremely brutal forms. " For 
a more detailed account refer to -Yugorsky Bank president Oleg Kantor and bodyguard Oleg Nepravda 
murdered, " The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Pressl vol. 47, no. 30 (20 July 1995), p. 19. 
137 These statistics were combined from data presented by Antonio Nicaso and Lee Lamothe, Global 
Mafia and the New World Order of Organized Crime. (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1995), p. 44. and 
Phil Williams, "Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?, " Transnational 
Organized Crime, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 12, in addition to news releases supplied 
by I terfax, Radio Free Eurove and Radio Liberty, and Itar-Tass. In 1994, authorities estimated that 
between 10 and 12 bankers were kidnapped every moniK. See Tom Hunter, "Russia's Maflyas: the 
New Revolution, " Jane's Intelligence Review vol. 9, no. 6 (June 1997). 
13' Reported by the Russian Interior Ministry to BBC World Service, 31 August 1999. 
139 Izvestia Analytical Centre (1994), "Criminal Russia, " p. 5. 
140 Interfax, 10 November 1999. 
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in 1999, the Russian Interior Ministry noted that the majority of victims were 
businessmen. 141 This is in contrast to 1994 when an estimated 35 businesspersons 
were murdered. 142 Between 2000 and 2004, the average number of recorded contract 
killings involving commercial and criminal rivals was 500-700.143 In the Vladivostok 
144 region alone, between May 2002 and May 2003, over 50 businessmen were killed. 
The Russian Interior Ministry, however, believes that the real number of annual 
contract killings is three to four times higher than that which is recorded, leading 
Interior Minister Valentin Stepankov to conclude that 'Gangster Capitalism' reigns in 
Russia. 145 
As mentioned above, a second key industry targeted by ROC through the 1990s was 
heavy industry. One of the first targeted factories - Uralmashzavod - is also an 
excellent illustration of the lengths to which ROC had gone to attain control over key 
industries. Uralmashzavod, a former Soviet machine works factory, was privatized in 
1992 for the undervalued price of U. S. $3.73 million. 146 Located in Yekaterinburg - 
noted as the capital of Siberian crime - the privatisation of Uralmashzavod played a 
central role in the rise of the Uralmash group, a criminal entity that successfully 
gained a significant degree of regional political and social influence. The Uralmash 
phenomenon is best summarised in the following quote: 
141 Scizodnya, 17 February 2000. There have been discrepancies in the number of contract killings of 
business people reported in 1999. The St. Petersburg Times reported on 25 June 1999 that in the first 
five months of the year 567 business people were assassinated, compared with 232 in the same period 
in 1998. Despite these discrepancies, the statistics used in the text of this thesis will be those quoted 
from official government sources and representatives, unless otherwise noted. 
142 "More Crime than Punishment in Russia, " Jane's Foreign Repo 08 December 1994. 
143 Carl Shreck, "Fall off in contract killings illusory as numbers rise, " St. Petersburg Times (24 August 
2004); and, Chris Stephen, "Hitmen who play roulette with Russian society's elite, " The Scotsman (24 
August 2004). 
144 "Businessman killed, " Associated Press 28 May 2003). 
145 Ibid. 
146 R. W. Dellow, "Russian Organised Crime, " Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Pal2e no. 
E97 (March 1998), p. 6. 
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[Uralmash] had become a network occupying the pre-eminent position 
in the shadowy world of business and crime in the Sverdlovsk region. 
Their criminal activities were broad ranging, including everything 
from rackets to trading in rare metals. Particularly lucrative was their 
export trade in nonferrous metals and titanium. They continued to help 
the Uralmash industrial plant - which suffered severely from the loss 
of state guaranteed markets for its products - by bringing up its 
finished products for marketing. The diversified interests of the 
Uralmash group included the local soccer team, restaurants, 
automobile dealerships, hotels, and other commercial enterprises, 
including their own brokerage firm. 147 
Although the Uralmash group did not initially gain control over the factory, they did 
gain a monopoly on the sale of products produced at the plant. With no access to the 
capital required to continue plant operations and pay staff wages, it is believed that 
Victor Korovin - the director of Uralmashzavod - entered into a relationship with the 
Uralmash group. 148 The Uralmash group facilitated this relationship by registering 
with the local justice ministry as "OPS Uralmash". 149 As a legally registered business 
entity, OPS Uralmash established an estimated 100 front companies used to sell the 
products produced at the plant. 150 Furthermore, the legal registration of their 
enterprise could be interpreted as an attempt by the Uralmash group to gain public 
legitimacy. This move was closely followed by a growing interest in entering regional 
PolitiCS. 15 1 Although their efforts in the 2000 elections were unsuccessful, Russian 
analysts predicted that OPS Uralmash members would seek to enter the political 
realm in future years. This prediction was bome out in February 2003 when Uralmash 
crime boss, Aleksandr Khabarov, sought a position in the State Duma. 
147 James Finckenaur and Yuri Voronin, "The Threat of Russian Organised Crime, " National Institute 
of Justice (June 2001), http: //www. ncjrs. org/txtfilesl/187085. txt (accessed 20 August 2002). 
14' Rose Brady, Kapitalizm: Russia's Struggle to Free its Economy, (New Haven, 1999), pp. 33-34. See 
also Varese, (2001). 
149 "Russia Economy: Business Outlook for the Urals, " Economist Intelligence Uni (20 August 1999), 
http: //www. viewswire. com. It is ironic to note the group's logic for using the name 'OPS'. Technically 
OPS is an acronym that stands for 'social-political union', however, the letter combination 'OPS' could 
also stand for 'organised crime group'. 
150 "Mafiya Murder and the Russian Power Struggle, " httpHwww. stratfor. com , 12 July 
2000. 
"' The successful penetration of Uralmash in regional politics is discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent sections. 
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The relationship that emerged between Uralmashzavod and OPS Uralmash did not 
translate into greater productivity at the factory, although it did ease practical 
operations. This situation, however, began to change in 1999 with the appointment of 
a new director, Oleg Belonenko. During a press conference in July 2000, Belonenko 
announced that the factory had received enough orders to increase metal production 
by an estimated 70 per cent, compared to the previous year. 152 Between his 
appointment in 1999 and July 2000, the majority of profits accrued from rising 
productivity went to OPS Uralmash as a result of the monopoly it held over 
distribution and sales. This situation ultimately led Belonenko to embark on a 
campaign to eliminate criminal influence from Uralmashzavod. Belonenko was 
murdered on 10 July 2000, an action that was strongly believed to have been ordered 
by OPS Uralmash. 153 Uralmashzavod was not important to OPS Uralmash solely 
because of its potential profitability, but more likely because it produced the majority 
of Russia's mining equipment, nuclear power and drilling equipment, in addition to 
producing strategic alloy and military hardware. The scope and range of the 
company's output meant that Uralmashzavod was crucial to the regional economy, 
and soon OPS Uralmash bore the same responsibility. As the group amassed profits 
from Uralmashzavod, unlike most traditional criminal groups which are only 
interested in taking from society, OPS Uralmash recognised the power associated with 
investing in society. The group thus began a legitimate investment arm (albeit 
supported by the use of violence), investing in a wide range of businesses, thus 
152 bttD: //www. lenta. ru, 10 July 2000. Since Belonenko's instalment as director of Uralmashzavod, 
overall annual productivity increased by 57 per cent, and sales increased by 90 per cent. "Mafiya 
Murder... " (2000). 
153 Itar Tass, and Agence France Presse 10 July 2000. 
267 
ultimately increasing "incomes and the degree of control. "' 54 Regional police data 
recorded that by the mid-1990s, the Uralmash group established over 200 companies 
and 12 banks, and had shares in another 90 companies. 155 
Belonenko was not the first person who was allegedly killed by the Uralmash group 
as a result of his attempts to diminish the influence it exercised in Uralmashzavod or 
in Yekaterinburg. On the contrary, 18 members of the group arrested in May 2000 
claimed responsibility for 25 unsolved contract murders. 156 Unlike many criminal 
groups, which conduct targeted violence discreetly, OPS Uralmash regularly carried 
out murders "in public places and in daylight for the sole purpose of intimidating 
local people and police. "157 Not only does this highlight their confidence in operating 
in the city without obstacle, it also reveals their sense of superiority established over 
the local authorities, as evidenced when they fired grenades into government 
buildings, "killing no one but terrorising the City.,, 158 
The example of Uralmashzavod is not an isolated case; the experience of other 
businesses connected with heavy industry and natural resources reveals that they have 
also confronted very similar scenarios in the immediate post-privatisation period. For 
example, while ROC was establishing a high degree of control over the export of 
159 16 161 aluminium , coal 
0 and petroleum products , several industry officials were 
154 Volkov (2002), p. 116. 
155 Ibid, p. 119. 
156 Giles Whittell, "Russian mobsters caged at last, " The Times 26 May 2000. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 In the region of Tyumen alone, at least four known aluminium executives were murdered or 
seriously injured between April and June 1995. Radio Free Euror)e and Radio Liberty, (20 July 1995). 
160 For example, in November 1998, Aleksandr Gontov (advisor on coal industrial matters to Aman 
Tuleyev, Kemerovo Provincial Governor) was murdered. It is believed that his death was a result of the 
ongoing division of criminal spheres of influence in the coal industry because prior to his murder, 
Gontov was involved in an investigation into the closure of coal mines in the province that were 
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eliminated. By 1997 ROC's penetration into the aluminium industry became so 
obvious that Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kulikov remarked in a speech to the 
Duma that the aluminium sector was completely criminalised, despite remaining 
competitive in the world market. 162 Successful penetration of the Russian heavy 
industry and natural resource sectors has given ROC access to parts of the economy 
that are commonly regarded as strategic assets to national security. These very sectors 
are also attacked by traditional terrorist groups because of the strategic economic 
importance they play within a country. This, de facto, placed ROC in a position with a 
potentially significant degree of political influence. A desire to gain control over all 
aspects of the Russian economy, however, also led ROC to penetrate the consumer 
163 164 industry, including alcohol and tobacco , the construction industry , the computer 
considered to be profitable. The findings of this investigation directly threatened those who stood to 
financially gain from their closure. "Tuleyev on the Murder of his Advisor, " Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 
November 1998, p. 2. 
161 ROC has developed intricate operations in its drive to vie for influence in the petroleum sector, 
including stealing oil from pipelines and pumping it to depots and refineries controlled by criminal 
groups. In the article, "Vladimir Rushailo is Launching a War - for Gasoline, " Kommersant 18 June 
1999, p. 3, cited in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press vol. 15, no. 24 (July 1999), p. 8., the 
Interior Ministry was recorded as stating that by 1998 a considerably percentage of oil refineries and 
terminals were controlled by ROC as a result of their targeted campaign of violence between 1995 and 
1998 - resulting in 29 recorded murders or attempted murders on the lives of oil industry executives. 
Violence in this lucrative sector continued well into 2000 with the successful contract bit against Vitaly 
Filippov, an executive of Gazprom. Reuters 13 November 2000. 
162 Boris Boiko, "Anatoly Kulikov Comes to Anatoly Chubais's Defense, " Kommersant Dail , 25 
February 1997, p. 6. 
163 For example, in January 2000 Ilya Vaisman, the financial director of Baltika Breweries in St. 
Petersburg was assassinated. See: http: //policy. house. gov/Russia/ch7. htm1. Baltika is one of the most 
successful Russian breweries who made an enviable recovery following the 1998 financial crisis - in 
fact, between 1998 and 2000 Baltika's directors pursued a policy of expansion by purchasing small, 
regional breweries. The beer industry has been regarded as one with growing potential, for example, in 
1999 production rose 30 per cent compared with the previous year. Agence France Pressc, 10 May 
2000. 
164 Between 1999 and 2000 the construction industry experienced a number of significant losses. For 
example, in December 1999, Nikolay Andreyev, president of the financial-construction company 
Rosyugstroy was killed. Ltar-Tass, 12 December 1999. His company dealt with the highly criminalised 
regions of Volga, Chechnya and the northern Caucasus. In March 2000, Sergei Krijan, manager of a 
construction supplies company, owner of ten additional businesses, and rising figure in Russia's 
financial markets, was murdered. [Agence France Presse, 23 March 2000. ] It is likely that Krijan's 
death was a result of his business ventures, in addition to the fact that he was a strong supporter of St. 
Petersburg's pro-reform parties. 
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market 165 , and the automobile sector. For example, the extent to which ROC 
infiltrated the automobile sector, partially a result of a concerted campaign of 
violence, is best exemplified by the case of the Avtovaz car plant in Togliatti. 
Avtovaz became a joint-stock company in 1992 after it could no longer depend on the 
state trade network to deliver its products. The necessity of seeking the services of 
private automobile dealers - many of which were linked to ROC - inevitably created a 
relationship that favoured the rising influence of organised crime. 166 In exchange for 
funnelling capital into Avtovaz, ROC was able to strategically place group members 
in the Avtovaz plant to gain immediate control over where vehicles were shipped off 
the assembly line. 
Local crime groups had gained almost complete control of the 
processes of shipping vehicles from the plant and selling them, and 
partial control of deliveries of spare parts and raw materials to VAZ. 
[... ] More than 360 firms involved in the auto business had been set up 
around the plant. Clearly, most of them were controlled by gangsters. 
As a result, about 90% of the Zhigulis produced at the plant were being 
sold in Togliatti itself. 167 
165 Given its potential to expand throughout the FSU, combined with its lucrative nature in other parts 
of the world, the computer industry is increasingly being marked by ROC as an industry of interest. 
Most likely a result of this, Veter Vcka, the leading Russian computer company that produces personal 
computers for the Russian market, experienced two significant losses in 2000 alone when the company 
director, Aleksandr Ridko, and co-owner David Dvali were killed. [www. russiatoday. com, 28 April 
2000. ] The December 1999 assassination of Mikhail Postnikov, vice-president of the VISTA computer 
company reveals another side of ROC's penetration of legitimate business. It is believed that following 
the financial crisis VISTA was in debt to the sum of US$15 million to companies including Samsung 
and Microsoft. [Radio Free Eurone and Radio Liberty 30 December 1999. ] Instead of borrowing 
money from accredited financial institutions, Postnikov sought credit from private individuals and 
companies. His death therefore falls into a common pattern wherein ROC provides low-interest credit 
as a way to eventually take over a legitimate enterprise. Assuming that Postnikov did not want to lose 
control over VISTA, it is likely that his death was the result of a disagreement with creditors. 
166 Alexandr Golubev, "Zhiguli Loses its 'Roor - But That Doesn't Make it a Convertible, " 
Kommersant-Dail 17 December 1997, p. 1. 
167 Aleksei Grishin, "Gangster Industry's Auto Giant - In the Past Two Months, More Than 100 
Criminal Cases Have Been Initiated at the Volga Automotive Plant, " Seizodny 23 December 1997, p. 
5., cited in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 59, no. 50 (1997), p. 11. 
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Because ROC took control over most vehicles produced at the plant, by the end of 
1997 Avtovaz owed the federal government approximately 13 trillion rubles in unpaid 
taxes and added penalties. 168 
The local office of the regional administration for combating organised crime reported 
in 1997 that between seven and nine criminal organisations were active in Togliatti, 
most of which emerged locally, although all had known criminal and business ties to 
MOSCOW. 169 Despite the fact that so many groups were interested in Avtovaz, media 
reports 170 suggested that group leaders allegedly came to an arrangement in which the 
total number of cars coming off the assembly line were divided according to 
prearranged agreements. Preliminary data concluded that Togliatti-based auto firms 
transferred about US$300 million to Western banks from transactions with Avtovaz in 
1997 alone. 171 The degree of cooperation among criminal groups and between the 
criminal underworld and plant executives, however, should not be overstated. 
Influence was a significant prize that was won by a handful of criminal organisations 
that survived a violent turf war for control that left 65 criminal bosses dead, along 
with several Avtovaz executives. ' 72 
At the same time that the automobile industry found itself facing a war for control, the 
hotel industry and the cemetery and funeral business also became priority sectors for 
criminal groups. As ROC sought to gain control of the hotel industry, which 
invariably included gaining control over lucrative gambling ventures, several large 
168 "Deputy premier says that he will join Avtovaz probe, " New Eurot)e, 14-20 December, 1997. 
161 "Forbes: Paul Klebnikov, The Rise of an Oligarch, " Johnson's Russia Listl No. 4466 (22 August 
2000). 
170 See, for example, compilation of relevant news reports: Russia Regional Report 04 December 1996. 
171 Grishin (1997), "Gangster Industry's Auto... ". 
172 "Deputy premier says... " (1997). 
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hotel directors and owners became targets of contract murders. 173 Criminal interest in 
the cemetery and funeral business, on the other hand, began a few years earlier. Since 
1992 ROC has been attempting to infiltrate and control this sector because it was 
regarded lucrative for the very reason that it is a service required by most members of 
society. In the last months of 1998 alone, 13 people directly connected to the city's 
cemetery business were murdered, and several others were assaulted or 
'disappeared'. 174 The severity of this predicament was evident in the case of St. 
Petersburg, where the Kazan criminal group had been credited for running local 
cemeteries since 1992.175 However, by 1998 the St. Petersburg police initiated a 
campaign to try and put an end to criminal control over the cemetery business. This 
initiative was believed to have been prompted by the murder of Yevgeny Agarev, the 
deputy chairman of the City Consumer Market Committee. 176 Agarev was finding 
ways to increase the presence of the state in the funeral sector, in addition to 
embarking on a campaign to control corruption in the business. Although the available 
evidence is limited, investigative journalists reporting on Agarev's death strongly 
believe that it was ordered by the Kazan group, which already controlled a significant 
portion of the funeral industry. 177 
Business in post-Soviet Russia also faced the persistence of criminal groups seeking 
to maximise their profit potential, and presence within society. This has meant that 
business leaders have often shared the fate of members of the government, judiciary 
173 For an overview of ROC targeting the hotel industry, refer to "Blood in the Suites: the Russian 
Hotel Wars, " Business Week 26 January 1998, p. 27. 
174 Satter (1998), p. 30. 
175 Johan Varoli, "Cemetery Business Infected by Crime, " St. Petersburg Times, 04 April 2000. One of 
Kazan's members, and former official with the Bureau of Funeral Services, Vladimir Korolyev (aka 
Father Funeral), was charged with embezzling approximately US$2 million in state funds between 
1994 and 1997. 
176 This committee was also in charge of managing the Bureau of Funeral Services, an organisation 
owned by the city that had a near monopoly on the local funeral business. 
177 Varoli (2000). 
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and law enforcement who have stood in the way of ROC. It appears increasingly 
evident that the successful spread of intimidation presented criminal organisations in 
Russia with unprecedented advantages which they used to gain control over many of 
the state's most lucrative sectors. According to a U. S. inter-agency report on 
international crime published in December 2000, ROC had acquired a strategic 
controlling interest in the economic sectors depicted in Figure 4.2.178 Not only has this 
had a devastating impact on the national economy, but it also had implications on an 
international scale. Sharon Cornwell, representative of the United States-born 
billionaire Kenneth Dart 179 , surnmarised the situation 
for business in Russia very 
succinctly, "Who is going to put money in if companies are just run into the 
ground ... and you 
have this pervasive atmosphere of fear? "180 
1781ntemational Crime Threat Assessment (December 2000), 
http: //clinton4. nara. gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270chap3. htmi (accessed 20 
February 2001). This document was prepared by a U. S. Government interagency working group in 
support of President Bill Clinton's International Crime Control Strategy. 
179 Kenneth Dart is one of the largest private investors in Russia. 
180 Sharon LaFraniere, "A Crisis of Control in Russian Far East, " Washington Post Foreign Service, 02 
May 2000, p. A 16. 
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In(lisci-iminale Bonibin, iýs - 0-iminal Retribution ot- Civilian Talgets? 
In addition to the selective and careful targeting exemplified in the majority of 
contract killings discussed above, there are indications that ROC has also used 
indiscriminate tactics as an example of symbolic and expressive targeting. Given the 
ability of ROC to use selective targeting to eliminate individuals who threaten their 
operations and nse to power, it appears puzzling that ROC has apparently also 
targeted populated public locations. Considering the characteristics unique to ROC 
since its inception, combined with its willingness to freely contract murders as a 
primary tool of problern-solving, it may be argued that borribings have been 
selectively and strategically used to spread a general sense of fear throughout society. 
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Figure 4.2: ROC Penetration of Kc. N Economic Sectors 
Commonly used by terrorists, bombs send very clear political messages "while 
containing physical damage to an immediate circle. "181 
Among the first apparent incidents of ROC displaying ruthless tactics in an effort to 
create a general sense of terror throughout Russian society while making a statement 
to government authorities occurred during two consecutive days in July 1996 with the 
bombing of trolley-buses in Moscow. The first blast injured five people and twenty- 
eight were hurt in the second explosion. 182 Although several different explanations 183 
were presented by the media and state officials, the absence of evidence to back initial 
assumptions that Chechen rebels were responsible for the attacks suggests that there 
was an alternative motivation for the bombings. 184 Shortly before the bombings, the 
Russian government passed the 'Decree on Combating Organised Crime', in an effort 
to show a concerted effort - publicly and internationally - to reduce the further 
infiltration of organised crime throughout society. It thus seems likely that the trolley 
bombings represented a response from ROC. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov referred to the 
blasts as "a blatant system of forcible pressure on the capital's authorities and 
Muscovites by certain criminal structures. "' 85 This incident could be compared to the 
wave of Italian mafia attacks conducted in 1993, in response to intense anti-mafia 
181 Christopher C. Hannon, Terrorism Today, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 161. 
182 Izvestia, 12 July 1996, pp. 1-2. 
183 The Federal Security Service blamed the bombings on Chechen terrorists without even waiting for 
all the evidence to be collected - many local journalists saw this as an attempt by the authorities to 
manipulate the effects of the explosions regardless of who was responsible. Kommersant Daily, 12 July 
1996, p. 14, and Rossiskaya Gazeta ' 16 July 1996, pp. 1-2. 184 Given tense relations with Chechnya, Russian government officials commonly blame Chechen 
terrorists for crimes perpetrated in Russia, regardless of whether they are in possession of evidence to 
back their accusations. Similarly with the 1996 bombings, officials were quick to lay blame on the 
August 2000 bomb that exploded in the Pushinskaya metro station in Moscow, killing eight people and 
injuring over 100. Failing to uncover evidence to support the official view that Chechen terrorists were 
responsible, investigators turned to alternative explanations. The most plausible theory was that the 
bombing was a result of an ongoing battle between criminal groups to gain control of the retail points 
in the underpass that allegedly bring in a revenue of at least US$ 10,000 per month. For further details 
of this theory refer to: Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and Itar-Tass press releases on 09 August 
2000 and II September 2000; and Agence France Presse, II August 2000. 
185 Izvestia, 13 July 1996, p. 1. 
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measures implemented by the Italian government. Jamieson refers to the use of terror 
tactics by the Italian mafla as 'bombs of dialogue' that were "not intended to cause 
loss of life - although that eventuality was necessarily part of the equation - but to 
weaken Italy's anti-mafia resolve by demonstrating that the Costa Nostra could strike 
where and whom it wished. "' 86 
A few months later, in December 1996, an explosion in Kaspiinsk, Dagestan 
destroyed a block of flats housing the officers (and their families) serving in the local 
detachment of the Transcaucasus Border District. The blast which reportedly killed 67 
people' 87 was initially believed to be a terrorist incident perpetrated by Wahhabists, 188 
however after investigators collected evidence, it was unofficially concluded that the 
explosion was specifically intended to kill Valery Morozov, the head of the 
detachment. Journalists following the incident reported that Morozov was involved in 
disputes with the leadership of criminal organisations that were involved in smuggling 
arms and caviar. Members of his troops reported that local crime groups had 
repeatedly and regularly threatened Morozov in the past. The likely catalyst of the 
bombing was the seizure of half a ton of black caviar heading for the United Arab 
Emirates by border troops at the airport. 1 89 The Kaspiinsk incident illustrates the 
lengths to which ROC has gone to discourage uncooperative and obstructive 
18' Jamieson (200 1), p. 216. 
187 Kommersant Daily, 19-20 November 1996. 
188 In the context of the FSU Wahhabis are not true followers of Wahhabism - the puritanical sect of 
Sunni Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century by Abdu I-Wahhab. The term 
Wahhabism was adopted by Soviet authorities after the 1970 Revolution in Iran because they feared 
that Islamic militancy could eventually cross over into the regions of Central Asia. As a result, the 
Soviet regime generally used the term Wahhabi to refer to Islamic militants. It appears as though the 
present leaders of the FSU have continued to use Wahhabism and Islamic militancy interchangeably. It 
is therefore important not to mistake Islamic revivalism in the FSU with Saudi Arabian Wahhabism as 
they have little to do with one another. For a good and succinct discussion of the revival of Islam in the 
FSU see Igor Rotar, "Wahhabisn in the Former Soviet Union: A Real Threat, or Just an Excuse to 
Settle Accounts With the Opposition?, " Prism: A Biweekly on the Post Soviet States, vol. 4, no. 10 (07 
August 1998), http: //www. jamestown. org. 
189 Seizodnya, 19 November 1996, cited in The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press vol. 58, no. 46 (11 
December 1996), p. 15. 
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behaviour and also highlighted the willingness of ROC to engage in activities that 
inevitably threaten the lives of innocent civilians (i. e. the families of the border 
troops). The use of indiscriminate bombings occurred again in 2002 when ROC 
detonated a car bomb near a McDonald's restaurant in Moscow, allegedly because the 
restaurant refused to succumb to extortion demands. 190 This behaviour was further 
evident in 2004 when a dispute for control over the Kirovsky market in Samara 
resulted in the detonation of a bomb that killed 10 people and injured over 50.191 
Goverment officials in Moscow quickly attributed responsibility for the blast to 
Chechen militants, but local law-enforcement officials "categorically rejected" any 
explanation involving a "Chechen trail" and focused in criminal intimidation. 192 
Orchestrating indiscriminate bombings has not been an evident priority of ROC; 
however, the lack of interest in conducting spectacular public attacks can be 
contrasted with ROC's success in perpetrating bombings in public that cause limited 
damage. The use of bombings as a tactic is reflected in state statistics between 1991 
and 1996 that documented known links between bombs that have exploded and 
organised crime. Throughout all the regions of the FSU, there were 260 criminal 
bombings in 1991; 1 93 in 1992 there were 240 criminal bombings in Russia alone; over 
300 in 1993; between January 1995 and July 1996 there were 449 reported criminal 
explosions (resulting in over 1000 deaths); and 886 explosions in 1996.1 94 
190 Although the bombing did not kill anyone, it did injure several people and damaged the building, 
and instilled a sense of fear amongst the visiting public. "Explosion rocks Moscow McDonald's, " BBC 
News, 19 October 2002, accessed at http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/europe/2342219. stm on 31 
October 2002. 
19' Charles Gurin, "Samara and Stavropol Bombs: Chechen 'Terrorism' or Russian Business 
Disputes? " Eurasia Daily Monito 1: 25 (7 June 2004). 
192 Interfax, 5 June 2004 and Ekho Moskvy 5 June 2004. 
193 These figures do not include incidents judged to be accidents such as explosions caused by gas 
leaks, but refer solely to incidents that the authorities concluded were criminal in nature. 
194 These statistics were compiled from Interior Ministry statements reported by Itar-Tass Reuters, and 
in Russian media reports cited in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. 
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ROC has primarily used bombings - some of which have been indiscriminate - as a 
business tactic. In doing so, bombings have served a dual purpose: to make a 
statement to a specific audience (i. e. rival gang members or uncooperative business or 
government personnel), and to create a wider sense of fear within society. As with 
most terrorist groups, ROC appears to have adopted the logic that their power and 
control could be maximised via the spread of fear - as opposed to gaining the respect 
of society through legitimate means. The use of (indiscriminate) bombings therefore 
indirectly contributed to the growing status of ROC while highlighting the fact that 
the actions of ROC revealed to the public that ROC is more powerful than the state in 
Russia. As outlined in Chapter Two, this predicament can be explained by the 
alternative view of security by accounting for the equal importance of non-state actors 
competing for state control. It also underscores the conclusion that political authority 
and legitimacy can also be attained by acquiring voluntary public submission to 
power through the orchestrated use of fear. In this way the state monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence is called into question because the state is seen to have lost 
its ability to control violence within its territory and protect the rights of its citizens. 
Tarzetinýz Civil Societv: Wreading terror to the pedphery 
Violence directed against state authorities and the business sector reveals the 
propensity of ROC to use terror tactics in order to gain or secure operational 
requirements. These targets were carefully chosen to create fear among specific 
groups of people - mostly those with power and authority, or access to money. As 
briefly described in the previous section, ROC has also sporadically shown that it is 
willing to engage in a much broader campaign of violence. ROC's attempts to 
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terrorise society in general is an issue that necessitates further attention, as this is an 
important crossover with traditional forms of terrorism. As a result, ROC's activities 
reflect a concerted effort to undermine and co-opt a central component of a strong, 
legitimate state - civil society. 
As discussed in detail in the following paragraphs, there are many ways in which 
ROC has sought to dominate civil society, including establishing charity funds as 
fronts for laundering money and creating a positive image for ROC at the community 
level. Comparable to 'traditional' terrorist groups, such as Hizb'allah and Hamas 
which have established social welfare programmes within their areas of domination, 
the social activities of ROC have also appeared to fill voids in state provision at the 
local and regional level. The creation of charity organisations and the funding of 
performance groups, sports teams, and other community activities have helped to 
create an aura of group legitimacy in the eyes of the population. At the very least, the 
majority of the public has ignored the violent and illegal activities of criminal groups - 
partially in recognition of their attempts to fill the social welfare gap that the 
government has not. In conjunction with supporting the community through social 
welfare programs, ROC has also sought to block an independent civil society from 
emerging. This can be seen through ROC's use of terror tactics against the media and 
non-governmental organisations to instil a sense of fear. As a result, although ROC 
can be considered among Russia's greatest social threats, anti-mafia groups formed to 
counter its influence or criminal activities have yet to emerge. 
Since 199 1, individuals who have spoken out against criminal organisations and those 
who attempt to uncover the relationship between ROC, big business and the 
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government have often faced intimidation. For example, journalists investigating 
criminal connections have regularly been assassinated. At least ten journalists have 
been killed a year between 1991 and 2000.195 In 1994 eleven journalists were 
killed, 196 while several others were seriously beaten; between 1998 and 1999,25 
journalists - the majority of whom were investigating links between government 
officials and ROC - were killed. 197 This trend declined after 2000, with "only" 15 
journalists assassinated between May 2000 and August 2004.198 There are several 
explanations for this apparent decrease in contract murders against journalists. Given 
trends in previous years, it is possible that journalists are less willing to investigate 
these links for fear of reprisal. Although the spectre of organised crime had not 
disappeared in 2000, media coverage devoted to its activities was reduced 
significantly - as evident in cursory media surveys of the Russian press. This reversed 
trend can also be explained by the fact that the Russian media was placed under 
greater government control with the rise of President Vladimir Putin in 2000; thus 
suggesting that stories of ROC-government connections had been indirectly 
prohibited. 
One of the most notorious examples of the murder of journalists is the 1994 killing of 
Dmitri Kholodov, a prominent investigative journalist who was attempting to uncover 
corruption and illicit activities in the Russian Ministry of Defence. Media reports 
suggested that Kholodov discovered evidence of illegal arms sales by the Western 
Group of Forces withdrawing from Germany, implicating senior officers including 
195 See figures compiled by the International Press Institute (http: //www. freemedia. at) and the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (http: //www. cpj. org). 
196 Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiva (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995). 
197 Associated Press, 18 January 2000. 
198 Chris Stephen, "Hitmen who play roulette with Russian society's elite, " The Scotsman, 24 August 
2004. 
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Matvei Burlakov, former Commander of the Soviet forces in Germany, and Defence 
Minister Pavel Grachev. Kholodov was killed on 17 October 1994 by the explosion of 
a briefcase which he was led to believe contained documents confirming illegal 
weapons trading in the military. 199 Although in February 2000 the office of the 
Prosecutor-General finally charged five paratroopers and security guards with 
murdering Kholodov, 200 questions surrounding his death remain unanswered, 
including the paratroopers' motivation, and the identity of those who ordered his 
death. 
Another high-profile murder of a journalist occurred in July 2000, when Sergei 
Novikov was shot to death in what the Interior Ministry described as a contract 
killing. 20 1 Novikov ran the radio station Vesna, which regularly reported on corruption 
in the Smolensk area. He also attempted to air a television programme in 1999 entitled 
'The Other Side of the Mirror', reporting corruption in the regional administration, 
judiciary and law enforcement. Although the programme was never broadcast, 
Novikov wrote an open letter to the governor of Smolensk, Aleksandr Prokhorov, 
naming people whom he suspected of corruption. It was this letter that is believed to 
have led to Novikov's death. 202 Two years later, in March 2002, a reporter from 
Nashe Vremia was killed in Rostov-on-Don. The journalist, Natalia Skryl, was 
believed to have been targeted as a result of ongoing investigations into the activities 
199 "Was the Military Involved in Journalist's Murder? " The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 
vol. XLVI, no. 42 (November 1994), p. 1. Kholodov's associates have maintained over the years that 
the briefcase was given to Kholodov by a source in the Federal Counterintelligence Service. 
200 These gentlemen confessed to killing Kholodov stating that they were trying to advance their own 
careers by impressing their superiors who were facing scrutiny for suspected corruption. Radio Free 
Europe Radio Liberty 07 February 2000. 
'01 Agence France Presse 30 July 2000. 
202 Agence France Presse 27 July 2000 and Ltar-Tass, 27 July 2000. 
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of several large corporations, including an investigation into the struggle for control 
over the local metallurgical plant, Tagmet. 203 
A further high profile alleged contract killing was responsible for the murder of the 
American editor-in-chief of the Russian edition of Forbes, Paul Klebnikov in July 
2004. Most accounts of Klebnikov's death focus on his work as a journalist 
investigating corruption and organised crime, including ties between Russia's 
oligarchs and ROC. 204 In addition to his journalism, Klebnikov wrote two books: 
Godfather of the Kremlin (2000) argued that businessman Boris Berezovsky made his 
fortune from manipulating the privatisation programme, and suggested that he was 
involved in the murder of television anchor-man Vladimir Listyev in 1995, and had a 
relationship to Chechen criminal groups 205 ; and, Conversation With a Barbarian 
(2003) was based on a series of interviews with separatist leader Khozh Akhmed 
Noukhayev that dealt with organised crime in Russia's ongoing war in Chechnya. 
In addition to utilising violence and the threat of violence to intimidate the media, 
ROC has gained significant control over the press by directly purchasing media 
enterprises. The acquisition of direct control over radio, television and newspapers is, 
according to Harmon, a mark of "terror group sophistication and financial 
203 Itar-Tass, 09 March 2002; Commission for the Protection of Journalists, 
http: //www. cpj. org/killed/Ten - 
Year-Killed/2002_list. htmi (accessed 10 April 2004); and, Kommersant 
09 October 2003. It has been reported that Skryl told several colleagues at the paper that she had 
obtained sensitive information about Tegment that she was planning to publish in an article. In the 
same year, editor of the Togliatti newspaper Tolyatinskoy Obozreniye, Valery Ivanov, was also killed. 
The paper was known for its reports on official corruption and organised crime, and Ivanov was also a 
deputy in the local Legislative Assembly. A year later, in October 2003, Ivanov's replacement, Aleksey 
Sidorov was also murdered in a killing that was described by the Prosecutor's Office of the Samara 
region as bearing the "hallmarks of a contract killing". 
'04 http: //www. mosnews. coffLImn-files/kiebnikov. shtmi (accessed 03 December 2004). 
205 Agence Free Presse 27 July 2000 and Itar-Tass, 27 July 2000. It was reported that Listyev was 
murdered because he made a habit of reporting corruption on his television programme. 
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strength"'. 206 Control over several media outlets has therefore given ROC an important 
tool that was used to influence the opinion of legislators and the general public by 
carefully filtering what news was released, and how it was reported. Control over 
media outlets also limited the amount of information the public received, especially in 
relation to the most egregious offences perpetrated by criminal organisations in the 
FSU. The acquisition of television stations and newspapers by ROC not only 
continued to inhibit the media from reporting details about ROC and its activities, but 
it restricted public access to objective coverage of economic and political news. 
Charities are a second group within civil society which have commonly been targeted 
by ROC, although for significantly different reasons. Given the activities of ROC, 
charitable organisations were primarily targeted because of the associated economic 
benefits that accompanied them. During President Boris Yeltsin's presidency, 
charities were given tax exemption - even when engaged in the import and export of 
lucrative commodities - and therefore presented an opportunity for ROC to maximise 
profits. Charities also presented an ideal way through which illicitly gained profits 
could be laundered, a trend commonly utilised by terrorist groups. ROC, however, 
also sought to co-opt civil society by giving the impression that they were providing 
social welfare programmes which a weak state was unable to offer, giving ROC a 
veneer of legitimacy within communities. This example stresses the continued 
importance of the state in international security, especially in relation to competition 
between state and non-state actors. For example, during the Soviet period, the 
government financially supported sports programmes, a luxury that the Russian 
government could not afford after 1991. As a result, ROC used its resources to 
206 Harmon (2000), pp. 57-8. 
283 
finance sports schools and clubs, and to organise charitable foundations to support 
amateur athletes. 207 In many respects, the ability of ROC to fill a gap in government 
social programming indirectly provided criminal groups with an efficient recruitment 
base. By 1996, an interest in sport "became almost a sure sign that one belongs to the 
mafia. , 208 
One example that clearly illustrates the lengths to which ROC had gone to penetrate 
this sector of society is its concerted effort to target sports organisations. 209 Based on 
the activities of ROC throughout the 1990s, the most direct way in which control was 
gained was by ordering contract killings against the directors of groups refusing to 
allow criminal groups to manipulate their charities' tax-free status. For example, 
Valentin Sych - chairman of the Russian Hockey Federation - was shot dead in May 
1997 after publicly criticising the expanding influence of ROC in national sports. 
Sych focused not only on ROC's attempts to control the Hockey Federation's rights 
for duty free imports, but also claimed that players were being intimidated into 
deliberately losing games. 210 The director general of the Spartak football club Larisa 
Nechayeva was killed in June 1997. Her death was allegedly the result of her 
207 01'ga V. Kryshtanovskaia, "Illegal Structures in Russia, " Sociological Research 
I 
(July-August 
1996), p. 64. The known leader of a criminal organisation in Moscow, 0. Kvantrishvili, established 
several charitable sports organisations, including: the Lev lashin Foundation for the Social Protection 
of Athletes, the Fighting Gloves Association of Professional Boxers, and the Association of Wrestlers. 
209 Ibid. 
209 In addition to sports organisations, ROC has also penetrated more traditional charity organisations 
such as the Russian Fund for Invalids of the Afghanistan War (RFIVA). Established in 1991 to provide 
social protection to disabled veterans, RFIVA initially began as an organisation with honourable 
intentions. However, after the government granted RFIVA tax exemption to import rapid turnover 
commodities (ie. alcohol and tobacco) as a source of fundraising, it soon attracted criminal interests and 
after a period of violence and assassinations, was controlled by ROC. For more information on the 
criminal penetration of RFIVA refer to the following sources: The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, vol. 58, no. 45 (04 December 1996), p. 7.; Geory Savelyev, "An Explosion at Kotlyakovskoye 
Cemetery Claims 13 Lives, " Segodnya, II November 1996, p. I.; Penny Morrant, "Cemetery 
Bombings: NGOs and the Mafia, " Open Media Research Institute Analytical Brief, no. 456 (11 
November 1996). 
210 Jane's Foreign Report 01 May 1997. The practise of intimidating Russian hockey players not only 
occurred in Russia, but Russian players in the National Hockey League (North America) were also 
targeted for extortion. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
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reluctance to sign a television rights deal with a company controlled by a leading 
criminal group. 21 1 Although high profile killings in Russian sports had dissipated by 
the end of the 1990s, "league administrators, team officials and star players" have 
continued to be targeted in the early years of the twenty-first century, apparently in 
order to stress the influence of ROC within the sports realm. 212 
Gawzin2 Success: Operational Bene its from the use of Terrorism 
The prevalence of premeditated violent crime perpetrated by ROC, especially at its 
peak between 1991 and 2000, against various segments of society successfully created 
a climate of fear. Although the perceptions of state officials and the business 
community are important to consider given the intensity of attacks perpetrated against 
them, it is the perception of the general public that shows how successful ROC's use 
of terror tactics has been. As early as 1994, a poll conducted by the independent 
Institute of the Sociology of Parliamentarism revealed that 91 per cent of a 
representative sample of 1000 Moscow residents felt a sense of fear on account of the 
level of crime. 213 Given the steady rise of contract killings since 1991,214 it may be 
surmised that this pervasive feeling of fear correspondingly increased with every year 
throughout the decade. As cited in an unofficial report on crime in Russia in 1993, 
"The magnitude of the crime wave that has swept over Russia in the past few years is 
211 Ibid. 
212 Jeff Merron, "Russians regroup on the other side of the red line, " ESPN News (14 February 2002), 
accessed at http: //www. espn. com on 19 June 2003. 
213 "Crime in the Capital: Only 6% of Muscovites Aren't Afraid of ltý" Izvestia 17 May 1994, p. 4. 
214 Statistics for Figure 4.3 are from MVD reports cited in the following sources: Kimberley Maren 
Zisk, "Institutional Decline in the Russian Military: Exit, Voice and Corruption, " PONARS1 Memo No. 
67 (September 1999), http: //www. fas. harvard. edu/-ponars/POLICYý/ý20MEMOS/Zisk67. html; and 
"Contract Murder Boom in Russia, " Izvestia 25 June 1999, p. 1. 
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something that we no longer merely guess at; we feel it every day, if not every 
_15 hour. -ý 
Figure 4.3 Contract Murders in Russia, 199 1_ 1999216 
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In addition to creating widespread terror, the extent to which ROC intimidated and 
subsequently infiltrated the political, economic and civil spheres created a general 
public perception that the most powerful criminal groups were gaining control over 
the state apparatus. For example, a 1992 poll indicated that one-third of residents in 
the Russian Far East believed that criminal structures "deten-nined the course of 
events in the region. "2 17 The following year a poll conducted in Yckaterinburg 
revealed that three-quarters of residents believed the city was ruled by organiscd 
crime, while 14 per cent of police openly admitted that they believcd the sarne. 218 In 
public opinion surveys conducted by the Institute for the Sociology of 
215 Excerpts from the 1993 RAU Corporation's "White Book" on crime in Russia, cited in "Crime 
Wave, Corruption: What Can be Done'?. - The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press. vol. 55. no. 6 
1993), p. 12. 
, P, Figures for this chart x%ere compiled from data provided in: Handelman (1995), Klebnikov (2000), 
and the Ministry of Interior as quoted in Russian media reports 
2" Stephen Handch-nan, "The Russian Mafiya, " Foreign Affairs, (March-April 1994), supra note 12, 
pp. 2 1-22, 
219 Ibid. 
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Parliamentarisin in 1994 and 1997, a representative sample of 6,000 respondents 
throughout Russia revealed an increase in the numbers of people who believed that 
ROC exercised the most state power. 2 19 The most common answers to the question 
"Who do you think really exercises state power in the Russian Federation? " in 1994 
were 'criminal structures, the mafia' (43 per cent), followed by the state apparatus and 
bureaucrats (30 per cent). Near the end of the decade, the proportion of people who 
thought that organised crime controlled the state increased to 52 per cent, with only 21 
per cent believing that the state apparatus maintained any control . 
220 By 2003 this 
figure dropped quite significantly, at least according to a poll of 1500 respondents in 
32 regions conducted in 2003 by the Agency of Regional Political Studies. 
Responding to the question "Who are the bosses in Russia? ", 37 per cent believed that 
power was exclusively held by the oligarchs and corporate enterprises, whereas only 
19 per cent still maintained that organised crime continued to assert significant 
political control over the state. 221 In part this could have been influenced by less 
media coverage of ROC, and the fear perpetrated by criminal groups forcing public 
complacency in light of widespread knowledge that retribution would be sought. The 
apparent or perceived power gained by ROC is comparable to that of traditional 
terrorists, who often do not seek to change the law or the polity "but they 
propagandize and attack to perpetuate a social atmosphere in which their own rights 
,, 222 and privileges remain paramount vis-A-vis other social or racial classes. The rise of 
conglomerate groups throughout this period reflects the paramount interest of ROC in 
219 "Poll: 52% Believe Mafia is Running the Country, " The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 
vol. XLIX, no. 36 (1997), p. 11. 220 Ibid. 
221 Igor Yelkov, "Who are the bosses in Russia? " WPS Monitoring Agency (20 August 2003), accessed 
at http: //www. wps. ru on 10 January 2004. 
222 Harmon (2000), p. 44. 
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attaining and subsequently maintaining power by harnessing the combined forces of 
power and money. 
The actions of ROC described in this section, especially during the period 1991 to 
2000, demonstrate that ROC exhibits three key characteristics of terrorism: the use of 
premeditated violent acts or the threat of violence in order to promote or protect its 
interests; careful target selection; and attempts to create a sense of fear - both within 
specific sections of society (i. e. law enforcement and the banking sector), and among 
the general public. Journalist Pamela Constable portrays the reality of this 'new' form 
of terrorism in Russia when she wrote, "everyone in Russia is extremely afraid of 
them [the mafiya], and they have all the power. They don't even have to say they will 
kill you. You just knoW. "223 The evidence thus strongly indicates that ROC are 
employing a form of terrorism, comparable to that which is exemplified by traditional 
terrorist groups: 
the ability to destroy or punish is an extreme manifestation of the 
exercise of influence. It is, in a sense, the terrorists' way of saying 
that they have the ability to exercise ultimate influence and 
determine, consequently, the limits to which others may 
function. 224 
ROC: A Political-Criminal Actor 
... in keeping with the Soviet tradition of uniting political and economic power, [ROC] could 
simultaneously occupy political office and own newly privatised companies. 225 
By spreading fear throughout society, ROC was able to influence political behaviour 
in Russia. Concentrating their efforts on careful target selection - especially among 
223 Pamela Constable, "From Russia With Chutzpah, " Washington Post, 18 August 1996, p. F4. 
224 Gressang, "Terrorism in the 2 Ist Century, " p. 88. 
225 Coulloudon (1997), p. 75. 
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government officials, notably the judiciary, law enforcement, and members of 
parliament 226 _ organised crime directly challenged the state's ability to claim a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force (i. e. because the state had proven unable to 
control violence perpetrated by ROC within Russian borders) and it has imposed "a 
level of harm. that probably exceeds the damage resulting from the activities of most 
,, 227 terrorist groups. More specifically, ROC has used terror tactics to influence 
political institutions into subscribing to, and supporting their short and long-term 
goals, including the ability to operate with impunity, unhindered access to state 
resources, and the eventual attainment of the sort of power and status usually only 
accorded to senior members of a government. As defined in point three of the CTC, 
ROC is illustrative of 'political crime' precisely because it integrates an economic and 
political agenda to the extent that they have become often indistinguishable. The 
operational use of terror tactics extended beyond a pragmatic rationale to incorporate 
political motivations. As a result, ROC's drive for profits was simultaneously 
accompanied by characteristics that are terrorist by nature -a combination that 
resulted in conglomerate groups establishing economic monopolies while infiltrating 
state institutions to the extent that some policies of the Russian government have 
arguably been impaired, if not manipulated. According to Rawlinson, 
Organised crime did more than block the evolution of a healthy 
political system. It became a leading determinant in the direction the 
country started to move after the first wave of reforms in 1992, that is, 
it assumed a proactive role in policy making, and more importantly, 
policy breaking, furthering governmental disunity and destroying 
public credibility in the democratic process. 228 
226 These are also the most common targets for traditional forms of political terrorism. 
227 Phil Williams and Ernesto Savona, "Problems and Dangers Posed by Organised Crime in Various 
Regions of the World, " Transnational Or-ganised Crime, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 34. 
228 Mary Patricia Rawlinson, Hunting the Chameleon: the problems of identifying Russian organised 
crime (London School of Economics, Political Science and Department of Social Policy and 
Administration, Ph. D. Thesis, September 1997), p. 188. 
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Breakinýz Into Politics: corruption versus state capture 
Throughout the 1990s Russian criminal groups successfully created a perpetual state 
of fear, ensuring that their potential for ruthlessness was understood by society. This 
fear facilitated the ability of ROC to use corruption as a secondary method of 
neutralising efforts directed against them, and as another way of attaining control and 
power at the highest political levels. Adopting the policy of offering the choice made 
infamous by the Italian mafla between 'silver or lead' ('plomo o plata'), ROC has 
relatively easily enticed those officials who are not already part of conglomerate 
groups to accept bribes in lieu of a violent end to their lives, or the complete 
destruction of their homes or workplace. Further-more, the successful perpetration of 
corruption reflects the importance of incorporating an alternative view of security to 
understanding the threat faced by ROC because it highlights the importance of 
additional referent objects such as social norms and values. 
The Russian state has faced two types of corruption inflicted by ROC: administrative 
corruption and state capture. According to the World Bank, administrative corruption 
refers to the "intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of 
existing laws, rules and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state 
actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private gains to public 
officialS.,, 229 This essentially refers to the corruption of members of state institutions 
through acts of bribery. State capture, according to the World Bank, refers to "the 
actions of individuals, groups or finns both in the public and private sectors to 
influence the fonnation of laws, regulations, decrees and other govenunent policies to 
their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private 
229 World Bank (2000), pp. xvii-xviii. 
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benefits to officialS.,, 230 Although administrative corruption has a detrimental impact 
on society, state capture contributes to an environment conducive to a nexus between 
organised crime and terrorism. The impact which state capture has had on Russia was 
evident after the resignation of President Yeltsin in 1999, with evidence of 
"institutionalised corruption at all levels of government and possibly irreversible 
, ý231 damage to key Russian institutions. 
Initial evidence of the extent of corruption in Russia is reflected in estimates that ROC 
allocated 30 to 50 per cent of its revenues to corrupt officials. 232 This was highlighted 
in the 1996 MVD 'Report on the Performance of the Internal Agencies', which 
detailed the extent of corruption throughout all branches of the government and 
bureaucracy by breaking down the distribution of corruption based on indictments. 
The report found that 41.1 per cent of personnel in ministries, committees, and local 
government structures were corrupt; 11.7 per cent of personnel in the credit and 
finance system were corrupt; 8.9 per cent of personnel in the regulatory agencies; 0.8 
per cent of deputies; 26.5 per cent of personnel in law enforcement agencies; 3.2 per 
cent of personnel in customs service; and 7.8 per cent of public servants working in 
other departments. 233 The perception of corruption displayed in official statistics has 
also been highlighted in annual Transparency International corruption reports. 234 In 
230 Ibid. 
23 ' Louise Shelley, "Crime and Corruption, " in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds), 
Developments in Russian Politics 5. (Houndsmills, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 244. 
232 Emilio Vanio, "The Russian Mafia and its Impact on the Privatisation of Markets, " The American 
University, Washington DC, 20016-8043 USA, p. 12, as quoted in Samuel Porteous, "The Threat From 
Transnational Crime: an Intelligence Perspective, " Commentary No. 70 (Winter 1996), p. 5. 
233 "MVD Report: Latest Data on the Performances of Internal Affairs Agencies and Internal Troops in 
1996, " Rossivskie vesti (Moscow), 20 February 1997, pp. i-iv, as quoted in William Webster, et al., 
Russian Organised Crime (Washington, DC: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
1997), pp. 79-88. 
234 Transparency International is an internationally recognised non-governmental anti-corruption 
organisation based in Berlin, but with off ices located globally. The organisation, its work and 
publications can be accessed at http: //www. transparency. org. 
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1999, Russia was rated the 16'h most corrupt country out of 99 following Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan; in 2000 it was ranked as the ninth 
most corrupt country out of 90 entries; in 2002 it fell to 52 nd , only to rise again to 45 
1h 
235 in 2003 and and to be named the 47h most corrupt country in 2004. Although 
corruption within Russia appeared to be declining, based on Transparency 
International's findings, the public perception of corruption within the state has 
remained relatively constant, averaging an annual rating of 2.5 out of 10 according to 
Transparency methodology. 236 Combined perception and reality of corruption in 
Russia brings a degree of undisputable truth to the conclusion that: 
Corruption has affected state structures, the credit-and-finance system 
and business like rust. It has become a dangerous brake on democratic 
transformations, it is nullifying the effectiveness of all state programs, 
and it is creating a real threat to the constitutional rights and liberties 
of citizens. Corruption has become a reliable cover for organised 
crime, which encourages and protects it. 237 
Adopting an Overt Political Ay-, enda 
Unlike traditional criminal organisations which primarily seek to influence political 
decisions through engaging in corrupt practises, conglomerate criminal groups have 
sought to expand their control throughout Russia by infiltrating the goverm-nent to 
directly influence policy. This line of argument is supported by Aleksandr Gurov, 
director of the Ministry of Security's security research institute, who asserted, 
"Before, the criminals tried to influence officials with bribes. Today they already have 
235 For the complete TI corruption index, and an explanation of how ratings are compiled, see 
http: //www. globalcorruptionreport. org. The year Russia was regarded the most corrupt by TI was in 
1997 when it was ranked the fourth most corrupt out of 52 countries ranked. 
236 In addition to assessing levels of corruption which are compiled in a final listing of the world's most 
corrupt countries, Transparency International also assigns a corruption perception index to each country 
assessed. The corruption perception index is based on a number between I and 10, with I representing 
the most corrupt, and 10 the least. Thus a consistent rating of 2.5 reveals that the Russian public 
continues to perceive its society as extremely corrupt. Details of annual corruption perception indices 
can be accessed at http: //www. transparency. org. 
237 Izvestia Analytical Centre, "The Unknown War Against Corruption, " Izvestia, 22 October, 1994, p. 
5. 
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their own lobby in the government and the parliament - not to mention the police and 
prosecutor's office. "238 Evidence of criminal penetration exists at all levels of 
government: local, regional (oblast) level and national. Thus, as representatives of 
leading criminal organisations assume key positions in the legislatures responsible for 
creating the legal framework for Russia and its regions, ROC comes closer to 
realising its political goals. 
Although the search for immunity has played a role in the attempts by members of 
organised crime groups to gain election to government positions, ROC. activities 
indicate that it cannot be considered the only factor affecting decision-making. 
Govermnent posts can be considered safe havens for criminals due to the 98th clause 
of the Russian Constitution, which ensures that serving state Duma deputies, senators, 
judges, the incumbent President and first President, "cannot be detained, arrested, 
subjected to search, except cases of detention at the crime site ...... 
239 In 1999 sources 
at the Interior Ministry reported that 15-20 per cent of candidates seeking seats in the 
State Duma had a known criminal past. 240 The mere presence of criminal elites in 
government subsequently ensured that criminal interests could be advanced to the 
detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation. It also directly discouraged - for 
fear of reprisal - other members of parliament from voicing their opinions, or 
suggesting legislation that threatened to interfere with the activities of ROC. 
However, if ROC is believed to have acquired control over state institutions through 
the widespread use of violent intimidation and corruption - therefore making the 
238 Barbara von der Heydt, "Corruption in Russia: No Democracy Without Morality, " Heritage 
Committee Brie no. 13 (21 June 1995), http: //www. heritage. org. 
239 "Immunity: New Cause of Troubles Found in Russia, " Izvestia 05 July 2000. 
240 This figure does not include the candidates who are known to 
ýave direct ties to criminals. Izvestia, 
05 November 1999. 
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likelihood of prosecution almost non-existence - why would they worry about gaining 
political immunity? The answer to this question is that the motivations of ROC are not 
entirely criminal, but also incorporate political objectives as criminal elites 
increasingly seek to maximise their power within society. Taking this into 
consideration, the evidence below of ROC's direct penetration into government 
structures at all administrative levels is representative of their attempts to gain 
political power. These attempts became blatantly obvious when media reports 
observed that "gangsters are so interested in becoming part of the government that by 
October 1995 over 100 suspected criminals had already declared their candidacy for 
the Duma elections in December of that year. "241 This predicament was stressed by 
Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov who had established approximately 1600 linkages 
between high officials and ROC. 242 A year later experts consulted by the United 
States Congress maintained that over 30 per cent of the Russian Duma were directly 
linked to ROC, suggesting that the relationship was so close that "today it is truly 
impossible in many cases to differentiate between Russian organised crime and the 
Russian state. " II 
Evidence of direct criminal involvement in the Russian government emerged as early 
as 1991 when a known criminal, Gregori Mirshnik, was appointed economic advisor 
to the Vice President of the Russian Federation. 243 The Mirshnik case acted as a 
catalyst for the State Security Committee to report that state officials were actively 
being drawn into criminal activity, noting that over 50 per cent of crimes reported 
241 Inga Saffron, "Russian Crooks Stay Out of Jail by Seeking Office in Parliament, " Houston 
Chronicle, 29 October 1995, p. 32. 
242 Anna Repetskaya, '85 Suspected Criminals Run for Duma Elections, " OMRI Daily Digest, no. 193, 
Part 1 (04 October 1995). 
243 Aaron Lukas and Gary Dempsey, "Mafia Capitalism or Red Legacy in Russia?, " 
http: //www. cato. org/dailys/03-04-OO. htm], 04 March 2000. 
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during the year involved state officials. 244 This trend was a common occurrence 
during the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union, 245 however it was not until 
1994-1995 that criminal elites regularly sought political office. It may be argued that 
this was primarily because in the first half of the 1990s criminal groups were focused 
on asserting their position within society and also between themselves. Thus it was 
not until after the end of the 'mafia wars' that the most powerful groups ascertained 
their presence, and thus sought ways to consolidate their power. 246 Furthermore, 
during this period state officials also became more willing to establish ties with 
criminal groups, in all likelihood because: 
When it is useless to combat the mafia, one must become its head. 
This thought - absurd, at first glance - has evidently become a reality. 
The way that representatives of all categories of Russia's population, 
without exception, are being killed, robbed and raped convinces us 
once and for all that terror and crime have become componentparts of 
state Policy. 247 
The organisation of the Russian parliamentary environment eased ROC's attempts to 
penetrate federal government. For example, in 1997 over 15,000 people were 
officially registered as aides to parliamentarians, despite the fact that fewer than 2,000 
people were registered as offiqial staff members receiving a state salary. 248 The reason 
244 Pravda 21 August 199 1, p. 2. 
245 For example, in 1994 the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service uncovered links between high- 
ranking officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and ROC. The FSB directly implicated Major 
General Igor Shilov, the First Deputy Director of the Interior Ministry's Administration for Criminal 
Investigations, as having links to known members of an organised crime group. Shilov, however, 
maintained that the FSB investigation was a ploy against him and the entire criminal investigation 
system by ROC via their connections to the FSB. Regardless of the truth behind the case, ROC's 
official ties are not under question because either Shilov or senior FSB officials who initiated the 
investigation evidently acted on the orders of a criminal group. For background information on this 
case see: Stanislav Zolotov, "Criminal Proceedings Have Been Instituted Against Major General Igor 
Shilov, " Nezavisimaya Gazeta "II May 1994, p. 1. 246 The years between 1990 and 1995 have been noted for the violence perpetrated between criminal 
groups seeking to assert their authority over the others. As a result of the violence, a status quo began to 
emerge, initially in the major cities (i. e. Moscow and St. Petersburg), producing "a rough balance of 
terror". Galeotti, "The Mafiya and the New Russia, " p. 427. 
247 Nikolai Chaplygin, "Power in Russia: The Criminals Are Applauding, " Argumenty i fakty 
November 1994, p. 2. 
248 Anatoly Stepanov, "Access to Okhotny Row, " Izvestia 01 March 1997, pp. 1-2. 
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for the additional 13,000 aides is a result of the inherent inadequacies of the 'Law on 
Status of Deputies' which states that every parliamentarian may appoint five aides at 
the expense of the state but which did not place any restrictions on the number of 
unpaid aides he or she appointed. This oversight directly contributed to criminal 
access to the Duma in the early 1990s when identification badges for Duma aides 
were allegedly sold on the black market for U. S. $400045000, thus granting direct 
access to officials in decision-making positions. As a result, Duma members in 1997 
had, on average, 34 aides. 249 The pervasive presence of ROC in the State Duma 
affected the course of events within the early years of post-Soviet Russia, this is 
illustrated during a 1994 debate in the Federation Council. Debating whether or not to 
pass a proposed crime bill, several members enquired, "Why should we adopt a 
resolution which actually okays a decree spearheaded against ourselves? " while others 
blatantly opposed the bill because it would "cut off money-laundering channels for 
the mafia. 1%250 This quandary is made even more significant by the knowledge that 
senior ROC figures sporadically attempted to legalise the leaders of ROC and political 
intentions. 251 Infiltration at this level leads to questions about the true "motivations, 
intentions and legitimacy of the state itself In such cases, what is criminal - and what 
is not - as well as issues of sovereignty and legitimacy become blurred or 
distorted. v9252 
249 Ibid. 
250 Yelena Tregubova, "Federation Council is Against Banditry Decree, " Segodny , 25 June 1994, cited in Peter Daniel DiPaola, "The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian 
Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, " 
http: //www. law. indiana. edu/gisj/vol4/nol/dippgp. htmi (14 October 1998). 
25 1 Kryshtanovskaia, (1996), p. 75. 
252 Robert Bunker and John Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: potentials and consequences, " Transnational 
Organised Crime vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 57. 
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State infiltration at the federal level can also be measured according to the responses 
of central government to those officials who sought to promote a focused policy 
against ROC. In Russia between 1991 and 2000, efforts to counter the rising 
dominance of ROC were hindered at the most senior political levels. For example, 
after informing President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 of criminal activity within Yeltsin's 
inner circle, internal security chief Viktor Ivanenko was fired and replaced by long- 
time Yeltsin crony, Viktor Barannikov. Barannikov was an MVD General who did 
little to combat ROC or corruption. 253 After warning Western governments that 
economic aid and loans were being manipulated to undermine reform, Finance 
Minister Boris Fedorov was forced out of government in 1994 and replaced by 
Vladimir Panskov, a former first deputy chief of the State Tax Committee who was 
under investigation for large-scale bribe taking, and misuse of public funds. 254 It may 
also be argued that Boris Nemtsov, former Minister of Fuel and Energy and Deputy 
Prime Minister, and Sergei Kiriyenko, acting Prime Minister in 1998, were removed 
from office because of their interest in rooting out corruption at the highest political 
levels. 255 The extent to which ROC penetrated government was so great that at two 
separate press conferences in 1998, Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov and the head of 
the organised crime division Vladislav Selivanov both admitted that ROC had 
successftilly penetrated the Russian government at all levels. 256 These types of 
remarks, combined with an attempt to act on infonnation received about money 
laundering and financial activities in foreign countries by some of Russia's leading 
government officials in foreign countries likely played a leading role in Kulikov's 
253 J. Michael Waller and Victor Yasmann, "Russia's Great Criminal Revolution: The Role of the 
Security Services, " Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, vol. 11, no. 4 (December 1995), p. 17 1. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Interfax, 14 April 1998. 
256 Reuters, 07 January 1998 and Interfax 22 July 1998. 
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own dismissal in 1999.257 Even near the end of President Yeltsin's term in office, he 
attempted to fire Prosecutor General Yurii Skuratov, and successfully ousted Prime 
Minister Primakov, reportedly in part because they were conducting investigations 
into criminal allegations that involved members of Yeltsin's immediate circle. The 
fact that Primakov was fired confirmed to Skuratov that "his 'clients' had long 
,, 258 tentacles and that resistance was useless. 
As discussed above, political ambivalence about supporting investigations or 
introducing legislation hannful to ROC's existence and activities was in part the result 
of organised crime's direct and indirect infiltration of the government. An example of 
this is the long and drawn-out process surrounding attempts to pass the legislation 'On 
the Fight Against Organised Crime', initially introduced to the State Duma in 1992. 
After ten drafts the Duma accepted the legislation in 1993, only to have President 
Yeltsin and his associates send it back for revisions - not to be adopted by the 
Federation Council until 1999, at which point President Yeltsin refused to sign it. 259 
This example illustrates the way in which the sporadic attempts made to counter ROC 
merely provided a smokescreen for the ongoing activities of criminal groups. 
There is sporadic evidence available in open-sources that outline the direct infiltration 
of ROC in federal government structures, but evidence of ROC's political 
manipulations at the regional level is much more common. As noted earlier, Moscow 
has been increasingly losing its control over regional and municipal centres since the 
257 Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 09 September 1999. 
258 Elena Dikun, "Public Prosecutor Caught in a Trap, " PRISM: A Biweekly on the Post-Soviet States 
vol. 5, no. 8 (23 April 1999). 
259 Margaret E. Beare, "Russian (East European) Organized Crime Around the Globe, " paper presented 
at the Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Customs Service, and the Australian Federal 
Police Transnational Crime Conference, Canberra, 9-10 March 2000. 
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1980s -a situation made worse by the fall of the Soviet Union. The decline of central 
government control over Russia's regions presented ROC with an opportunity to 
directly enter into competition with the state by consolidating control over regional 
government structures. As the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies asserts, 
The subsequent collapse of the Russian banking system greatly 
reduced Moscow's influence in the regions. The private banking sector 
had been Moscow's main link to the regions, and this link was now 
diminished. With no ability to collect the tax payments due to Moscow, 
the regional governors were forced to take matters in their own hands. 
Regional industries adapted to this cashless existence by exploiting 
existing systems of exchange and barter, with the cooperation and 
participation of corrupt regional authorities. 
Russian organised crime adapted well to this new reality. The 
power vacuum created by Moscow's waning influence in the regions 
was quickly filled by corrupt officials and armed criminals. ROC 
syndicates quickly stepped into the role of facilitator in exchanges and 
arrangements within the barter economy, meting out swift and severe 
punishment to those who crossed them. Regional authorities now 
operate either in collusion with, or in opposition to, ROC groups, 
depending on the particular circumstances. 260 
The government therefore was the last sector of society left for ROC to penetrate at a 
regional level as they already successfully gained control over a large percentage of 
banking, production facilities, trade organisations, commodity production networks 
and nuclear arsenals. 261 
Based on this line of argument, it can further be ascertained that ROC played a role in 
pushing certain regions to seek greater independence from the central government in 
Moscow so that ROC could continue to benefit from the associated opportunities that 
autonomy provided for their criminal activities and acquisition of political power. As 
Varvarin argued, this is not equal to the decentralisation sought by promoters of 
260 William Webster and Arnaud De Borchgrave, eds., Russian Organised Crime and Corruption: 
Putin's Challenge (Washington, D. C.: CSIS, 2000), p. 5. 
261 Yuriy Voronin, "Organised Crime: Its Influence on International Security and Urban Community 
Life in the Industrial Cities of the Urals, " (March 1998), http: //www. american. edu/transcrime. html 
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democracy from the United States, but represented the rise of "local fiefdoms, 
protected by armed bandits loyal to local leaders who seek economic and political 
,, 262 control over regions. Some of these regions exemplify the nature of political crime 
to such an extent that they display characteristics of the 'black hole syndrome' (point 
four of the CTC). 
Commonly cited as the capital of crime in Russia, connections between ROC and 
government structures in the region and city of St. Petersburg are believed to run very 
deep. An example commonly used to illustrate this is the allegation that regional 
governor Vladimir Yakovlev won the 1996 election with the explicit aid of ROC. This 
allegation was corroborated by a story released by the television station NTV, which 
suggested that President Putin won Yakovlev's support and loyalty as mayor of St. 
Petersburg in 2000 by threatening to publicly uncover his link to local crime 
groupS. 263 Further indications of the interest on the part of organised crime in 
influencing the state emerged during the 1998 election campaign with suggestions that 
ROC used 'shadow candidates' - candidates who were registered namesakes of the 
leading contestants - in an effort to get their representatives elected. The purpose of 
this technique was "to confuse voters with multiple candidates with the same last 
name and first initials, thereby splitting the vote. , 264 Some journalists suggested that 
up to 50 per cent of the registered candidates in the 1998 St. Petersburg elections were 
connected to criminal groups, further blurring the distinction between the legitimate 
and criminal state. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Agence France Presse 19 April 2000. 
264 Sergeyev (200 1), p. 166. 
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A similar scenario emerged during the 1997 by-elections for the State Duma in 
Yekaterinburg where at least 17 of the registered candidates were linked to the 
Uralmash crime group. 265 For example, the leading candidate Aleksandr Khabarov 
was officially known as the vice-president of the Uralmash basketball team and 
266 director and founder of approximately ten businesses , unofficially he was a 
founding leader of the Uralmash group. 267 Khabarov's involvement in politics 
extended to the central government, evident in his efforts to organise 'The Worker's 
Movement in Support of Boris Yeltsin'. for which he received a personal letter of 
gratitude from the President. 268 Furthermore the governor of Yekaterinburg, Eduard 
Rossel, has also been tied to the Uralmash group through construction and investment 
deals that he conducted with their front companies; and through his former chief of 
regional internal affairs who regularly attended social gatherings of known criminals. 
Given this personal relationship, it may be concluded that the Uralmash group 
sponsored Rossel's 1999 campaign for regional governor - during the same period 
that it registered itself as a political organisation under the name of the Social-Political 
Union of Uralmash (i. e. OPS Uralmash). Further-more, as OPS Uralmash, the group 
extended its involvement with the community in an effort to increase its public 
support, and underscore that it was "a political organisation with ambitions of 
becoming a party that defends the interests of regional industry -a substantial part of 
which is the property of its members.,, 269 Like many terrorist groups seeking to find 
legitimacy for their political agenda, OPS Uralmash married a political platform with 
265 "Mafiya Murder and the Russian Power Struggle, " http: //www. stratfor. com, 12 July 2000. 
266 Grigory Kavokin, "Once again, candidates with a dubious past, " Izvestia 02 December 1997. 
267 Volkov (2002), p. 119. 
269 Ibid, pp. 119-120. 
269 Ibid., p. 12 1. 
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social outreach, a combined policy that was highlighted on its official website, 
http: //www. ops-uralmash. ru. 270 
The penetration of ROC into regional structures of government was partially a result 
of local governments recognising their dependence on ROC because it had gained 
control over a significant portion of the most lucrative economic sectors. Local 
governments were thus "loath to pass legislation attacking organised crime for fear 
they will lose the economic benefits associated with the mafiya. , 271 In addition to 
economic practicalities, regional and local officials had been forced to find their own 
approach to counter the influence of ROC because Russian legislation did not offer 
specific guidance. 272 The reality has been that local and regional officials are unable 
to "enforce the laws against organised crime because prosecutors must show 
concretely who did what and define the consequences of these actions. Such tasks are 
extremely complicated when criminals have high-level protection from state 
,, 273 officials. Unlike in many other societies of the world, "criminals [in Russia] did 
not have to neutralise the enforcement of the laws. Instead, the only needed to ensure 
that laws and oversight mechanisms were not adopted. 1,274 What better way to do so 
than to successfully infiltrate the political realm? 
Cooperation with ROC, especially in regions far from Moscow, has thus become the 
most effective approach for government authorities - at least those not directly tied to 
ROC - to maintain a semblance of local or regional order. With access to political 
270 As of late 2004, the OPS Uralmash website was accessible only by password. 
27 1 DiPaola (1998). 
272 This was a conclusion highlighted during a conference on organised crime held at Yaroslavl 
University in January 2004. Other key findings are reported in the Russian Regional Report, vol. 9, no. 
1 (03 February 2004). 
273 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
274 Shelley in Godson, (2003), p. 212. 
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structures, criminal leaders who have consolidated their positions in the criminal 
underworld shifted their efforts to consolidating their position in legitimate sectors of 
society, thus turning into "respectable capitalists with political aspirations". 275 fbiS 
motivational shift mirrors an old dictum of the Soviet Union where economic and 
political control naturally went hand-in-hand. The notion of what is 'respectable' in 
this context is offset by evidence indicating that 'political aspirations' often focus on 
securing the status quo attained by ROC in this position - maintaining the capacity to 
react violently to opposition. 
By successfully influencing political behaviour at all political levels, ROC complies 
with the fourth characteristic of terrorism which demands that groups considered as 
terrorist must display political objectives. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
increasingly powerful 'conglomerate' groups in Russia have established a 
considerable degree of control over the licit and illicit economy, leaving the political 
sphere the only sector of society that did not exhibit a significant degree of direct 
criminal penetration. Thus, to ensure the security of their economic interests and that 
their personal power would continue to expand, criminal elites embarked on a 
campaign to control the political life of Russia - not only through bribery and 
corruption, but by attempting to merge with government structures. Although ROC 
intimidated citizens, its main target has been the state, turning itself into "one of the 
greatest and most effective lobbyists in Russia. 276 As a result, ROC has essentially 
275 Vadim Volkov, "Security and Rule-Enforcement in Russian Business: the Role of the Mafia and the 
State, " PONARS Memo, no. 79 (October 1999), 
http: //www. harvard. edu/-ponars/POLICY`/*20MEMOSNolkov79. Volkov illustrates this point by 
discussing the example of Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Factory owner, former boxer and ROC elite, A. 
Bykov; and Moscow entrepreneur and founding leader of the Solmsevskaya criminal organisation, S. 
Mikhailov. 
276 Victor Sergeyev, "Organised Crime and Social Instability in Russia: the alternative state, deviant 
bureaucracy, and social black holes, " in Bonnell and Breslauer, Russia in the New Century (2001), p. 
158. 
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forged a new political system where the notions of rule of law and the 
public good are secondary to the necessity of keeping power and 
managing the state's wealth. They have adorned this system with 
democratic trappings, including a constitutional court, a democratically 
elected parliament, and a free press. But they reject the idea of a real 
alternation of power in the Kremlin. 277 
The fact that ROC has political aspirations indicates the continued importance of 
including the state as a referent object in defining security threats. As Ayoob argues in 
his theory of Subaltern Realism, the state is the only actor that can provide national 
security. Thus given that the Russian state, in certain aspects, is being dominated by 
criminal structures, it may be concluded that the future of Russian national security 
will be determined by a regime that is primarily interested in safeguarding their 
criminal interests. Unlike traditional criminal groups who target the private citizen, 
ROC followed the route of terrorist organisations by targeting the state. Unlike most 
terrorist groups, however, the activities of ROC have had an impact on the emergence 
of a civil society that is dual in nature, "formally sovereign but informally 
9,278 criminalised . 
Neutralising the State and Ado! pting State Functions 
The successful use of terror tactics, combined with the penetration of criminal elite 
into federal, regional and local government institutions, impaired the ability and 
capacity of the state to fulfil required state functions. This was most evident during 
the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), however continued under Vladimir 
Putin. ROC established a political community encompassed in a new form of "non- 
state based authoritarianism. Citizens still live in fear but are now intimidated by non- 
state actors in the form of organised criminal groups. The coercive apparatus of the 
277 Virginie Coulloudon, "Crime and Corruption After Communism: the Criminalisation of Russia's 
Political Elite, " East European Constitutional Review vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1997). 
278 Sergeyev (200 1), p. 159. 
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state (the KGB and MVD) has been privatised to organised crime. ', 279 'IbiS 
authoritarianism has revealed itself in six ways, as discussed in the previous section, 
by: achieving a degree of domination over the economic and ruling structures; 
intimidating citizens; intimidating the media; privatising state resources; subverting 
civil society-, and privatising state coercion. ROC thus represents "an abnegation of 
the state's obligations to its citizenry and reflects its inability to protect them from 
threats against their life, livelihood, or economic security.,, 280 At the same time, ROC 
has fulfilled the five key strategies of terrorism by: creating societal dislocation or a 
sense of chaos; discrediting or destroying a particular government; rendering 
economic and property damage; 'bleeding' the state security forces; and spreading 
fear across state borders. 281 
It is evident that the activities of ROC have, to a certain degree, neutralised the 
Russian state through its use of terrorism. Having ascertained that ROC complies with 
the first four characteristics of terrorism (the use or threat of premeditated violence; 
the creation of fear among an adversary or specific segment of society; careful target 
selection; and political objectives), it may also be argued that ROC has fulfilled the 
fifth basic requirement of any terrorist organisation - breaking the will of the 
opposition and forcing it to submit to certain demands. The non-state type of 
authoritarianism Shelley describes suggests that ROC has evolved to "affect all 
279 Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organised Crime, " Transnational Orizanised Crime, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 
(Autumn 1996), p. 122. 
280 Ibid., p. 123. 
28' Christopher Harmon, "Five Strategies of Terrorism, " Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 12, no. 3 
(Autumn 2001), p. 39. 
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aspects of society including economic relations, political structures, legal institutions, 
citizen-state relations and human rights. 19282 
As ROC competed for control over the economy and the state, it evolved while 
organising and arming itself, drawing state structures into its orbit, and penetrating the 
structures of power and administration throughout the Russian Federation. In doing 
so, ROC represented something very distinct from the "quintessentially political 
terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s or the clich6d mafia syndicates we are all too 
,, 283 familiar with. ROC has instead produced a state in which terrorism and organised 
crime are indistinguishable, but in which the line between the criminal and political is 
also blurred. 
Conclusion: Bringing in the Conceptual 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter reveals two essential points in 
understanding how ROC is simultaneously criminal and terrorist in nature. Firstly, the 
examples highlight that ROC has met with success in its use of terror tactics, and has 
gained a degree of power within society as a result of the widespread fear it has 
created. Secondly, the examples provided also demonstrate the relevance of the 
conceptual framework provided in Chapter Two when measured against actual events 
in the 'real' world. More specifically, the empirical evidence validates four conceptual 
points: the interplay between the individual, state and international community; the 
existence of an alternative form of anarchy that highlights additional referent objects; 
the idea that non-state actors can be as important as state actors in security 
282 Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organised Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism, " Transnational 
Organised Crime vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 123. 283 Sebastyen Gorka, "The New Threat of Organised Crime and Terrorism, " Terrorism and Security 
Monito (June 2000). 
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considerations; and the relevance of a multisectoral approach in determining the 
nature of security threats. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, once a state is no longer capable of responding 
to challenges that threaten its authority, legitimacy and stability, it can no longer be 
considered the sole referent object. Instead, the individual, group and international 
levels of analysis take precedence as they cannot depend on the state to be the main 
guarantor of security. In the case of Russia, the inability of the state to control the rise 
of ROC has resulted in insecurity for the individuals and groups of individuals 
described in this section. Selective targeting also highlights the interplay between 
levels of analysis, and the relevance of alternative referent objects. For example, the 
murder of Starovoitova was symbolically directed at the individual Duma deputy; the 
ideas of democratisation and individual freedoms that her work represented; and it 
had repercussions on Russia's international image. 
The third conceptual point corroborated by the empirical evidence presented in this 
section is that an alternative form of anarchy - as argued by Booth - does exist. In the 
case of Russia, however, an alternative anarchy exists in the negative sense. Given 
ROC's success in spreading fear throughout society in general, Russian citizens' 
support of the state has been deteriorating. This predicament is directly related to the 
idea of subsidiarity where political decisions are to be taken at the lowest possible 
level. The 'subsidiarity' component of Booth's alternative anarchy necessitates a 
strong civil society that is prepared to ensure that the government creates conditions 
of security - this is absent from Russia. ROC's use of terrorism has also broken down 
the notion of 'community' by delineating society into two camps: the criminal troika 
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(traditional criminals, government collaborators and new entrepreneurs) versus the 
rest of society. Given the successes of ROC to the detriment of the Russian state, the 
overarching question is whether or not it is ever possible for the government to gain 
back the confidence of its citizens. Furthermore, the use of terror tactics by criminal 
organisations in Russia against Russian society has undermined the emergence of 
reciprocal obligation, mutual self-interest, sense of loyalty and moral obligation 
between the government and its citizens - conditions necessary for the creation of a 
secure environment. In some situations, the absence of the state has been replaced by 
ROC as a non-state actor. Although the authority and legitimacy acquired by ROC is 
based on its use of violence and intimidation, in the context of some regions (i. e. the 
Russian Far East), this has produced public submission to the power claimed by 
criminal elites. As such, the importance of the state (specifically state functions) 
clearly remains an integral component when assessing security. 
Finally, the empirical evidence in this section validates the utility of employing a 
multisectoral approach to security. As indicated in this chapter, the rise of ROC and 
its successful use of terror tactics have threatened the political, military, economic, 
environmental and societal sectors. The impact on the political realm is evident when 
considering the level of criminal penetration in government. Military security, 
although not dealt with explicitly in this chapter, is reflected in the example of 
Chechnya as a 'black hole'. In this context, the activities of ROC directly contributed 
to the prolonging of a conflict zone, directly through its involvement in the illicit arms 
trade that supplied weapons to militants, and indirectly by contributing to the creation 
of a criminal-political class with an invested interest in shaping Chechnya to suit their 
specific needs. Furthermore, economic security was evidently threatened by ROC via 
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capital flight, money laundering, corruption and the pilfering of state resources during 
privatisation. These activities directly contributed to undermining economic 
infrastructure because they directly and indirectly harmed property owners, and the 
ability of the government to collect taxes to pay for social welfare programmes. This 
economic strategy has also been commonly employed by traditional terrorist 
groups. 284 
Considering that the characteristics of terrorism as defined in Chapter Two have been 
fulfilled by ROC, it may be concluded that ROC has been using terror tactics not only 
to safeguard their own criminal interests, but to secure itself a position of power 
within Russia. This has been done by revealing the weakness of Russian state 
institutions while simultaneously attempting to fill the voids created by a weak 
Russian state. As Victor Sergeyev argued, this created an alternative state wherein 
groups such as ROC privatise state power. Ayoob therefore was correct in asserting 
the importance of a strong state to ensure individual and national security. Without 
strong state non-state actors can become a "clear threat to political stability-281 - as is 
the case with ROC in the Russian Federation. In doing so, ROC has exhibited the 
"most surprising form of political action for a terrorist group" by folding into the 
established political process. 286 
294 Harmon (2000), 64. 
285 Victor M. Sergeyev, "Organised Crime and Social Instability in Russia: The Alternative State, 
Deviant Bureaucracy, and Social Black Holes, " in Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Breslauer (eds), 
Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), p. 169. 
286 Harmon (2000), 63. 
309 
Chapter 5 
Travelling the Length of the CTC: 
The Evolving Nature of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
From Terror Group to Criminal Organisation 
"We belie our pretension of being a civilised, moral, and dignified people when, under the most futile 
pretexts, we appeal to arms or we proceed to commit acts of violence. "' 
"Despite the group's Marxist rhetoric, it seems to have more in common with Al Capone and the darker 
aspects of Clausewitz than with any leftist hero. "2 
This chapter focuses on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an 
example of a terrorist group that has traversed the crime terror continuum (CTC), 
evolving from an entity motivated by political interests, to one that exhibited a high 
predilection towards advancing criminal aims. The chapter will make three inter- 
connected arguments. First, an overview of the development of FARC will 
demonstrate that the group was terrorist in nature in accordance with the definition of 
terrorism provided in Chapter One. Second, the dynamics of FARC during the period 
1991-2003 illustrate that it increasingly came to display characteristics of an 
organised crime group. Finally, while plotting its development along the CTC, this 
chapter will illustrate how the evolution of FARC in Colombia can be explained by 
the alternative view of international security provided in Chapter Two. This case 
study will thus argue that organised crime and terrorism should be incorporated into 
the security agenda because they are necessary and relevant to the study of 
international security. These threats, as they are illustrated in the Colombian context, 
derive not from state strength, military power and geopolitical ambition, but rather 
1 President Manuel Menillo Toro, 1874 as quoted in Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: the 
role of the state in the Colombian peace process, " Journal of Latin American Studiesl vol. 28, no. 2 
(May 1996): 279. 
2 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia. Mexico. (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 1. 
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from state weakness and the absence of political legitimacy; from the failure of states 
to provide minimal conditions of public order within their borders; from the way in 
which domestic instability and internal violence can spill into the international arena; 
and from the incapacity of weak states to form viable building blocks for a stable 
regional order and to contribute towards the resolution of broader common purposes. 3 
The evolution of FARC, and the related convergence of security threats in Colombia 
illustrates important features of security in the post-Cold War environment, including 
the multisectoral nature of threats, the nexus between levels of analysis, and the 
continued relevance of the state and its functions as something to which many non- 
state actors aspire to control. 
Although other terrorist groups, such as the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, Sendero Luminoso (a. k. a. Shining Path), and Abu Sayyaf 
could be used to illustrate this aspect of the CTC (i. e. moving to the opposite end of 
the continuum), FARC stands out as the leading example for several reasons. 
Operationally, FARC is one of the oldest terrorist groups with a significant 
membership base of an estimated 12,000 to 18,000 followers. 4 Its endurance and 
strength have provoked U. S. officials to conclude that it is the "best trained and 
equipped terrorist group in Colombia, [and] asserts influence and varying degrees of 
control on large areas of Colombia's eastern lowlands and rain forest, which are the 
primary coca cultivation and cocaine producing regions in the country. ý95 It is this co- 
location with coca fields that defines a second unique aspect of FARC. The rise of the 
3 Andrew Hurrell, "Security in Latin America, " International Affairsl vol. 73, no. 3 (Summer 
1998): 541. 
4 Asa Hutchinson, DEA Administrator, Testimony before the U. S. House Committee on International 




Colombia drug trade in the 1970s and 1980s created an environment commonly 
referred to as 'Colombianization 6_ the dominance of narcotics traffickers in territory 
that is no longer under state control, or state-controlled economic, political and social 
structures. An absent state thus pennitted the emergence of a degree of political chaos 
(i. e. a black hole) wherein power has most commonly been attained and maintained 
through the use of violence, and financed through participation in illicit activities. 
Exemplifying commercial terrorism weighed in favour of organised criminal 
behaviour, the development of FARC gives credence to the quote: "today many of the 
greatest threats are generated by the growing nexus between internal political violence 
and international criminal activities. tt7 This point is at the heart of the perpetual 
instability and violence that characterises Colombia in the contemporary post-Cold 
War security environment. 
Colombia's Tradition of Violence 
The history of Colombia is intimately interwoven with periods of sustained violence 
and weak government authority. Whether describing the civil wars of the nineteenth 
century, 8 or the enduring era of violence between 1948 and 1965 - collectively 
referred to as 'La Violencia' - the most revealing conclusion to be drawn about 
Colombia is that "from the beginning, governments in Colombia have been weak, and 
periods of intense, mutual bloodletting have punctuated the country's history. "9 As a 
6 Joseph R. Nunez, "Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia, " Strategic Studies Institute Working 
Paper, U. S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA (April 2001). 
7 Richard L. Millett, "Colombia's Conflicts: the Spillover Effects of a Wider War, " Strategic Studies 
Institute Working Paper, U. S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA (October 2002), p. 27. 
8 Nineteenth century Colombia is often referred to by regional historians, such as Gonzalo Sanchez, as 
a "country of permanent war". In fact, following 14 years of the Wars of Independence, Colombia 
suffered from eight civil wars, 14 local civil wars, numerous small uprisings, two wars with Ecuador, 
and three coup d'etats. Gonzalo Sanchez and Ricardo Penaranda, eds. Pasado v presente de la violencia 
en Colombia, (Bogota: CEREC, 1984). 
9 Phillip McLean, "Colombia: Failed, Failing or Just Weak? " The Washington Quarterly vol. 25, no. 3 
(Summer 2002), p. 124. 
312 
result of the frequency and intensity of civil wars in Colombia, violence has 
historically come to represent a relatively legitimate and accepted way to settle 
political differences, even if political balance has never been achieved. 10 Although 
violence in Colombia has had a very close connection to party politics, especially in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the structure of economic development 
from the mid-twentieth century onward played a formative role in shaping the nature 
of contemporary discontent. " 
In many respects, the security problems in Colombia today are rooted in the crises of 
the past. A unique history has built a country that is simultaneously regarded as a 
Latin American success story (due to its economic growth, a large middle class and 
relative political stability), while remaining notorious for the activities of the drug 
trade and violence perpetrated by indigenous terrorist groups. As Jenny Pearce argues, 
the Colombian paradox can be partially explained by recognising that there is a 
distinction between the 'formal' Colombia and the 'real' Colombia. The formal 
Colombia refers to the Colombia characterised as the most democratic state in Latin 
America, whereas the real Colombia refers to the "Colombia of the people, where the 
rule of law barely holds, deprivation and poverty are the norm and democracy is just a 
word on a historic document. "12 The link between these two personalities of the state 
is loyalty to the two traditional political parties (the Liberal 13 and the Conservative' 4 
parties), for which the people of Colombia have regularly fought, both on behalf of 
10 Rochlin (2003), p. 90. 
11 For an excellent investigation into the dynamics of Colombian party politics, and subsequent ties to 
economic structures, see Robert H. Dix, Colombia: the Political Dimensions of Change, (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1967). Jenny Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labvrinthl (London: 
Latin America Bureau Limited, 1990) also provides a good overview of the various dynamics which 
have worked to undermine the ability of the country to govern itself. 
12 Pearce, (1990), p. 4. 
13 The Liberals supported free trade, mercantile capital, a secular state, and federalism. 
14 Conservatives promoted feudal agrarian production, economic protectionism, and emphasised the 
importance of religion in the state. 
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the ruling elite and as a result of their own feelings of party allegiance. As Robert Dix 
concludes, "Most Colombians - even those who have known and cared nothing of 
doctrines and programs - evidence a profound psychic attachment to one or the 
other. "15 At the same time, however, political dualism in Colombia has also been 
explained as "rival bands of brigands fighting over literal loot. ", 6 Within this context 
the importance placed on client-patron relations in the state is evident (i. e. the party in 
power ensures that all levels of government positions are filled by their own members, 
thus almost entirely excluding members of the other party). ' 7 Thus, in Colombia, as in 
Russia, control over economic and financial resources eventually contributed to the 
acquisition of political power by non-state actors. 
The Colombian tradition of having two principal political parties vie for political 
dominance regularly culminated in political violence, which came to a head during 
"the last great civil war between the parties: La Violencia. "" Discussed in greater 
detail in the next section, La Violencia is important because it highlighted the nature 
of competition between the two political parties, and unleashed a host of additional 
conflicts whose roots lay in a combination of economic, social, and personal factors. 
It may thus be concluded that La Polencia helped instil a sense of criminality into the 
political order of contemporary Colombia - acting as a catalyst for the rise of 
revolutionary, and subsequently terrorist, groups seeking leflist political change 
15 Dix, (1967), p. 203. Dix provides a very thorough argument about how Colombians are socialised 
into partisanship - making allegiance to a party closely related to family and inheritance. As a result, 
"The Colombian is very early socialized into enmity toward one and loyalty to the other historic party. " 
211. 
For this particular view, see Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millionsl (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 1957), p. 23. 
17 Dix (1967), pp. 179-182. 
18 Pearce (1990), p. 5. 
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explicitly through violent struggle; and, laying the ground for the ernergence of 
groups driven by the accumulation of illicit profit. 
Although political ideology played a role in the fori-nation of the Colombian state, by 
the 1990s socio-economic concerns were being replaced with predominantly 
economic ones. Thus the most common route to attaining control over the state was 
no longer focused on converting support based on an ideological platform, but 
acquiring power through financial strength. In contrast to the trend in more stable 
democracies, increased attention to the role of the economy in Colombia did not result 
in the growth of licit economic activity. On the contrary, Colombia's violent history 
suppressed the growth of the legitimate economy and contributed to the emergence of 
an intricate web of illicit actors competing for state resources and territorial control. 
Organised criminal groups, illegal armed groups (i. e. paramilitaries), urban gangs, and 
terrorist entities thus incessantly confronted state authorities and acted as a significant 
obstacle to the creation of political stability at the local, national, and increasingly at 
the regional level. As will be discussed further in this chapter, the competition over 
state resources and territorial control emphasizes the relevance of the argument that 
the state itself can no longer be considered the only significant political actor, but 
should be regarded on an equal footing with non-state actors which have also come to 
seek the same functions. 
In search of their own power bases, these illicit groups came to rely on the country's 
position as the world's leading producer and distributor of refined cocaine as a 
definitive route to establish control over the state's economic and political institutions. 
In many ways, the Colombian predicament mirrored, and then surpassed the 
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experience of the Russian Federation (political crime) discussed in the previous 
chapter. Beginning at the opposite end of the CTC, the case of Colombia illustrates 
how politically motivated terrorist groups have evolved into a hybrid entity, 
subsequently developing into an organisation that displays aims and motivations 
clearly located at the opposite end of the continuum from which it began: in this case 
FARC ultimately came to favour the criminal over the political. A rising dependence 
on illicit activities to secure power and finance political activities has contributed to 
the decline of political ideology as the primary motivating force in the Colombian 
context. 
The Birth of FARC: 1966-1982 
Formed in the mid-1960s under the leadership of Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as 
Manuel Marulanda V61ez 19 or 'Tirofijo' (Sureshot), the legacy of FARC dates back to 
the period of La Holencia. This period of intense violence acted as a catalyst for the 
establishment of guerrilla groups in Colombia, and it also aggravated feelings of 
political discontent, especially throughout the peasant populations. More specifically, 
as the government increasingly targeted people associated with the Colombian 
Communist Party (CCP), and blocked their access to legitimate participation in 
politics, frustration among Communist guerrillas intensified. In many respects, as will 
become evident in the following sections, La Violencia and its immediate aftermath 
created the conditions in which many people were willing to engage in violence to 
improve their situation. La Violencia also produced conditions that were subsequently 
used by the FARC leadership to create an aura of political legitimacy. As a result, it 
19 Marin changed his name to Marulanda in honour of a union leader of the same name who was killed 
by the security forces. See "El viejo guerrillero y su deffin, " El Mundo (Madrid), 11 July 1998, as 
quoted in Peter Chalk, et a]. Colombian Labyrin h: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its 
implications for regional stabili! Yl MR-1339-AF, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001), p. 23, FN 
1. 
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was during this timeframe - from the mid-1960s to 1982 - that the group was in its 
purest political form, thus organisationally and operationally terrorist in nature. 
La Violencia 20 
The actual origin of La Violencia remains an issue of great debate. However, what is 
rarely contested is that La Violencia was sparked by an intensification of rivalry 
between the Liberal and Republican parties that came to a head with the assassination 
of Jorge Eli6cer Gaitdn in 1948. Gaitdn, a presidential candidate and the leader of a 
land-reform movement, was a popular member of the Liberal party primarily because 
of his dedication to secure rights for landless Colombians. Gaitin was also known for 
voicing criticism of the exaggerated misdistribution of wealth, and the concentration 
of political power in the hands of an elite oligarchy. 21 His death was significant 
because it highlighted the end of a long-running period of Liberal administrations 
(1930-1946) that introduced land reform restricting ancestral privileges -a factor that 
was considered important to the Conservatives. A new Conservative government 
came to power in 1946 and unleashed a wave of political violence to regain land for 
the elite, and subsequently remained in power. 22 The assassination of Gaitin in 1948 
highlighted the centrality of control over land and land ownership to political power in 
20 For an excellent, all inclusive, overview of La Violencia, refer to David Bushnell, The Making o 
Modem Colombia: a Nation in Spite of Itsel (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1993), and James D. Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima, 
(Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1985). 
2' Harvey Kline, Colombia: Democracy Under Assault , (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), p. 
43. At the time, three-quarters of the Colombian population were peasants, and an estimated three per 
cent of landowners controlled over 50 per cent of agricultural territory. 
22 Alfredo Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: a guerTilla group's long history, " NACLA Report on 
the Americas (September/October 2000), downloaded from: 
http: //www. derechos. net/paulwolf/colombia/molan. htm on 16 June 2003. 
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Colombia, stressing that land was not a resource that was to be divided amongst the 
people. 23 
Gaitan's assassination acted as a catalyst for the onset of a decade-long struggle that 
24 
resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 Colombians. Seeking to control the Liberal 
outbreaks of 1948, the Conservative government armed Conservative peasants 
throughout the country and provided unprecedented levels of financial support to the 
National Police. Historical accounts of La Violencia have concluded that the militant 
peasant groups, supported by the Conservative party and backed by wealthy 
landowners and industrialists, were responsible for a significant proportion of the 
atrocities which were committed against civilians. 25 Liberal peasants, in turn, armed 
themselves with the aid of the CCP, creating numerous self-defence groups. These 
groups in turn formed rural communities referred to as 'Independent Republics'. 26 
The most popular Independent Republics included El Pato, Rio Chiquito, Sumapaz, 
and Marquetalia, most of which are located in the southern departments of Colombia, 
where the violence of La Violencia was the most severe (Figure 5-1: Map of 
Colombian Departments). Violence was centred in the department of Tolima - where 
many Liberal guerrilla bands and Communist self-defence forces operated. In fact, it 
was in Tolima that Marulanda, the future leader of FARC, began his career as a 
Liberal guerrilla. 27 Eventually a conglomeration of these Liberal and Communist 
23 Pearce (2000), p. 52. It was not until the "political winds shifted" that property was subsequently 
reclaimed. 
24 Manwaring (2002), p. 2. For a thorough discussion of this period in Colombian history, refer to 
Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez eds. Violence in Colombia: The 
Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992). 
25 Victoria Garcia, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, " Centre for Defence 
Information Terrorism Project Information Sheet (7 May 2002), accessed at: 
http: //www. cdi. org/tefforism/farc-pr. cfm on 14 June 2003. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Chalk (2001), p. 23. 
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groups combined forces to forrn FARC .28 
During this period, violence becarne the 
non-n throughout rural Colombia, as it constantly fed on "traditional partisan hatreds 
and on the political 'laxv of the Jungle' which stipulated that one's good, one's honour, 
-29 and evcn one's life depended on who controlled the government. 
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19 It is important to note that these self-defence groups were supported by a political policy 
implemented by the CCP in response to the rising number of civilian victims. The object of the CCP 
was to organise "peasants into autonomous safe havens that could defend themselves against the 
situation of generalized violence. and particularly against the Conservative armed groups" Lacking tile 
required manpower. the Communist activists were forced to form an agreement with tile Liberal party 
to help organise the peasant communities into self-governing structures. and into a resistance of 
guerrilla units. See: Ronlan D. Ortiz. "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: the Case of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. " Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 25, no. 2 (March- 
April 2002), pp. 13 1-132, and Pearce (2000), pp. 52-56. 
29 Dix ( 1967), p. 363. 
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Initially, La Violencia was the result of political differences where "rural bosses 
mobilised their peasant clients in bloody vendettas against neighbouring villages; and 
Liberal landowners organised peasant-guerrilla an-nies which engaged the 
Conservative forces of the state in 'hit and run' actions .,, 
30 However, with every year 
that La Violencia continued, the political focus of the fighting appeared to diminish. 
Several historical accounts of this period even noted that La Violencia was 
exacerbated and prolonged by other motivations and causal factors. For example, 
Robert Dix argues that soon after the start of La Violencia, "economic motives for 
violence were mixed with the political. i0l Thus during La Violencia, 'political losers' 
were often preventing from owning land. 
In addition to political and economic dimensions of the violence, it was not long 
before political and social factors were intermixed with criminality. 32 For example, in 
western parts of Colombia 'entrepreneurs' commonly hired gunmen to terrorise local 
populations and destroy their agricultural crops, thereby "inducing the abandonment 
03 of farms or their sale at minimum prices. It also became common practice for 
coffee crops to be seized by armed bands just before the harvest so that these illicit 
groups could profit from their cultivation and establish protection rackets. As Dix 
notes, "violence was thus used to gain wealth and power by a rising rural middle class 
which otherwise found social ascent difficult in a quasi-feudal society. 04 TJJiS 
highlights the existence of an historical interplay between illicit (and often violent) 
30 Pearce (2000), p. 52. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Pearce (2000), p. 54. 
33 Dix (1967), p. 364. 
34 Ibid. 
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wealth accumulation and the search for political power, an interplay that has always 
played a determining role in the history of Colombia. 
Another important dynamic that contributed to the prolongation of La Violencia was 
the socialisation of violence among boys who witnessed atrocities within their 
families and their communities. This was a significant factor in drawing new recruits 
to illicit armed groups because membership provided an escape from an agricultural 
lifestyle and from personal vulnerability to armed groups. Long after clear political 
objectives had disappeared, "motives of revenge, hard experience, and a yearning for 
adventure and self-assertion"35 ensured that the violence that characterised La 
Violencia continued. It is this combination of political, socio-economic and criminal 
factors that ultimately created an environment in Colombia facilitating the emergence, 
and eventual growth, of a crime-terror continuum. 
The dynamics of La Violencia took a turn in 1953 when General Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla took control of Colombia by force. An anti-communist, Pinilla gained backing 
from elements in the Conservative and Liberal parties and the U. S. administration. 
Shortly after seizing office, he declared an amnesty which was welcomed by armed 
peasants primarily based in eastern Colombia. 36 This amnesty, however, did not 
include the CCP, "although they would have readily accepted it.,, 37 The General was 
subsequently chosen as President of Colombia in 1954, with the support of both 
parties -a position he held until 1958. By 1955, despite his rhetoric of seeking a 
peaceful resolution to conflict, the General declared the CCP illegal and launched a 
military operation against rural areas that remained strongholds of peasant and 
35 Dix ( 1967), p. 365. 
36 Molano (2000). 
37 Pearce (2000), p. 60. 
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Communist guerrilla groups. This new period of violence resulted in the death of an 
estimated 16,000 people, including many who had accepted Pinilla's initial amnesty. 38 
Financially supported by the U. S., the Colombian army attacked and bombed guerrilla 
and peasant positions, forcing them to retreat to the jungles of the Andean foothills. 39 
Amongst the guerrillas was Marulanda, who himself had joined the Communist Party 
in 1952 after many Liberal guerrilla leaders began to collaborate with the Colombian 
army against Communist forces. 40 By the early 1960s, Marulanda commanded the 
self-proclaimed independent republic of Marquetalia in the Central Andes, but he was 
forced to leave Marquetalia in 1964 when the government re-established control .41 In 
many respects, during La Violencia, the peasants came to see the Communist 
guerrillas as their defenders because they were the same people who "saved them 
from being killed by the chulavitas in 1950, which enabled them to confront the army 
in 1955,42 and who would go on to defend them from the landowner uprisings of the 
1960s and 1970s. 
In 1958 General Pinilla was forced out of government by a newly formed 'civic front' 
called the National Front. The National Front was a pact agreed upon by the 
Conservative and Liberal parties, "in which they would alternate in power every four 
years during a minimum period of 16 years. 1943 This agreement formed the basis for 
La Violencia drawing to a close as its first priorities were "political peace and the 
restoration of the constitutional order, taking precedence over any objectives of 
38 Pearce (2000), p. 60. 
39 Molano (2000). 
40 Pearce, (2000), p. 56. Liberal support for General Pinilla did not last long, and dissipated after Pinilla 
attempted to prolong his rule by interfering in the next elections that the Liberals hoped to win. At this 
point demonstrations spread throughout Colombia - most of which were violently repressed by the 
overnment who blamed the Communist Party for disrupting public order. Molano, (2000). 
Jenkins (2001), p. 50. 
42 Pearce (2000), p. 60. 
43 Pearce (2000), p. 61. 
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economic development or social reform. "44 However, it soon became clear that the 
success of the National Front depended not only on its ability to achieve peace 
between the two main parties and strengthen democratic institutions, but also to 
stimulate economic development and forge the structure of a modem 
society not divided by the tremendous inequalities which today 
characterize it, which offers to all its members remunerative 
employment, a decent standard of living, protection against risks, free 
access to education, and broad opportunities to rise to positions of 
leadership both in the sphere of private activity as well as in the field 
of public affairs. 45 
The emergence of the National Front, however, did little to resolve widespread 
violence in the rural areas of Colombia. Instead of seeking to form an inclusive 
system of government, the National Front's official policy was to recognise modem 
, 46 liberal groups, and repress "those that asked for 'excessive' reform. In addition to 
excluding the emerging middle class, the educated, the poverty stricken, and the 
majority of the population, 47 all Liberal and Communist self-defence groups that 
emerged during La Violencia were specifically excluded from political talks. As Ann 
Mason concludes, "political reconciliation, internal order and economic growth were 
achieved, yet bipartisan rule by its very nature provided for the institutional exclusion 
of third parties from political power. , 48 Although the National Front succeeded in 
ushering in a period of relative stability with restored public order, by neglecting to 
further strengthen law enforcement and the judiciary, their policy of exclusion fuelled 
the discontent of many rural-based groups. In this situation, as had happened in earlier 
historical periods in Colombia, the state contributed to producing an environment that 
threatened societal security as defined by the Copenhagen School. As a result, 
"Dix (1967), p. 147. 
43 Programa del Frente Nacional, 1962, (Bogota: Editorial ARGRA, 1962), p. 4, as quoted in Dix, 
(1967), p. 147. 
46 Serres (2000), p. 194. 
47 Rochlin (2003), p. 96. 
48 Ann C. Mason, -Colombian State Failure: the Global Context of Eroding Domestic Authority, " 
Paper presented at the Conference on Failed States, Florence, Italy (10-14 April 2001), p. 11. 
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violence continued throughout Colombia over the next two decades. The violence of 
the early 1960s took another guise, with many guerrilla groups espousing largely 
nationalistic aims, or aims tied to various international centres of power. 49 Many 
Colombian guerrilla movements, for example, found inspiration and encouragement 
from the Cuban Revolution. According to Buscaglia and Ratliff, the spread of 
violence at this time could be attributed to "the Colombian political system's 
incapacity and unwillingness to open itself to all interested parties and to serve the 
public interest [and] the foreign support for insurgents. "50 
Crime was a ftirther problem associated with the instability of La Violencia that 
continued to grow even after the emergence of the National Front. By 1964 robbery, 
burglary, and the kidnapping of prominent people was common, leading the middle 
and upper classes to pay patrols of night watchmen for protection from bandits. 51 
Rising crime rates at this time reflected the weak nature of the state. Public confidence 
in the institutions of state authority (i. e. law enforcement, judiciary, and government 
leaders) was extremely low, and the failure of the state to provide sufficient social 
services required of a modem state (i. e. education, public works and social welfare) 
undermined the government's legitimacy. As a result, most Colombians were no 
longer able to "identify their own well-being with that of the nation and with their 
own responsibility for the nation's welfare. "52 Although the state existed in principle, 
the authorities were unable to attain effective control over state functions, thereby 
leaving a vacuum that non-state actors sought to fill. 
49 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 3. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Dix (1957), p. 175. 
52 Dix (195 7), p. 179. 
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The consequences of the weakness of the state and the policy of political exclusion 
practised by the National Front in the post-La Violencia period were demonstrated in 
a series of events in 1964. The Colombian army had been targeting Communist forces 
in armed raids since 1958 because they were considered elements of subversion, and 
launched one of these events ('Plan Lazo') in May 1964 with the advice and financial 
support of the United States. This campaign sent 16,000 Colombian troops to encircle 
"the narrow valley of Marquetalia, 53 where a small group of peasants (42 according to 
the testimony of the group's leader Manuel Marulanda) were working, while the 
, %54 airforce dropped bombs. This pinnacle of goverment violence was conducted 
against Communist strongholds despite the fact that the CCP, and Manuel Marulanda, 
made several attempts to cooperate with the National Front, explicitly stating that they 
were not interested in engaging in an armed struggle. 55 However, as government 
directed violence continued, the armed groups were forced to take refuge in the 
mountainous areas of southern Colombia. In September 1964 several of these armed 
groups came together in a conference of the 'Bloque Sur de Guerrilla', forming a 
military wing of the CCp. 56 The principal aim of the Marxist armed militants, under 
the leadership of Marulanda, was to focus on land reform. 57 Two years later, during a 
second conference of the 'Bloque Sur', the militants renamed themselves the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC. Ideologically driven by 
Marxism, FARC maintained ties to the Communist Party until the end of the 1970s. 
53 Marquetalia, located in the southern department of Tolima, was established as a Communist-oriented 
'independent republic' in early 1964. Other similar independent republics established by the 
Communist Party in the department of Tolima included: Rio Chiquito, El Pato-Guayabero and Santa 
Barbara. All of these were eradicated by the Colombian army be 1966. Chalk, (2001), p. 24. See also 
Serres (2000), pp. 193-195. 
54 Pearce (2000), p. 64. 
55 Pearce (2000), p. 64. 
56 Chalk (2001), p. 21. 
57 Phillip McLean, "Colombia - Thinking Clearly About the Conflict, " CSIS Policy Papers on the 
Americas vol. X111, study 7 (October 2002), p. 2. 
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The origins of FARC were intrinsically linked to the political violence that 
characterised La Violencia, and its immediate aftermath. 58 Experiences of state 
repression and a culture of peasant rebellion, coupled with the desire to seek 
appropriation and stabilisation of land ownership, served as key elements for gaining 
and holding peasant support. 59 This was exacerbated by the physical absence of the 
state in many regions, along with the inability of the state to provide key social 
services throughout Colombia. The emergence of FARC was therefore unlike the rise 
of other leftist revolutionary groups in Latin America. Although the group was 
partially influenced by the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba '60 FARC was not a by- 
product of the Cuban revolution. Instead, the group emerged from struggles for land 
"characteristic of a dependent economy passing from traditional forms of land 
exploitation to modem capitalism. "61 Furthermore, despite engaging in the use of 
violence as will be demonstrated in the next section, FARC - at its birth - was largely 
forced to use violence in order to secure its existence. In this way the group was 
engaged in a cycle of self-help characterised by the security dilemma which is 
comparable to the actions of a sovereign state. As Monica Serres concludes, "The 
status of FARC in 1966 was a combination of vague calls for revolution and armed 
struggle mixed with reformist agrarian demandS. "62 
58 Serres (2000), pp. 193-195. 
59 Serres (2000(, p. 200. 
60 Rochlin (2003) argues that the Cuban Revolution inspired the FARC leadership in principle. For 
example, the fact that a small island so close to the U. S. could achieve a Communist revolution was 
considered inspiring. Furthermore, the Cuban revolution proved that popular forces could win against 
national armies, and that successful struggles began in the countryside. 
61 Serres (2000), p. 194. 
62 Serres (2000), p. 195. 
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A Political Azenda Materialises 
Initially created under the rubric of the CCP which sought to organise peasants into 
armed defence units, the original premise behind FARC was not to use violence 
against the state to attain their political aims. On the contrary, in the first years of 
FARC's existence, armed struggle remained "subordinate to a broader political 
strategy, which included electoral participation. "63 FARC leadership, which wholly 
adopted a Marxist ideology, were careful to note that a revolutionary situation did not 
exist in Colombia, and therefore a guerrilla struggle was not a legitimate course of 
action. Instead, the group was primarily interested in advancing an agenda that 
focused on agricultural and land reform. FARC therefore called for the nationalisation 
of strategic industries, and for "breaking the yoke of imperialist domination.,, 64 This 
platform was reflected in early membership patterns, which primarily incorporated 
landless peasants and small rural landowners. These paramount interests, combined 
with a Marxist foundation that "offered a global vision that helped the revolutionaries 
design their political agenda to attract followers, find a social power base, and develop 
their strategy for gaining power, "65 appeared to preclude the use of sustained violence. 
That is not to say, however, that FARC was accepted by the authorities as a legitimate 
political actor. With all legitimate means to power ultimately blocked by the 
Government, FARC's leadership recognised that using legal means to break through 
Colombia's political and agrarian structure was impossible. The only option which the 
leadership believed remained was to eventually declare an armed rebellion. 
63 Pearce (1990), p. 167. 64 Rochlin (2003), p. 97. 65ortiZ (2002), p. 128. 
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During the Third FARC Conference at the end of the 1960s, the group's primary 
focus was on strengthening its organisational capacity. It thus established a national 
ideological training centre to train leaders and ensure political cohesion within the 
group. Furthermore, with a continued interest in avoiding the use of violence against 
the state, it sought ways to utilise political activism by planning political and mass 
organisations, distributing propaganda, and consolidating a social base. 66 After the 
Third Conference a national FARC command structure began to take shape, and was 
further reinforced during the Fourth and Fifth Conferences when a central general 
staff under a secretariat was established to head the group's an-ned movement, and "to 
,, 67 provide political direction. The chain of command, however, was not completed 
until the Sixth FARC Conference in 1978.68 
Although the group dispersed mobile guerrilla units into several regions, including the 
middle Magdalena valley, FARC remained a defensive organisation "with roots 
among peasant colonisers for whom Communism was less a political ideology than a 
strategy for survival. 1.969 Peasants who were unable to protect themselves from the 
harassment of large cattle ranchers (who received military backing) depended on 
FARC for protection. Focused on winning popular support, FARC combined the 
provision of protection with basic social services. 70 This policy played a large role in 
spreading FARC influence throughout the regions of Colombia, becoming, in some 
cases, the de facto governing authority for large numbers of peasants where the state 
66 Ortiz (2002), p. 133. 
67 Chalk (2001), p. 24. 
68 Ortiz (2002), p. 133. During the Sixth FARC Conference, the group approved statutes, disciplinary 
requirements, command guidelines, established the responsibilities of the general staff for running 
different fronts that acted as tactical units. 
69 Pearce (2000), p. 167. 
70 Ibid. 
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was either negligent or absent. 71 In providing these services to communities, the 
FARC was granted a degree of authority and legitimacy - once relegated to the state - 
that allowed them to strengthen their rural foothold throughout his period. 
With the National Front still dominating the economic and political life of Colombia 
in the 1970s, the government of Misael Pastrana (1970-1974) adopted a rural 
development model that aimed to eliminate obstacles to investment in rural areas. 72 
This fuelled FARC's political agenda by further concentrating land ownership and 
undermining small-scale peasant producers. Tbousands of peasants were thus 
organised by FARC to invade rural properties (i. e. large haciendas) as a form of 
backlash. Property owners, with the support of the local political leadership, 
responded to this tactic by unleashing a combination of public and private force 
against the peasants. 73 This repression directed against organised peasants was 
accompanied by the expulsion of tenants from the lands they cultivated, and an 
associated expansion of commercial agriculture to less populated areas of Colombia. 
Many of these locations were conveniently situated in the same areas where FARC 
maintained a strong presence. As a result of Pastrana's policy, which neglected the 
peasant population, FARC was able to further consolidate its influence and acquire 
support in new areas. It was during this period that FARC membership expanded to 
include students, intellectuals, workers and peasants. 74 A non-state actor, FARC 
demonstrated that it had the components necessary to directly challenge the state. 
71 Ibid. 




It is clear that FARC influence and expansion proceeded, albeit slowly, from its 
inception in 1966. Focused on defensive actions in its early stages, including 
conducting ambushes against Colombian military units, the main military objectives 
were to capture equipment, secure food and supplies, and capture hostages and 
informers. 75 In other words, FARC was predominantly interested in securing its own 
survival against external influences in much the same way the Colombian state had 
done. This initial consolidation of activities was eventually highlighted by the group's 
interest in acquiring accoutrements of an army by beginning to wear uniforms and 
insignia, and establishing a disciplinary code for members engaged in banditry, crimes 
of passion and informing. 76 Strict internal discipline was introduced to keep the group 
members focused on political aims, and to ensure that FARC was not associated with 
bands of criminals. Focused efforts to strengthen the foundation of FARC, combined 
with a general backlash against the Pastrana administration, helped expand the 
groups' territorial presence three-fold between 1979 and 1983, from nine to 27 
fronts. 77 
Adopting Terrorist Tactics 
With an organisational structure in place, FARC leadership were able to shift the 
focus of their Seventh Conference, held in May 1982, to discuss how the group could 
further spread its influence. The proceedings of the Seventh Conference concluded 
that this could be accomplished by systematically expanding their fronts. Each 
existing front was to produce another front, until there was a front located in each of 
75 Chalk (2001), p. 24. 
76 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas. and Politics in Colombia, R-0630-ARPA (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 197 1), pp. 284 1. 
77 Pearce (2000), p. 173. 
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the country's approximately 50 departments. 78 The Conference also conceded that a 
revolutionary situation did exist in Colombia, thereby noting that FARC was officially 
in favour of adopting offensive military tactics to transform itself in response to 
64strong state repression and the growing lack of legitimacy of the Colombian 
regime. 1979 Illustrating this operational shift, FARC added the letters 'EP' (Ejercito del 
Pueblo, People's Army) to its name. In doing so, the group revealed a determination 
to replace its focus on political strategy with a military strategy that would not 
preclude building alliances with other illicit armed groups in order to ultimately seize 
political power. The immediate result of this strategic shift in FARC policy was the 
unleashing of a wave of "chronic political violence. "80 In addition to conducting 
kidnapping operations, FARC claimed responsibility for exploding nine bombs 
against U. S. targets in Cali and Bogota in May 1984, and for setting off a series of 
bomb attacks against U. S. business targets in Bogota and Medellin in February and 
September 1985.81 
This drive towards the use of violence by FARC was met by an equally violent 
response from the Colombian authorities, and used by president-elect Belisario 
Betancur to present a political platform to the Colombian public that focused on 
initiating peace talks. With no real previous government attempt to negotiate with 
FARC, the promise of peace talks resulted in an electoral victory for Betancur (1982- 
1986). After taking office, Betancur declared an amnesty for armed groups - without 
the accompanying requirement to disarm - as well as initiating a 'national dialogue' 
through the creation of a Peace Commission that sought to reshape the Colombian 
78 Chalk, (2001), pp. 24-25. 
79 Pearce (2000), p. 196. 
go Serrcs (2000), p. 197. 
81 Memorial Institute for the Protection from Terrorism (MIPT) Database, University of Oklahoma, 
accessed May 2002 at http: //www. mipt. org. 
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political system. 82 FARC was seen to engage the peace process when its leaders 
signed a ceasefire in 1984 and renounced kidnapping. It also created a political arm in 
1986 (with the CCP and other left-wing organisations) called the Union Patriotica 
(UP), to present candidates for elections. In direct contradiction to the policy 
announced at the Seventh FARC Conference, this move suggested that, despite its 
rhetoric the group never gave "real predominanCe'83 to military objectives over 
political ones. Or, it merely reflected the success of FARC terrorist tactics in forcing 
the government to seek compromise and include FARC in the political process to 
avert future violence. Either way, it was evident that FARC "oscillated between the 
project of seizing power, and the possibility of accepting the present institutions of the 
state, as long as it was possible to modify them through dialogue with the 
,, 84 government . 
As a direct result of establishing the UP, FARC was permitted to participate in the 
1986 local elections, where they won the majority of votes in numerous municipalities 
and also gained 12 congressional seats. 85 The immediate political success of the UP, 
however, was regarded as a direct threat by landowners who did not want land 
ownership issues -a FARC priority - to be discussed in a legitimate political setting. 
Landowners thereby contracted paramilitary units to assassinate influential UP 
members. Often with the tacit or open support of the Colombian Armed Forces, these 
paramilitary groups unleashed "a systematic campaign of extermination against UP 
82 Ibid. 
83 Serres (2000), p. 198. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Jonathan Hartlyn, "Drug Trafficking and Democracy in Colombia in the 1980s, " University of North 
Carolina Working Paper, No. 70 (1993), p. 18. 
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,, 86 officials. Between January 1986 and April 1988, it is estimated that approximately 
334 UP members were killed, including local government officials and a UP 
presidential candidate. 87 These actions posed a significant obstacle to FARCs efforts 
to re-engage in a purely political struggle, and provided rhetorical ammunition that 
could be used by the group as justification for retaliatory violence. At this point, 
political engagement as an option for FARC was severely hampered as the FARC 
leadership and membership would naturally be extremely sceptical of an proposed 
government accommodation in the future. 
Complicating this situation were government allegations that FARC units regularly 
violated their ceasefire agreement, thus giving the impression that some FARC 
members were not serious about engaging in a purely political struggle. Placed in the 
context of a rise in the incidence of paramilitary operations against the UP, FARC 
violations of the ceasefire could be regarded as a necessity as the group naturally felt 
that their political participation was unwelcome. As a result, however, the FARC-EP 
was politically compromised as a "self-reinforcing cycle of polarization appeared to 
be operating whereby UP leaders, lacking trust with regard to their personal safety 
and the democratic process, remained ambiguous with regard to the guerrilla option 
and the use of force; this in turn, helped right-wing groups to justify the use of 
violence against them .,, 
88 The landowner-sponsored campaign against the UP was 
directly responsible for preventing FARC from involvement in public life with any 
degree of normality, thereby blocking the leadership from legitimate electoral 
86 Michael Shifter, "Colombia on the Brink: there goes the neighbourhood, " Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, 
no. 4 (July/August 1999), 
http: //www. foreignpolicy2000. org/library/issuebriefs/readingnotes/fa_shifter. html, accessed 05 March 
2002. See also: Mason, (2001). 
87 Hartlyn (1993), p. 19. It was in fact during the newly elected Virgilio Barco administration (1986- 
1990) that the majority of violence against the UP was conducted. 
88 Hartlyn (1993), pp. 19-20. 
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participation. 89 Most importantly, however, is that violence against FARC-UP 
members left the group sceptical about any future peace negotiations, especially if 
they involved subscribing to a ceasefire. With their military structure intact, FARC 
emerged from this experience with the belief that offensive military tactics were the 
only way in which political influence could be secured in Colombia. 
As a result of acknowledging the utility of violence as a legitimate tool for political 
struggle, FARC conducted sporadic terrorist operations between 1986 and 1990. In 
terms of generating public condemnation against the government's inability to ensure 
personal security, the group focused its efforts on perpetrating kidnap-for-ransoms 
and ambushing military convoys. However, as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, this careful target selection was not done solely to advance political goals but 
had much to do with the associated profits the group collected from these activities. 
FARC fronts also conducted more attacks against small towns outside the group's 
immediate influence, or which appeared to support the government and paramilitary 
units. These operations, however, did not preclude the group from considering 
participation in peace talks, once again, under a new Colombian administration led by 
Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994). Although the Gaviria administration successfully 
negotiated peace with several small guerrilla groups, including the People's 
Liberation Army, it proved unsuccessful in persuading FARC to disarm. This failure 
reflected FARC's previous experiences with peace negotiations which caused the 
group's leadership to demand a broad agenda from the outset. In addition to a 
guarantee that the group could maintain forces in areas where it had exerted 
significant influence, FARC also demanded that the government disband the 
89 Ortiz (2002), p. 134. 
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paramilitaries and restructure the armed forces. 90 Although Gaviria agreed to outlaw 
paramilitary groups, the government measures adopted in this respect were regarded 
as more symbolic than real because the government was unable to exert complete 
control over these entities. As a result, the paramilitaries continued to grow and the 
army "continued to facilitate paramilitary seizures of the most important economic, 
political and military regions, including: Uraba, the banana plantation area; the 
Panama border; and Montes de Maria, an area of big farms near Cartagena. "91 The 
failure to reach common ground for beginning peace talks under the Gaviria 
administration acted as a catalyst for FARC's more focused engagement with 
terrorism. As part of its guerrilla campaign against the Colombian government, FARC 
began to utilise terror tactics against select targets in what appeared to be an attempt 
to directly influence political behaviour within the state. The use of terror tactics in 
this situation is commonly associated with influencing political behaviour when 
compared with historical accounts of terrorism (refer to Chapter 1). From 1992 
onwards, FARC's reliance on the use of terrorism intensified, combining kidnapping 
operations - periodically resulting in the deaths of hostages - with sporadic bombings 
of government and business targets. 
Between 1966 and 1986 FARC activities reveal that the group was primarily focused 
on consolidating itself as a formidable political organisation, and expanding its 
presence and influence - preferably through legitimate political means - throughout 
the Colombian countryside. During these two decades the group was almost 
exclusively focused on its political agenda and showed little interest in adopting the 
use of terror as its primary tactical tool. FARC's decision to use violence offensively 
90 Chalk (2001), p. 72. 
91 Alfredo Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC, " NACLA Report on the Americas, (Sept/Oct 2000), 
http: //www. derechos. net/paulwolf/colombia/molano. htm, accessed 24 February 2002. 
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was perceived by the group as its only remaining option. The failure of its attempts to 
effect change through the Colombian political process resulted in a growing 
disillusionment among FARC leadership and membership base, reinforcing the long- 
held Colombian experience - as previously discussed - that violence was the only 
avenue to power for groups blocked from legitimate politics. This feeling was further 
supported by the common knowledge that the Colombian state failed to "assert 
exclusive authority over all its territory or monopolise the recourse to violent force. "92 
It is thus evident that the breakdown of peace talks in 1986,1991 and 1992 
contributed to the continued reliance on violence by state and non-state actors. 
Furthermore, the inherent weakness of the Colombian state, combined with the 
existence of active illicit armed groups, also facilitated the rise of a parallel criminal 
environment that would become a significant factor in the perpetuation of the use of 
violence by non-state actors seeking economic, political, and social power. 
Illicit Dru-as and the Proliferation of Violence 
The influence of FARC and other non-state actors in Colombia93 grew in parallel to 
the country's expanding illicit drug economy. Drug trafficking became "one of the 
factors that is most closely related to the persistence and intensification of Colombian 
conflict". 94 The rise of the modem illicit drug trade can be traced back to the mid- 
1960s when small-scale drug traffickers organised shipments - primarily of marijuana 
- to an expanding U. S. market. The wealth amassed by these traffickers allowed them 
92 Miguel Ceballos and Gerard Martin, "Colombia: Between Terror and Reform, " Georgetown Journal 
of International Affairsl (Summer/Fall 2001), p. 88. 
93 Such groups include the ELN, the EPL, and M- 19. 
94 Fabio Sanchez, et al. "Conflict, Violent Crime and Criminal Activity in Colombia, " Economics and 
Politics of Civil War Working Paper, (Yale University, November 2002), p. 14. Roberto Steiner and 
Alejandro Corchuelo drew the same conclusion, writing: "the drug trade is one of the best examples of 
an organisation where success is based on the perrnanentý systematic and cumulative use of violence. " 
Quoted in "Economic and Institutional Repercussions of the Drug Trade in Colombia, " CEDE Working 
Paper, (Universidad de los Andes, December 1999), p. 1. 
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to respond to a global surge in drug demand in the late 1970s by expanding their 
operations in the processing and exporting of cocaine. 95 The two groups that gained a 
monopoly over illicit drug exports, and ultimately emerged as the largest producers 
and distributors of cocaine worldwide, were the Medellin and Cali cartels. Cocaine 
demand in the U. S. coupled with the emergence of the drug cartels produced a chain 
of events that resulted in the growth of Colombian coca cultivation by an estimated 50 
per cent between 1966 and 1999 - the source of three-quarters of global cocaine 
96 supplies. By the late 1980s, the Medellin and Cali cartels controlled an estimated 80 
per cent of cocaine exported from Colombia, profiting as much as U. S. $34 billion. 97 
Placed in a national context, according to U. S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates, 
the Colombian drug trade amassed several billion dollars profit annually, thereby 
directly contributing to the economic, political and social power attained by leading 
illicit drug trade actors. 98 
Led by Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the Medellin cartel showed an interest in combining 
their drug wealth with overt political power, and therefore "waged war on the 
Colombian government, killing hundreds of judges, police investigators, journalists 
and public figures. "99 In 1989 alone, the Medellin cartel was responsible for killing 
more than 550 people in a concerted bombing campaign; 100 and during a six month 
period in 1990, the Medellin cartel was blamed for killing approximately 1,700 people 
95 Winifred Tate, "Colombia's Role in the International Drug Industry, " Foreign Policy in Focus, vol. 
4, no. 30 (June 200 1), p. I- 
96 U. S. General Accounting Office, "Narcotics Threat from Colombia Continues to Grow, " 
GAO/NSIAD-99-136 (June 1999), p. 6. 
97 Lee (2002), p. 542. 
98 GAO, (1999), p. 6. 
99 Tate (2001), p. 1. 
100 Ibid. 
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and 400 police officers in 200 bomb explosions, 101 including the bombing of a 
domestic airliner in 1989 that resulted in the death of all 107 passengers. ' 02 MiS 
operational use of terrorism by the Medellin cartel (point 2 on the CTC), combined 
with their in-depth involvement in the drugs trade, resulted in the group's acquisition 
of enough power to "replace the state either functionally or geographically. "' 03 
Functionally the cartel provided an alternative economic structure to farmers, and 
geographically, the cartel was able to exert near exclusive control over territory it 
used to grow coca crops and refine coca paste into cocaine, and traffic the final 
product through the region. Thus while the Colombian government was seeking ways 
to secure territorial control throughout the country in the face of the growing 
opposition posed by armed groups such as FARC, the "power and violence of the 
drug industry came to permeate all facets of Colombian society, as signified by the 
saying "plata o plomo" - silver or lead - meaning 'take the bribe or take the bullet. "I 04 
This environment, often referred to as the Tolombianization' of society, is generally 
characterised by the collapse of state structures and a permanent state of violence, 
including political assassinations, executions and human rights violations. " 105 
As a result of government counter-narcotics efforts, significantly aided by the support 
of the U. S., the Medellin and Cali cartels were disrupted in 1993 and 1994 
respectively. Because these groups controlled the vast majority of the Colombian drug 
trade, the death of Pablo Escobar and the incarceration of the heads of the Cali cartel 
101 Sayaka Fukumi, "The Impact of Andean Cocaine Trafficking: The Cases of Bolivia, Colombia and 
Mexico, " 29" Joint Sessions of Workshops, ECPR, Grenoble, France (6-11 April 200 1), p. 9. 
102 Douglas D. Davids, Narco-Terrorism: a Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace, 
(New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002), p. 24. 
103 Roberto Steiner and Alejandra Corchuelo, "Economic and Institutional Repercussions of the Drug 
Trade in Colombia", Cede, Universidad de los Andes, (December 1999), p. 16. 
104 Tate (200 1), p. 1. 
105 David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies, (Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 83. 
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were intended to significantly reduce illicit drug operations. Instead, these law 
enforcement successes merely replaced large drug syndicates with "smaller, more 
vertically integrated trafficking organisations whose nimble, independent traffickers 
are much more difficult to detect and infiltrate. These traffickers employ new and 
constantly changing shipping routes through Central America, Mexico, and the 
Caribbean for moving cocaine and, increasingly, heroin. "106 These new groUPS, 107 
operating in small, autonomous cells, often contracted work out to specialists who 
were not always part of any integrated structure. 108 Adopting a network approach to 
their organisation as depicted in Figure 5.2, it is evident that contemporary Colombian 
drug trafficking organisations learned from the past mistakes of the large, 
hierarchically structured Cali and Medellin cartels, and recognised that "decentralised 
structures are much less vulnerable. "' 09 As of 2002, Colombian authorities confirmed 
that an estimated 162 drug trafficking organisations with over 4,000 members and ties 
to over 40 international criminal syndicates operated in Colombia. ' 10 Seeking to avoid 
the inherent vulnerabilities of traditional hierarchical cartel structures, the new 
Colombian drug trafficking organisations evolved by incorporating new technologies 
into their operations, and by constantly responding to the shifting political 
landscape. ' 11 
106 Tate (2 00 1), p. 1. 
"' For a very good overview of the evolution of drug trafficking groups in Colombia, see: Michael 
Kenney, "When Criminals Out-Smart the State: Understanding the Leaming Capacity of Colombian 
Drug Trafficking Organisations, " Transnational Organised Crimg, vol. 5, no. I (Spring 1999): 97-119. 
108 Peter Chalk, "Heroin and Cocaine: a global threat, " janeýs Intelligence Review, (January 1998), p. 
6. 
109 Geopolitical Drug Watch, "A Drug Primer for the Late 1990s, " Current History, vol. 97, no. 618 
(1998), p. 15 1. 
"o Cope 2002: 8. 
111 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences, " 
Transnational Organised Crime, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 55. 
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Figure 5.2 Drug Cartel NetNýork"2 
Criminal organisations, like the large cartcls of' the past, however, (li(l not hold 
exclusIve participation rights to the drugs trade in Colombia. Since the decline of the 
cartels, drug trafficking groups have often found it necessary to cooperate with other 
"2 "Colombia's New Crime Structures Take Shape. - Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 14, no. 4 (April 
2002). 
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illicit actors, a situation made easier by the fact that the state was unable to control all 
its territory. The growth and success of any drug cartel therefore grew to depend on 
relations developed with corrupt local, departmental and national officials, and with 
terrorist groups which acquired armed control over key cultivation or transit territory. 
For example, because these smaller, diff-use groups lacked their own resources, they 
quickly came to depend on FARC militants to provide protection. 113 As discussed in 
greater detail in the next section, these relations provided the initial catalyst for the 
emergence of a crime-teffor nexus. 
Entertaining Alliances: a friend of the narco-traffickers, 1982-1994 
Aware that the illicit drug trade in Colombia was growing, FARC's leadership 
initially attempted to distance itself from drug cartels because they feared that illicit 
narcotics represented an 'imperialist' invasion. The predominant belief was that if 
peasants prospered from their involvement in the drug trade, they would stop 
supporting FARC's revolutionary struggle. 114 FARC thus "forbade the cultivation of 
,, 5 coca and marijuana, which they considered counter-revolutionary. 11 This sentiment, 
however, did not last long because elements within FARC recognised that banning 
coca would eventually result in the loss of support from the growing number of 
peasants engaged in coca-fanning. 116 This realisation was highlighted during the 
Seventh FARC Conference (1982), during which the group openly discussed their 
113 Mark S. Steinitz, "The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America's Andean Region, " CSIS 
Policy Papers on the Americas, vol. 13, study 5 (July 2002), p. 9. 
114 Molano (2000). 
115 Chalk (2001), p. 26. 
116 Molano (2000). 
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involvement in the drug trade as a necessary source of funding that could be used to 
build a 'true democracy. ' 117 Narcotics would be exploited 
to create and sustain a liberation army, recruited from marginalized 
parts of society and equipped to be capable of defeating security 
forces, controlling territory in order to isolate cities, undermining 
legitimacy of government at all levels, weakening societal will to 
resist, and ultimately winning the revolutionary struggle. I is 
Faced with the prospect of losing popular support and receiving only limited logistical 
and financial aid from the Communist regimes in the region or the Soviet Union, ' 19 
involvement in the drug trade was rationalised as an organisational necessity for 
financing and support. 
FARC involvement in the Colombian drug trade, however, began on a very limited 
scale, initially restricted to "taxing all facets of the drug trade", 20 and "protecting and 
controlling production areas. " The relationship that subsequently developed between 
FARC and the Colombian drug cartels also included FARC protection of the cartels' 
landing strips and cocaine refining and processing laboratories hidden in the jungles. 
This formed an important strategic alliance because, as outlined above, FARC needed 
to ensure organisational security and the cartels needed a security force that had 
knowledge of the coca-growing territories. Furthermore, because FARC already 
controlled a significant portion of territory the drug cartels needed access to, 
cooperation was more cost effective for the drug cartels than attempting to eliminate 
117 Howard LaFranchi, "Guerrilla Commanders says, 'This is a means', " Christian Science Monito 19 
July 1999. 
118 John A. Cope, "Colombia's War- Toward a New Strategy, " Strategic no. 194 (October 2002), p. 2. 
119 Serres (2000), p. 204. 
120Taxes imposed on drug traffickers and prosperous coca farmers were locally referred to as 'gramaje'. 
In most cases, the tax amounted to a fixed rate of 10 per cent of the profits made from transactions in 
return for protection from the authorities. For more details see: Jorge Orlando Melo, "The Drug Trade, 
Politics and the Economy: the Colombian Experience, " in Elizabeth Joyce and Carlos Malamud eds. 
Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 80. 
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FARC fronts. 121 The alliance (point I on the CTC) that was created between drug 
cartels and FARC thus facilitated FARC's access to "cash and lines of transportation 
and communication"] 22 possessed by organised crime while the cartels received help 
to "protect their assets and project their power within and among nation-states. " 123 
In assessing the relationship that existed between FARC and Colombian narcotics 
traffickers, evidence indicates that ties were "mixed and fluid, containing elements of 
conflict and competition, as well as cooperation and coordination. " 124 For example, 
drug cartels allowed FARC to use their criminal connections to obtain weapons. On 
the one hand, cooperation was evident in a case uncovered in December 1988 when 
Jamaican authorities seized a vessel containing 10 tons of weapons destined for 
FARC militants. Following investigations into the seizure, Jamaican and Colombian 
authorities concluded that Colombian cocaine dealers who worked with FARC had 
underwritten the operation. 125 An example of the tensions between them, on the other 
hand, was a conflict that developed between FARC and the Medellin cartel in 
northern and central Colombia. In order to facilitate its drug operations, the Medellin 
cartel began to force peasants off their land in the late 1980s and simultaneously 
attempted to dislodge FARC in order to cease paying revolutionary taxes. Because the 
militants had a relatively weak presence in these areas, the cartels were able to 
dislodge parts of the group by supporting the rise of small private annies. 126 By the 
1990s the FARC-cartel alliance was best understood geographically: tense relations 
1211t is, however, important to note that the cartels did attempt to eliminate the FARC by supporting 
paramilitary groups. Although the paramilitaries inflicted damage on the FARC, they were unable to 
remove FARC from the southern regions of Colombia. 
122 Manwaring (2002), p. 8. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Steinitz (2002), p. 2. 
125 Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 155. 
126 Steinitz (2002), pp. 4-5. 
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dominated the northern and central regions, and high levels of cooperation prevailed 
in the south where a FARC presence was especially strong. 
FARC's decision to become involved in the illicit narcotics trade generated several 
organisational and operational benefits not previously experienced by the group. The 
greatest immediate significance was that the profits generated from collecting taxes 
provided the necessary financial base for expanding the size of the group's 
membership. Throughout the 1970s, lack of resources limited FARC to maintaining 
an armed strength of 100, whereas by the mid-1980s, the group grew exponentially 
into a force of 2,000-armed militants and an estimated 5,000 political supporters. 127 
Discussed in further detail in the next section, FARC's expanding involvement with 
criminal activities in the 1990s further contributed to a growing membership base, 
culminating in an estimated 18,000 militants by 2001 . 
128 Douglas Davids highlighted 
the importance of this development when he wrote: "So vital to FARC's existence 
were drugs that in May 1984, when a government commission met with FARC 
leaders in the Alto de la Mesa rain forest to negotiate peace, the effort failed because 
the two sides could not reach an agreement on a cessation of drug trafficking. " 129 In 
addition, FARC slowly acquired the knowledge, links and resources needed to Play a 
more direct role in the Colombian drug trade after the downfall of the Medellin and 
Cali cartels. FARC, alongside emerging smaller drug networks, moved to fill the 
vacuum left by the demise of the large cartels and used criminal activities to gain 
maximum political and economic benefits. 
127 James Adams, The Financing of Terrorism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 217; and 
Sanchez et al, (2002), p. 16. 
129 Manwaring (2002), p. 5. 
129 Davids (2002), p. 24. 
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Despite the fact that FARC engaged in limited alliances with the drug trade during the 
period between 1982 and 1994, its decision to venture into criminality had political 
implications. For example, during the 1980s the PCC had begun to distance itself 
from FARC. Although the two groups shared a similar ideological outlook, it became 
evident that their identities had diverged 130 _ suggesting that FARC was no longer 
ideologically close enough to act as the military arm of the PCC. In response to an 
interview question posed in 1993 about FARC ideology, Marulanda himself was 
quoted as saying: 
Within our organisation there is a little of everything. There are 
Marxist-Leninists too. But above all FARC is an armed guerrilla 
organisation which opens its doors to all political, philosophical, 
religious and ideological tendencies, and which brings together people 
with the common ideal of liberating this country. 131 
This relationship was also affected by the decline of communist ideology as a result of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the death of Jacobo Arenas - the FARC's 
ideological commander - in 1990. The death of Arenas, who held major political 
influence over FARC since the 1970s and acted as a personal link between FARC and 
the PCC, produced a natural gap in relations between the two organisations. 132 niS 
post-Cold War ideological crisis reduced the credibility of Marxist-Leninism amongst 
FARC members, thereby creating an ideological void through which increased 
participation in illicit activities could be justified. This is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
In distancing themselves from their historical affinity to Communist ideology, 
coupled with rapidly expanding financial resources, FARC leaders attempted to 
130 Ortiz (2002), pp. 133-134. 
131 Carlos Arango, FARC: Veinte Anos. De MaEguetalia a la Uribe, (Bogota: Ediciones Aurora, 1984), 
p 
,; 2120. Ortiz (2002), p. 135. 
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devise a new structure and programme for political mobilisation. As Ortiz notes, the 
FARC "separated themselves from the Communist crisis since their new political 
agenda does not propose the transformation of the state in accordance with certain 
ideological principles, but rather the construction of a new one that is simply more 
efficient. 433 The group thus created a clandestine party based on a network of cells 
called Nucleos de Solidaridad to focus on attaining the FARC's traditional 
agricultural claims, "presenting an offer to completely reform the Colombian state and 
its economy. "' 34 Despite acknowledging and benefiting from the lucrative trade in 
illicit narcotics, FARC's leadership and membership continued to ascribe to political 
aims and motivations. This was further reflected in the evolving membership of the 
group, from predominantly relying on land labourers in the 1980s, to attracting a 
following with an intellectual background from the urban middle classes, 
' 35 thereby 
providing "the FARC with the intellectual potential to develop its own differentiated 
ideological line and to crystallize a political identity distinct from that of the 
Communist Party. "136 
Unlike many guerrilla groups operating in Colombia at the time (including M- 19 and 
the EPL), FARC did not choose to end their campaign of violence as a result of the 
elimination of material and strategic support from abroad after the end of the Cold 
War. Instead, FARC learned how to harness its alliance with drug cartels, thereby 
securing finance for their "war efforts by taxing and protecting coca and opium-poppy 
related production, processing and distribution facilities as well as by kidnapping and 
133 Ortiz (2002), p. 13 1. 
134 Ortiz (2002), p. 134. 
135 Ortiz (2002), p. 135. 
136 Ibid. 
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extortion. "' 37 Providing drug cartels with protection from anti-cartel campaigns 
perpetrated by the Colombian National Police with the support of the U. S. enabled 
FARC to purchase weapons, and ultimately support an influx of new draftees. 138 As a 
result, the two illicit groups with vastly different goals equally benefited from a 
strategic and tactical alliance. At the point of entering this "marriage of political 
convenience" 139 both groups shared a common goal, which was to destabilise and 
undermine the government. For FARC, this was facilitated by the fact that it became 
"a serious factor due to the power which came from drugs grown by a marginalized 
population. , 140 
Adopting an Internal Organised Crime Capacity: 1994-1999 
The dissipation of the large drug cartels that operated in Colombia until the early 
1990s, combined with a rising global demand for drugs, created a vacuum within the 
domestic drug trade. Although the new decentralised drug trafficking groups secured 
their place in the illicit Colombian drug trade, the demise of the cartels, which 
provided a high degree of order and control in the industry, "emboldened Colombia's 
various guerrilla organisations to enter the business of refining, trading, and exporting 
drugs. "141 Contributing to this predicament was the simultaneous demise of coca 
supply from Bolivia and Peru in the 1990s, which resulted in additional crops being 
moved across the border into predominantly FARC-controlled territories in southern 
137 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 4. 
138 Ibid., p. 5. 
139 Ehrenfeld (2003), p. 160. 
140 Thomas Marks, "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, " U. S. Army War College - 
Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper (January 2002), p. 8. 
141 Rensselaer W. Lee, "Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy, " Qrbis, vol. 46, no. 3 
(Summer 2002), p. 539. 
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Colombia. 142 This increased the economic opportunities (in production, processing 
and marketing of illicit drugs) for large numbers of migrants who were attracted to 
these coca-growing areas, eventually resulting in numerous migrants accepting the 
,, 143 FARC as "the main guardians of their newfound 'narco-economy'. 
Despite the successful alliances created between FARC and drug trafficking 
organisations, by 1994 the emphasis on building and maintaining alliances had 
become less of a priority for FARC. This was due to several factors, including the 
repercussions of the downfall of the Medellin and Cali cartels on the way that the 
illicit drug trade in Colombia was structured. Equally relevant, however, was the 
appearance that FARCs leadership was keen to eliminate potential vulnerabilities 
associated with engaging in long-term alliances. For example, the longer alliances 
operate, the greater the chance that group activities could be compromised via the 
penetration of informants, or by the other party in the alliance. The FARC activities 
outlined in the following sections reveal that long-term alliances with drugs cartels 
were feared because they could compromise some FARC fronts by completely 
integrating them into the drugs trade. This would have a direct impact on the ability of 
FARC command to assert control throughout its membership, and it threatened to 
create confusion over FARC aims and direction. 
FARC activities between 1995 and 1999 revealed that the group attempted to seek 
control over aspects of the illicit drug trade to reduce its dependence on drug cartel 
142 Sanchez et al., (2002), p. 15. Sanchez cites that in 1990 there were 20,000 hectares of coca 
cultivated, whereas by 2000,160,000 hectares of coca were cultivated in the country. See also: U. S. 
State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Rep2 (Washington, D. C., March 2002). 
143 Camilo Echandia Castilla, El Conflicto Armado Y las MAnifestaciones de ]a Violencia en las 
Regiones de Colombial Presidencia de ]a Republica de Colombia, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para 
]a Paz, (Bogota, 2000), p. 79, as quoted in Chalk, (2001), p. 17. 
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operations and increase its own profit margins. Asserting itself at a time when the 
major cartels were being targeted by the authorities ultimately elevated FARC to a 
position of operational advantage because it was one of the only established groups in 
Colombia that had the resources and knowledge to successfully navigate through the 
international drugs trade. Thus by 2000 it was estimated that 61 per cent of FARC- 
controlled territory was directly used for cocaine cultivation. 144 
Prior to the FARC's involvernent in the narcotics trade in the 1980s, the group 
engaged in a variety of other criminal activities - albeit to a very limited extent. For 
example, FARC began its involvement in crime by extorting protection money from 
landowners, 145 and conducting kidnap-for-ransom operations. 146 Between 1987 and 
1996, the majority of kidnappings were conducted in agricultural and cattle-raising 
areas in FARC strongholds 147 in eastern Colombia. By focusing on resource-rich 
areas, FARC derived at least one-fifth of its income from kidnapping operations 
during this period. 148 Asserting itself as a guerrilla group in the country, kidnapping 
also appeared to be used as the FARC's primary tool of intimidation. In 1999 alone 
the group was responsible for conducting 2,465 kidnappings - averaging six per 
day. 149 Between January 1995 and January 2001,7748 kidnappings - worth an 
estimated U. S. $80 million annually - were reported to the authorities. 
150 
1" Interpol, (2000). 
145 Pearce (2000), p. 173. 
146 Chalk (2001), p. 33. 
147 According to Chalk, (2001), the FARC grew in the 1980s by expanding their operations in resource 
rich areas, including: the eastern plains (cattle), Uraba and Santander (commercial agriculture), the 
middle Magdalena valley (oil), and Antioquia (gold). 
148 Chalk, (2001), p. 34. 
149 Michael Radu, "The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas, " Orbis vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer 2000), p. 
368. 
15ORochlin (2003), p. 120. Despite these apparently high numbers, Rochlin noted that most kidnappings 
actually went unreported for fear of reprisals. 
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Although considerable profits were amassed through kidnapping, as previously 
mentioned, it was the drug trade that offered FARC access to an unparalleled source 
of profit. The potential for profit acquisition was increased between 1995 and 2000 
when coca production in Colombia more than doubled in the FARC's southern 
strongholds of Guaviare, Caqueta and Putumayo. 15 1 By the late 1990s, Colombian 
government authorities estimated that the FARC received 48 per cent of its income 
from drugs, 36 per cent from extortion, 8 per cent from kidnapping, 6 per cent from 
cattle rustling, and the remainder from bank robberies. 152 Although exact figures of 
FARC income are not known, the same source estimates that in 1998 combined 
annual illicit profits from Colombian terTorist groups included: U. S. $551 million 
from drugs, 153 U. S. $311 from extortion, and U. S. $236 from kidnappings. 
Substantial financial resources combined with a growing membership base also 
facilitated FARC's territorial expansion from 173 municipalities in 1985 to 622 (out 
of a total of 1050) in 1995.1 54 In view of FARC's stated political interest of 
overrunning and taking over the government, its territorial presence in large parts of 
the state illustrates how successful FARC was in denying the government of 
Colombia the traditional functions associated with a state including control over its 
own territory. Whether intentional or not, by providing peasants with a structure of 
social support, including provisions that traditionally fell under the responsibility of 
the acting government, FARC gained a degree of legitimacy that ultimately 
151 Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land. Divided Society, (New York: 
9pen University Press, 2002), pp. 362-363. 
15- Alfredo Range] Sanchez, "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy in 
Colombia, " Journal of International Affairs, 53 (Spring 2000), p. 585. 
133 Jeremy McDermott, Colombia correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation has written 
that the FARC earns at least 60 percent of its income from drugs trafficking, estimated to be U. S. $300 
million. See: Jeremy McDermott, "FARC and the Paramilitaries Take Over Colombia's Drug Trade, " 
Jane's Intelligence Review July 2004. 
1-54 "Survey of Colombia, " Ihe Economis4 21-27 April 2001. 
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contributed to the political threat it posed. Detailed in the next section, a stable source 
of finance from the illicit narcotics trade ultimately pushed FARC into playing a more 
prominent role in the drugs trade, creating more revenue, and posing an even greater 
threat to the state - economically, environmentally, politically, and militarily. 
This period of FARC evolution denotes the beginning of its transformation from an 
ideological movement to a movement with a "light ideological payload but offering 
'good govemment'. "155 This strategy was further facilitated when the govermnent 
agreed to establish a 13,000 square kilometre demilitarised zone (DMZ) for FARC as 
a geographic setting (i. e. no go zone) from which peace talks could continue. The 
DMZ was also a demand set by FARC's leadership prior to releasing several dozen 
captured Colombian soldiers they held hostage. In addition to exerting control over 
territory, securing a DMZ and dictating the terms of peace talks illustrated the group's 
ability to exert political pressure on the government. The granting of a DMZ 
confirmed that sovereignty in Colombia was not a "privilege of the state" but was 
shared with non-state actors. 156 Although this could be perceived as the group 
securing its political agenda, FARC actions within the DMZ - as will be discussed in 
the next section - also revealed that this period acted as a catalyst for the 
abandonment of FARC's original political aims and motivations by a significant 
proportion of the group's membership. 
By finding an alternative source of revenue in the illicit narcotics trade, FARC was 
able to remain operational in the same immediate post-Cold War environment that 
witnessed the demise of many other armed left-wing movements in Latin America. 
155 Ortiz (2002), p. 135. 
l-'6 Serres (2000), p. 213. 
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The group's growing engagement in the drugs trade, however, begs the question of 
whether FARC used "the discourse of ideological combat", while acting as "an 
efficient business organisation that takes advantage of the possibilities offered by the 
drug trade, kidnapping and extortion. "' 57 Instead of declining into an entity relegated 
to Colombia's violent history, FARC has "undergone a rapid adaptation to the new 
strategic scenario which, apart from guaranteeing its survival, has enabled it to comer 
the Bogota government in political and military terms. "158 In other words, FARC 
manipulated the Colombian criminal environment to strengthen its capacity for 
survival, and to continue to pose a serious challenge to the state. It became "an 
insurgent organisation with a new profile, considerable political flexibility, 
sophisticated military strategies, and increasing logistic autonomy.,, ' 59 Thus, it Was 
not until FARC became a major player in the drug trade that it moved from being a 
marginal political actor, to a political actor with considerable strength. ' 60 The 
successful relationship with organised crime, and specifically the illicit drugs trade, 
allowed the group simultaneously to integrate criminal and terrorist activities into its 
operations, supporting political aims with criminal intent and vice-versa (point 3 on 
the CTC). This convergence of interests and motivations also increased and 
intensified the security threat posed by FARC to Colombia's neighbouring states and 
to the international community. 
An Era of Convergence: 1999 - 2003 
The expansion of FARC's activities into the Colombian drug trade ultimately fostered 
its evolution into a hybrid organisation that was simultaneously terrorist and criminal. 
157 Serres (2000), p. 191-192. 
158 Ortiz (2002), p. 127. 
159 Ortiz (2002), p. 130. 
160 Marks (2002), p. 8. 
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Facilitated by an environment conducive to illicit activities, the convergence between 
terrorism and organised crime in Colombia was a logical progression - essentially 
following the trajectory of a trend that began decades earlier. The overarching 
question, therefore, that needs to be addressed is whether FARC is an example of a 
group that simultaneously operates in two distinctly different realms (one political, the 
other criminal), or whether it has entirely transformed into an entity located at the 
opposite end of the CTC from which it originally began. Based on the evidence 
provided in the remainder of this chapter, it will be shown that by the early years of 
the 21" century FARC exemplified a group that favoured profit-maximisation. 
'Black Holes'and the Sustained Use of Terror Tactics 
Although FARC increased its involvement in the Colombian narcotics trade between 
1999 and 2003, during this period the group leadership maintained that it was 
committed to a political agenda - the destruction of the government of Colombia, and 
the eradication of the U. S. imperialist presence in Latin America. Repeatedly denying 
that it was primarily interested in securing profits from its criminal enterprise, 
FARC's leadership consistently stated that the group existed to serve the needs of the 
people of Colombia. 161 Despite this political rhetoric, however, FARC failed to take 
advantage of several successive government attempts at initiating peace negotiations 
since 1991 and it expanded its practice of using terror tactics against the civilian 
population. Even when FARC seriously considered engaging in a dialogue with the 
authorities, historical mistrust of the government's inability to follow through on 
previous commitments fuelled discontent amongst many front commanders who were 
'61 This is confirmed in the various FARC communiqu6s, reproduced on its website 
http: //www. farcep. org. Refer to communiquis of 12 July 2003,22 June 2003, and 27 May 2003. 
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no longer willing to secure political legitimacy "at the expense of the profits from 
drug deals and ransoms. "162 
There remain some indications that FARC still seeks to espouse a political agenda that 
it is seeking to fulfil through the use of terror tactics. Officially, its fundamental 
objective is to take power by winning over the hearts and minds of the people. 163 
Unofficially, however, the group's political agenda parallels that of traditional 
organised crime groups, which is to secure criminal activities by coercing or co-opting 
the authorities. Thus the focus on the use of terror tactics by the FARC at the end of 
the 1990s, and again after 2002, could be viewed as wide-scale intimidation used to 
elicit submission from the government and civil servants. More practically, the 
sustained use of terrorism also exacerbated the security threat posed by FARC against 
the economic, military, political, and societal sectors of Colombia and the wider 
region. 
Between 1994 and 1998 peace negotiations between the government and FARC were 
at a standstill, in part because of questions raised about the legitimacy of the 
presidency of Ernesto Samper following revelations that his election campaign was 
financed by organised crime. 164 Of greater relevance for FARC, however, was the fact 
that Samper supported the use of state terror by the Colombian military, which led to 
the rise of paramilitary groups. This period witnessed the targeting of FARC-UP 
members, resulting in the death of an estimated 2,000 members by 1995. With no 
recourse other than the use of violence, this development provided an additional 
162 Buscaglia and Ratliff, (2001), p. vii. 
163 Refer to: http: //www. farcep. org, official FARC website, accessed 22 October 2003. 
164 Jordan (1999), p. 82. It is believed that Samper received approximately U. S. $6 million. Arlene 
Tickner, "Colombia: Chronicle of a Crisis Foretold, " Current History, vol. 97, no. 616 (1998), p. 64. 
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reason for FARC to be extremely sceptical of entering into cease-fires. 165 This 
scepticism was deflected in 1998 with the granting of the DMZ by the newly elected 
President Pastrana, a measure which reflected FARC's ability to force the government 
to submit to its demands. Even in the context of peace talks, FARC manipulated the 
DMZ to sharpen its terror tactics, prepare a focused assault on the government, and 
expand its criminal activities (this last point will be discussed in the next section). 
While the FARC leadership engaged in discussions with the government, the DMZ 
, 466 became "a state within a state, with its own police, courts and administration. 
Located at the centre of Colombia, the DMZ not only facilitated greater FARC 
activity in the drug trade, but it also became an exceptional military base from which 
the FARC launched armed attacks in other regions, while also establishing new coca 
plantations. 167 This gave FARC a considerable controlling presence in approximately 
200 municipalities throughout Colombia, where the group essentially replaced the 
state's "provision of law, order, and social services. " 168 FARC activities within the 
DMZ, but also in areas with a large FARC presence, highlighted the erosion of the 
state's ability to "carry out legitimising functions. "169 In challenging the ability of the 
government to ftilfil its obligation of providing goods and services to its citizens 
(including medical services, water supplies, education, housing and transportation 
infrastructure), by the end of the twentieth century the FARC had considerably 
threatened the Colombian political secton' 70 In essence, the DMZ came to represent a 
165 Serres (2000), p. 198. 
166 Radu (2000), p. 373. 
167 Radu (2000), p. 373. 
168 Alredo Rangel Sanchez (1998), p. 580. 
169 Manwaring (2002), p. 14. 
170 John Martz, The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia, New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 7. 
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'black hole' (point 4 on the CTC) that proved essential to FARC's evolution into a 
criminal actor. 
The haven provided to FARC in the shape of the demilitarised zone gave the group an 
opportunity to evolve strategically. Faced with limited opposition, FARC improved its 
ability to conduct "larger and more complex operations". 171 The group also conducted 
premeditated acts of violence, often against targets not explicitly identified as the 
group's enemies. For example, in comparing FARC capabilities throughout its 
development, Ortiz (2002) notes that in 1973 the group could only coordinate armed 
attacks with 50 combatants in a single operation, whereas by 1996 it was able to 
deploy 400 combatants on five fronts with the support of Special Forces units. By the 
end of the 1990s, the group consisted of 15,000 militants (rising to an estimated 
20,000 by 2002 172 ) distributed in 60 fronts located throughout the country. ' 73 For 
example, in August 1996 the FARC coordinated a night attack on a Colombian 
military base in the Putumayo district, killing 54 soldiers, wounding 17, and taking 60 
hostages. 174 In March 1998 between 600 and 800 FARC militants destroyed an elite 
army unit in the southern department of Caqueta, killing 107 of 154 soldiers. 175 By 
2000 the FARC was conducting coordinated attacks against several targets, for 
example in January of that year 800 militants attacked military and police positions in 
three towns, while simultaneously cutting off land communications between Bogota 
and Villavicencio. 176 According to Ortiz this increased capability emerged from 
improved command and control, the introduction of new communications 
171 Ortiz (2002), p. 136. 
172 McLean (October 2002), p. 2. Figures of FARC strength quoted by the Colombian Ministry of 
Defence, as quoted in Cope, (2002), p. 8, include: 5,000 in 1990,11,930 in 1998, and 16,980 in 2002. 
173 Mason (200 1), p. 12. 




equipment, 177 the development of special units, and the support that came with 
employing heavy weapons (i. e. mortars, rocket launchers and surface to air missiles). 
All of these factors were attained as a result of access to a relatively constant flow of 
financing provided by the drugs trade, and the training that the FARC was able to 
exercise in the DMZ. These examples highlight the threat the FARC came to Pose 
against the military sector, demonstrating that the government was unable to maintain 
itself against internal threats, posing a direct challenge to "the claim of exclusive right 
to self-government over a specified territory and its population. " 178 
Although the structure of FARC was established well before the group was given a 
DMZ, three years of relatively unobstructed existence produced organisational 
changes which contributed to the group's ability to conduct sophisticated and 
coordinated attacks. FARC was structured along three hierarchical levels, with fronts 
(fighting units composed of approximately 100 members) occupying the lowest 
levels. 179 Fronts were organised into blocks, which controlled FARC operations in 
specific geographic areas. Finally, the highest level of FARC consisted of a general 
staff protected by a security force of an estimated 2,000 militants and Special 
Forces. 180 Although originally organised as a hierarchical structure, by 2000 orders 
and resources were no longer dictated by the general staff Instead, decisions came to 
be increasingly made at the front level. Although the general staff continued to 
coordinate large-scale attacks, often against government targets, fronts increasingly 
planned and conducted small-scale attacks at their discretion. The increasing 
177 An overview of FARC's use of their financial wealth to purchase more sophisticated weapons and 
communications equipment is provided in "FARC's Innovative Artillery, " Jane's Intelligence Review 
(December 1999). 
178 Buzan (1998), p. 49. 
179 Chalk (2001), pp. 27-29. 
180 Ortiz (2002), p. 140. 
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independence of fronts is largely due to their control of the ma ority of the FARC's 
economic resources, which also gives fronts some role in determining how resources 
are divided between units, blocks, and the general staff. FARC has thus developed "a 
wide range of multiorganisational supporting networks. "18 1 But while FARC's 
organisation permitted a high degree of group flexibility, these structural changes also 
facilitated the emergence of internal factions. This is an extremely important factor 
which contributed to an increase in the number of FARC fronts which focused their 
efforts on criminal activities for profit. By 2000 there was nothing within the FARC 
structure, including a sense of shared ideology, that could stop a front or block 
commander from appropriating funds at their will, highlighting "a guerrilla 
organisation characterised by weak ideological cohesion. "' 82 
Despite advocating political objectives since its inception, FARC's engagement with 
criminal activities - as discussed in the next section - has marginalized the group from 
the Colombian political arena. The group has therefore lost any serious interest in 
becoming involved in the political process because of its distraction by criminal 
activities and because the public perception of FARC's involvement in the drugs trade 
began to undermine the legitimacy it had previously enjoyed. In spite of sporadically 
appearing willing to enter into peace talks, the fact that FARC was increasingly 
equated with illicit narcotics operations became a symptom of the group's "gradual 
degeneration. "' 83 The Colombian government's perception that FARC had become 
preoccupied with criminality obstructed attempts to secure peace negotiations, and 
eventually caused the government to lose interest in conducting negotiations with the 
group. Thus in February 2002, after FARC was held responsible for the hijacking of 
181 Chalk et al, (2001), p. 37. 
1 g2 Ortiz (2002), p. 140. 
193 Serres (2000), p. 198. 
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an Avianca flight carrying a Colombian senator amongst other passengers, President 
Pastrana ordered the Colombian armed forces to enter the FARC DMZ and reassert 
government control. ' 84 The successful military repossession of the DMZ was possible 
through the U. S. initiated Plan Colombia. 185 Primarily focused on counter-narcotics 
and specifically dislodging FARC, through Plan Colombia the U. S. injected hundreds 
of millions of dollars into Colombia to professionalise the military, provide new 
military equipment, and train Colombian authorities in the extensive use of 
surveillance and biological warfare agents (to be used against coca crops). 186 This 
concerted government backlash against FARC continued after the May 2003 election 
of President Avaro Uribe on a platform 187 of continuing the military campaign against 
terrorism. By increasing the Colombian military budget from two per cent to three per 
cent of gross domestic product, Uribe employed more police and established groups 
of peasant forces. 188 As a result, by the end of 2003 fewer than 70 municipalities, as 
opposed to over 150 in the previous year, were without a police presence. 189 
Internal fractures, a growing reliance on organised crime, and the avoidance of 
legitimate forms of political participation all appeared to accommodate the increased 
use of terror perpetrated against an expanding list of targets. Government attempts to 
reassert greater control, with support from the U. S., merely unleashed a wave of 
194 Testimony of Asa Hutchinson, Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator, before the U. S. House 
Committee on International Relations, (24 April 2002), 
httP: //www. ciponfine. org/colombia/02042403. htm, accessed on 05 May 2003. 
185 In addition to providing anti-narcotics aid, the main driving force of Plan Colombia was to debilitate 
the FARC. See: Rochlin (2003). 
186 Rochlin (2003), pp. 155-157. 
187 Uribe's plan, referred to as his policy of defence and democratic security, was based on four aims: 
to consolidate state control over terrorism; to protect the population; to eliminate the illicit drugs trade; 
and, to ensure the efficiency and transparency of contracts and government operations. See: Jeremy 
McDermott, "Uribe Gains the Upper Hand in Colombia's Guerrilla War, " Jane's Intelligence Review, 




terrorism in Colombia that expanded from the targeting of government forces in rural 
areas and economic targets'90 (i. e. oil pipelines'91 and electricity pylons), to the 
targeting of urban centres and directed bombing campaigns against the civilian 
population. As has occurred in the past, FARC responded to its new operational 
environment by readjusting its tactics. The absence of a DMZ from which large 
military campaigns could be organised forced the group to prioritise the use of small 
units to conduct quick and focused attacks, and then retreat into FARC-controlled 
areas of jungle and mountain strongholds. 192 For example, in 2002 and 2003 bombs 
were detonated at restaurants and nightclubs in urban centres, reflected in the 
examples noted in Table 5.1.193 FARC attacks against entire villages and public places 
were indicative of its strategy to "instil fear in the targeted population to either 
support the group or else suffer horrific consequences. "' 94 These tactics contradict 
FARC claims that it was fighting on behalf of the Colombian people, because most of 
its victims were neither rich, nor part of the 'corrupt oligarchy' the group officially 
sought to overthrow. 195 The extent of FARC's interest in targeting civilians was also 
noted by Human Rights Watch, which criticised the group in 2000 for the documented 
murder of 496 civilians. 196 In addition to this, FARC has intensified its 'hit and run' 
tactics against state targets (see Table 5.2 for examples) - an ability attained as a 
result of the reorganisation of the group's structure into small units. 
190 Between January and May 2002, the FARC bombed 170 electricity pylons, and have also damaged 
several reservoirs and water mains. Jeremy McDermott, "FARC Widens Terrorist Targets, " Jane's 
Intelligence Review, (May 2002), httpJ/www. janes. com, accessed 20 April 2002. 
... FARC targeting of oil pipelines has caused considerable enviromnental damage. Between 1986 and 
2001 an estimated 2.6 million barrels of oil was spilled in Colombia as a result of FARC-bombings - 
II times more than the Alaskan Exxon Valdez disaster. New York Timesl 16 August 2001. 
192 McDermott (December 2003). 
193 Jeremy McDermott, "FARC Widens Terrorist Targets, " Jane's Intelligence Reviewl (May 2002), 
httr): //www. ianes. com, accessed 20 April 2002. 
194 Rochlin (2003), p. 138. 
195 McDermott (May 2002). 
196 Rochlin (2003), p. 138. 
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Table 5.1: Ch-Wan Targets' 97 
2002 
May Mortar bomb explodes at a church in Choco province (117 killed) 
August Mortar fired at President Alviro Uribe's swearing in ceremony at the 
presidential palace in Bogotd (21 killed) 
October Bicycle bomb detonated close to a police station in a Bogotd neighbourhood 
(2 killed, 36 injured) 
December Car bomb detonated in the car park of a Bogotd supermarket (69 injured) 
2003 
February Car bomb detonated at the exclusive El Nogal club in Bogotd (36 killed, 160 
injured) 
March Vehicle bomb detonated in a car park of a shopping centre in C? cuta (13 
killed, 70 injured) 
August Bomb detonated in a ferry in Meta province, exploded as boat docked on a 
busy quay (5 killed, 40 injured) 
September Two bombs exploded simultaneously in Pasto near office buildings (2 killed) 
Bomb strapped to a horse detonated in a crowded market in the north-eastern 
Colombian town of Chita (8 killed, 20 injured) 
Motorcycle bomb detonated outside nightclub in Florencia as people were 
leaving (I I killed, 46 injured) 
October Car bomb detonated in central Bogoti's commercial area (6 killed, 12 
injured) 
Motorcycle bomb detonated by remote control in a busy district of south 
Bogotd (10 killed, 50 injured) 
November Bombs detonated in two bars within seconds of one another on the same 
night in BogotA (I killed, 72 injured) 
Table 5.2: State Targets (Military and Political) 
2002 
October Grenade thrown at a truck carrying policemen (I killed, 28 injured) 
November Three mortar rounds fired at the headquarters of the Prosecutor General's 
office (2 injured) 
December Briefcase bomb exploded in Hotel Tequendama, a favourite gathering place 
for congressmen (23 injured) 
2003 
January Vehicle bomb exploded in car park next to the Prosecutor General's office in 
Medellin (5 killed, over 40 injured) 
Car bomb detonated in Arauca province as a military patrol was passing (7 
killed) 
197 These examples were compiled from the Jane's Terrorism Watch Report, and from the terrorism 
database at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University. 
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February Bomb detonated in a house in southern Colombia as security forces 
responded to a call (17 killed, 35 injured) 
October Two local mayors assassinated in Cauca department 
In the run-up to regional elections, 25 candidates are assassinated - directly 
contributing to the withdrawal of 160 others 
FARC's sustained interest in conducting terror tactics as a way to maintain influence 
over the people and government of Colombia confirms the group's terrorist nature. 
Over the years the group has increased its dependence on the use of premeditated 
violent acts, which created fear within society in general, and within certain levels of 
government more specifically (i. e. local government). This has been accomplished by 
carefully selected targeting, often dictated by the level of attention and influence the 
FARC sought to attract. The strategy that dictates FARC operations is 
designed to render parts of the country ungovernable and instil terror 
in the cities. Attacks on the national infrastructure are intended to 
damage the government's exchequer and drain funds available to fight 
the war, as well as sap the urban populations will to support the 
struggle against insurgency. This strategy has also shown an increasing 
disregard for civilian casualties and an adoption of the paramilitary 
technique of targeted massacres. 198 
Sentiments of fear associated with FARC terror tactics have subsequently turned the 
group into an entity capable of intimidating and coercing a targeted audience into 
acting according to FARC demands. Most obviously at the local level (i. e. through 
forcing peasant support), the group has also successfully influenced political 
behaviour. For exarnple, although Colombia holds regular democratic elections, illicit 
armed groups including FARC commonly assassinate leaders, candidates and elected 
politicians. Between 1989 and 1999 the group murdered 138 mayors and 569 
members of parliament, deputies and city council, along with 174 public officials in 
198 "Rebels Kill Six Police, - Jane's Terrorism Watclý Reporý 02 December 2003, http: //www. janes. com 
(downloaded 20 December 2003). 
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other positions. 199 This trend continued in 2002 when FARC specifically demanded 
the resignation of all departmental, municipal and village officials in the run-up to the 
elections. As a result of the failure of state power to react to FARC threats against the 
political participants, over 200 officials "heeded these threats .,, 
200 Although these 
attacks produced political results, it could also be argued that the driving motivation 
behind them was to ease FARC's ability to conduct criminal activities. 
Even though FARC has not destroyed its opposition - the government of Colombia - 
it has outlived ten administrations which have come to power since its inception. It is 
primarily FARC's ability to contribute to breaking the political will of governments 
unable to secure political legitimacy, state sovereignty, or social stability that is 
largely responsible for the group's longevity. The failure of successive governments 
to significantly undermine or disrupt FARC further contributes to the group's relative 
success. 
FARC as a Criminal Or-aanisation 
Although FARC engages in extortion and kidnapping 201 operations, the group's main 
criminal activities are focused on the drug trade. FARC expanded its involvement in 
the drug trade significantly after 1998 when coca and opium cultivation in Colombia 
multiplied. 202 Regardless of the group's political rhetoric, evidence of FARCs direct 
involvement in illicit narcotics processing and trafficking reflects its transforination 
199 Manwaring, (2002), p. 13. 
200 John A. Cope, "Colombia's War: Toward a New Strategy, " Strategic No. 94 (October 2002), p. 3. 
201 According to the non-governmental organisation, Pais Libre Foundation, in 2002 alone the FARC 
were responsible for committing 778 abductions. McDermott, (January 2002). 
202 Buscaglia and Ratliff, (2001), p. 16. Coca cultivation increased primarily along the Ecuadorian and 
Peruvian borders in the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta, and in the northern departments of 
Bolivar, Norte de Santander and Guaviare. Opium poppy cultivation, on the other hand, increased on 
the eastern side of the Central Cordillera Mountains in the departments of Cauca, Huila and Tolima. 
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into a traditionally defined organised crime group that uses terror tactics for 
operational purposes. FARC has evolved beyond the operational use of criminal 
activities as a source of financing, to conducting terrorist operations in support of their 
criminal agenda. 
Allegations of the group's direct interest in focusing on criminal enterprises first 
appeared in 1996 when FARC was accused of pressuring remnants of the Cali cartel 
to abandon between seven and ten cocaine processing laboratories in Caqueta, and 
five to six tons of stored cocaine. 203 Caqueta's status as a long-time FARC stronghold 
ensured that considerable attention was paid to this allegation, which was 
strengthened after the leading Colombian current affairs magazine, Semana, published 
an investigation in 2000 about the drug activities of the FARC's 16 th Front, operating 
from the Guainia department between 1996 and 1998. According to Semana, this 
front was specifically used to traffic narcotics, raising an estimated U. S. $15 million 
within the reported two-year period. 204 Despite these early assertions, it was not until 
after 1999 that there was significant documented evidence of FARC's preoccupation 
with the drugs trade. This involvement in narcotics has blurred the underlying aims 
and motivations of the group to the extent that "it is arguable that financial gain has 
become the overriding motivation, rather than simply a means to support a political 
agenda. , 205 
One of the first indications that FARC was beginning to exhibit a direct interest in 
conducting crime for profit was revealed in the after-math of a May 1999 drug raid 
conducted by the Colombian authorities. The raid resulted in the death of the group's 
203 Lee (2002), pp. 543-544. 204 
"Se Busca, " Semana (04 September 2000), pp. 4042. 205 
Dishman, (200 1), pp. 50-5 1. 
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financial chief, Jos6 Prieto, and revealed a detailed FARC plan to use U. S. $3 million 
from cocaine sales to purchase assault rifles. 206 Despite indicating a sustained interest 
in amassing weapons to continue using terror tactics, this case proved that FARC was 
directly involved in drug trafficking -a claim that the group's leadership consistently 
refuted - and amassing significant profits. The extent to which the group was 
involved in the drug trade was further reflected in April 2000 allegations that FARC 
ordered peasants in Caqueta to grow coca, and subsequently forced them to sell their 
yield to a FARC-controlled monopoly. 207 Instead of forwarding the cultivated coca to 
laboratories traditionally run by criminal organisations (as had been done in the past), 
trends that developed throughout 2000 strongly indicated that FARC secured the skills 
needed to manage their own laboratories to process cocaine base. 208 Furthermore, in 
November 2000 a FARC member was arrested in Mexico following evidence that he 
was trading cocaine to the Mexican Tijuana cartel . 
209 The implication of this was that 
FARC was involved in international aspects of the trade, and thus could "represent [a] 
self-contained or vertical cartel engaged in all aspects of cultivation, production and 
,, 210 sales. Its involvement in the drugs trade no longer limited to securing territory on 
behalf of criminal groups, by 2000 it was apparent that FARC endeavoured to play a 
direct role in the international drug trade, making the group comparable to any 
traditional drug mafia. 
The intensified involvement of FARC in the drugs trade directly resulted in rising 
annual profits. By 2000 Interpol officials estimated that FARC made U. S. $500 
206 "Colombia in the Long Shadow of War, " The Economis (17 July 1999), p. 31. 
207 Refer to McDermott (2000). 
208 Lee (2002), p. 544. 
209Revista Cambio 3-20 November 2000, http: //www. cambio. com. co/20001113/paisi. html 
(downloaded 17 January 2001). 
210 Rochlin (2003), pp. 135-136. 
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million from the drugs trade annually, 211 and U. S. estimates placed annual FARC drug 
revenues at U. S. $400 million. 212 In fact, the group's financial reliance on drug 
production and distribution replaced their previous dependence on extortion and 
kidnapping operations, illustrated by estimates that 50 to 65 per cent of all FARC 
fronts were financed from drug related activities by the end of 2000.2 13 Colombian 
authorities also released estimates at this time indicating that the majority of FARC 
income was accrued ftorn narcotics related activities. 214 Buscaglia and Ratliff have 
also concluded that, in most of these cases, FARC attained direct ownership in the 
production and distribution of illicit narcotics. This finding is supported by evidence 
collected by Colombian authorities of FARC involvement in "almost every aspect of 
the international drug trade. ,2 15 The Spanish authorities also revealed evidence that, 
since 2000, FARC was directly involved in buying and selling coca products. 216 This 
is especially important because it highlights the international nature of the drugs trade, 
and suggests that FARC engaged in alliances with international criminal organisations 
in order to move cocaine through the global cocaine market (i. e. as it had done with 
ROC, as described in Chapter Four). Alliances between organised crime groups has 
become a common tactic used to gain access to new markets. 
Although the trajectory of FARC activities throughout the 1990s facilitated their 
growing involvement in the drugs trade, access to a DMZ acted as an important 
catalyst for the group to integrate traditional criminal interests into its remit. This de 
facto 'state within a state' facilitated the emergence of the FARC as the leading 
211 Mutschke (2000). 
212 Mason (200 1), p. 12. 
213 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 5. 
214 Lee (2002), p. 546. 
21 5 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 5, as quoted from Margarita Martinez, "Rebel Leader Faces Drug 
Arrest, " Washington Pos IOApriI2001. 
216 Steinitz (2002), p. 14. 
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middleman in southern Colombia for narcotics trafficking operations, allowing them 
to establish control over the purchasing of coca paste and cocaine base from growers 
to supply cocaine-producing laboratories. The French independent think-tank, 
Geopolitical Drug Observer thus concluded in their 1999 Annual Report that as a 
result of manipulating the DMZ, "the FARC seemed to have reached a point of no 
,, 217 return on the road to criminalizing their organisation. Furthermore, at the end of 
2000, Interpol announced that approximately 61 per cent of FARC's operational area 
was used for the cultivation and processing of cocaine, 218 suggesting that the group 
was more interested in dominating all aspects of the Colombian and international drug 
trade (i. e. cultivation, processing and trafficking) than in reaching a political victory 
over the Government. 
Evidence of direct FARC involvement in the drugs trade increased after 2001. For 
example, the U. S. government passed a federal indictment against three members of 
the 16th Front, including Front Commander Tomas Molina Caracas, for trafficking 
narcotics along the Venezuelan border and for subsequently selling them to 
international traffickers responsible for transporting illicit shipments to Brazil, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Spain, Suriname and the U. S. 219 These findings also provided 
evidence implicating FARC's Is', 7h, IOh, 39h, and 44 th Fronts in trafficking cocaine 
to the border regions and selling to international traffickers in exchange for money, 
weapons and other equipment. 220 Additional evidence from the Colombian Armed 
217 "The World Geopolitics of Drugs, 1998/1999: Annual Report, " (April 2000), p. 143, 
http: //www. ogd. org. 
218 Mutschke, (2000). This conclusion was also reflected in Buscaglia and Ratliff, (2001), p. 19, who 
noted that "although the guerrillas control a small portion of Colombian territory, operations linked to 
guerrillas working drug production and distribution occur in 50 to 60 per cent of the country. " 
2 19 Hutchinson (2002). 
220 Ibid. 
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Forces reveals that 32 of the group's 61 fronts are directly linked to illicit drugs. 221 
Furthermore, with the support of the U. S. Drug Enforcement Office in Bogota, the 
Colombian National Police were able to seize several tons of cocaine hydrochloride 
and cocaine base laboratories, along with documentation revealing that FARC 
members "personally sold cocaine base to laboratory operators', 222 in the former 
FARC demilitarised zone in March 2002. After the breakdown of peace talks in 
February 2002 and the reassertion of Colombian military control over the DMZ, the 
Colombian army reported intercepting FARC messages of efforts to move large 
amounts of stored cocaine to the Pacific coast. 223 By 2003, government operations 
directed against the FARC regularly resulted in the discovery of FARC-controlled 
drugs operations. For example, in August 2003, raids conducted by the armed forces 
against the group uncovered 27 car bombs, and four FARC cocaine-processing 
laboratories. 224 
In addition to these cases, there have also been reports that FARC intensified its 
operation of cocaine laboratories, which have subsequently been used to export 
cocaine to Brazil and Mexico. 225 FARC activity has also been noted in neighbouring 
countries, with evidence revealing, for example, that the group has spread coca- 
processing activities to Panama and Venezuela, including the Darien Province border 
region. 226 Darien Province is believed to have been used for conducting drug 
transhipments from Colombia, and as a transhipment point for weapons smuggled into 
221 Chalk et al, (2001), p. 33. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Steinitz (2002), p. 14. 
224 "Colombia Raids Uncover 27 Bombs, " Jane's Terrorism Watch Rellort, 12 August 2003. 
225 Lee (2002), pp. 541-542. 
226 Hutchinson, (2002), and Luz E. Nagle, "Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and 
Implications for Hemispheric Security, " U. S. Army College, Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies 
Institute Working Paper (December 2002), p. 3 7. 
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Colombia. Suriname, on the other hand, is also used as a FARC transhipment point 
for drugs to the European market. 227 
After extending its internal organisational capacity to encompass all aspects of the 
illicit narcotics trade, FARC continued to expand its criminal ties to external 
organised crime groups. This reflects FARC's intention to find ways to increase its 
hold over drug operations in Colombia. Since 2000, for example, the 16 th Front 
cooperated with Brazilian-based drug trafficker Luis Fernando Da Costa (Femandinho 
Beira-Mar). Although this alliance was primarily based on drugs for cash transactions, 
it also included drugs-for-anns. 228 The 16'h Front is believed to have controlled an 
entire 'cocaine complex' in Guainia and Vichada, which it is alleged to have sold to 
the Brazilian Beira-Mar. Reports assert that the 160' Front was paid U. S. $10 million 
229 
per month, to export an estimated 20-25 tons of cocaine per month . Various FARC 
Fronts have also established alliances with the Tijuana cartel of Mexico, 230 the 
Mexican Arellano Felix gang, 23 1 Russian criminal organisationS, 232 Ukrainian 
organised crime, Croatian and Jordanian criminal groups, 233 and groups based in 
neighbouring countries. The threat posed by FARC through its criminal activities and 
associations is transnational in nature, revealing the regional and international 
implications of a security threat often rhetorically confined to Colombia. 
FARC has also provided international terrorist groups based in the Triborder area with 
criminal services. This is an important development given that FARC is primarily 
227 Nagle (2002), p. 38. 
229 "Se Busca, " Semana, (04 September 2000), pp. 4042. 
229 Lee (2002), p. 545. 
230 Steinitz (2002), p. 12. 
23 1 Lee (2002), p. 545. 
232 Davids (2002), p. 25. 
233 Ehrenfeld (2003), p. 166. 
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regarded as a terrorist group - thus indicating, once again, its proclivity for 
criminality. For example, the group has been implicated in providing false passports 
to Hizballah -a group with which it shares no ideological association - since the late 
1990s, and is believed to have increased its involvement in providing Colombian 
passports and identities to other militant Islamic groups. 234 Furthermore, as a result of 
intensifying its engagement with crime, FARC has established a money-laundering 
network that extends throughout Colombia and beyond, into countries including 
Panama. Often utilising the 'black market peso exchange system', this illicit financial 
network has subsequently been transferred into a criminal service offered by FARC to 
other criminal and terrorist organisations. 
In many ways the expansion of FARC into securing its role throughout the illicit 
narcotics supply chain is an example of a successful illicit group taking advantage of 
its operational environment. FARC initially merely exploited an opportunity 
presented to them to fill a lucrative vacuum caused by the fall of the Cali and 
Medellin cartels. However, the group's very interest in expanding its operations into 
the narcotics trade on such a large scle is proof that the group's original motivations 
were being transformed. The expansion of FARC's criminal interests, from merely 
obtaining revenue from protection fees and taxes to profiting from refining, 
trafficking and the sale of illicit narcotics, 235 strongly suggests that their political goals 
were set aside in the interest of criminal advancement. This argument is strengthened 
when FARC's simultaneous expansion into the growing heroin market is considered. 
In 2000 the group began to produce heroin in southwestern Colombia, cornering a 
234 Nagle (2002), pp. 32-38. 
235 Lee (2002), p. 54 1. 
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relatively significant share of the U. S. east-coast heroin market. 236 As with Colombian 
cocaine cultivation, there is now a close correlation between poppy cultivation and 
areas under FARC control. This development begs the question: why is FARC 
seeking control over new criminal markets and products if it is solely interested in 
securing enough profit to sustain its group and conduct operations in support of its 
political goals? 
Notwithstanding persistent FARC rhetoric that it is not interested in crime as an 
enterprise, but seeks political change, the group's actions illustrate that FARC's 
ideological commitment and political aims are deteriorating. As the group became 
increasingly entrenched in the drug trade from the mid-1990s, it was evident that the 
FARC began to replace Marxism-Leninism with a "less rigid ideological package, 
labelled as 'Bolivarian', " essentially combining Colombian nationalism with left-wing 
ideas. 237 This limited ideological focus was likely driven by a sense of pragmatism 
within FARC's leadership, realising - after three decades of operations - that their 
chances of seizing the Colombian state were small. As a result the group began to 
focus on seizing political and territorial power without engaging in an electoral 
process. 238 By the end of the 1990s, this dynamic changed the group's political 
agenda, and eventually contributed to transforming the nature of FARC's competition 
with the state. 239 The group began to focus, once again, on the use of military force, 
including the use of torture, assassination, kidnapping and other forms of violence and 
intimidation, instead of ideological appeal, in order to attain and hold power over 
236 Steinitz (2002), p. 10. 
237 Ortiz (2002), p. 130. 
238 Serres (2000), p. 203. 
239 Ortiz (2002), p. 130. 
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Colombian territory. 240 Control over territory, especially at the municipal level, was 
subsequently used by FARC to demonstrate its ability to provide a "viable and 
credible alternative" form of government that would be able to provide social services 
to the population. 241 Despite increasingly relying on intimidating the government and 
public, FARC's leadership has been seeking to create a parallel state by deserting "the 
discourse of revolution and socialist order and to concentrate its rhetoric on more 
modest claims of regional domination .,, 
242 In political terms the expansion of FARC 
aims from a municipal to regional level initially appears to reflect a group growing in 
power. More realistically, however, FARC's shift to seeking a regional presence more 
accurately reflects its desire to assert direct control over drug cultivation and 
trafficking operations. Control over cross-border territory - in addition to territorial 
control within Colombia - has subsequently helped facilitate FARC's transition into 
an organisation with criminal intent. As discussed in the previous section, interest in 
expanding territorial control was intensified when FARC was given its DMZ - which 
was used "as a base for kidnapping, drug trafficking, and troop training. , 243 
The use of its DMZ as a base and its focus on more modest political objectives from 
1999 gave the appearance that FARC became more pervasive throughout Colombia. 
As Serres (2000) notes: "The guerrilla movement has descended from ideology to 
pragmatism, from redemptionism to realpolifik. Paradoxically, that renders it more 
dangerous and destabilising. "244 The group's ability to gamer support (increasingly 
dependent on the use of force) at the local level, especially in the coca-growing areas 
240 Serge F. Kovaleski, "Rebel Movement on the Rise of Colombian Guerrillas Use Military Force, Not 
Ideology to Hold Power, " The Washington Post, 5 February 1999. See also Serres, (2000), pp. 201- 
202. 
241 Ortiz (2002), p. 13 1. 242 Serres (2000), pp. 201-202. 243 McLean (2002), p. 11. 
2" Serres (2000), p. 202. 
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of the country, provided the group with additional strength. The often-violent 
penetration of power in communities 245 by FARC militants has translated into 
political influence at the national level to such an extent that it is believed that the 
group, both directly and indirectly (i. e. through extortion, kidnapping and 
revolutionary taxation) "ensures the election of candidates who have made alliances 
with it; orientates administrative and political decisions by menacing the incumbents, 
,, 246 practically decides the way the budget is going to be spent. As a terrorist group, 
the primary FARC goal has been to replace the government by attaining direct 
control. Unable to do so through the use of terror tactics in the past, the combination 
of the group's newly acquired financial influence and the known intent to use violence 
has given FARC the additional ability to influence the political realm through the use 
of corruption. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the use of corruption and intimidation is an important 
survival technique employed by criminal organisations to ensure that the government 
does not significantly interfere in the conduct of criminal activities. FARC 
involvement in these activities thus reveals that it was no longer solely interested in 
directly overtaking the state, but like other criminal organisations, it used these tools 
to obtain indirect political influence which could help to secure the survival of the 
organisation itself and its criminal operations. In seeking to secure its drug operations 
in rural municipalities, in June 2002 FARC demanded the resignation of all mayors 
and public officiaIS247 By the end of the year, 399 mayors resigned, almost 300 
relocated to urban centres in the interest of greater security, and 12 mayors were 
245 In 2000, for example, the FARC was present in 622 of 1,071 Colombian municipalities. Serres, 
(2000), p. 203. 
246 Serres (2000), pp. 202-203. 
247 T. Roule and M. Salak, "FARC and Colombia's Intermeshing Economies, " Jane's Terrorism and 
Security Monito (January 2003), http: //www. janes. com (accessed 20 January 2003). 
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assassinated . 
248 Public officials who remained in FARC-controlled areas were faced 
with rising pressure either to "collude with FARC drug operations, or face death or 
,, 249 physical harm. The group also instigated corruption and intimidation at higher 
levels of government, including the office of President. There is no substantiated 
evidence proving that FARC has funded presidential candidates, but there has been a 
precedent of organised crime funding presidential candidates sympathetic to the 
narcotics trade since 1982 . 
250 Although this use of corruption and intimidation is 
characteristic of organised crime tactics, as discussed in the case of ROC, it also 
illustrates an active criminal environment. Equally important is the fact that 
corruption and violent intimidation pose a threat to political security because they 
directly undermine the legitimacy of political institutions, such as law enforcement, 
the judiciary, and the authority of the executive. 
Furthermore, as indicated in the previous section, the evolved FARC structure has 
also played a role in facilitating the group's engagement with organised crime. Today, 
FARC operates as a "highly decentralised network. Its fronts operate separately and 
seem to have several different 'business-plans' A new front moves into territory with 
little effort given to making converts. The goal is finding ways to make money. , 25 1 
Indictments and prosecutions against FARC members have, in fact, uncovered 
evidence indicating that the group's funding cycle "resembles the methods of 
traditional criminal organisations, rather than a terrorist network. "252 Major profits 
249 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Jordan (1999), pp. 158-159. One of the most cited examples surrounds the 1994 election campaign 
of Ernesto Samper and allegations that drug cartels provided U. S. $6 million to help him achieve 
electoral victory. Arlene Tickner, "Colombia: Chronicle of a Crisis Foretold, " Current History, vol. 97, 
no. 616 (1998), p. 64. 251 McLean (2002), p. 130. 
252 Roule and Salak (January 2003). 
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from the narcotics trade and kidnap-for-ransom operations forced FARC to become 
increasingly well versed at money laundering by integrating and investing profits in 
the Colombian economy. This was often completed through the establishment of front 
companies, including casinos, holiday resorts, transportation companies and farms. 
For example, a high-ranking FARC official arrested in January 2000 controlled funds 
over U. S. $12 million, including 14 luxury hotels with casinos. 253 
The financial benefits accrued by FARC from criminal enterprise, combined with its 
expanding ability to launder illicit funds and re-invest in the legitimate economy, has 
a potentially significant impact on Colombia's economic security if it continues to 
grow. A large black economy interferes with national economic policy and reduces 
the amount of money available for the state to collect through taxation. This in turn 
has a direct impact on the effectiveness of state-supported welfare programmes. 
FARC's ability to accrue a strong financial position, to the detriment of Colombia's 
national economy, has subsequently allowed FARC to provide public goods - 
including healthcare, education and a crude judicial system - which the state has been 
unable to provide. This has especially been the case in agrarian regions of the country, 
"where the state is not present" and where it is relatively easy for the FARC to bring 
order and social regulation because the population is often "exploited and live under 
high levels of insecurity. , 254 The sentiment that municipal authorities are often 
corrupt and local authorities incompetent in providing public services helps explain 
why the public interacts with FARC, which is known to provide a range of public 
services. 255 The group has therefore been "legitimising their occupation by 
253 Ibid. 
254 Serres (2000), p. 208. 
255 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 9, quoting the results of surveys conducted in the regions of 
Putumayo, Caqueta, northern Bolivar, and Norte de Santander, which showed that over 90% of the 
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institutionalising their presence. "256 Worth noting, however, is that the areas that 
FARC provides social services are the same areas where drug cultivation and 
production are high, suggesting that FARC's ability to maintain authority was no 
longer a by-product of its political agenda, but a by-product of the fear it imposed on 
the peasants responsible for farming coca. 
The adaptive structure of FARC combined with its focus on making money, and 
supporting peasants in drug-producing areas, has also helped it to attract larger 
numbers of recruits, with members increasingly appearing to join for monetary 
benefit, as opposed to ideological fulfilment. By 1998 the group was in a financial 
position to pay its recruits, on average, three times more than the Colombian anny 
paid theirs. 257 This contributed to rising membership numbers from an estimated 
7,000 active members in 60 fronts in 1995, to over 15,000 in more than 70 fronts in 
2000.258 This situation altered the combat profile of FARC from a membership 
primarily composed of altruistic peasants and students, to a membership consisting of 
"unemployed peasants, ostentatiously showing urban consumer goods as status 
symbols. 259 
FARC involvement in organised criminal activities and its organisational dynamics 
combined to create a group that is a criminal organisation according to the definition 
population though municipal authorities were corrupt and over 60% believed local authorities were 
incompetent in providing public services. Of those surveyed, approximately 60% used or knew 
somebody who used informal judicial system run by the FARC, 35% participated in FARC-run public 
works, and almost 70% admitted to using FARC-operated health services. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Dishman (2000), p. 52; and Mark Falcoff, "Colombia: the problem that will not go away, " AEI 
Latin American Outlook, (March 2000), p. 1, http: //www. aei. org/lao/lao I 1476. htm (accessed 08 April 
2002). 
258 Falcoff (2000), p. 1. 
259 Oscar Menjivar, "The Transformation of Low Intensity Conflict in Latin America, " Low Intensity 
Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 10, no. I (Spring 2001), p. 80. 
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provided in Chapter One. To begin with FARC incorporates all five mandatory 
criteria. First, it consists of a group of over three people. Second, based on its long 
history and continued operations, FARC has been gathered for both a prolonged and 
indefinite period of time. Third, FARC members have been suspected, and convicted, 
of committing criminal offences. Fourth, group objectives include the pursuit of both 
power and profit; and fifth, FARC relies on the threat and/or use of violence in order 
to sustain its criminal activities. In addition to these mandatory criteria, FARC also 
fulfils many of optional criteria. For example, the group is engaged in money 
laundering and international operations; certain fronts are tasked with specific 
assignments; and the group exerts influence on both the public and private sector - 
through the use of corruption and intimidation. 260 In this context there is very little 
difference between contemporary FARC dynamics and the operations of Russian 
Organised Crime as discussed in Chapter Four - the FARC and ROC mirror one 
another on opposite ends of the CTC. Thus regardless of the group's "egalitarian 
rhetoric, the group's actions suggest calculated criminal neoliberaliSM.,, 261 
Conclusion: Moving Beyond Convergence, FARC as a Criminal Organisation 
Based on the arguments presented in this chapter, it is evident that FARC has 
responded to the disintegration of Marxist ideology in the post-Cold War environment 
by developing a dual terrorist and criminal capability to ensure its survival, a 
capability that was eventually overtaken by a proclivity towards crime. FARC has 
successfully adapted to its changing environment - both domestic and international - 
by taking advantage of new criminal opportunities, the failure of the Colombian 
government to assert control over all its territory, and by utilising the advantages of 
2'0 An example of this is provided on page 273. 
261 Rochlin (2003), p. 145. 
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networks in daily operations. The group has learned to shift its operational dynamics 
from large centrally controlled forces, to decentralised cells able to react to any 
change in environmental (i. e. political, military) conditions. This apparent desire to 
survive has transformed a group once exclusively focused on an ideological struggle 
into a "combination of drug crime, rural anarchism, and political sensitivity by the 
governing classes. , 262 This combination of threats has posed a direct challenge to the 
state and to internal stability, both of which have been exacerbated by the inability of 
the FARC leadership to claim "firm control over their own far-flung fronts, some of 
which appear more as criminal bands operating as FARC franchises rather than as 
disciplined units in an insurgent army.,, 263 Although this may lead to the conclusion 
that FARC, as a group, has considerably weakened, the group, in fact, continues to 
operate as a relatively strong - albeit disparate - entity. As a FARC member indicated 
in an interview, "We have seen 10 presidents come and go. We will strike them when 
the conditions Suit US.,, 264 
According to Ortiz (2002), FARC's ability to continue operating emerges from its 
ability to manipulate its environment to the point that it was ultimately able to 
establish autonomy on three levels: complete self-financing; independent capacity for 
weapons acquisition; and the ability to use new relationships to access technology and 
training needed to increase the sophistication of its attacks. 265 It is within these 
capabilities that the criminal nature of FARC is reflected. For example, according to 
Ortiz (2002) only 15 per cent of FARC income is used to conduct operations, leaving 
85 per cent of the group's annual income to be used towards the acquisition of 
262 McCaffrey (2002), p. 28. 
263 McLean (2002), p. 7. 
264 Jeremy McDermott, "Rebels Bide Their Time, " Jane's Defence Weekly http: //www. janes. com, 
accessed 24 December 2003. 
265 Ortiz (2002), pp. 13 7-14 1. 
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supplies and invested in the licit economy through a wide FARC money-laundering 
network. FARC investments could subsequently be used to penetrate the legitimate 
political system - as in the case of ROC - or to conduct a more concerted terror 
campaign to apply constant pressure on the government. In neither case does this 
revenue appear to be exclusively utilised in support of the group's advocated political 
agenda. As Rochlin (2003) argued: "The FARC has claimed to be ideologically 
committed to its own brand of socialism, but the group's power is largely military, 
rather than political or ideological, and its military power is rooted in its participation 
in the booming capitalist enterprise of narcotrafficking. , 266 
Based on this disparity between rhetorical political claims and group actions, FARC's 
hybrid nature increasingly appears to lean towards organised crime rather than 
traditional terrorism. The political realm of the group is limited to the perception that, 
because violence is historically commonplace in Colombia, "the country's guerrillas 
have long since become a major pillar in the establishment they want to 
overthrow. , 267 This directly contradicts any notion of revolutionary intent, as FARC 
has come to depend on the perpetuation of the prevailing political system. 
Furthermore, because Colombia has a "constitutional democracy, non-authoritarian 
regime, free elections, and free press, there is no clear political dimension to the 
confliCt,, 268 and subsequently no reason to believe "that poverty, inequality, and 
political exclusion should produce stronger forms of violence in Colombia than they 
tend to produce in other Latin American countries - which sometimes have more 
serious social problems than Colombia. , 269 The true commitments of FARC's 
266 Rochlin (2003), p. 100. 
267 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), pp. 2-3. 
269 Ceballos and Martin (200 1), p. 90. 
269 Cebal los and Martin (200 1), p. 90. 
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political aims, therefore, are naturally called into question. In the case of FARC, the 
struggle to survive in the jungles and mountains of Colombia for decades has turned 
the act of being a member of a terrorist group into a de facto profession. As Serres 
argues, "Without accepting the argument that the FARC is the biggest gang in 
Colombia, we acknowledge that the chronic aspect of the conflict has led many of its 
members to see in the organisation a way to construct a project of criminal life that 
has become normalised . ý5270 This profession has been "nourished, not only by 
ideology or a sense ofjust cause, but increasingly by the reliance on criminal activity 
such as drug trafficking. " As a result, the driving motivation is to ensure survival, 
making political dialogue - let alone concessions for peace -a moot point. The 
Colombian experience can therefore be compared to many other conflict-ridden 
societies, such as Afghanistan and Northern Ireland - each of which are plagued with 
breakaway terrorist groups who refuse to entertain political compromise because 
conflict has become both a business and a way of life. 
One of the greatest problems in treating the FARC like a traditional terrorist group 
emerges from its fragmented organisational nature. Although FARC's leadership 
holds influence over its fronts, this influence has been slowly diminished because a 
growing number of front commanders have attained a high degree of autonomy in the 
financing and conduct of operations. This is primarily due to front commanders 
acquiring ownership of drug labs and controlling national and international drug 
distribution channels. 27 1 Direct control over their own financial fate has given front 
commanders greater autonomy in recruiting militants, facilitated by the promise of 
wages. The fact that recruits are attracted by money "does not guarantee the 
270 Serres (2000), pp. 212-213. 
27 1 Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 22. 
380 
development of a political consciousness; instead, it encourages a mercenary 
, ý272 mentality that could lead to their criminalisation. Therefore in Colombia, ideology 
is no longer a necessary precondition for "taking up arms; the need to solve daily 
. ), 273 subsistence is usually enough . 
Within this context, front commanders have little 
incentive to engage in peace negotiations, since the acceptance of a political solution 
to FARC's demands would effectively mean eliminating the livelihoods and way of 
life of approximately 15,000 - 20,000 men who have become used to living "entirely 
,, 274 outside the law. 
Even the motives of FARC's support base in rural Colombia raises significant 
questions about the extent to which FARC is regarded as a political entity among the 
population it officially seeks to safeguard. Although the group has successfully 
manipulated the power vacuum and acted as a substitute regulative authority, in rural 
areas to attract peasant support, this support - whether in the 1960s or 1990s - was 
,, 275 not necessarily based on ideology, but on "opportunistic considerations. Involved 
in growing drug crops, many of these supporters are motivated almost exclusively by 
opposition to government campaigns aimed at eliminating the drugs trade. 276 Thus 
their support for FARC is primarily based on the terrorists' ability to secure drug 
operations in rural areas - and its ability to show its power through fear and 
intimidation - thereby ensuring an important source of peasant/farmer income. Despite 
this pessimistic view of the FARC support base, this very predicament helps explain 
why FARC has travelled the length of the CTC. In a 2000 public opinion poll, FARC 
272 Luis Alberto Restrepo, "The Crisis of the Current Political Regime and Possible Outcomes, " in 
Bergquist et al., Violence in Colombia, p. 286. 
273 Menj ivar (200 1), p. 74. 
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leader Marulanda was noted as the most trusted political figure in Colombia, 
highlighting the fact that: 
Despite their apparent transformation into criminal enterprises that live 
off kidnappings and the drug trade, tarnishing their reputation as 
revolutionaries, the guerrillas maintain a degree of legitimacy in the 
eyes of many Colombians: naturally in the areas where they are the 
only authority, but also among the dispossessed, the landless, the 
marginalized, left-wing romanticists and even, and most tellingly, 
among the general population. 277 
Thusthe .... FARC is both a narcotrafficking operation and an insurgent group seeking 
political power. Its strongholds are the areas that grow 90 percent of the country's 
cocaine. , 278 Legitimising their own involvement in the illicit drugs trade, coca- 
farmers and FARC members have created a fagade to pacify their own actions despite 
evidence revealing that their political motives have largely been replaced by the 
search for profit secured from crime. Over the past decade the group has become 
entirely dependent on crime as a primary source of revenue, however its search to 
acquire criminal, economic and political influence by joining - advertently or 
inadvertently - criminal and terrorist tactics has resulted in the intertwining of each of 
these motivations to the point where the criminal motive eventually took precedence. 
FARC's proven ability to conduct sustained campaigns of terrorism against state 
institutions and the public, and substantially profit from organised crime, has further 
contributed to the legacy of the weak state in Colombia. Intimidation and corruption 
have undermined state legitimacy, and the growing brutality of terrorist attacks has 
undermined institutional capacity and capability. 279 Combined with efforts to provide 
277 Brian Michael Jenkins, "Colombia: Crossing a Dangerous Threshold, " The National Interest, 
(Winter 2000/01), p. 49. 
278 Rafael Pardo, "Colombia's Two Front War, " Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2000), p. 71. 
279 Ceballos and Martin (2001), p. 89. 
382 
patronage to the poor (in the forrn of access to the drugs trade and a social welfare 
programme), the FARC has had a negative impact on the creation of "responsible 
government - and against any allegiance to the notion of the public good and political 
equality.,, 
280 This impact, however, has not been confined to Colombia, but has begun 
to extend beyond its borders into neighbouring states. In addition to contributing to 
the export of cocaine and heroin, which directly threaten human security by 
contributing to rising addiction rates, the FARC has also made military incursions into 
Bolivia '281 BraZil, 
282 Ecuador '283 Panama, perU284 and Venezuela . 
285 Most of these 
incursions were connected to arms trafficking, kidnapping, or the expansion of 
FARC's participation in the illicit narcotics trade. FARC's involvement in facilitating 
smuggling operations "complicates cross-border issues, intermixing national, 
,, 286 regional, and international concerns. Furthermore, these activities challenge "the 
central governance of countries affected, and [they undermine] the vital institutional 
pillars of regime legitimacy and stability. 99287 With reference to international security, 
FARC involvement in criminal activities has also complicated its role in the realm of 
international terrorism. For example, FARC has been implicated in providing criminal 
services to terrorist groups present in the triborder area of Latin America. Although 
these groups, such as Hezbollah, do not directly target regional states with terrorist 
280 Manwaring (2002), p. 4. 
281 See: Tom Carter, "Colombian Guerrillas Alarm Bolivia, " Washington Times, 05 November 2002; 
George Gedda, "Colombian Rebels Spotted in Bolivia, " Associated Press, 04 November 2002; Richard 
Millett, "Colombia's Conflict: the Spillover Effects of a Wider War, " The North-South Agenda, Paper 
57 (September 2002), p. 7. 
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Sharon Stevenson, "The FARC's Fifth Column, " Newsweek Inte ational, 21 June 2002. 
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attacks, they have used the triborder area to plan significant acts of terrorism 
worldwide. 
The relative successes enjoyed by the FARC over the years, coupled with the reality 
that the government of Colombia, and the governments of the region, have been 
unable to ensure their own sovereignty, let alone the security of their citizens, has 
produced a situation wherein "the connection of financial power and ideology"288 has 
become a greatly feared combination. As a result, "trying to explain the Colombian 
crisis in purely political terms is a dead-end road . "289 For as long as the FARC 
continues to find relative success in its combined criminal-terrorist strategy, it will 
continue to pose a threat to Colombia and the wider region. 
The country's crisis is seen more poignantly in the violence and chaos 
caused by a thriving illegal drug industry that has become closely 
linked to the hemisphere's oldest, and, not coincidentally, only 
burgeoning armed insurgency. 290 
288 Sayaka Fukumi, "The Impact of Andean Cocaine Trafficking: the Cases of Bolivia, Colombia and 
Mexico, " presented at the 291h Joint Sessions Workshop, ECPR, Grenoble, France (6-11 April 2001). 
289 Ceballos and Martin (200 1), p. 89. 
290 Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff, War and Lack of Governance in Colombia: Narcos. 
Guerrillas, and U. S. Polic , (Stanford University: Hoover Press, 2001), p. iii. 
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Conclusion 
Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, terrorism and transnational organised crime 
(TOC) were relegated to 'low politics' and often isolated to the domestic realm. The 
subsequent emergence of a highly transitional international security environment, 
often placed within the context of globalisation and the rise of networked non-state 
actors, has challenged this perception. Terrorism and TOC, as they have evolved since 
1989, can be defined as non-state actors capable of competing for control over state 
functions and territory. The prominence of violent non-state actors in the 
contemporary security environment thus questions the dominant traditional views on 
security (i. e. realism) that elevate the state above all other actors. Unable to directly 
explain and understand the threats posed by organised crime, terrorism, or their 
convergence, a 'new' framework for conceptualising security threats in the twenty- 
first century has become a necessity. 
Contributions of an Alternative Security Approach 
Any reconstituted security framework must account for factors (i. e. the blurring of 
boundaries between levels of analysis, and the challenge posed to state sovereignty by 
non-state actors) that are now considered to be prevalent in the international 
environment, and thus have an impact on how security is explained and understood. 
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties that traditional International Relations 
theories have had in addressing security in the post-Cold War environment, this thesis 
has argued that a combination of elements extracted from the Copenhagen School and 
selected Post-Realist writers could be used to develoP an alternative understanding of 
security and threats to security. 
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The elements of this alternative approach include: the interconnectedness of the three 
levels of analysis (individual, state, and international); the assumption that the state 
remains an essential (but not the only) component of security; the fact that the state is 
no longer the only legitimate referent object, but is considered equal to a host of 
additional referent objects including the individual, groups, the international system, 
and intangible concepts such as shared norms and values (i. e. as exhibited in 
international law and diplomacy); the idea that non-state actors are as important as 
state actors in security considerations; and a multilateral approach to security; 
As discussed in the two case studies, once a state is no longer capable of responding 
to challenges that threaten its authority, legitimacy and stability, it can no longer be 
considered the sole referent object. Instead, the individual, group and international 
levels of analysis take precedence as the state is no longer able to guarantee security. 
In the case of Russia and Colombia, the inability of the state to control the rise of 
ROC and FARC respectively has resulted in insecurity for targeted individuals and 
groups of individuals, but also for domestic society through the implications that the 
activities of these groups have had on economic, political and societal stability. The 
interplay between levels of analysis is also highlighted in discussions about targeting 
techniques used by these entities. For example, in both Russia and Colombia, the 
murder of key liberal government officials engaged in anti-crime or counter-terrorism 
initiatives are often simultaneously directed at the individual, the ideas they 
represented (i. e. democratisation, anti-corruption), and the overall international image 
of the state. 
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The third conceptual point corroborated by the empirical evidence presented in this 
thesis is that an alternative form of anarchy - as argued by Booth - does exist. In the 
case of Russia and Colombia, however, an alternative anarchy exists in the negative 
sense. Given the success of ROC and FARC in spreading fear throughout society in 
general, public support for the state has deteriorated. This predicament is directly 
related to the idea of subsidiarity where political decisions are to be taken at the 
lowest possible level. The 'subsidiarity' component of Booth's alternative anarchy 
necessitates a strong civil society that is prepared to assist the government create 
conditions of security - this is absent from Russia and Colombia. Furthermore, ROC's 
use of terrorism has also broken down the notion of 'community' by delineating 
society into two camps: the criminal troika (traditional criminals, government 
collaborators and new entrepreneurs) versus the rest of society. This is also evident in 
Colombia where the FARC and other groups involved in the drug trade have also 
differentiated themselves from the rest of the state. Given the successes of ROC and 
FARC to the detriment of the state, the overarching question is whether or not it is 
ever possible for the governments in question to re-gain the confidence of its citizens. 
Furthermore, the use of terror tactics against Russian and Colombian society, 
combined with involvement in organised criminal activity, has undermined the 
emergence of reciprocal obligation, mutual self-interest, sense of loyalty and moral 
obligation between the government and its citizens - conditions necessary for the 
creation of a secure environment. In some situations, the absence of the state has been 
replaced by ROC and FARC as non-state actors. Although the authority and 
legitimacy acquired by these groups is primarily based on their use of violence and 
intimidation, in the context of some regions (i. e. the Russian Far East and Colombia's 
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DMZ), this has produced public submission to the power claimed by criminal elites. 
As such, the importance of the state (specifically state functions) clearly remains an 
integral component when assessing security. 
Finally, the empirical evidence in this thesis validates the utility of employing a 
multisectoral approach to security. As indicated in Chapters Four and Five, the rise of 
ROC and FARC, and their successful use of terror tactics and organised crime have 
threatened the political, military, economic, environmental and societal sectors. The 
impact on the political realm is evident when considering the level of criminal 
penetration in government in Russia, and the extent to which FARC has forced their 
political agenda on the government in Colombia. Military security is especially 
evident in discussions about 'black holes'. In this context, the criminal and terrorist 
activities of ROC and FARC have directly contributed to the prolonging of conflict 
zones directly by arming and financing militants, and indirectly by contributing to the 
creation of a criminal-political class with an invested interest in shaping the political 
environment to suit their specific needs. Furthermore, economic security was 
evidently threatened by ROC and FARC via their involvement in money laundering, 
corruption and the pilfering of state resources. These activities contributed to 
undermining economic infrastructure because they directly and indirectly harmed 
property owners, and the ability of the government to collect taxes to pay for social 
welfare programmes. 
Contributions of the Crime-Terror Continuum 
As argued in this thesis, the relationship between transnational organised crime and 
terrorism encompasses several distinct facets - each of which may be placed along a 
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continuum that traces the evolution of groups depending on the predominant 
operational environment. During the Cold War, concerns about a crime-terror nexus 
were relatively insignificant, as the nexus was almost entirely precluded to the 
relationship between insurgent groups in Latin America and regional drug cartels. 
However, the international environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War 
created conditions that supported the development of criminal and terrorist 
organisations into increasingly sophisticated and international entities. The result 
being the strengthening of transnational organised crime, and international networked 
terrorist groups. Each of these groups have created a state of heightened insecurity 
within the world as govermnents accustomed to military threats posed by state-actors 
were forced to react to the economic and societal destruction increasingly perpetrated 
by non-state actors. 
Growing reliance on cross-border criminal activities - facilitated by open borders, 
weak states, immigration, financial technology, and a highly intricate and accessible 
global transportation infrastructure - and an associated interest in establishing 
political control in order to consolidate and secure future operations, have all 
contributed to the rise of the crime-terror nexus. As a result, non-state actors, in the 
guise of transnational organised crime and terrorism, are directly challenging the 
security of the state by seeking to replace the state - arguably for the first time in 
history. The realisation that economic and political power enhance one-another, 
suggests that more and more groups will become hybrid organisations by nature, or 
will travel the CTC in one way or another. This is enhanced by the fact that criminal 
and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each 
other's successes and failures. Furthermore, given the unremitting existence of 
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territory that is not adequately under state control - such as the Northwest Frontier 
Province of Pakistan, areas within Tajikistan, and the Triborder Region - 
environments (i. e. 'black holes') that provoke and promote strengthened ties between 
organised crime and terrorism endure. 
As the alternative conceptualisation of security seeks to provide an explanation of 
security in the post-Cold War environment, the CTC more specifically seeks to 
provide an explanation of the changing dynamics of this environment as it relates to 
TOC and terrorism. In doing so, its primary purpose is to highlight that security 
threats are not static phenomena, but are continually in a state of flux. It is therefore 
evident that the nature of TOC and terrorism, including their convergence, are 
dictated by the continuously evolving environment in which they are found, apd by 
the relationships in which they are engaged. Furthermore, the CTC illustrates that 
security is no longer solely about the military objectives of state actors, but has been 
joined by economically driven interests. The combination of political and economic 
motivations and a group prepared to attain them through the use of terror tactics 
reveals the inherent dangers of the CTC and of contemporary security threats. These 
dangers are exacerbated by the interplay between levels of analysis. Not only do 
transnational criminal and terrorist groups cross national borders as a consequence of 
their existence, but the impact of the activities in which they are engaged inherently 
affect a range of levels from the individual to global as is particularly evident through 
the activities of ROC and FARC. 
In addition to the fact that the security threats posed by terrorism and TOC inherently 
cross levels of analysis, the CTC also highlights the importance of relinquishing a 
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state-centric approach of International Relations because the state is losing, and in 
some cases has lost, its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. In the territorial 
sense, ROC and FARC have already revealed their ability to thwart the state from 
territory, as was evident in some Russian provinces and the DMZ in Colombia. Even 
where non-state actors have not ousted the state from territory, their combined use of 
terror tactics with criminal activities have directly affected the state's effectiveness in 
countering threats aimed at deteriorating their authority and legitimacy within society. 
In both Russia and Colombia this was, in part, illustrated through the initiation of 
social welfare programmes at the community level. Furthermore, both ROC and 
FARC have also challenged the state through their proven aptitude of manipulating 
economic aims to control the state. This is evident in the economic power attained by 
ROC through its ability to gain control over licit and illicit sectors. The FARC has 
also attained a significant degree of economic power, as reflected in its annual income 
from criminal activities. Considering growing evidence that non-state actors have 
taken on a host of roles once reserved exclusively for the state, such as imposing and 
collecting taxes, the state can only be seen as one actor among many equals. This 
confirms that the role of non-state actors within International Relations has not only 
risen, but has met with successes by proving an ability to take over state functions 
from the state. 
It is therefore evident that the CTC builds on the conceptual framework. In light of the 
changing nature of post-Cold War security, it is important that International Relations 
theory adapt in order to be able to address security threats that have transformed to the 
prevailing environment in which they seek to operate. The CTC was thus introduced 
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as a way to help explain the ever-changing nature of security in the twenty-first 
century. 
Future Dynamics 
In light of the various components of the crime-terror continuum, one consistent and 
relatively easily identifiable factor is criminality. Regardless of where a group sits 
along the continuum (apart for traditional terrorism), every point necessitates some 
degree of involvement with criminal activities. As a result, the continuum inherently 
implies that focusing on criminal activity, as opposed to political aims and 
motivations, in formulating policy responses to - especially to terrorism - has been 
under-utilised. Thus, for example, although it is important to understand the political 
motivations of terrorist groups, on a practical level counter-terrorist policy and 
initiatives would likely meet with greater initial success in locating group weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities if they focused on criminal aspects. Furthermore, limiting access to 
lucrative profits from illicit activities simultaneously eliminates the operational 
capacity, and subsequent political influence, of both criminal and terrorist groups. 
Thus, it is essential that greater attention and resources are given to cutting off funds 
acquired through crime (i. e. credit card and insurance fraud, money-laundering, 
smuggling), or on criminal services that terrorist groups depend on (i. e. document and 
identity fraud). 
Understanding the crime-terror continuum expands the security tools that a state can 
employ in order to respond to the ever-evolving threats of transnational organized 
crime and terrorism. Acknowledging, and continuously tracing, the crime-terror 
continuum as it pertains to the evolving dynamics of transnational organised crime 
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and terrorism will therefore have an explicit impact on the formation of counter- 
terrorist and anti-crime policies. The crime-terror continuum thus seeks to highlight 
the importance of overlapping counter-terrorist and anti-crime policies as a way of 
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